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Preface and Acknowledgements 
 
“During the second half of the 20th century, much pro-
gress has been made in promoting the idea of human 
rights, in developing a universal normative framework 
with legally binding rights of human beings and corre-
sponding obligations of states, and in creating effective 
monitoring bodies and procedures able to assess the ac-
tual state of human rights implementation in all coun-
tries of our globe. It is exactly our improved monitoring 
capacity … which enables us to realize how large is the 
gap between legal commitments and the factual situa-
tion on the ground.” 2 
 
Mary Robinson, former President of the Republic of Ireland (1990-1997) and former 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (1997-2002) in her speech at the 
Austrian Parliament during the Academic Council on the United Nations System’s 
(ACUNS) 23
rd
 Annual Meeting, June 4, 2010 read out the above quote. The intention of 
her speech was, as she said, to highlight this big implementation gap.  
“The big challenge of the 21st century is to close or at least significantly narrow 
this implementation gap which clearly undermines the validity and legitimacy of 
the legally binding universal human rights framework.”3  
And she urged the international community to move from standard setting to standards 
implementation with a focus on institution building and establishment of the rule of 
law.
4
 Her speech reflects the starting point of my own motivation to write this thesis. 
During my employment as advocacy officer with LIGHT FOR THE WORLD, a Con-
sortium of European Development Organizations dedicated to ensuring the rights of 
persons with disabilities in developing countries, I was inter alia responsible for a large 
pilot advocacy project in Tanzania (2005-2011). The project applied the human rights 
based approach to development cooperation. Persons with disabilities and their interest 
organizations advocated for an implementation of the right to inclusive education and 
equal political participation by persons with disabilities. Soon the project steering com-
mittee came to realize that in order to implement human rights, it is not only necessary 
to have them enshrined in the national legal framework, but there also needs to be effec-
tive implementation of the law in the form of judicial prosecution of human rights viola-
                                                     
2
 Panel on Human Dignity, 2011: 32  
3
 Robinson, 2010:  minutes 3:48-5:22; Panel on Human Dignity, 2011:32 
4
 Robinson, 2010:  minutes 3:48-5:22; Panel on Human Dignity, 2011:32 
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tions, and in the form of according policies and budget provisions. Finally, the assigned 
budget also needed to arrive in the local schools. This is when we started to engage in 
budget work at the local and national levels. This was very exciting work and we at-
tained some remarkable results, particularly in the rural district of Mwanga in the Kili-
manjaro region (see also chapter 2.2.).  
Back then I would not have thought that today I am writing about Supreme Audit Insti-
tutions. But I believe civil society budget groups and Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) 
have a lot in common. Both aim to be an independent watchdog of public administra-
tion. Terence Nombembe, current Chair of the International Organization of Supreme 
Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) and Auditor General of South Africa wrote in an editorial 
note to the 2012 January issue of the INTOSAI Journal on Government Auditing that 
the main purpose of SAIs is to be “an independent voice of reason for the benefit of 
citizens”. And indeed the last few years have shown remarkable developments which all 
reflect an increased self-confidence by SAIs. They have started to empower themselves 
and have initiated national reforms to fortify their independence. They have also suc-
ceeded in strengthening their profile as an international community of like minded insti-
tutions. Well, reforms strengthening Supreme Audit Institutions have been more suc-
cessful in some countries than in others. This dissertation investigates the factors which 
support or constrain such reforms. 
I owe gratitude to many people who helped me throughout my doctoral studies. First 
and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Otmar Höll, director of the Austrian 
Institute for International Affairs (oiip) and University Professor at the Department of 
Political Science, University of Vienna, for his constant support on this research project. 
I was very fortunate to have a supervisor who gave me the freedom to explore my own 
ideas, while at the same time being available for guidance when I needed it. Most im-
portantly, he provided me with crucial moral support and encouragement as he always 
believed in me. Thank you! 
Furthermore I am deeply grateful to Alejandro Cuñat, University Professor at the De-
partment of Economics and the Department of Development Studies, University of Vi-
enna for his interest in my work and the many hours he spent on my research. I am very 
grateful that he agreed to act as a second supervisor for this thesis and particularly thank 
him for the valuable advice he provided to me concerning the statistical part of this the-
sis. Furthermore I appreciate the help of Marcelo Jenny, Bernhard Kittel and Martin 
Eijnar Hansen to get along with the econometrics during earlier stages of the project.  
Special thanks go to all my interview partners who shared their valuable time and im-
mense knowledge with me. I particularly would like to thank Joachim Wehner from the 
London School of Economics and Political Science as he pointed out the research gap 
on Supreme Audit Institutions to me. And very importantly, I especially thank the lead-
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ers of Supreme Audit Institutions who first of all accepted to talk to me but more im-
portantly spoke very frankly about the challenges they are facing and how they or their 
colleagues are overcoming certain constraints. I also thank Sophia Gollwitzer, Jack 
Mills, Paolo de Renzio; and particularly Einar Gorrissen, Yngvild Herje Arnesen and 
Trygve Christiansen from the INTOSAI Development Initiative for the provision of 
statistical data.  
I further owe a deep debt of gratitude to the University of Vienna for granting me a 
number of scholarships: the University of Vienna Research Grant (2009), the Stanford 
University Graduate Student Exchange Grant (2009), a travel grant for short term study 
visits abroad to conduct preliminary research in England (2009) and two dissemination 
grants to present my research at the 3
rd
 European Consortium for Political Research 
(ECPR) Graduate Conference (2010) and at the 26
th
 Annual International Conference of 
the International Consortium on Governmental Financial Management (2012). I also 
thank the Austrian Political Science Association (ÖGPW) for the travel grant. Further-
more, I am thankful to the ECPR for the scholarship to participate in the 5
th
 ECPR 
Summer School of Methods and Techniques, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. I am 
deeply thankful to LIGHT FOR THE WORLD for accepting my educational leave, 
which financed my studies during 2010.  
Last but not least, none of this would have been possible without the assistance of my 
family and close friends. I particularly owe greatest gratitude to my mother in law, Ma-
rie-Claire Maptué who stayed with us during the first three years of my doctoral studies 
(which by the way in total took me six years to finish). Without her love and support in 
taking care of the children and the household I could never even have started this pro-
ject! Merci! I deeply thank my parents, Veronika and Johann Scheba, for their multifac-
eted support, particularly with the children and the house. I also thank my sister and her 
husband, Michaela and Gernot Neuhauser, as well as my brother and his wife, Andreas 
and Suraya Scheba, for their invaluable support. They demonstrated interest in my top-
ic, encouraged me and also helped me to find time for writing as they too participated in 
taking care of our children and spoiled them with presents. I also particularly thank 
Elisabeth Campestrini and Simone Gaßler for their highly appreciated friendship and 
help. Most importantly I thank my husband Serge Noussi for his unwavering love, con-
tinuous encouragement and full support! Finally, I thank our children Lionel, Marwin 
and Dorian for their strength, patience, understanding and overwhelming love! You are 
my three angels, I love you so much! 
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1. Introduction and Research Design 
1.1. Problem Statement 
1.2. Aim and Scope 
1.3. Research Design 
1.4. Thesis Overview 
 “Public accountability is the hallmark of modern demo-
cratic governance. Democracy remains a paper proce-
dure if those in power cannot be held accountable in 
public for their acts and omissions, for their decisions, 
their policies, and their expenditures.”5  
1.1. Problem Statement 
Public accountability is a topical issue. The Arab Spring has finally proven that the be-
lief in democracy, human rights and public accountability is not related to culture but of 
universal value. At the same time, patterns of public accountability are also hotly debat-
ed in the industrialized and democratic OECD countries, where financial, economic and 
public debt crises have sparked a new public interest in the politics of the Budget.
6
 So, 
how is it possible that some governments accumulate unbearable amounts of debt? And 
how is it possible that certain governments serve themselves and their cronies from pub-
lic funds for decades without being held to account? As much as these debates share an 
interest in public finance management, the reasons that spark these discourses, the na-
ture of the problems discussed and particularly the strategies available to citizens differ 
fundamentally between OECD and non-OECD countries. This dissertation is primarily 
interested in the processes in place in developing countries and emerging economies and 
will not analyze the policy processes and polities of OECD member countries in depth.  
While in 1974 nearly three-quarters of all countries were dictatorships; today, more than 
half are democracies and it has become very difficult for political leaders to claim that 
authoritarianism is intrinsically the best regime. Democracy has become the norm. (Di-
amond, 2009:7,13,54) Yet, according to Freedom House, in 2011 globally the political 
                                                     
5
 Bovens, 2007: 182 
6
 The thinking that the Budget is a political process in the sense that “budgeting is governing” has been 
strongly influenced by American political science since the early 1980s and its realization that 
the budget has become the major issue of American politics (see particularly Wildavsky, 1964, 
and Wildavsky and Caiden, 2004). The famous citation was recorded for the first time by Stein, 
Herbert. 1989. “Budgeting is governing, for US.” Wall Street Journal, January 11, 1989 qtd. in 
Toinet, 1989. Similar famous sayings with unknown authors: “The budget by definition is 
policy. If there is no budget there is no policy.” “The budget is like the blood in the veine in the 
body circulating, making you live.”  
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rights and civil liberties declined overall for the sixth consecutive year. This is the long-
est continuous period of decline for global freedom since the forty years of existence of 
this survey. (Freedom House, 2011) Equally, the Open Budget Index 2010, a survey by 
the International Budget Project (IBP, 2010) of 94 countries concludes that 80% of 
governments do not account for their spending.  
So, what we have today are democracies which do not provide a wide range of rights 
and public accountability. The appearance of democracy is often deceiving or mislead-
ing. Institutions that should provide for horizontal and vertical accountability instead 
fail to take action to investigate abuses of power in the public or private bodies over 
which they exercise jurisdiction, for reasons of both capture and bias. So how can these 
so called “empty shell” institutions come to life and stand up against powerful groups 
which would rather like to keep the status quo? How can state institutions gain inde-
pendence from the executive branch and even more importantly, how can the huge gap 
between formal provisions and informal practices be closed?    
1.2. Aim and Scope 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate how public accountability in developing 
countries and emerging economies can be institutionalized, de jure as well as de facto.  
How do institutions providing for public accountability develop, consolidate and en-
dure? This question is of interest from three main research perspectives.  
First, from a development aid perspective, there is the need to find out how rule of law 
and good governance develop. After having cut down the state during the 1990s, today 
the aid community stresses the need for building state institutions. Thus, the first scope 
of this thesis is to contribute to the literature on donor strategies for institution building. 
This literature has grown immensely in the last few years, particularly among US-based 
scholars due to the challenges involved in re-building Iraq and Afghanistan. The prac-
tice of institution building and the challenges associated with it exceed conflict ridden 
countries. Aid effectiveness and good governance as a prerequisite for development is 
consensus among OECD aid agencies and thus concerns all aid recipient countries. 
However, this dissertation goes beyond practical concerns for donor and advocacy strat-
egies.  
The question of how effective institutions for public accountability develop is also 
closely linked to the question how effective democracies develop. I therefore not only 
address the question how development aid can be effective in building state institutions, 
but more broadly, this research project contributes to the literature on democracy, au-
thoritarianism and transitology. Particularly, this dissertation aims to test the rational 
Introduction and Research Design 3 
 
choice institutionalism theory, such as North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 2009b) and 
Haber (2006).  
The third scope of this dissertation is to contribute to the literature on public expendi-
ture management and oversight. While the legislative role in budget oversight is rela-
tively well researched, the role of Supreme Audit Institutions is a much neglected issue, 
in academic research as well as reform praxis.
7
 Consequently, this dissertation investi-
gates the question how effective institutions for public accountability develop through a 
case study of Supreme Audit Institutions taking a cross-national, comparative perspec-
tive. Specific research questions are: Why do reforms to strengthen Supreme Audit In-
stitutions thrive in some countries and fail in others? What are the reasons that explain 
the variation in the power of Supreme Audit Institutions across countries? Which strate-
gies can be built upon these insights in order to strengthen weak Supreme Audit Institu-
tions?  
This dissertation focuses on exploring the stated topic, developing an argument and 
conducting some first rather broad tests of it. The next step would be to conduct in-
depth case studies and more elaborate econometric analyses proofing the argument right 
or falsifying it. This goes however beyond the scope of this dissertation and will be left 
for post-doctoral research. This dissertation investigates these questions through a 
mixed methods approach, integrating quantitative and qualitative research. The next 
chapter discusses the methodology and the methods that have been applied.  
1.3.  Research Design 
Pragmatism as worldview: 
This study is inevitably based on my personal experiences, which have influenced my 
worldview
8
 and thus how I designed and conducted the dissertation. I define worldviews 
or paradigms as ways to “view the world and thus, go about conducting research. They 
contain a basic set of beliefs or assumptions that guide our inquiries.” (Guba & Lin-
coln, 2005, qtd. in Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007:21). I am convinced that it is im-
portant to be aware of and to make explicit one’s worldview. I started off with an advo-
cacy perspective or worldview; developing strategies for the realization of human rights 
                                                     
7
 At this point I want to again express my sincere gratitude to Joachim Wehner from the London School 
of Economics and Political Science for pointing out this research gap to me and raising my 
interest in Supreme Audit Institutions. 
8
 The four main types of worldviews and their different stances on the nature of reality (ontology), on 
how we gain knowledge of what we know (epistemology), on the role values play in research 
(axiology), on the process of research (methodology), and on the language of research (rhetoric) 
are presented in Appendix A.1. 
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based budgeting were my main research interest. This approach stemmed from my then 
professional work as advocacy officer. However, after a first round of research, I adopt-
ed pragmatism as the main worldview which should guide this dissertation project.  
Pragmatism as a worldview is typically associated with mixed methods research.  
“The focus is on the consequences of research, on the primary importance of the 
question asked rather than the methods, and multiple method of data collection 
inform the problems under study. Thus it is pluralistic and oriented toward 
“what works” and practice.” (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007:22)  
Pragmatism as a worldview like any paradigm has its implications for research practice 
associated with it. I have chosen a pragmatic view of looking at my main question be-
cause I believe that there are singular and multiple realities worth to explore and that 
combining methods results in more than just the sum of the methods. I am also con-
vinced that the research question should determine the choice of method used and not 
the other way around. Although this was challenging, as I had to learn new methods, 
which would allow me to better investigate particular aspects of my research question, I 
am convinced that this is the epistemology which is best apt to approach a research 
problem.  
To conclude, mixed methods research allows me to take multiple stances; I can include 
both biased and unbiased perspectives in my research. Finally, my research also in-
cludes other worldviews depending on the sub-questions. Thus, while the overall re-
search paradigm of this dissertation is pragmatism, it inevitably incorporates other para-
digms such as advocacy, postpositivism and constructivism as these influenced the way 
I conducted and reported particular parts of this mixed methods study.  
Praxeological knowledge as research strategy 
Harrits (2011) compares two major mixed-methods research (MMR) strategies and 
shows how they reflect different worldviews. “Nested analysis” (Lieberman, 2005) as 
an MMR strategy is based on a postpositivist ontology while “praxeological 
knowledge” (Bourdieu, 1973; Fries, 2009; Harrits, 2011:151) addresses the problem of 
“double hermeneutics”, which I would say is comparable to the pragmatic ontology (see 
Appendix A.1).
9
 The term praxeological knowledge was suggested by French sociolo-
gist Pierre Bourdieu in a discussion of science and knowledge in 1973.  
According to Bourdieu (1973; Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron, 1991 qtd. in 
Harrits, 2011:156) the strategy of praxeological knowledge implies a specific ordering 
                                                     
9
 Accepting the scope of this dissertation, I will not go into depth of the ongoing debates on the nature of 
MMR paradigms, but instead present the MMR strategy of praxeological knowledge as it builds 
the framework for my own overall research design. Nested analysis as a MMR will be discussed 
in some detail in chapter 6.5., where it will also be applied in practice. 
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of the research process into four phases (see Appendix A.2). The first step implies to 
break with common sense. In Bourdieu’s perspective, one of the greatest obstacles for 
social scientists in the initial parts of the research process is their inherent familiarity 
with their object. “Consequently, the first challenge of a research project is to find a 
research question that is not posed by the research object (or subject) itself.” (Bourdieu, 
Chamboredon, and Passeron, 1991 qtd. in Harrits, 2011:157, Italics in original) Bour-
dieu and his colleagues claimed that “the ars inveniendi of research should be under-
pinned by different methods for formulating research questions and hypotheses”. 
(Harrits, 2011:157, Italics in original) 
The second phase of the praxeological research strategy consists of “the objective con-
struction of the object, that is, the construction and testing of an explanation from an 
observer’s perspective” by the approach of structuralism or by the use of statistical 
techniques and access to systematically collected data. (Harrits, 2011: 157) This outside 
perspective presents a view of the research object (or subject) not accessible to itself and 
thus it can be seen as an epistemological advancement within the social sciences com-
pared to purely phenomenological knowledge, which only describes or reconstructs 
meanings and experiences. (Harrits, 2011: 156) However, Bourdieu argues, although it 
is an important part of the research process, “objective knowledge risks hypostatizing 
itself as reality”. (Bourdieu, 2000, Bourdieu, 2004 qtd. in Harrits, 2011:156). Scholars 
tend to produce “scholastic fallacities”, forgetting that people do not act with the 
knowledge available to researchers (ibid.).  
To produce praxeological knowledge, the research process now requires a second break 
and needs to include reflexivity. This implies that researchers need to move from the 
opus operatum, that is, from analyzing structures and regularities, to the modus operan-
di, that is, to analyzing principles of production of these regularities inherent in practice. 
(Bourdieu 1984, 2000 qtd. in Harrits, 2011:156) This third step of the analysis combines 
“explaining” and “understanding” or what is also called “bringing the lifeworld back 
in”. This is the crucial element of praxeological knowledge because it tests whether the 
regularities that we can observe in quantitative analyses can be found in the practices. 
As Bourdieu (1984:173 qtd. in Harrits, 2011:157) put it, “Systematicity is found in the 
opus operatum because it is in the modus operandi”. Thus praxeological knowledge 
requires the mixing of quantitative and qualitative methods to incorporate reflexivity 
into objective knowledge.  
Figure 1.1 summarizes my research process, whereas capital letters stand for the domi-
nant approach (QUAN and QUAL) and lowercase letters (quan and qual) for sub-parts 
of the study. The overall structure of this dissertation is organized as proposed by Bour-
dieu’s praxeological strategy and thus consists of four distinct phases. Phase one is con-
cerned with the development of the research question and identification of the specific 
research problem. In phase two, I develop the argument and test it through quantitative 
Introduction and Research Design 6 
 
analysis. In phase three, I explore the problem through interpretative, qualitative analy-
sis. There is a backwards and forwards relationship between the phases two and three. 
Phase three also influences phase two, which is refined after the conclusion of phase 
three. As one of the outcomes of the qualitative research, new variables are proposed, 
which are then incorporated in phase two. Finally, in phase four, I mix the findings of 
the previous phases, discuss them and draw my overall conclusions. Each subsequent 
chapter will engage in a deeper discussion of the respective research methodology and 
research methods used. 
Figure 1.1 Research Design 
Phase 1: Formulation of the research question, breaking with 
common sense (preliminary qual and quan research) – Chapters 
two, three and four  
  
Phase 2: QUAN model building and testing: construction and 
testing of an explanation from the observer’s perspective – 
Chapters five and six 
 
Phase 3: QUAL model building and testing:  adding reflexivity 
through the subject’s perspective or “bringing the lifeworld back 
in” through interpretative analysis – Chapter seven 
 
 
Phase 4: In the fourth phase the three parts will be brought together, not as a sum but 
through triangulation and integration of the findings (qual analysis). -  Chapter eight 
 
1.4. Thesis Overview  
This doctoral thesis starts in chapter two with the development of the overall research 
question. It addresses the basic question what this dissertation is about. It justifies the 
overall research question. Why is a study asking how public accountability is effectively 
institutionalized important? Chapter two thus provides the overall background to this 
dissertation. The main research methods that I use in this chapter are literature reviews 
and preliminary expert interviews. By the end of chapter two I will have defined the 
research gap and outlined how I chose the overall research puzzle that I wanted to solve. 
This chapter will also explain why I decided to conduct a case study of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (SAIs) in order to investigate my overall research question.  
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Chapter three then takes a closer look at the choice of the case study. Are Supreme Au-
dit Institutions (SAIs) a valuable case study for the investigation of how public account-
ability is institutionalized in the developing world? This chapter provides an overview 
of the role and function of SAIs and a discussion of the concept of public accountabil-
ity. Besides literature reviews, this chapter also conducts a content analysis of the Inter-
national Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs) to analyze how SAIs define 
themselves. Do they see themselves as accountability arrangements and what accounta-
bility purpose do they pursue? It concludes that SAIs can indeed be defined as account-
ability arrangements and therefore as an adequate case study. 
Chapter four then takes stock of the situation of SAIs worldwide. What is their account-
ability practice? While chapter three concluded that SAIs have committed themselves in 
the ISSAIs to serving public accountability, to what extent have they implemented their 
standards? In this chapter I conduct a cross-national assessment of the power of SAIs 
based on data from four surveys. I show that there is a strong variation in SAI power 
across countries and within regions. Based on this insight, I formulate the specific re-
search question of this dissertation: Why does independent, citizen-focused external 
public auditing thrive in some countries and fail in others?   
Now the dissertation proceeds to its second phase in chapter five. Chapter five develops 
the argument. It discusses potential explanations for the variation in SAI power based 
on seven strands of literature: institutional design, source of national income, institu-
tional diffusion, modernization, institutional capacity, rational choice institutionalism 
and organizational theories of leadership-led change. My hypotheses thus include both 
structural and agency based accounts of institutional change. 
Chapter six now tests my argument from an objective point of view. It explores rela-
tionships between variables through econometric analyses. Due to the lack of compara-
ble studies available, this undertaking has been extremely difficult and time-consuming. 
I test a huge number of variables on several SAI rankings, as specified in chapter four. 
Finally, I also test the results of the statistical analyses through mini-case analyses. As a 
reduced form of the nested analysis method (Lieberman, 2005), the mini-case analyses 
contribute to confirming my econometric results. 
The third part of the dissertation is chapter seven. Here I study the practice of reform 
through inductive qualitative research. I conducted 17 semi-structured expert interviews 
with leaders of Supreme Audit Institutions from six INTOSAI regions. This section of 
the dissertation depicts what the practice of reform looks like for heads of SAIs, which 
stories they have to tell and how they feel about reforms which aim at increasing the 
political leverage and the de facto independence of SAIs. 
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Now the dissertation proceeds to its fourth phase in chapter eight. Here I triangulate the 
various research findings into a common discussion and draw my final inferences. I 
conclude that public accountability arrangements cannot be autonomous from the elite 
structure in the country. They need to be embedded in the elite’s interests; otherwise 
they risk becoming so called “empty-shell” institutions. An increase in inter-elite com-
petition, pressure from above and below, exit strategies in the form of rewards or incen-
tives and above all plural, functional and problem-oriented leadership strategically ad-
vocating for reform can put powerful groups into a position where they believe that the 
benefits of accepting democratic reforms outweigh potential costs. Finally, I discuss my 
contributions to current scientific debates and the rich potentials for future research. I 
close by suggesting five practical strategies for strengthening powerful accountability 
arrangements that endure. 
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2. Background – Why Study the 
Institutionalization of Public Accountability 
2.1. How to Develop an Innovative Research Question 
2.2. The Starting Point – How Can Citizens Participate in Budget Processes? 
2.3. Outcome of Preliminary Research 
2.4. Summary and Conclusions  
 
“The research questions drive everything.”10 
2.1.  How to Develop an Innovative Research Question 
The starting point of this dissertation is the normative idea of development as the reali-
zation of all human rights for all and the subsequent problem, how human rights can be 
implemented for all, in form of laws on the one hand, but also in form of policies and 
according budget provisions on the other hand. How can human rights get institutional-
ized in various country contexts and how can governments as the main duty bearers be 
held accountable by rights-holders to implement their international commitments local-
ly? When starting this dissertation I asked this normative question. I asked questions of 
what should be and how new developments could be realized. Based on radical demo-
cratic ideas of inclusion and deeper democracy, positive experiences with civil society 
budget oversight in Tanzania and an advocacy worldview on research, I started off ask-
ing the following specific research question:  
How can persons with disabilities and other discriminated groups effectively participate 
in budget oversight in developing countries in order to translate their rights into budget 
allocations, realize pro-poor development and ‘deepen’ democracy?  
I then engaged in an in-depth evaluation and refinement of this research question. It is 
only much later that I realized what I was practicing was actually the first phase within 
the research strategy of praxeological knowledge (Bourdieu et al. 1991; Fries, 2009; 
Harrits, 2011). 
Bourdieu pointed out that one of the greatest obstacles for social scientists in the initial 
parts of the research process is their inherent familiarity with their object, which creates 
a tendency to produce what he called “spontaneous sociology” (Bourdieu et al., 1991 
qtd. in Harrits, 2011). Consequently, he urged social scientists to be aware of this falla-
                                                     
10
 Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009:14 
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cy and take the first stage, which is defining the right question, very seriously. The re-
searcher should find a question, which is not posed by the research object (or subject) 
itself. Bourdieu strongly believed that the art of finding new insights through research 
necessarily needs to be underpinned by different methods for formulating research ques-
tions and hypotheses. In sum, the first phase within the research strategy of 
praxeological knowledge consists of “an initial break with common sense” in order to 
develop new research questions and build innovative models. (Bourdieu et al. 1991, qtd. 
in Harrits, 2011:157) 
The objective of chapter two is to report on this process of identifying the overall prob-
lem, the research gap and the research question. The research methods used during this 
process consisted of an extensive literature research and two study visits (England, June 
2009 and Stanford University/USA, November 2009) with the objective to discuss the 
research problem, potential research gaps and appropriate research designs with experts 
in the field of inquiry. The main results of the two research visits, next to literature re-
search and participation in lectures, seminars and public events, was that I conducted 8 
expert interviews in England
11
 and 11 expert interviews at Stanford University
12
. The 
outcome of this preliminary research phase was that I changed my initial research ques-
tion and research design. The remaining chapter will now summarize the outcome of my 
preliminary research as the thematic background to this dissertation. By the end of this 
chapter, I will have clarified how my initial research question changed during this first 
research phase and why.  
2.2.  The Starting Point – How Can Citizens Participate in Budget 
Oversight? 
The starting point of this dissertation is based on my personal experiences during my 
role as coordinator of the pilot advocacy project “Inclusive Tanzania- inclusive educa-
tion and equal political participation of persons with disabilities through empowerment 
and capacity building”. This joint project by LIGHT FOR THE WORLD13 and the In-
                                                     
11
 Andrea Cornwall, University of Sussex; Andres Mejia Acosta, University of Sussex; Mick Moore, 
University of Sussex; Nilima Gulrajani, London School of Economics and Political Science; 
Joachim Wehner, London School of Economics and Political Science; Heidi Tavakoli, Overseas 
Development Institute; Leni Wild, Overseas Development Institute; Mark Robinson, UK 
Department for International Development. 
12
 Miriam Abu Sharkh; Joshua Cohen; James S. Fishkin; Nick Hope; Erik Jensen; Saumitra Jha; Stephen 
Krasner; Jonas Linde; Helen Stacy; Barry R. Weingast; Sean Yom. 
13
 LIGHT FOR THE WORLD is a European confederation of development organizations specialized in 
promoting the inclusion of persons with disabilities in development cooperation. Its 
programmatic work focuses on advocating for the rights of persons with disabilities, 
empowerment and capacity building of disabled people’s organizations, community based 
rehabilitation and prevention of blindness. http://www.light-for-the-world.org 
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formation Center on Disability
14
 started in November 2005 and was officially closed in 
April 2011. The overall objective of this project was to realize an inclusive society in 
Tanzania by persons with disabilities advocating for their rights and to develop lessons 
learned on the application of a human rights based approach to development (HRBA).
15
 
During the course of the project, the project steering committee realized that in order to 
claim their rights, they also needed to analyze and track the government budget. The 
budget institutions in Tanzania include a participatory process, the public expenditure 
review (PER). This process started in 1998/1999 and involves national as well as re-
gional and communal government representatives, international financial institutions, 
research institutes, development partners and civil society organizations. The objective 
of the PER is to improve public expenditure management and to facilitate a detailed 
discussion among national stakeholders and development partners.
16
 The PER structure 
consists of a steering committee under the leadership of the finance ministry, a macroe-
conomics group and three thematic clusters containing a number of workgroups. Once a 
year, the finance ministry organizes a large PER Consultative meeting with all PER 
groups, which as a result produces a public expenditure and financial accountability 
(PEFA) review and serves as a basis for the development of the next budget.
 17
  
Civil society organizations can initiate thematic groups with their responsible ministry. 
The ministry then decides on a representative who will head this group and finances 
group activities, particularly budget analyses. For example, there is a PER group on 
children and a PER group on women, which conduct budget analyses on the impact of 
the national budget on the respective groups.  
                                                     
14
 The Information Center on Disability (ICD) is a Tanzanian NGO based in Dar es Salaam. 
15
 Today nearly all bi- and multilateral development agencies have based their policies or parts of it on a 
human rights approach to development (HRBA). With the ending of the political dichotomy 
around 1990, all human rights and fundamental freedoms were recognized to be universal, indi-
visible, interdependent and interrelated. They have become an important aspect of development 
cooperation and politics. The Vienna World Conference on Human Rights 1993, the UN Millen-
nium Summit 2000 and the UN World Summit 2005 all recognize the mutually reinforcing and 
interdependence of development and human rights. The HRBA to development works towards 
strengthening the capacities of rights-holders, particularly discriminated groups, to make their 
claims and of duty-bearers, particularly state authorities, to meet their obligations. From an 
HRBA, the attainment of development goals and the fulfilment of human rights are two sides of 
the same process. Development in this sense means access to social, economic, political, civic 
and cultural rights. The HRBA and the Good Governance approach are both based on the same 
principles of participation, inclusion, accountability, transparency and state responsibility. The 
difference is that Good Governance works either on the supply (f.ex. reforming state institutions 
to make them more effective) or on the demand side (f.ex. civil society advocacy campaigns that 
promote responsive governance). A HRBA helps to link this artificial distinction by linking the 
supply and demand side through the conceptual lens of rights-holders, duty-bearers and 
citizenship. (OHCHR, 2006; OECD, 2006:17) Today, social movements also increasingly refer 
to human rights law to make their socio-economic claims (Tomasevski, 2005). 
16
 DPG, 2006:24 
17
 http://www.mof.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32&Itemid=47 (Last Accessed 
October 26, 2012) 
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At the same time, transparency of the budget process also gained in importance at the 
regional and local levels. Tanzania is committed to implementing its decentralization 
strategy. The tendency is clear, the central government budget is decreasing while the 
budget for the regions and local government authorities (LGAs) are increasing. LGAs 
therefore are increasingly challenged to improve their financial management and assure 
that the resources really reach the population.
18
 This development gave the impetus for 
civil society organizations to engage in budget tracking activities at the local level (Pub-
lic Expenditure Tracking Systems).
19
 While the NGOs see this activity as a cooperative 
and not confrontative process, they still often encounter resistance. In one recorded in-
stance, the government criticized an NGO that it no longer considered it as an inde-
pendent organization but instead as an emerging opposition party.
20
  Despite these prob-
lems, the government overall is committed to involving civil society organizations in 
the budget process. These organizations are in close contact to various social groups and 
so can point out important information and demands, which otherwise would not get 
attention in the budget formulation process.  
The objective of a participatory budget process is to realize a balance between repre-
sentative democracy and participatory democracy. One of its main purposes is to create 
a feeling for citizen responsibilities in the population, to encourage citizens to engage in 
political processes and make their claims towards political decision makers. A participa-
tory process aims to open up a political space for marginalized groups and to encourage 
and empower these to play a bigger role in the budget process. (UN DESA, 2009; Fung 
and Wright, 2003) These objectives are clearly in accord with the human rights based 
approach to development (HRBA). From a human rights based approach to develop-
ment public finance matters a lot. First of all, from a rights-based approach citizens and 
taxpayers are entitled to full disclosure with regard to the management of public money 
(Fölscher 2009:19; Elson, 2006). Second, all rights can have budgetary implications. To 
this extent, taxes and budgets have a significant and direct bearing on which human 
rights are realized and for whom. A human rights based approach to the budget de-
mands that budgetary decisions are made on the basis of transparency, accountability, 
equality, non-discrimination, participation and progressive realization of human rights. 
These principles should be applied at all levels of the budgetary process, from the draft-
ing stage, through approval by parliament, implementation and monitoring. (Elson, 
                                                     
18
 Policy Forum, 2007:1 
19
 The project „Fuatilia Pesa – Follow  the money“ is led by three national NGOs. Starting in 2006, it 
conducted Public Expenditure Tracking Initiatives in more than 40 distrcits. (Kallonga, 2007 and 
Hakikazi Catalyst, 2007) 
20
 Discussion with Rutachwamagyo Kaganzi/ICD, August 21, 2007 and again October 03, 2007 
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2006) Most progress has been achieved in the area of Gender Responsive Budgeting
21
 
under the leadership of UN WOMEN
2223
.   
The Inclusive Tanzania project initiated a PER group on vulnerability (including per-
sons with disabilities, orphans, persons living with HIV/Aids, elderly etc.). The objec-
tive of this PER was to engage in budget analysis, to hold the government to account on 
past promises and to demand the realization of their entitlements. During the kick-off 
workshop of this PER group one disability activist justified the participatory budget 
process as follows:  
“In the absence of the shoe wearers, who addresses vulnerability issues to be 
considered in priority settings and resource allocation to achieve different vul-
nerability goals and targets in the MKUKUTA decision making structures?“24  
Her statement reflects a self understanding as civil society stakeholders with a responsi-
bility to engage in political decision making processes in order to claim the realization 
of the human rights of persons with disabilities. While the initiation of this PER group 
was a big success, the implementation of PER group activities was difficult as it de-
pended on the political will to fund the activities.  
Second, the Inclusive Tanzania project also engaged in budget oversight at district level 
to track public funds for inclusive education. While the participation of the Consortium 
in budget oversight was difficult in Dar es Salaam, it achieved remarkable results in the 
rural Mwanga district (Kilimanjaro region). Here the work group not only was allowed 
to track the money flow but a participatory budget process was established whereby 
civil society organizations were invited to jointly discuss the budget distribution for 
inclusive education with district officials. The district representatives had realized that 
the school headmasters, the parents of children with disabilities and their representative 
organizations knew best where children with disabilities live, which schools needed 
additional teachers (for children with learning disabilities etc.), supportive materials 
(like books in Braille) and which schools most urgently needed adaptations to guarantee 
accessibility  for children with motoric disabilities (ramps for wheelchairs, accessible 
                                                     
21
 „Gender-responsive budgeting (GRB) is government planning, programming and budgeting that 
contributes to the advancement of gender equality and the fulfillment of women's rights. It entails 
identifying and reflecting needed interventions to address gender gaps in sector and local go-
vernment policies, plans and budgets. GRB also aims to analyze the gender-differentiated impact 
of revenue-raising policies and the allocation of domestic resources and Official Development 
Assistance.“ http://www.gender-budgets.org/ (Last Accessed on October 31, 2012)   
 For literature and guidelines on human rights based budgeting see also 
http://www.crin.org/hrbap/index.asp?action=theme.subtheme&subtheme=5 (Last Accessed on 
October 23, 2012) 
22
 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN WOMEN) 
http://www.unwomen.org/ (Last Accessed on October 31, 2012) 
23
 See also Steger (2012) on the pionieering role of Austria in Gender Responsive Budgeting. 
24
 Inclusive Tanzania Consortium (2007) PER Kick-off Workshop Report, September 25, 2007. 
MKUKUTA is the acronym for the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Program (PRSP) for 
Tanzania Mainland, covering the years 2005-2010. 
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toilets etc.). This part of the project was so successful that not only the district repre-
sentatives committed themselves to participatory budgeting but also the parents started 
to contribute with manpower and resources to the construction of ramps for the 
schools.
25
  
The development literature in the late 1990s and early 2000s recognized the need for 
social and political inclusion and highly appreciated participatory models claiming that 
it would increase the legitimacy of development policies as well as their effectiveness. 
The World Bank, a major driver of this debate, had introduced the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in 1999. While the idea that governments were expected not 
just to make a plan but to discuss it with civil-society stakeholders was a real innova-
tion, it failed in the implementation. (Booth, 2012) With time, it was realized that the 
participation processes lacked in quality and that despite wide deliberation processes the 
outcome did not reflect the aspirations of the poor.
 26 
  
Critics say the main reason of failing was the difficulty of transforming  technocratic 
‘ownership’ of the process into true political ‘ownership’ at the highest level. (Booth, 
2012)
 
Others accused the donors for having based the idea on the liberal concept of civil 
society (in the tradition of Alexis de Tocqueville, 1835; Putnam, 1993). From the liberal 
point of view, civil society shall provide important functions for the operationalization 
of state services. Such types of participation are realized in form of expert consultations 
with already well recognized civil society institutions. The neo-Gramscian approach, 
which has recently gained in influence in political economy, is criticizing this under-
standing of civil society as service deliverers. Civil society is instead defined as a realm 
of independent political activities, as a space of rebellion against the construction of 
cultural and ideological hegemony. The emphasis is on negotiations within power 
struggles and it is this type of political transformation which is required in developing 
countries. (Lister, 2006:13)  
“So ultimately participation is about power, the way the kind of donor discourse 
has incorporated participation has been to take out the power element and to 
say consultations are enough for civil society engagement so that is the problem 
                                                     
25
 Own experience by the author as project coordinator. 
26 As Knoke (2003:84) argues, every empowerment of marginalized groups in a system of mutual power 
claims, necessarily also means that the current elites must cede some of their power. According 
to Morrison and Singer (2007:723) the principal conclusion is that participation is only likely to 
be successful if the government is fully committed to civil society inclusion. Golooba-Mutebi 
(2005) shows that popular participation is not a viable solution to quality problems in primary 
health care in Uganda, given the depth of the prevailing inequalities of status and power. Lister 
(2006), Aldaheff (2002), Masschelein (2006) and Siebold (2005) all agree that there is an urgent 
need for learning by all sides and clarification of concepts; See Siebold (on the PRS process), 
Bossuyt (writing on the European Commission’s CSP process in Lister, 2006), Morrison and 
Singer, 2007:723. 
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with participation and yet this is the way it is currently practiced. This paper
27
 
might suggest that participation that we see needs to be much more substantial 
and ultimately to think about development about politics and about power. So it 
is not engagement for the sake of engagement but it is actually engagement for 
truly altering the power structure.” (Interview with Nilima Gulrajani, June 29, 
2009, London School of Economics and Political Science) 
Next to the good governance and accountability agenda of the new aid paradigm, two 
other phenomena helped opening up budget processes in the 1990s. On the one hand, 
there was the influential Brazilian experiment of participatory budgeting with its origins 
in Porto Alegré in the mid 1980s.
28
 On the other hand, a large number of independent 
budget groups had emerged to expose among others gender biases in government budg-
ets.
29
 At the same time, several studies started to question civil society participatory 
models, including participatory budgeting.
30
  
To sum up, despite the acknowledged limitations in the implementation of participatory 
models, donors had come to change their understanding of the nature of the policy and 
budget process. These were no longer considered as the exclusive preserve of the gov-
ernment and treated as a purely technical matter, but as a rather dynamic, open and 
highly political process, which involves multiple stakeholders, including civil society 
organizations. Thus, in a number of countries, participation in public expenditure man-
agement by civil society organizations had emerged as a major new arena for political 
activity at all levels of government.  
“Because these state-based accountability methods have met limited success, at-
tention has shifted towards strengthening the ‘voice’, or capacity, of ordinary 
citizens (especially poor citizens) to directly participate in policy-making pro-
cesses. …Citizen-driven accountability instruments, such as participatory budg-
eting, public expenditure tracking, social audits, community scorecards and 
budget watchdogs, are being implemented to complement conventional mecha-
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 Gulrajani, Nilima (2009) The Future of Development Management: Examining Possibilities and 
Potential. London, UK: DESTIN, London School of Economics and Political Science. Working 
Paper Series, No. 09-99. 
28
 There is no single definition of Participatory Budgeting as it differs greatly from one place to the next. 
Nevertheless, according to UN-HABITAT (2004:22) in general terms, a Participatory Budget is 
"a mechanism (or process) through which the population decides on, or contributes to decisions 
made on, the destination of all or part of the available public resources." On participatory budg-
eting see also Robinon, 2008. 
29
 See Goetz and Jenkins, 2005; Waglé and Shah, 2001; Norton and Elson, 2002; Songco, 2001; Healy 
and Tordoff, 1995 
30
 Bräutigam (2004) challenges the usual presentation of participatory budgeting as an example of suc-
cessful civil-society pressure on government. She shows that citizen participation in budget pro-
cesses has not always had pro-poor results. And the experiences which did lead to pro-poor shifts 
in spending were associated with the accession to power of left of- centre political parties, not 
with citizen participation on its own.  
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nisms of accountability such as political checks and balances, accounting and 
auditing systems, administrative rules and legal procedures.”31  
Robinson (2006:9) summarized the body of knowledge concerning citizen participation 
in budget processes as follows:  
“However, while there is acknowledgement that independent analysis, advocacy 
and capacity-building efforts have the potential to influence government budget 
priorities and improve the transparency of the budget process, there is limited 
evidence on the efficacy and impact of this body of work. ... Hence, there is a 
compelling case for a deeper investigation of the significance of this type of non-
governmental public action through comparative research on what works where, 
how and why.” 
Based on my personal experiences and this body of literature, I had formulated my orig-
inal question in 2009 as follows:  
How can persons with disabilities and other discriminated groups effectively participate 
in budget processes in developing countries in order to translate their rights into budget 
allocations, realize pro-poor development and ‘deepen’ democracy? 
2.3. Outcome of Preliminary Research  
The main outcome of the preliminary expert interviews in 2009 can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Pro-poor development is a misleading concept. 
2. It is difficult to reconcile fiscal sustainability with democratic inclusion in times 
of crisis. 
3. Public expenditure management (PEM) reforms emphasize the need for finan-
cial accountability. 
4. Donors realize the difficulties in building institutions. 
5. Normative ideas confront realist views. 
6. Supreme Audit Institutions are a research gap. 
 
I will now discuss each of these points in turn: 
1. Pro-poor development is a misleading concept 
The first insight from the expert interviews in England concerned the concept of pro-
poor development. It is a very misleading concept and nobody was happy with it, alt-
hough for different reasons. This concept was criticized mainly from two perspectives, a 
macroeconomic and a radical democratic one. Joachim Wehner (Interview on June 29, 
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 http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/voice-and-accountability/overview (Last Accessed on November 
05, 2012) 
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2009, Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science) 
explained that from a macroeconomic standpoint the term pro-poor is often used to 
mean increases in social spending, neglecting that conservative fiscal politics can also 
be pro-poor by not increasing the national debt, but inviting investment and growth.  
On the other hand radical democrats like Andrea Cornwall (Interview on June 25, 2009, 
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex) criticized the concept because it 
only talks about the poor, while development also needs to talk about the rich. Pro-poor 
puts development in the corner as an add-on to growth, treating poverty like an illness 
that we can treat other than saying that poverty is a structural condition. It should be 
inclusive or equitable development, which addresses structural inequalities, redistribu-
tion, equality and the attainment of human rights.  
This first insight very well reflects a more general debate among development theorists 
and policy makers on the question which socio-economic policies are best suited to re-
duce poverty and social exclusion – be it through macro-economic policies that will 
allow for „growth trickling down to the poor” combined with targeted poverty allevia-
tion programs (Washington Consensus) or be it through universal access and compre-
hensive social protection measures (e.g. AU Livingston Call for Action, 2004). This 
debate dominated the development discourse during the mid 2000s but has lost momen-
tum since the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. The consequent economic and public 
debt crisis put fiscal austerity programs on the top of the agenda.  
2. It is difficult to reconcile fiscal sustainability with democratic inclusion in 
context of crisis.  
Why should it not be possible to address social exclusion and to acknowledge the need 
for fiscal sustainability? I discussed this question with Mark Robinson (Interview on 
June 30, 2009, UK Department for International Development DFID) who agreed with 
me that both objectives are important but also pointed out that it is not easy to reconcile 
fiscal sustainability and democratic inclusion in the context of low or declining growth:  
“I think that to achieve both objectives in Africa in the contemporary context of 
crisis is almost impossible. ...that’s what I said about realism and boundaries. 
That in a sense it is incremental that we need to make small gains on both fronts. 
You need to have a medium to long term vision about the fiscal sustainability ob-
jective, you need to think about revenue raise, you need to think about building 
governmental capacities for rational budget making and at the same time create 
opportunities for more legislative scrutiny and oversight and civil society en-
gagement, but we are talking of decades rather than years.”   
This statement by Mark Robinson very well summarizes the main objectives of Public 
Expenditure Management (PEM) reforms in poor countries today. Reflecting on my 
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discussion with him and other interviewees, I realized that I had started off this disserta-
tion with the same mistake that many donor agencies had made when reforming nation-
al PEM systems in the 1980s and 1990s. I had the idea that developing countries could 
leapfrog all the way to the final ideal of institutional and democratic development, for-
getting about the realities on the ground. 
3. Public Expenditure Management (PEM) Reforms emphasize the need for 
accountability. 
In industrialized countries, PEM reforms are concerned with reforms that should over-
come limitations of budgetary institutions and prevent political opportunism and fiscal 
mismanagement. Van Hagen (2007:29) distinguishes between three types of budgeting 
institutions
32
 and shows how the institutional design of budgeting institutions can 
strengthen or weaken the accountability of political agents and the competitiveness of 
the political system and thus contribute to controlling the principal-agent problem
33
 and 
the common pool problem
34
 of public finances. Current PEM reforms in industrialized 
countries aim to assure the development of  
“a comprehensive budget that includes all government operations, a results-
based chain demonstrating their performance, transparency of the budget pro-
cess, and use of the budget as an instrument for strategic management and citi-
zen empowerment”. (Shah, 2007:1)  
On the other hand, in many developing countries, budgetary institutions are still mainly 
used as tools for legalistic controls and micromanagement. The awareness that develop-
ing countries need to strengthen their PEM
35
 systems is fairly new. It was only at the 
end of the 1980s, when it was recognized that effective budget support requires an 
agreement on the government expenditure program as well as management systems 
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 Three types of budgeting institutions according to van Hagen (2007:29ff): 1. Institutions shaping the 
environment of the budgeting process (e.g. comprehensiveness, transparency, budget as a tool 
for strategic management and ex-post accountability); 2. Output-oriented rules (e.g. balanced-
budget constraints); 3. Procedural rules of the budget process (e.g. rules that focus on decision-
makers and rules that focus on content); see also van Hagen (2006:465) 
33
 The principal-agent problem in the conduct of fiscal policy concerns the relationship between the voters 
(the principals) and the politicians (the agents) in democracies. Voters delegate the power over 
public spending and taxes to elected politicians, who can extract rents from being in office and 
spend public moneys on projects other than those that the voters desire.  (Persson, Roland and 
Tabellini 1997; Seabright 1996) 
34
 The excessive levels of public spending and deficits caused by social benefit programs targeted at indi-
vidual groups in society, and whereby the net benefits for the targeted groups typically exceed 
the net benefits for society as a whole. (van Hagen and Harden, 1995) 
35
 While Public Expenditure Management (PEM) is concerned with budgeting and budgetary institutions, 
Public Finance Management (PFM) also looks at the revenue side of the public finance. While 
both, the collecting and the spending of public money are important aspects of reforms, they dif-
fer in their history, content and rate of success. For the purpose of this study, only PEM reforms 
are examined.  
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adequate for its implementation.
36
 At about the same time as PEM reforms began to be 
included into adjustment assistance in aid recipient countries, important changes in 
macroeconomic and fiscal management were being introduced in industrialized coun-
tries – particularly Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, and Sweden. These reforms were 
soon summarized under the label “new public management” (NPM) and were believed 
to be the new “best practice”. The World Bank and other organizations believed that 
these reforms could also be exported to developing countries.
37
 However, the reforms 
aimed to strengthen the public expenditure management systems did not take root in the 
entirely different institutional and administrative climate.
38
 The donor institutions pain-
fully had to realize that it was not possible to jump all the way to the end point of insti-
tutional change and that it required hard work to tailor innovations to reality on the 
ground.
39
 (Schiavo-Campo, 2007:387-388) 
“I think … Public Financial Management reforms often have been too technical-
ly based and did not take into account politics. … And I see in the ministry of 
education [of Namibia], you have these positive objectives making sure that you 
have an x national enrolment ratio by a certain year but nobody actually has 
worked out how this will be achieved in terms of how you will actually calculate 
the costs and allocate budgets. So often you have incremental budgeting, which 
is basically, what was budgeted last year plus a couple of percent. And everyone 
argues it is a useless way in ensuring that certain policy objectives are imple-
mented because you are just maintaining a system producing certain outputs. … 
I guess that you could argue … at the macro level they are kind of good and fair-
ly aligned but then it actually fell apart at the lower level. … You find that lots of 
developing countries if they have a certain level of development they will all 
have these fantastic plans and policies but it is actually implementing the plans 
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 The World Bank’s (1989) public expenditure review for Madagascar was the first to include a major 
institutional component. (Schiavo-Campo, 2007: 430) 
37
 Schiavo-Campo (2007:388) suggests that the reasons behind this fallacy were many: World Bank tech-
nocrats were encouraged by the partial success of the new NPM reforms in some industrialized 
countries, they were in love with the semantics of NPM, they were blind to the known problems 
of transplanting institutional models and they were pushed by the international consulting indus-
try.  
38
 Allen (2009:10) points out that contrary to the experience of the reforms concerning the expenditure 
side of budgets, reform of tax policy and tax collection has generally proved easier in developing 
countries.  For example, several low-income countries have made progress in recent years in in-
troducing VAT systems, unified tax and customs authorities, and large taxpayer offices. The 
plausible explanation for this is that tax reforms may increase the opportunities for rent-seeking 
behavior by creating new sources of revenue, and new and more efficient methods of collection. 
On the other hand, reforms of the expenditure side of the budget generally do the reverse. As we 
have discussed above, its objective is to close loopholes, introducing new controls, enhancing 
transparency and eliminating rent-seeking opportunities.  
39
 Allen (2009) makes a claim against complex PEM reforms which have not shown the intended results. 
He therefore concludes that “getting the basics right”, an approach by Schick (1998) is more 
adequate for the poorest countries. Authors such as Allen, 2008, 2009; Santiso, 2006, 2009; Pre-
torius & Pretorius, 2008; Shah, 2007; Stapenhurst et al, 2008; Gupta et al, 2007; Kohnert, 2008 
and Schiavo-Campo, 2009 all criticise the technical approach taken in reforming budget institu-
tions in poor countries which did not take the local political economy and social environment 
into account. 
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which is the problem.” (Interview with Heidi Tavakoli, Overseas Development 
Institute, July 01, 2009)   
Today, there is consensus that PEM reforms need to focus on the basics first. At the 
same time these basic reforms must be complemented by a road map of subsequent im-
provements and a reasonably clear view of the medium- and long-term goals of ad-
vanced systems and practices. (Schiavo-Campo, 2007: 388) If the government budget is 
to become an instrument to realize policy choices, the first priority is to protect the re-
sources from corruption and mismanagement. However, this priority was not acknowl-
edged by Washington’s technocrats at first. In the first stage of fiscal reforms in the 
1990s, Washington consensus policy prescriptions centered on strengthening the execu-
tive functions of government in the management of public finances because “most 
scholars warned against the dysfunctional fiscal effects of unrestrained legislative 
budgetary powers”.(Santiso, 2006:70) The concentration of budgetary powers within 
the executive is said to aid the enforcement of fiscal restraint, in order to avoid large and 
persistent deficits and implement fiscal adjustments more promptly. At the heart of first 
generation reforms was therefore greater centralization of budgetary systems within the 
executive branch, particularly the finance ministry, combined with the adoption of nu-
merical and procedural constraints. (Santiso, 2006:70, citing Stein, Talvi and Grisanti, 
1998; Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and Perotti, 1996)  
However, while these arguments are substantiated by empirical evidence
40
, experience 
also revealed the risks of excessive executive control in public budgeting. (Santiso, 
2006:70) While immature legislatures and unstable party systems have often caused 
dysfunctional economic governance, high budget deficits, and fiscal imbalances, auto-
cratic presidents have also tended to abuse their constitutional authority and delegated 
powers. The misuse by the executive in public budgeting has often led to serious eco-
nomic mismanagement, pervasive corruption, and state capture. The combination of 
excessive executive discretion and weak legislative oversight inevitably led to the neu-
tralization of accountability mechanisms. (Santiso, 2006:70; Wehner, 2010; Schick, 
2002) 
Second generation fiscal reforms then emphasized the importance of transparency and 
accountability and underscored the value of external scrutiny, legislative and societal 
oversight. Greater transparency and accountability is associated with improved fiscal 
discipline, reduced corruption and improved quality and legitimacy of fiscal govern-
ance.
41
 This broader understanding of the governance of the budget has lead to a new 
interest in the role of parliaments, Supreme Audit Institutions and civil society organiza-
                                                     
40 See Stein, Talvi & Grisanti, 1998; Alesina et al, 1999, Stein et al, 1998; Alesina & Perotti, 1996, all qtd. 
in Santiso, 2006:70 
41 See Santiso, 2006:70; Alesina & Perotti 1996; Hameed 2005; Alt & Lassen 2006 in CABRI, 2009:21; 
Wehner, 2004, Schick, 2002 
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tions in budget management and oversight.
42
 The main research gap is then according to 
Santiso (2006:67),  
“how to retain the advantages of strong executive authority required to ensuring 
fiscal responsibility while providing the institutional checks and balances that 
ensure democratic accountability and prevent corruption”.  
Taking these two sides into account, the donor community over the last decade no long-
er spoke of only Public Expenditure Management (PEM) reforms but of Public Ex-
penditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) reforms. In 2001 a multi-donor partner-
ship between seven donor agencies and international financial institutions launched the 
PEFA program, which assesses the condition of country public expenditure, procure-
ment and financial accountability systems and develops a practical sequence for reform 
and capacity-building actions.43  
According to the PEFA program, the three main goals of budgetary reforms are  
 1) to have aggregate fiscal discipline,  
 2) to ensure strategic resource allocation and  
 3) to achieve economically efficient use of resources for service delivery.44  
In order to realize these three budgetary goals, the PEFA program has developed the 
PEFA performance framework
45
 which highlights that reform must concentrate on four 
aspects, namely  
 A.) Public Finance Management Outturns,  
 B.) Key cross-cutting features,  
 C.) the Budget Cycle and  
 D.) Donor Practices.  
The PEFA Framework is a high level analytical instrument which consists of a set of 31 
indicators and a supporting PFM Performance Report and provides an overview of the 
performance of a country’s PFM system (see Appendix A.3). To conclude, with the 
adoption of the PEFA framework by the donor community and the majority of aid-
dependent countries worldwide, there is a policy consensus today on what reforms to 
strengthen public expenditure management systems should look like and how they are 
to be realized. It thus seems that there is finally a common understanding of a theory of 
budgeting, acknowledging that budget principles, budget policies and budget processes 
                                                     
42 See Santiso, 2006; Schick, 2002; Schick, 1998; Wehner, 2004; Manning &  Stapenhurst, 2002; OECD, 
2001; Krafchik & Wehner, 1998; Petrei, 1998 
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 http://www.pefa.org/en/content/resources (Last Accessed on August 20, 2012) 
44
 Equally, Allen (2009) summarizes that the main goals of public expenditure management reforms are 
to have aggregate fiscal discipline and to ensure the economically efficient allocation of 
resources to priority sectors. 
45
 http://www.pefa.org/en/content/pefa-framework (Last Accessed on August 20, 2012) 
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matter.
46
 Finally, there is no doubt that in order for public expenditure management sys-
tems to achieve their goals, the existence of effective public finance accountability sys-
tems is a must.  
4. Donors realize the difficulties in building institutions 
The influential comparative study of democratic transitions by Linz and Stepan (1996), 
the World Development Report: The State in a Changing World. (World Bank, 1997), 
and the insights by Fukuyama (2004) led to the emergence of the institutional capacity 
approach in the aid debate. Fukuyama (2004) explained that although it was necessary 
to limit the scope of state functions in poor countries as part of structural adjustment 
programs during the 1990s, it was a mistake to also reduce state capacity. The aid com-
munity started to stress the need for good governance and in this context supports the 
training of civil personnel and strengthening of state institutions. It is particularly insti-
tutions providing for horizontal and vertical accountability, which do not work properly 
and are under the focus of reform. The mainstream of development policy today follows 
this institutional capacity approach and stresses the need for building capacity of state 
institutions in order for them to become effective and for development to occur. For 
instance, in 2005, donor and recipient countries alike signed the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness
47
, which has as objective to increase the effectiveness of development 
aid through providing General Budget Support (GBS), donor alignment, aid harmoniza-
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 De Renzio (2011:4) explains that scholars have studied the reform of PEM from different theoretical 
perspectives, which have never been properly united. These diverse views contributed to the 
problems in developing adequate reforms of budgeting institutions in developing countries. 
Reforms which stemed from a public administration perspective on budgeting mostly 
concentrated on aspects of planning, accounting and inter-organisational linkages (Coe, 1989; 
Guthrie et al. 2005, qtd. in de Renzio, 2011:4). This is because from a public administration 
perspective, the budget is an instrument to organise the way in which public resources are 
managed. Here budget institutions are examined in relation to key budgetary principles 
(Sundelson, 1935, qtd. in de Renzio, 2011:4). On the other hand, from a public finance 
perspective, the budget is a tool to achieve fiscal policy objectives. This perspective draws 
theoretically on the scholarship of public economics (Musgrave 1959; Stiglitz, 1986, qtd. in de 
Renzio, 2011:4) and assesses whether budget institutions serve to maintain fiscal balance, 
allocating resources according to policy priorities and stimulating consumption. Finally, the 
political economy perspective on budgeting is concerned with the constellation of stakeholders, 
interests and incentives within the budget process. It draws on the literature of new institutional 
economics (North, 1990; Campos and Pradhan, 1996 in de Renzio, 2011:4) and, to a lesser 
degree, of fiscal sociology (Schumpeter, [1918] 1991; Moore, 2004, qtd. in de Renzio, 2011:4).  
Here the budget is an instrument to reconcile competing interests over the use of public funds. 
Acknowledging these three perspectives on budget institutions, Schick (1998, qtd. in de Renzio, 
2011:4) was the first to highlight the need to bring together principles, policies and processes: 
“even when a government adheres to accepted budget principles, it may fail to obtain optimal 
fiscal outcomes”, and that “to achieve its preferred outcomes, a government […] must create an 
institutional framework that enhances the probability that actual outcomes will conform to 
professed targets” (Schick, 1998: 2, qtd. in de Renzio, 2011:4). De Renzio concludes that it is 
therefore „at the interface between principles, policies and processes that the quality of public 
expenditure management systems need to be assessed“. 
47 http://www.aidharmonization.org/ (Last Accessed May 13, 2008) 
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tion and building up national systems of accountability and local ownership. Recipient 
governments, not multilateral agencies or donors, are expected to be the prime movers 
of poverty reduction strategies and civil society organizations are to participate in the 
formulation and implementation processes.  
This political commitment to strengthening Good Governance is also reflected in the re-
foundation of the African Union in 2002. With it ended the taboo of interference in state 
affairs and the recognition of good governance as an important element of development 
by African heads of state. The focus on strengthening public finance accountability sys-
tems as part of the development agenda also gained momentum with the endorsement of 
the UN Convention Against Corruption (2005).  
As mentioned above, donor-led participatory models (such as the PRSP) had failed to 
deliver on their promises. Donors now bid farewell to their civil society hype and start-
ed to watch out for strengthening formal institutions instead (parliaments, judiciary 
etc.). Then the difficulties associated with state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq be-
came apparent and a new debate on the overall potential of development cooperation 
emerged.
48
 Was it possible to transfer institutions to other country contexts?  This ques-
tion was also picked up by political economists researching in the tradition of new insti-
tutional economics.
49
 The scholarship of political economy investigates how political 
and economic development are interrelated processes and jointly condition the devel-
opment of effective institutions. And in relation to the development discourse, this 
whole debate had put politics back at the heart of development research. (Krasner, 2009; 
Unsworth, 2009; Booth, 2012; Laws, 2012)     
“I think that there are three big arguments about development. Modernization 
theory is to do the economics first and then the politics will follow. That’s one, 
the second is institutional capacity building because the state does not have 
enough capacity to function effectively. … The third argument labeled rational 
choice institutionalism, which is where American political science is, particular-
ly political science at Stanford, you know where the argument is that develop-
ment is the result of deals that are made by the elites. And the deals have to be 
self-enforcing and pareto-improving. They have to make everybody better off 
and nobody worse off otherwise they will not be accepted. … So I think those are 
the three perspectives out there. And if you look at issues of state building they 
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 This debate was hotly discussed in the US media during the years 2005 to 2009 by two prominent 
economists, Jeffrey Sachs and William Easterly. Critics like Easterly (2006), but also Moyo 
(2009) and Collier (2008, 2009) claim that aid has helped little and instead supported authoritari-
an regimes. On the other hand, Sachs (2005, 2008) and prominent pro-aid movements argue that 
aid has helped so little because it was too little. Miller (2010) on the Sachs-Easterly debate con-
cludes that there are differences when assessing aid effectiveness from a macro or a micro per-
spective, which do not necessarily have to be reconciled. Findley et al. (2010) argue that we have 
to differentiate between different aid sectors. See also Hielscher (2008) and Rajan (2007) on this 
debate. 
49
 Prominent scholars of institutional economics are: Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Oliver Williamson, 
Harold Demsetz, Avner Greif, and Claude Menard. See International Society for Institutional 
Economics http://www.isnie.org/ (Last Accessed on October 23, 2012) 
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imply very different things. If you believe in modernization theory, what you 
want to do is to just give them the money (Jeff Sachs). If you believe in institu-
tional capacity, which is the language of most of governments because it is what 
they can do, if you look how the US government talks about Afghanistan or Iraq, 
they say we will train the national Afghan army. … The political deal argument 
is not that the institutions are unimportant, but for institutions to work well the 
deals of the elites have to work well for the whole population in the end, that is 
the open access argument.
50” (Interview with Stephen Krasner, November 11, 
2009, Stanford University) 
Chapter five will pick up these three theories and discuss them in detail. However, as a 
consequence of this interview, I got interested in studying and testing this rational 
choice institutionalist approach to development. 
5. Normative ideas confront realist views  
The scholarship on how deliberative models can “deepen” democracy is largely 
spawned by the work of Habermas (1962; 1984) but also Bohman and Rehg (1997), 
Elster (1998), Cohen (1989) or Dryzek (2002, 2004). They have analyzed in depth the 
societal and institutional characteristics necessary. These include on the one hand the 
willingness of governments to incorporate the results of deliberation and secondly, the 
required equality among decision makers.
51
 However, both conditions are difficult to 
realize, particularly within the framework of donor-led initiatives. From a positivist per-
spective therefore, it is first of all important to understand why formal institutions are 
not working the way they should.  
“… there is a vast difference between adopting legislation that articulates hu-
man rights and the provision of that right and it is not just because it costs mon-
ey but because it requires a cultural shift. So in one community there has been a 
practice to get married at age 15 and then to pass the CEDAW convention will 
not prevent families to giving in to marriage, there is dowry and property impli-
cations. There is a big junction between legal rights on the one hand and chang-
ing practices that are grounded in culture or gender or race on the other hand. 
… The reason that they sign on the international treaties is not because they 
might come on to human rights but it is a signaling device to other countries, 
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 see North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009 
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 Cohen (1989:22) concluded that the participants must be “both formally and substantively equal” and 
“the deliberation itself must be free”; see also Morrison and Singer (2007) as well as Baiocchi 
(2001); Cornwall and Schattan Coelho (2007). Fung and Wright (2001, 2003:3-45) propose three 
institutional design features for a practical implementation of what they call Empowered Partici-
patory Governance (EPG): (1) the devolution of public decision authority to empowered local 
units; (2) the creation of formal linkages of responsibility, resource distribution, and communica-
tion that connect these units to each other and to superordinate, more centralized authorities; and 
(3) the use and generation of new state institutions to support and guide these decentred problem 
solving efforts rather than leaving them as informal or voluntary affairs. See also Young, 2000; 
Baiocchi, 2001; Cohen & Rogers, 1992; Evans, 2004; Fung, 2003; Fung, Wright & Abers, 2003; 
Groves & Hinton, 2004; Lister & Carbone, 2006, Brinkerhoff et al, 2003; Gaventa, 2006.  
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come and invest capital, but it is not a trigger for human rights, it is basically a 
cheap way for governments saying come and invest.” (Interview with Helen Sta-
cy, November 09, 2006, Stanford University) 
6. Supreme Audit Institutions are a research gap 
Asking my interviewees to identify the most pressing research gaps, all pointed out that 
there was a need to understand how to create effective public finance accountability 
systems. The question how effective public finance accountability systems develop is of 
interest to public finance, development and human rights scholars. External auditing is 
ideally a component of a regulatory system of public finance and public administration 
oversight that includes internal auditing, parliamentary reviews, public debate facilitated 
by the media, judicial prosecution, and other mechanisms (see Appendix A.4.). In gen-
eral one finds an abundance of literature on the role of parliaments, party systems, donor 
strategies as well as to some extent on the media and civil society in promoting public 
finance accountability. Comparable few studies have looked at the role of SAIs and how 
they can be reformed, as Joachim Wehner pointed out: 
“I am always interested in the institutions in the budget process. For sure there 
is a lot that you can look at. Also the Supreme Audit Institutions … How can you 
measure their performance? How can you know in which political system audit-
ing works better? What is the impact of Supreme Audit Institutions? Does more 
money then reach the schools?”52 (Interview with Joachim Wehner, June 30, 
2009, London School of Economics and Political Science) 
Today there are globally 191 Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs), such as audit offices 
and courts of accounts, which are a member of the International Organization of Su-
preme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). In 2011 in a groundbreaking Resolution by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations (A/RES/66/209) the international community 
has committed itself to strengthening SAIs. For the first time all UN member states have 
recognized that SAIs need to be “independent and protected against outside influence 
in order to accomplish their tasks objectively and effectively.” But how do SAIs devel-
op, consolidate and endure and how can they be strengthened? 
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 Great thanks to Joachim Wehner for first pointing out this research gap to me in my interview on June 
30, 2009. Author’s own translation from German to English. Original interview text, “Ich 
interessiere mich immer für Institutionen im Budgetprozess. Da gibt es sicher vieles was man 
sich anschauen kann. Auch Rechnungshöfe, Supreme Audit Institutions ... Wie kann man die 
Performanz von denen messen? Woran erkennt man in welchem politischen System auditing 
besser funktioniert? Welche Effekte Rechnungshöfe haben, kommt dann mehr Geld bei den 
Schulen an?“ 
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2.4.  Summary and Conclusions 
“And it turns out they [institutions providing for independent third party moni-
toring of government actions] are extremely difficult to build in developing 
countries because there are patrimonial networks and there like where funds are 
channeled … but there is a very interesting case, and in fact it was just reported 
on in today’s or yesterdays New York Times … about the Indonesian Counter 
Corruption Commission (KPK) ... most of the counter corruption commissions 
fail across the developing world and if you think about it, high level corruption 
is a very sensitive matter and any institution that wants to take a look at that 
needs a lot of political support and without the strong political support from the 
highest level these institutions end up prosecuting petty officials or doing noth-
ing at all. … Let me just go into some details about what the Indonesian KPK 
has to tell us. Why is it working and why are others not? I am applying this to 
the counter corruption commission but you could apply this to SAIs too. And this 
is looking at the political economy that surrounds these institutions.” (Erik Jen-
sen, Stanford University, Interview on November 05, 2009) 
The outcome of the preliminary research phase was that I changed my preliminary re-
search question. To recall, I started off with the overall research problem that human 
rights implementation requires rights-holders to claim their rights and that entitlements 
need not only to be enshrined in laws but also in policies with according budget provi-
sions. Based on this problem, I asked the normative question, how persons with disabili-
ties and other excluded groups can effectively participate in budget processes in order to 
translate their rights into budget allocations, realize pro-poor development and ‘deepen’ 
democracy. 
The new overall research problem looks at institutions providing for public accountabil-
ity which often do not work properly. As we have seen above, the institutionalization of 
public accountability is a topical research problem from a public finance, development 
and human rights perspective. My overall research focus has thus changed from study-
ing normative ideas how institutions for public deliberation should develop within an 
aid-dependent country context to studying why formal institutions providing for public 
accountability do not work. As we have seen, the PRSP and other participatory process-
es have largely failed to deliver because de facto they were not institutionalized within 
national contexts. We have also seen that while most countries are formal democracies 
today, political and civil rights are declining world-wide. There is the crucial need for 
government willingness to institutionalize public accountability. While citizens un-
doubtedly play an important role in budget oversight and budget advocacy, their efforts 
will hardly deliver results, if the formal institutions are not working. Supreme Audit 
Institutions already exist as an institutionalized independent watchdog. And as latest 
research and international efforts have shown, there are huge prospects for civil society 
cooperation with Supreme Audit Institutions. For example, the United Nations (UN) in 
cooperation with the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions 
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(INTOSAI) organized the Symposium Effective Practices of Cooperation between Su-
preme Audit Institutions and Citizens To Enhance Public Accountability from July 13-
15, 2011 in Vienna. This 21
st
 UN/INTOSAI seminar identified successful practices of 
cooperation between SAIs and citizens and highlighted innovative new approaches to 
such cooperation, in order to strengthen government audit so that it can commit itself 
more strongly to the benefit of citizens.
53
 
Thus, instead of focusing on participatory models which are hardly ever institutional-
ized, the main reform efforts should focus on making those institutions that already ex-
ist, such as the judiciary, parliaments, anti-corruption agencies, ombudsmen and Su-
preme Audit Institutions, work. These institutions are confronted with a situation where 
political and legal commitments do not always match factual institutionalization. There 
is wide recognition today, that institutions providing for public accountability cannot 
simply be transferred to other country contexts and that this often produces so called 
“empty shell” institutions. But institutions need not only exist de jure but also de facto. 
Formal and informal practices need to match. Today there is a lack of comprehensive 
understanding of political and economic processes leading to institutional development. 
Addressing this research gap, my revised overall research question asks,  
How do institutions providing for public accountability develop, consolidate and en-
dure? 
In order to answer this overall research question I decided to conduct a case study of 
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) as accountability institutions which have been ne-
glected in both reform practice and research. Three initial hypotheses explaining poten-
tial determinants for the development of independent auditing offices were presented in 
the interview quote by Krasner above. Others were developed in a discussion with Sean 
Yom at Stanford University. These included hypotheses based on the source of national 
income, based on the level of democratization of a country and the hypothesis of a 
forced move due to political crisis.    
“...where a state extracts revenue and how it spends revenue both reflect and af-
fect the kinds of institutions it will build and those institutions will have long 
term effects….  
… you only develop robust auditing systems unless you have strong democratic 
institutions in place to ensure the construction of a truly independent office. 
When that’s the case then it is really a strong democracy causes public account-
ing institutions and not public accounting institutions cause strong democracies. 
…. States respond to crises by building institutions. This is my belief drawn 
heavily from contemporary institutionalism, institutions are created primarily 
during points of crises as a rational response to pressures from beyond or within 
from exogenous or domestic pressures.” (Interview with Sean Yom, November 
11, 2009, Stanford University) 
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This dissertation examines potential factors explaining the variation in external public 
auditing practices across countries world-wide through a mixed methods approach.  
To summarize, this chapter has outlined the importance of the research question and the 
method for defining an innovative question. In 2009 I engaged in an in depth prelimi-
nary research, comprised of participatory observation, 19 expert interviews and a com-
prehensive literature review. The result was that my research question changed from the 
spontaneous interest by me as a subject involved in a development project to a question 
which actually addressed a scientific research gap. My overall research design has 
changed from a normative perspective studying what should be, to a positivist perspec-
tive, examining why things are the way they are. Chapter three will provide background 
information on Supreme Audit Institutions, such as their evolution, role and functions 
and will then go on to analyze whether they qualify as accountability arrangements and 
thus as a case study.   
 
Table 2.1 Overview of Research Results of Chapter Two
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qual data collection qual data analysis 
Procedures: 
 Participatory observation 
 One-on-one semi-structured interviews 
(n=19) 
 Literature reviews 
Procedures: 
 Thematic development 
Products: 
 Project reports 
 Interview Transcripts 
 Literature summaries 
Products: 
 Thematic analysis: identification of six 
main themes 
 Reviewed research design: Identifica-
tion of research gap, research question 
and case study method 
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3. The Case Study - Supreme Audit Institutions as 
Accountability Arrangements  
3.1. The Role and Function of SAIs 
3.2. The Concept of Public Accountability 
3.3. Assessing the Accountability Purpose of SAIs 
3.4. Summary and Conclusions 
 
“Promoting the efficiency, accountability, effectiveness 
and transparency of public administration by strength-
ening Supreme Audit Institutions”55 
3.1. The Role and Function of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) 
From the time of the ancient Egyptians, Greeks and Romans, the practice of auditing the 
accounts of public institutions existed. Checking clerks were appointed in those days to 
check the public accounts. To locate frauds as well as to find out whether the receipts 
and payments are properly recorded by the person responsible was the main objective of 
auditing. (Puttick, Esch, and Kana, 2007:2) The development of Supreme Audit Institu-
tions was part of a long process of economic and political institutional development. 
The famous account of the Habsburg Netherlands in the 16
th
 Century shows how wars 
played a central role in the development of nation-states and economic and political 
institutions. The increase in tax to finance war expenditures led to an increase in the 
state’s bureaucratic capacities. Tilly (1990) famously wrote, “states make war and war 
makes states”. With the increase of tax income, the pressure on kings to render their 
accounts mounted. Finally, in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 Century the first agencies to audit public 
accounts were formed (f.i. 1714 Prussia, 1761 Habsburg, 1776 USA, 1787 UK, 1807 
France, Netherlands 1814).  
Today, nearly every state in the world has a Supreme Audit Institution (SAIs). At pre-
sent, the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (www.INTOSAI.org) 
holds 191 full members (190 national SAIs and the European Court of Auditors) and 4 
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 Title of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution “A/RES/66/209”, adopted on December 22, 
2011 during the 66th UN General Assembly. http://www.un.org/en/ga/66/resolutions.shtml;  
 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/471/36/PDF/N1147136.pdf?OpenElement 
(Last Accessed on June 27, 2012) 
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associate members
56
. INTOSAI is the umbrella organization of SAIs and was founded 
in 1953 at the initiative of Emilio Fernandez Camus, then President of the SAI of Cuba. 
At that time, 34 SAIs met for the 1
st
 INTOSAI Congress in Cuba.  
INTOSAI defines itself as “an autonomous, independent and non-political organiza-
tion”. The organizational structure of INTOSAI is composed of a triannual congress of 
all member SAIs (INCOSAI), a governing board, a general secretariat (with its seat in 
Vienna, Austria), seven regional groups
57
 as well as thematic groups such as INTOSAI 
Goal-Committees, Sub-Committees, Working Groups, Task Forces and Project Groups. 
INTOSAI has a special consultative status with the United Nations and operates in five 
languages (English, French, Spanish, Arab and German). The core values to guide 
INTOSAI’s efforts are Independence, Integrity, Professionalism, Credibility, Inclusive-
ness, Cooperation and Innovation. INTOSAI has also four main strategic goals. They 
are: 
 Strategic Goal 1: Professional Standards 
 Strategic Goal 2: Institutional Capacity Building 
 Strategic Goal 3: Knowledge Sharing/Knowledge Services 
 Strategic Goal 4: Model International Organization  
As part of INTOSAI’s Strategic Goal 1, INTOSAI issues two sets of professional stand-
ards: The International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs) and the 
INTOSAI Guidance for Good Governance (INTOSAI GOV). The ISSAIs and INTOSAI 
GOVs convey the generally recognized principles and shared professional experiences 
of the international community of SAIs. All ISSAIs and INTOSAI GOVs are developed 
and maintained in accordance with the “Due Process for INTOSAI’s Professional 
Standards” and issued after a decision of final endorsement by all SAIs at INTOSAI’s 
congress (INCOSAI). The ISSAIs comprise “the basic prerequisites for the proper 
functioning and professional conduct of Supreme Audit Institutions and the fundamental 
principles in auditing of public entities.” (www.ISSAI.org) On the other hand, the 
INTOSAI GOVs express INTOSAI’s recommendations to governments and others with 
responsibility for the management of public funds and publicly funded activities. 
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 Association des Institutions Supérieures de Contrôle Ayant en Commun l’usage du français 
(AISCCUF), Organization of SAIs of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), The Institute of 
Internal Auditors (IIA) and The World Bank 
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 AFROSAI (African Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions), ARABOSAI (Arab Organization of 
Supreme Audit Institutions), ASOSAI (Asian Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions), 
CAROSAI (Caribbean Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions), EUROSAI (European Or-
ganization of Supreme Audit Institutions), OLACEFS (Organization of Latin American and Car-
ibbean Supreme Audit Institutions), PASAI (Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions). 
AFROSAI also has two sub-groups, namely AFROSAI-E for the English speaking African coun-
tries and CREFIAF representing the Francophone African countries. See Appendix B.36 for a 
list of SAI’s main membership affiliations.  
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(INTOSAI PSC, 2011) The ISSAIs and INTOSAI GOVS as such are thus not legally 
binding but present important norms to INTOSAI members. 
The ISSAI framework is organized in four hierarchical levels. The first level contains 
The founding principles of INTOSAI: ISSAI 1 - The Lima Declaration, which was en-
dorsed by the INCOSAI in 1977. This historical document calls for the establishment of 
effective SAIs, provides guidelines on auditing precepts and builds the basis for the de-
velopment and elaboration of all other ISSAIs. The second level is composed of The 
prerequisites for the functioning of SAIs (ISSAIs 10-99). These include principles and 
guidance on independence, transparency and accountability, ethics and quality control. 
The Lima Declaration and The Mexico Declaration on SAI Independence (ISSAI 10), 
endorsed in 2007, constitute the highest level of commonly shared norms and princi-
ples. The third level (ISSAI 100 – 999) contains Standards on fundamental auditing 
principles, which express the essence of public sector auditing, and the fourth level 
(ISSAIs 1000-5999) contains Auditing guidelines. Their objective is to translate the 
fundamental auditing principles into more specific, detailed and operational guidelines 
that can be used on a daily basis in the conduct of auditing tasks. (INTOSAI PSC, 2011) 
The purpose of audit is outlined in The Lima Declaration (INTOSAI, 1977: Section 1): 
“The concept and establishment of audit is inherent in public financial admin-
istration as the management of public funds represents a trust. Audit is not an 
end in itself but an indispensable part of a regulatory system whose aim is to re-
veal deviations from accepted standards and violations of the principles of legal-
ity, efficiency, effectiveness and economy of financial management early enough 
to make it possible to take corrective action in individual cases, to make those 
accountable accept responsibility, to obtain compensation, or to take steps to 
prevent--or at least render more difficult--such breaches.” 
While all SAIs share the ISSAIs as their common standards, they actually differ strong-
ly in their organizational structure, their mode of operations and the types of audit that 
they traditionally focused on. In order to understand the different roles of SAIs, we first 
need to understand the main differences among types of audit, namely the difference 
between pre-audit and post-audit; between internal and external audit; and between the 
main types of audit methodologies, all of which are outlined in the first sections of The 
Lima Declaration (INTOSAI, 1977: Section 2): 
The Lima Declaration, Section 2. Pre-audit and post-audit 
1. Pre-audit represents a before the fact type of review of administrative or fi-
nancial activities; post-audit is audit after the fact. 
2. Effective pre-audit is indispensable for the sound management of public 
funds entrusted to the state. It may be carried out by a Supreme Audit Institu-
tion or by other audit institutions. 
3. Pre-audit by a Supreme Audit Institution has the advantage of being able to 
prevent damage before it occurs, but has the disadvantage of creating an ex-
cessive amount of work and of blurring responsibilities under public law. 
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Post-audit by a Supreme Audit Institution highlights the responsibility of 
those accountable; it may lead to compensation for the damage caused and 
may prevent breaches from recurring. 
4. The legal situation and the conditions and requirements of each country de-
termine whether a Supreme Audit Institution carries out pre-audit. Post-
audit is an indispensable task of every Supreme Audit Institution regardless 
of whether or not it also carries out pre-audits.  
This excerpt shows that, while both the before the fact and the after the fact audit are 
essential activities, pre-audit might be carried out by another institution than the SAI, 
while post-audit is an indispensable task of every SAI.  
The Lima Declaration, Section 3. Internal audit and external audit 
1. Internal audit services are established within government departments and 
institutions, whereas external audit services are not part of the organization-
al structure of the institutions to be audited. Supreme Audit Institutions are 
external audit services. 
2. Internal audit services necessarily are subordinate to the head of the de-
partment within which they have been established. Nevertheless, they shall 
be functionally and organizationally independent as far as possible within 
their respective constitutional framework. 
3. As the external auditor, the Supreme Audit Institution has the task of examin-
ing the effectiveness of internal audit. If internal audit is judged to be effec-
tive, efforts shall be made, without prejudice to the right of the Supreme Au-
dit Institution to carry out an overall audit, to achieve the most appropriate 
division or assignment of tasks and cooperation between the Supreme Audit 
Institution and internal audit. (INTOSAI, 1977: Section 3) 
SAIs are external audit institutions and their task includes examining the effectiveness 
of internal audit services that are established within government departments and insti-
tutions.  
The main tasks of SAIs are primarily to attest the legal compliance and numerical cor-
rectness of public accounting and finance, and in recent years more and more SAIs have 
started to review the performance of public administration.  
The Lima Declaration, Section 4. Legality audit, regularity audit and perfor-
mance audit 
1. The traditional task of Supreme Audit Institutions is to audit the legality and 
regularity of financial management and of accounting. 
2. In addition to this type of audit, which retains its significance, there is an-
other equally important type of audit--performance audit--which is oriented 
towards examining the performance, economy, efficiency and effectiveness of 
public administration. Performance audit covers not only specific financial 
operations, but the full range of government activity including both organi-
zational and administrative systems. 
3. The Supreme Audit Institution's audit objectives--legality, regularity, econo-
my, efficiency and effectiveness of financial management--basically are of 
equal importance. However, it is for each Supreme Audit Institution to de-
termine its priorities on a case-by-case basis. (INTOSAI, 1977: Section 4) 
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There exist three main types of audit methodologies, namely (1) legality/compliance 
audit, (2) regularity/financial audit and (3) performance audit:
58
 
(1) Legality audit, which is today more commonly known under the label compliance 
audit, examines the question whether legal rules were followed/complied with.  
“In compliance auditing the auditor seeks to locate instances of illegal or irreg-
ular transactions. The purpose is to determine whether the accountable entity 
has conformed to the laws and regulations governing its operations.” (Wang 
and Rankner, 2005:4) 
In compliance auditing the auditor thus 
 “checks whether government revenue and spending have been authorized and 
used for approved purposes. Transactions are reviewed to determine if govern-
ment departments and agencies have conformed to all pertinent laws and regu-
lations. This process includes checking the spending authority in the annual 
budget and any relevant legislation.” (World Bank, 2001) 
 
(2) Regularity audit is today mainly called financial audit or attestation audit. It verifies 
the numerical correctness of an organization’s financial statements. Financial auditing 
seeks to attest to, or verify the accuracy of the data contained in financial statements and 
reports. The objective is to ensure that the government’s financial statements are 
reliable in the sense that they yield a correct picture of the financial activity and the 
condition of the entity. (Wang and Rankner, 2005:4)  
 
Auditors plan and perform attest audits, using their knowledge of accounting 
and auditing and of the government organizations that are being audited. As 
part of these audits, they gather evidence to support the amounts and disclosures 
in the financial statements. Ultimately, the auditor adds credibility to financial 
statements by providing an unqualified audit opinion on the financial statements, 
or at least providing useful information explaining any reservations.  
(Stapenhurst and Titsworth, 2006:101) 
 
(3) Finally, a performance audit (or ‘value-for–money-audit’) examines the overall per-
formance of a program or policy. Performance auditing determines “whether taxpayers 
have received value for their taxes…. Auditors work closely with subject matter experts 
who offer advice and review audit results. (World Bank, 2001) The mandate for per-
formance auditing varies among SAIs. “Sometimes it is confined to reviewing opera-
tional efficiency.” In other cases “it extends to reviewing the effectiveness of govern-
ment programs in achieving their objectives.” (Stapenhurst and Titsworth, 2006:101) In 
performance auditing the auditor typically reviews the “three Es”, i.e. economy (spend-
ing less), efficiency (spending well) and effectiveness (spending wisely) and at times 
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extends the exercise to an overall evaluation of public administration by examining the 
following questions. (EUROSAI, 2004: 1.15): 
 Economy Audit: Do the means chosen represent the most economical use 
of public funds for the given performance?  
 Efficiency Audit: Are the results obtained commensurate with the re-
sources employed?  
 Effectiveness Audit: Have objectives of policy been achieved?  
 Evaluation of the consistency of the policy: Are the means employed by 
the policy consistent with the set objectives?  
 Evaluation of the impact of the policy: What is the economic and social 
impact of a particular policy?  
 Evaluation of the effectiveness of the policy and a cause effect analysis: 
Are the observed results due to the policy, or are there other causes?  
Each of the  three main types of audit involves different methodologies and, as a 
consequence, different sorts of quality controls and management requirements. While 
compliance and financial audit are the traditional forms of audit,  
 
“performance auditing developed partly in response to a demand from parlia-
mentarians of advice on how to increase the efficiency of government and thus 
on how to obtain better value for the taxpayer’s money. A holistic perspective is 
applied and an entity, program or activity is examined in an effort to make sure 
that administrative procedures adhere to managerialist criteria. This type of au-
diting is therefore tightly knit to ‘new public management’ reforms and requires 
different skills than the traditional methods of auditing.” (Wang and Rankner, 
2005:4)  
 
The type of audit work conducted by a SAI, but particularly the reporting tools and fol-
low-up mechanisms, are strongly influenced by the institutional model of the SAI. 
There exist three main organizational models of SAIs
59
; the Judicial model, the Mon-
ocratic model and the Board model. However also within these three main types there is 
strong variation.
 
 
The “Judicial model” is also called “Napoleonic model”, “court of audit” or “court of 
accounts” (“cour des comptes”). SAIs of this type have both judicial and administrative 
authority and are an integral part of the judiciary. This type of SAI is governed by col-
legiate/board bodies composed of judges with members acting on equal term and one 
judge acting as „President“. Central direction and management of the court is focused 
on consensus within the board on important issues like strategy, programme planning 
and publications, as well as on overall organization matters (budget, staff, training, etc.). 
At the same time virtually all decisions related to audit execution are vested in separate 
components (“chambers”), which operate largely independent of each other. Within the 
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separate chambers, there are few layers of supervision over the auditors or audit teams. 
The staff of the courts of audit are mostly qualified lawyers. The tenure of the judges is 
often regulated to serve until retirement age. The traditional purpose of this type of SAI 
is to conduct compliance audits, but today they also conduct financial audits and per-
formance audits. As the name already tells, the judges serving on the court have judicial 
authority to impose penalties or corrections. This type of SAI is independent of both the 
legislative and executive branches of government. As a consequence the SAI’s relation-
ship to parliament is different to the other SAI models. This type of SAI does not de-
pend on the legislature for follow-up, however less parliamentary involvement also can 
mean less pressure and thus less transparency for a SAI. This type of SAI is prevalent in 
the Latin countries of Europe, as well as Greece, Turkey and most former French, Span-
ish and Portuguese colonies. (World Bank, 2001; DFID, 2004; EUROSAI, 2004; 
Stapenhurst and Titsworth, 2006; UK NAO, 2007) 
The “Monocratic” SAI model is also called the “Westminster type” or “audit office” 
SAI model. This SAI typically has a single head, usually with the title “’Auditor Gen-
eral” or “President”. However, the authority actually exercised by this official varies 
widely.  In some, virtually all important decisions (typically including final approval of 
an audit report) are made by, or referred to and approved by, the President (Auditor 
General). In others, substantial authority may be delegated to subordinate officials with-
in a strategic and corporate planning framework for the whole office. These subordi-
nates may have then sufficient independent authority to initiate audits and approve issue 
of some types of resulting report. At times these “audit offices” also have collegial as-
pects. This audit office is an independent body that reports to parliament, which is re-
sponsible for follow-up. At times the audit office is even considered an integral part of 
parliamentary oversight, in other countries it is characterized as having close links to the 
bureaucracy. The staff of this type of SAI are usually trained accountants and auditors 
and the traditional type of audit carried out is financial audit. The audit office has no 
judicial function but, when warranted, its findings may be passed to legal authorities for 
further action. The tenure of office of the head of the SAI is usually term limited but in 
some cases until retirement. This SAI is used in many Commonwealth countries (United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, India, many Anglophone Sub-Saharan African and Carib-
bean, Pacific countries) but also in Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the United States of 
America, and parts of Latin America (e.g. Chile). (World Bank, 2001; DFID, 2004; 
EUROSAI, 2004; Stapenhurst and Titsworth, 2006; UK NAO, 2007) 
The third type of SAI model is the “Board system” or “Collegiate system”. These SAIs 
employ a high level of collegial approach to deciding important issues but have no judi-
cial function. In these SAIs, the “President” (or “Chair”) may still have significant in-
fluence on the decisions made in the collegial process. Between the members of the 
court and the individual auditors, there may be several levels of hierarchy or supervi-
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sion, which are similar in some ways to the “Monocratic model”. This type of SAI also 
resembles the “Monocratic model” in that it is independent of the executive and helps 
parliament perform oversight. This type of audit system is used in Germany and the 
Netherlands as well as many Asian countries (e.g. Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Japan) 
and in Argentina.  (World Bank, 2001; DFID, 2004; EUROSAI, 2004; Stapenhurst and 
Titsworth, 2006; UK NAO, 2007) 
So far I have outlined the functions of the three main ideal typical SAI models
60
. We 
have seen that they differ in their institutional organization and their role in the budget 
cycle particularly their relationship with parliament. In the Westminster system, parlia-
ments typically rely on SAIs to audit public accounts. Then a multiparty public accounts 
committee reviews reports by the audit office, considers testimony by witnesses from 
government departments and agencies, and sends its reports to the full parliament for 
comment and action. Following the plenary stage, parliamentary recommendations and 
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 As Wynne (2011) argues, there is a third type of audit model, the General State Inspectorate. He ex-
plains that while in France, the role of the Court of Accounts has expanded in recent years to also 
conduct other audit duties than compliance auditing (see also chapter 6.5.), in many francophone 
African countries the General Sate Inspectorate has been used to fulfill these additional roles. 
Wynne (2011:95) describes the Court of Accounts and the General Sate Inspectorates in franco-
phone Africa as follows:  
 “-   the Court of Accounts is a division of the Supreme Court or separate court within the judi-
cial system. The individual members of the court (judges or magistrates) are led by a presi-
dent who is generally appointed by the president of the country. The court, with the support 
of its staff, judges the legality and regularity of the transactions and accounts of individual 
public accountants and reports to Parliament on the overall State Account. There is limited 
follow up of the Court’s reports by Parliament. The professional staff traditionally have a 
legal rather than accounting or audit backgrounds, but this is expanding in several coun-
tries.  
- the General State Inspectorate reports either to the president or the country’s prime minister 
(rather than parliament), but it is largely independent of the state bureaucracy and has ac-
cess to all state institutions, public servants and their documents. It usually largely sets its 
own annual programme. The professional staff of the General State Inspectorate are usually 
educated in public financial management at specialist higher education institutions. If ir-
regularities are found they are reported to the relevant ministry or other agency for appro-
priate action to be taken” (Wynne, 2010). 
 There is currently a debate on whether these General State Inspectorates should be considered as 
internal or external audit institutions and what the role of the Court of Accounts in francophone 
Africa should and could be, particularly taking into consideration the overall weak role of par-
liamentary control and the comparable effectiveness of an audit institution which is directly 
linked to the President of the Republic. Wynne criticizes the international financial institutions 
and donors for supporting the development of Courts of Accounts where they were only men-
tioned in the constitution but did not exist in practice instead of taking the local reality into ac-
count and supporting the General State Inspectorates. Wynne also points out that the PEFA 
framework does not consider General State Inspectorates as SAIs and often considers them to be 
internal audit institutions.   
 In Africa the following General State Inspectorates are members of INTOSAI and consider 
themselves to be the SAI for their countries: Burundi, Cameroon, Centrafrique, Guinea, Mali and 
Togo. In my study I considered the SAIs of these countries (apart from Guinea) as monocratic 
institutional models. They are headed by one person who is responsible and thus do not qualify 
for the Board model. They also do not have judicial functions and despite their reporting to the 
Executive, they are more independent than an audit department in the ministry of finance. Thus, 
in my model, SAIs which are categorized as “ministry of finance”-models are actually countries 
which do not have an SAI at all. (see chapter 6 and table B.39 in Appendix B)  
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comments are conveyed to the executive. In the board system the audit board prepares 
and usually sends an annual report to the cabinet, which submits it to parliament. Board 
staff attend all deliberations on fiscal accounts and are expected to explain the board’s 
opinions. In the Judicial style audit institutions, parliaments do not automatically re-
ceive the auditor’s reports, though they may receive a report on the court’s work. There 
are, however, four possible forms of collaboration between the court and parliament: 
The SAI may pass the court’s findings to parliament’s finance committee. A parliamen-
tary committee may ask the SAI to conduct a performance audit. The court’s annual 
report may address the legal concordance between the general accounts of the finance 
department and the treasury. And the court may prepare an annual report for parliament 
on the use of the resources made available by the previous year’s finance act. (World 
Bank, 2001) 
3.2. The Concept of Public Accountability 
Accountability is a crucial concept of the human rights based approach to development 
(HRBA). The HRBA has introduced the location of accountability for failures within a 
social system and views the process of account giving not only as facilitating develop-
ment processes, but as the objective of development per se. (OHCHR, 2006:15)
61
  
From an economic approach, processes of account giving are understood as an instru-
ment. Normative micro-economic theory has as objective  
“to expand choices to consumers, both because choices raise utility directly and 
because competition among providers increases social welfare. In addition, 
benchmark theories of competitive equilibrium require full information on pric-
es, quantities, quality and preferences; and contemporary accounts of service 
delivery also endorse reducing information asymmetries among principles and 
agents.” (Gauri, 2004:13) 
Therefore, participation and account giving are critical in the economic approach, but 
they do not have intrinsic value. They could in principle be reconciled with authoritarian 
styles if those obtained the same goals. (Gauri, 2004:13) 
Thus, there are significant differences between a rights based approach and an economic 
approach to development.
62
 Still, authors such as Gauri (2004) and Seymour and Pincus 
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 See also chapter 2.2. on the HRBA  
62
 “For many economists, any attempt to posit and enforce a human right to basic services is either fanci-
ful or counterproductive, or both. Human rights theorists counter that economists are too quick 
to hide behind the impracticality of realizing rights, particularly economic and social rights, 
when in many cases violations are  primarily the result of explicit political decisions rather than 
resource scarcity or other physical or institutional limitations.” (Seymour and Pincus, 2008:388 
citing: Donnelly, 2003:29) 
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(2008) believe that both approaches share some similarities and are in fact complemen-
tary.
63
 Both approaches have their origin in the enlightenment thought and are commit-
ted to the autonomy of the individual and its choices.
64
 Concerning the concept of ac-
countability, the two views although different can be reconciled. Both are skeptical that 
electoral politics and market rules by themselves provide sufficient accountability for 
the effective and equitable provision of services. Both approaches recommend wider 
access to information, more local organizations for clients/rights-holders, stronger ad-
vocacy, and changes in governance to strengthen the position of service recipi-
ents/rights-holders respectively. (Gauri, 2004)   
In the scholarship of democratization processes, public accountability has mainly been 
used to describe an aspect of democratic governance. Today most scholars “perceive 
public accountability as a key attribute of both democracy and democratic quality, as 
well as an essential ingredient in democracy’s long term viability.” (Schedler, Diamond 
and Plattner, 1999:2)  It has become  
“increasingly clear that without working systems that can provide “credible re-
straints” on the overweening power of the executive, democratic regimes tend to 
remain shallow, corrupt, vulnerable to plebiscitarian styles of rule, and incapa-
ble of guaranteeing basic civil liberties. In short, they tend to remain “low-
quality” democracies.” (O’Donnell, 1994, qtd. in Schedler, Diamond and 
Plattner, 1999:2)  
Deficiencies of public accountability are however by no means confined to the develop-
ing world, but deficiencies of accountability are only “more visible, dramatic and ur-
gent in new than in long-established democracies”. (ibid.) As discussed in the introduc-
tion of this dissertation, what we are observing today is a world where institutions 
providing for horizontal and vertical accountability are in place in most countries, how-
ever, de facto political rights and civic liberties have been declining. Abdukadirov 
(2010) explains that these regimes were originally conceptualized in the literature as 
transitioning towards full democratization, but that today they have come to be recog-
nized as a separate category, distinct from both full democracies and full autocracies 
(see also Carothers, 2002). He further elaborates that various authors have categorized 
them as ‘electoral authoritarian’ (Schedler, 2006), ‘semi-authoritarian’ (Ottaway, 2003), 
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 A human rights based approach to development can direct the tools of economics to contribute to the 
attainment of human rights, which are articulated in international law. On the other hand, eco-
nomic understanding and tools are important for human right defenders to pursue their goals 
more effectively. (Seymour and Pincus, 2008:404) 
64
 “Whether the focus is on rights or preferences, the individual reigns supreme, with all the methodolog-
ical advantages and disadvantages that this implies for the study of society. Economists recog-
nize that the rational agents who motivate their microeconomic models could not freely express 
their preferences without the prior realization of at least some rights. That set includes property 
rights, the realization of which, as with rights more generally, assumes the prior existence of the 
required legal infrastructure to establish and protect them. For their part, rights advocates know 
that individuals cannot realize their rights without access to a minimum level of income.” (Sey-
mour and Pincus, 2008.388) 
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‘competitive authoritarian’ (Levitsky and Way, 2002) or ‘hybrid’ regimes (Diamond, 
2002).  
Vertical accountability, in the form of principal-agent relationships, most importantly 
exercised through elections, mass media and civil society observation, in democracies 
are “a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for keeping state power under 
control.” (ibid.) Institutions of horizontal accountability, a concept developed by 
O’Donnell (1993, 1998) and Richard Sklar (1987), refer to the capacity of state institu-
tions to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of government. According 
to Bovens (2007) already in classical political thought the separation of powers between 
the judiciary, executive, and the legislative was intended to create a system of con-
straints and mutual checks. Today, however, the functional differentiation of the state 
has gone well beyond this simple tripartite division of powers. The list of accountability 
agents has expanded to include election commissions, electoral tribunals, administrative 
courts, constitutional courts, human rights commissions, central banks and many 
more.
65
  
O’Donnell argued that integrity and transparency in government require that state agen-
cies of horizontal accountability interlock and overlap in a systemic fashion. Diamond 
(2009: 303) elaborates on O’Donnell’s argument:  
“Interlocking authority allows different agencies to become reinforcing, so that, 
for example, an audit agency uncovers fraud, a counter corruption commission 
imposes civil penalties for it, the judiciary presses for criminal penalties, and an 
ombudsman stands by to investigate and report if any piece in the process 
breaks down or needs assistance.”  
This dissertation leaves the key issue of most other discussions of horizontal accounta-
bility, namely executive-legislative relations, aside and instead focuses on the independ-
ent institutions providing for public accountability. These specialized bodies are often 
insulated from state officials and from the people as well, at times they are unaccounta-
ble and at risk of being undemocratic themselves. (Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner, 
1999:3) 
So far, we have seen that accountability is an important concept for the human rights 
based and the economic approach to development and that it is a crucial concept for the 
study of democracy. Today there is a tendency of using accountability in many contexts, 
which according to Dubnick (2002) has been a strong impediment to systematic com-
                                                     
65
 For a more detailed discussion of the move from vertical to an abundance of horizontal accountability 
relationships as well as a presentation of various forms of accountability relationships such as 
organizational accountability, political accountability, legal accountability, administrative ac-
countability, professional accountability, corporate accountability, hierarchical accountability, 
collective accountability, individual accountability and the problem of excess of accountability 
see Bovens (2007). 
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parative, scholarly analysis of accountability arrangements. Accountability has become 
a very fashionable word and concept during the last decades. For policy makers ‘ac-
countability’ has become an easily used and seldom reflected ‘icon’ for good govern-
ance (Dubnick, 2002). It serves as a synonym for many other words such as responsibil-
ity, responsiveness, answerability, transparency, controllability, fidelity or participation 
and thus the concept is not adequate for discourse analysis.
66
 Accountability today 
stands as a standard term for any mechanism that makes powerful institutions respon-
sive to their respective publics. (Mulgan, 2000, 2003:8) Equally, scholars of various 
academic disciplines such as public administration, law, political science, education and 
psychology use the concept widely, often without reflecting about the meaning of it. 
Accountability is used in different contexts, with a wide variety of different understand-
ings and nearly every author sets out to produce his or her own definition of accounta-
bility.
67
  
However, during the last few years the scholarly interest of overcoming this deficit has 
grown and there is currently a lively cross-disciplinary debate about the content and 
limits of accountability, as well as a first consensus among the main scholars in the field 
that there are broadly speaking two main concepts of public accountability: “accounta-
bility as a virtue and as a mechanism.”68   
In the former case, mostly dominant, but certainly not exclusively, in the American aca-
demic and political discourse, accountability is used as a normative concept. It often 
serves as a set of standards for the evaluation of the behavior of public stakeholders, 
being accountable is seen as a virtue, as a positive quality of organizations or officials. 
In British, Australian, Canadian and continental European scholarly debates, accounta-
bility is more often used in a narrower, descriptive sense. The focus of this strand of 
accountability studies is on the way in which institutional arrangements operate and 
accountability is seen primarily as a “social mechanism”.69  
While both concepts, accountability as a virtue and as a mechanism, are useful for the 
study of democratic governance, each of them addresses different issues and implies 
different sorts of standards, frameworks and analytical dimensions. The interest of this 
paper is to analyze accountability in the second sense, thus as an institutional arrange-
ment or mechanism. Here accountability refers to a specific set of social relations, of 
                                                     
66
 Behn 2001:3-6; Dubnick 2007a, Mulgan 2000:555; all qtd. in Bovens (2007:453-454)  
67
 Bovens, 2010: 946 quoting Behn 2001:3-6; Dubnick 2005; Mulgan 2000:555, Pollitt 2003:89; and cf. 
Biela and Papadopoulos 2010:4 quoting Bostrom and Garsten 2008; Dowdle 2006b; Ebrahim 
and Weisband 2007; Curtin, Mair et al. 2010 
68
 Dubnick and Frederickson, 2010, in Bovens, 2010 
69
 Bovens, 2010:947-8 based on Aucoin and Jarvis 2005; Bovens 2007b; Day and Klein 1987; Goodin 
2003; Mulgan 2003; Philip 2009; Scott 2000 
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which the most concise definition is, “the obligation to explain and justify conduct”.70 
This basic definition implies a relationship between an actor, the accountor, and a fo-
rum, the account-holder or accountee.
71
 On the basis of this definition Bovens (2007) 
has developed a more elaborate and now widely used definition of accountability ar-
rangements: 
“Accountability is a social relationship between an actor and a forum, in which 
the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum 
can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences.”72 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the elements contained within Bovens’ concept of accountability.      
Figure 3.1 Accountability (Bovens, 2007:454) 
  Actor       forum 
 
  Informing  debating  judging 
  about conduct 
          informal 
       consequences 
          formal 
Thus, according to Bovens (2006, 2007, 2008) a relationship qualifies as an accounta-
bility mechanism if it meets the following three main criteria: 
 Information provision: The actor should be obliged to inform the forum about 
his conduct. 
 Debate: There should be an opportunity for the forum to debate with the actor 
about his conduct as well as an opportunity for the actor to explain and justify 
his conduct in the course of this debate. 
 Consequences: Both parties to the relationship should know that the forum or 
some third party is able to not only pass judgment but also to present the actor 
with salient consequences.  
The question of the purpose and linked to that the adequacy of a particular accountabil-
ity arrangement is an altogether different question to the one defining the constituent 
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 Bovens, 2005:184; 2007:450; see also Schedler (1999) who defines accountability as a two-
dimensional concept, composed of the two pillars “answerability” and “enforcement”. The 
Oxford Dictionary of English (revised second edition 2006) provides a very similar definition: 
“accountable > adjective 1 Required or expected to justify actions or decisions; responsible: 
ministers are accountable to Parliament | parents cannot be held accountable for their children’s 
actions. 2 able to be explained or understood.DERIVATIVES accountability noun, accountably 
adverb.”   
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 Pollitt, 2003:89, qtd. in Bovens, 2007:450 
72
 Bovens, 2007:450 based on Day and Klein 1987:5; Romzek and Dubnick 1998:6; Lerner and Tetlock 
1999:255; McCandless 2001:22; Scott, 2000:40; Pollit 2003:89; Mulgan, 2003:7-14; O’Loughlin 
1990. For a detailed discussion of all the elements in this definition see Bovens, 2007:450-452. 
This definition implies that the focus of accountability studies is more on ex post facto processes 
in governance than on ex ante inputs. Most of the ex ante processes should then be studied sepa-
rately for what they are, forms of deliberation, participation and control Bovens (2007:467) 
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parts of an accountability arrangement.
73
 Bovens (2006, 2007, 2009, 2010) identifies 
three main purposes of accountability. Behind each of the three purposes lies a different 
theoretical perspective on the rationale for accountability and thus a separate perspec-
tive for the actual assessment of the adequacy of an accountability mechanism (table 
3.1). The three main purposes of accountability can be summarized as follows:
74
  
 1) Democratic: Public accountability serves as a democratic means to monitor 
and control government conduct. 
 2) Constitutional: Public accountability should help prevent executive abuses.  
 3) Learning: The purpose of public accountability is to enhance the learning ca-
pacity and effectiveness of the executive branch and its partners in governance.  
The democratic perspective: March and Olsen (1995:141-81) and Mulgan (2003) argue 
that from the democratic perspective, public accountability is essential for citizens to 
control those holding public office. The rationale for vertical accountability through 
elections and other forms of citizen engagement reaches back to the tenets of Rousseau 
and Weber, and has been theoretically defined by Strom (2000, 2003) and Lupia (2003) 
using the principal-agent model. Przeworski (et al. 1999) show that public accountabil-
ity is an essential precondition for the democratic process to work, since it provides citi-
zens and their representatives with the information needed for judging the propriety and 
effectiveness of government conduct. From this perspective, the quality of accountabil-
ity arrangements depends upon their proven ability to consolidate and reaffirm the dem-
ocratic chain of delegation. (Bovens, Schillemans and ‘T Hart, 2008:230) 
The second rationale for public accountability is to prevent corruption and abuse of 
power. This constitutional perspective defined by O’Donnell (1999) and Behn 
(2001:42-3) is derived from the liberal tradition of Locke, Montesquieu and the Ameri-
can Federalists. The main concern here is to prevent the abuse of power through the 
organization of “checks and balances” in the form of institutional countervailing pow-
ers. Witteveen (1991), Baithwaite (1997) and Fisher (2004:506-7) argue that good gov-
ernance arises from a dynamic equilibrium between the various powers of – and in-
creasingly beyond – the state. Thus, from the constitutional point of view, public ac-
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 When analysing the effects of various accountability arrangements, inadequacies can either take the 
form of accountability deficits – a lack of accountability arrangements – or of accountability ex-
cesses – a dysfunctional accumulation of a range of accountability mechanisms. The former is 
often cited in relation to various aspects of European Union governance (Arnull and Wincott, 
2000; Fisher:2004; Harlow, 2002; all quoted in Bovens, 2007:462). The latter is schematised by 
executive agencies and public managers particularly in countries, which have extensively im-
plemented NPM reforms. (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996; Power, 1997; Behn,2001; Halachmi, 
2002; all quoted in Bovens, 2007:462) 
74
 See Bovens, Schilemans and ‘T Hart (2008) and Bovens (2007:463; 2005:192ff; 2006:25-27) for a 
more detailed overview of the three rationales for public accountability. Next to these three ra-
tionales are two additional concerns of accountability, which Bovens accords only indirect im-
portance. The first indirect importance is the assurance of legitimacy of governance; the second 
is public account giving after incidences of tragedy, fiasco and failure.  
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countability arrangements are designed to prevent or at least uncover and redress abuse 
of public authority. (Bovens, Schillemans and ‘T Hart, 2008:231-2) 
The third rationale for public accountability is to enhance government effectiveness 
through learning processes. Van den Berg (1999:40) and Aucoin and Heintzman 
(2000:52-4) believe that the purpose of public accountability is to induce the executive 
branch to learn. Accountability offers a regular mechanism to confront administrators 
with information about their own functioning and forces them to reflect on the successes 
and failures of their past policy. Political scientists (Easton 1965, Luhman 1966, 
Lindblom 1965) have long discussed the advantages of a pluralist democracy compared 
to other political systems as it encourages learning in the process of policy making. Ac-
countability mechanisms induce openness and reflexivity; it facilitates the development 
of institutional learning. To conclude, from the third perspective, accountability is seen 
not so much seen as an adversarial mechanism, but rather an ‘exhortative’ one. It is not 
about ‘keeping the bastards honest’ (constitutional perspective) but about ‘keeping the 
bastards smart and sharp”. (Bovens, Schillemans and ‘T Hart, 2008:232)  
Finally, coming back to the beginning of this chapter, we can conclude that the human 
rights based approach to development applies the concept of accountability from a dem-
ocratic perspective, the economic literature argues for accountability from a learning 
perspective and the comparative study of democratization which recently focused on 
studying the deficiencies in formal institutions, uses the concept of accountability main-
ly from a constitutional perspective.  
3.3. Assessing the Accountability Purpose of SAIs 
Do SAIs share a common understanding of their accountability purpose? Do they even 
consider themselves as accountability arrangements or is there no such consensus? Are 
they oversight agencies, technical auditing offices serving parliament or do they want to 
enforce constitutional accountability themselves? The result of this assessment has con-
sequences for the development of the research design of this dissertation. If SAIs share 
a common understanding as accountability arrangements, then it is worth conducting a 
comparative analysis of SAIs from a global perspective. On the other hand, if there is no 
such common understanding and only some SAIs identify themselves as accountability 
arrangements, then it would be interesting to study only those or to compare different 
types of SAIs. Finally, if this assessment comes to the conclusion, that there is a com-
mon understanding of SAIs that they are not accountability institutions by themselves 
but rather professional institutions serving parliament or another public body, then this 
will also affect the research design as their relationship with this public body, which 
actually enforces accountability, will be central to the research design.  
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In order to assess the accountability role of SAIs, I need a tool or theoretical framework 
which specifies standards and methods on how to define and evaluate accountability 
arrangements. The existence of the three perspectives on the purpose of accountability 
helps to develop an integrated assessment of particular accountability arrangements. It is 
important to point out, however, that these perspectives require different mechanisms 
and that what is considered beneficial from one perspective, may very well be judged 
detrimental from another perspective.
75
 The different perspectives on accountability 
contain normative tension, which is particularly evident between the constitutional and 
the learning perspective.
76
 So, which criterion is to prevail over the others for the case 
of Supreme Audit Institutions?  
Bovens, Schillemans and ‘T Hart (2008) developed an integrated assessment tool, 
which I will use to assess the accountability purpose of SAIs (see table 3.1). They first 
disaggregate public accountability into its constituent parts (information provision, de-
bate and consequences). The authors emphasize that in any given accountability rela-
tionship or set of arrangements, each of these critical components are designed in and 
safeguarded to a particular degree. The authors then articulate evaluation criteria for 
each part using each of the three perspectives on the accountability purpose presented 
above (democratic, constitutional, learning). 
I decided to answer this question through a structured qualitative content analysis
77
 of 
the ISSAIs. The research question of this chapter then is, “Are SAIs defined as account-
ability arrangements in the ISSAIs and if yes, what type of accountability purpose do 
they aspire to serve?” My hypothesis is that SAIs do qualify as accountability arrange-
ments in all three perspectives, but that their main purpose is to serve constitutional ac-
countability. The data analysis was conducted according to the step model of deductive 
category development (Mayring, 2000
78
). First, I developed the question (see above). 
Then I reviewed the literature for existing assessment methods and opted to use the as-
sessment tool by Bovens, Schillemans and ‘T Hart (2008) (see table 3.1). In a next step 
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 Bovens, Schillemans and T’Hart (2008:233-4) give a few examples: Judicial review of laws and regula-
tions may be considered an adequate form of public accountability from a constitutional perspec-
tive, but at the same time as inappropriate from a democratic perspective, as it suffers from what 
Bickell (1985) has called “the counter majoritarian difficulty”, i.e. it limits the exercise of popu-
lar sovereignty through the legislative branch. Another example is overly rigorous democratic 
control, which may backfire when it generates “rule-obsessed organizations [that] turn the timid 
into cowards and the bold into outlaws” (Zegans, quoted in Bovens, Schillemans and T’Hart, 
2008:234). Finally, too much emphasis on corruption control could lead to proceduralism that 
could hamper reflexivity and organizational learning. (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996, qtd. in 
Bovens, Schillemans and T’Hart, 2008:234) 
76
 From a constitutional perspective, accountability serves to curtail executive power by building counter-
vailing powers that are as strong as possible; the learning perspective is about creating a ‘safe’ 
atmosphere conducive to business like re-examination of existing policies and practices. 
(Bovens, Schillemans and ‘T Hart, 2008:230) 
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 See Bovens, 2007 and Mayring, 2000 for a description of the method used 
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 For a summary of the book and the research steps see:http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1089/2383 (Last Accessed on August 11, 2012) 
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I developed coding rules. Finally I conducted the actual coding of ISSAI 1 up to ISSAI 
400, in total 11 documents.
79
 Then I revised and examined the reliability of the findings. 
In a last step, I generated a summary table (table 3.2.). The summary table includes 
those statements which most strongly verify a hypothesis/category. 
The ISSAIs analysis (table 3.2.) shows that overall SAIs as defined in the ISSAIs can be 
considered as accountability arrangements. Furthermore, the analysis shows that SAIs 
understand themselves as arrangements guaranteeing all three types of accountability, 
namely democratic, constitutional and learning accountability. My analysis suggests 
that the main objective of SAIs as laid out in the ISSAIs, is to guarantee constitutional 
accountability. The aspect of learning accountability is only an additional rationale for 
their work, which has however gained in importance with the rise of performance audit-
ing. Finally, SAIs in principle also understand themselves as guaranteeing democratic 
accountability.  
Concerning the first aspect, the provision of information, I conclude that SAIs clearly 
qualify as accountability arrangements. The actor, i.e. the government and its agencies, 
should be obliged to inform the SAI about his conduct. ISSAI 1, Section 10.1. states 
that “SAIs shall have access to all records and documents relating to financial man-
agement and shall be empowered to request orally or in writing, any information 
deemed necessary by the SAI…” The SAI should also inform parliament and the public 
at large about its findings and by doing so enable “democratic accountability”. Howev-
er, as many SAIs are found in (semi-)authoritarian regimes where SAIs do not have the 
possibility to inform “a democratic chain of delegation”, the ISSAIs also include next 
to parliament the option “or any other responsible public body” as potential recipient of 
its findings. However, it is clear that SAIs understand themselves as guarantors of con-
stitutional accountability. They understand themselves as part of a regulatory system 
with the objective to assess whether the behavior of the executive is “in accordance 
with laws, regulations and norms”. Finally, SAIs also consider themselves as guaran-
tors of learning accountability. While it is clear, that objectivity and independence have 
priority for the work of auditors, several ISSAIs point out that auditing involves the 
development of an “atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding”. This is in con-
trast to public finance control and inspection, as it was practiced for instance in the So-
viet Union before its break-up and the transition to democracy.  
The second aspect of an accountability arrangement requires the SAI to have an oppor-
tunity to debate with the executive about its conduct as well as for the auditees to have 
an opportunity to explain and justify their conduct in the course of this debate. Here 
again, the assessment of the ISSAIs (table 3.2) clearly verified the hypothesis. ISSAI 1, 
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 The list off ISSAIs analyzed included all available ISSAIs 1 to ISSAI 400. These are: ISSAI 1, 10, 11, 
20, 21, 30, 40, 100, 200, 300 and 400. (www.issai.org, Last Accessed on October 11, 2010) 
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Section 17.2 states, “The SAI shall give due consideration to the point of view of the 
audited organizations on its findings.” This interaction however does not concentrate 
on conformity with the parliament’s (as principal of the executive) preferences but on 
conformity of the executive’s actions with laws and norms (in the sense of constitution-
al accountability). In addition, SAIs have also started to engage in performance audit-
ing, which resembles more a “performance feedback” in the sense of learning account-
ability. Finally, SAIs also at times engage in advising governments on how to improve 
the use and the management of public funds, while always taking care to guard their 
independence.  
When it comes to the requirement that there be consequences to satisfy the definition of 
an accountability arrangement, the mandate of SAIs differs as to whether they can pre-
sent the auditees with legally valid and enforceable judgments. Still, even for SAIs 
which do not have this mandate, the ISSAIs clearly specify that the SAI should dispose 
of “effective follow-up mechanisms”. (ISSSAI 10, Principle 7) SAIs should be able to 
exercise “credible ‘deterrence’” as guarantors of constitutional accountability by hav-
ing the power “to approach the authority which is responsible for taking the necessary 
measures and require the accountable party to accept responsibility”. (ISSAI1, Section 
11.2) And finally the SAI should clearly have the power to publish its reports. As a con-
sequence, the SAI can be considered “a powerful government watchdog” (as in the 
constitutional sense of accountability). The ISSAIs do not generally propose to develop 
“a ‘safe’ culture of sanctioning” (as in the learning sense of accountability), only the 
area of performance auditing is open to judgment and interpretation therefore less con-
cerned with imposing sanctions but with enabling learning processes.   
The overall picture according to my analysis (table 3.2) is then one of SAIs which quali-
fy as accountability arrangements because SAIs qualify for the main criteria; the execu-
tive “should be obliged to justify or explain its conduct” to the auditors. While the 
ISSAIs in principle acknowledge the objective of SAIs for serving democratic account-
ability and also support the idea of SAIs inducing continuous learning, the primary ob-
jective of SAIs is to observe the integrity of the executive as a powerful, because inde-
pendent, watchdog with the aim to  
“make it possible to take corrective action in individual cases, to make those ac-
countable accept responsibility, to obtain compensation, or to take steps to pre-
vent—or at least render more difficult—such breaches.” (ISSAI 1, Section 1)  
The role of SAIs most closely meets the criteria of the constitutional perspective. They 
concentrate on uncovering irregularities and mismanagement. SAIs furthermore aspire 
to support democratic accountability, they want to contribute to the ability of the princi-
pal (parliament, public opinion) to steer or control the agent (executive). Finally, their 
work also includes aspects which satisfy the criteria offered by the learning perspective 
as SAIs might also have advisory, reflective roles.  
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Table 3.1 The Purpose of Accountability from Three Perspectives (table based on tables 1-3 in Bovens, Schillemans and ‘T Hart, 2008) 
 Democratic perspective: accountability and 
popular control 
Constitutional perspective: accountability 
and equilibrium of power 
Learning perspective: effective governance 
Central idea Accountability controls and legitimizes gov-
ernment actions by linking them effectively 
to the ‘democratic chain of delegation’. 
Accountability is essential in order to with-
stand the ever-present tendency toward 
power concentration and abuse of powers in 
the executive branch. 
Accountability provides public office-holders 
and agencies with feedback-based induce-
ments to increase their effectiveness and 
efficiency.  
Central evaluation 
criterion 
The degree to which an accountability ar-
rangement or regime enables democratically 
legitimized bodies to  monitor and evaluate 
executive behavior and induce executive 
stakeholders to modify that behavior in ac-
cordance with their preferences.  
The extent to which an accountability ar-
rangement curtails the abuse of executive 
power and privilege. 
The degree to which an accountability ar-
rangement stimulates public executives and 
bodies to focus consistently on achieving 
desirable societal outcomes. 
Concrete evaluation questions: 
a. Are democratically legitimized principals 
informed about the conduct of executive 
stakeholders, and about the social conse-
quences of that conduct? 
Does the accountability forum have enough 
investigative powers and information-
processing capacity to credibly evaluate ex-
ecutive behavior, particularly regarding con-
formity of executive action with laws, regula-
tions and norms? 
Does the accountability arrangement yield 
both stakeholders and clients and key exter-
nal stakeholders an accurate, timely and 
clear diagnosis of important performance 
dimensions? 
b. Do the debates between accountability fo-
rum and stakeholders focus on whether the 
behavior of the latter accords with the dem-
ocratically legitimized principals’ standards 
and preferences? 
Does the accountability forum have incen-
tives to engage executive stakeholders in 
relevant questioning and debate and is their 
interaction focused on conformity of actions 
with laws and norms? 
Does the accountability arrangement provide 
a setting and a set of interaction routines 
which induces ongoing, consequential dia-
logue among executive stakeholders and key 
stakeholders about performance feedback? 
c. Does the accountability arrangement provide 
sufficiently significant incentives for execu-
tive stakeholders to commit themselves to 
the agenda of their democratically legiti-
mized principals? 
Does the accountability forum possess credi-
ble sanctions to punish and deter executive 
misbehavior? 
Is the accountability forum sufficiently strong 
to make accountors anticipate, yet sufficient-
ly ‘safe’ to minimize defensive routines so 
that accountors adopt the lessons learned 
from performance feedback and stakeholder 
dialogue? 
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Table 3.2 Accountability Components: Criteria and Summary Conclusions for ISSAIs Analysis (based on Bovens, Schillemenas and ‘T Hart, 2008:238) 
Assessment 
Criteria: 
Are SAIs accountability arrange-
ments? 
Are SAIs guarantors of democratic 
accountability and popular con-
trol? 
Are SAIs guarantors of constitu-
tional accountability and equilibri-
um of power?  
Are SAIs guarantors of learning 
accountability and effective gov-
ernance? 
Information 
provision 
The actor should be obliged to in-
form the forum about his conduct. 
Democratic chain of delegation is 
informed about the conduct and 
consequences of executive stake-
holders.  
Forum gains insight into whether 
actor’s behavior is in accordance 
with laws, regulations and norms.  
Information gathering and provision 
routines yield an accurate, timely 
and clear diagnosis of important 
performance dimensions. 
Assessment YES: ISSAI 1: Section 10: "1. SAIs 
shall have access to all records and 
documents relating to financial 
management and shall be empow-
ered to request, orally or in writing, 
any information deemed necessary 
by the SAI…"  
PARTLY: ISSAI 1, Section 16.1. "The 
SAI shall be empowered and re-
quired by the Constitution to report 
its findings annually and inde-
pendently to Parliament or any 
other responsible public body; this 
report shall be published…” 
YES: ISSAI 1, 1.1.: "Audit is not an 
end in itself but an indispensable 
part of a regulatory system whose 
aim is to reveal deviations from 
accepted standards and violations 
of the principles of legality, efficien-
cy, effectiveness and economy of 
financial management ..."  
YES: ISSAI 200: "2.25. The SAI… 
should, however, seek to create ... 
amicable relationships with them. 
Good relationships can help the SAI 
to obtain information freely and 
frankly and to conduct discussion in 
an atmosphere of mutual respect 
and understanding.” 
Debate There should be an opportunity for 
the forum to debate with the actor 
about his conduct as well as an 
opportunity for the actor to explain 
and justify his conduct in the course 
of this debate.  
Interaction concentrates on con-
formity of action with principal’s 
preferences.  
Interaction concentrates on con-
formity of actions with laws and 
norms.  
Ongoing, substantial dialogue with 
clients and other stakeholders 
about performance feedback.  
Assessment YES: ISSAI 1, Section 17.2. "The SAI 
shall give due consideration to the 
points of view of the audited organ-
izations on its findings."  
NO, because independent: ISSAI 1, 
Section 8: "The independence of 
SAI as provided under the Constitu-
tion and law also guarantees a very 
high degree of initiative and auton-
omy, even when they act as an 
agent of Parliament and perform 
audits on its instructions."   
YES, but not exclusively: ISSAI 1, 
Section 4: "1. The traditional task of 
SAIs is to audit the legality and reg-
ularity of financial management 
and of accounting. 2. In addition to 
this type of audit, …there is another 
equally important type of audit -
performance audit - …"  
YES, but with reservations: ISSAI 
200, 2.15. “The SAI should be 
ready to advise the executive … 
The SAI must ensure that in giving 
such advice it avoids any explicit 
or implied commitment that 
would impair the independent ex-
ercise of its audit mandate." 
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Consequences Both parties to the relationship 
should know that the forum or 
some third party is able to not only 
pass judgment but also to present 
the actor with salient consequences.  
Ability of democratic chain of dele-
gation to modify the actor’s policies 
and/or incentive structures. 
Forum should be able to exercise 
credible ‘deterrence’ vis à vis the 
actor.  
Sufficiently strong outside stake-
holders to make accountors antici-
pate, yet sufficiently ‘safe’ culture of 
sanctioning to minimize defensive 
routines.  
Assessment YES: ISSAI 10, Principle 7: “The ex-
istence of effective follow-up 
mechanisms on SAI recommenda-
tions” 
PARTLY: ISSAI 1, Section 16.1. "The 
SAI shall be empowered and re-
quired by the Constitution to report 
its findings annually and inde-
pendently to Parliament or any 
other responsible public body; this 
report shall be published. This will 
ensure extensive distribution and 
discussion, and enhance opportuni-
ties for enforcing the findings of the 
SAI." 
YES: ISSAI 1, Section 11.2."To the 
extent the findings of the SAI's find-
ings are not delivered as legally 
valid and enforceable judgments, 
the SAI shall be empowered to ap-
proach the authority which is re-
sponsible for taking the necessary 
measures and require the account-
able party to accept responsibility."  
PARTLY: ISSAI 400, 21.: 
"…performance audit is wide-
ranging in nature and is more open 
to judgment and interpretation; … 
As a consequence performance 
audit reports are varied and contain 
more discussion and reasoned ar-
gument.” 
Cumulative 
effect 
The actor is obliged to justify or 
explain conduct.  
Actor acceptance of principal’s right 
to control its policies and perfor-
mance. 
Actor awareness that powerful 
watchdog(s) observe its integrity 
and check its powers. 
Actor commitment to continuous 
improvement by dialogue-induced 
focus on outcome achievement. 
Assessment YES: ISSAI 1, Section1: "Audit is not 
an end in itself but an indispensable 
part of a regulatory system whose 
aim is to … make it possible to take 
corrective action in individual cases, 
to make those accountable accept 
responsibility, to obtain compensa-
tion, or to take steps to prevent--or 
at least render more difficult--such 
breaches." 
YES, IN PRINCIPLE: ISSAI 1, Pream-
ble: “whereas …the communication 
of information to public authorities 
and the general public through the 
publication of objective reports, are 
necessary for the stability and the 
development of states in keeping 
with the goals of the United Na-
tions;” 
    
YES: ISSAI 1, Preamble: “…it is in-
dispensable that each country have 
a Supreme Audit Institution whose 
independence is guaranteed by 
law;”  
PARTLY: ISSAI 200: "2.15. A degree 
of co-operation between the SAI 
and the executive is desirable in 
some areas. The SAI should be 
ready to advise the executive in 
such matters as accounting stand-
ards and policies and the form of 
financial statements."  
The understanding of SAIs as guarantors of constitutional accountability is also reflect-
ed in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/209
80
 on “Promoting 
the efficiency, accountability, effectiveness and transparency of public administration 
by strengthening Supreme Audit Institutions”, adopted in December 2011. This path-
breaking resolution stresses that SAIs need to be “independent and protected against 
outside influence in order to accomplish their tasks objectively and effectively”. The 
General Assembly resolution, which was initiated under the leadership of INTOSAI 
reflects the increased self-confidence of SAIs today. The development of this self-
confidence or empowerment of SAIs started with INTOSAI’s strategic plan of 2005, 
whereby INTOSAI decided to complement its focus of mutual exchange facilitation 
among SAIs with a strengthening of its external profile and communication. This in-
creased self-confidence of SAIs is also reflected in the endorsement of the Mexico Dec-
laration on SAI Independence in 2007
81
, in the Johannesburg Accords and the South 
African Declaration on the ISSAIs, both of which were adopted during the XX. 
INCOSAI in November 2010 in South Africa
82
. Equally, in the January 2012 issue of 
the INTOSAI Journal on Government Auditing
83 
Terence Nombembe, Chairman of the 
INTOSAI Governing Board and Auditor General of South Africa, identified the main 
purpose of SAIs as being “an independent voice of reason”, again highlighting the main 
objective of SAIs to be a powerful watchdog of government as defined by the constitu-
tional purpose of accountability. 
This exercise shows that the tool by Bovens, Schillemans and ‘T Hart (2008) facilitated 
a systematic and nuanced assessment for defining the type of accountability arrange-
ment that corresponds to SAIs. I now will point out some caveats and limitations of this 
exercise. Bovens, Schillemans and ‘T Hart acknowledge that the three perspectives of 
accountability assessed above do not completely assess all normative ideas of public 
accountability. The authors give two additional aspects of accountability, which have 
not been taken into account. The first analyzes accountability relationships for its effects 
upon the legitimacy of the political system at large and the second meaning of account-
ability which has been neglected is the process of account giving in order to provide 
public catharsis after natural disasters or political injustices.  
Secondly, my analysis is not immune to the usual challenges of research. There may be 
errors of operationalization, wrong causal attribution and bias. Precisely because my 
interest is in proofing that SAIs are accountability arrangements, otherwise they could 
not serve as a case study for my overall research question, I might have been inclined to 
                                                     
80 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/471/36/PDF/N1147136.pdf?OpenElement (Last 
Accessed April 18, 2012) 
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 http://www.issai.org/media(626,1033)/ISSAI_10_E.pdf (last accessed on 16 Sept.2011) 
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 http://www.intosai.org/blueline/upload/jhbaccordsen.pdf (last accessed on 16 Sept.2011) 
83
 http://www.intosaijournal.org/ (last accessed January 31, 2012) 
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oversee arguments falsifying my hypothesis. Santiso (2009:37) for instance argues that 
SAIs are “oversight agencies or agencies of restraint, and not accountability institu-
tions.” He defines accountability as entailing “the power to sanction non-compliance 
with rules” and oversight as being “primarily concerned with controlling, informing 
and restraining”. According to his view, SAIs are primarily auxiliary institutions to 
legislatures, which are ultimately responsible for enforcing accountability and imposing 
political sanctions on the government. My analysis of the self-understanding of SAIs as 
laid out in the ISSAIs only partially agrees with his view. While SAIs in principle 
should support democratic accountability, they can also be considered as accountability 
arrangements in their own right. They should have the power to publish reports, thereby 
creating negative publicity for the government, a powerful sanction at its own right. 
And the ISSAIs specify that SAIs are not mere agents of parliament but independent 
institutions, with the power to approach parliament and demand that it follows up on its 
findings. Furthermore, those SAIs which also have judicial powers clearly qualify as 
accountability arrangements as they have direct sanctioning powers.  
Bovens (2005, 2007a) also discusses the accountability purpose of audit offices (SAIs). 
He explains that due to the fact that in the last decade many audit offices have taken on 
new tasks, most importantly the conduct of performance auditing, which also requires 
new skills and new dilemmas, auditors find it difficult to combine both the traditional 
auditing role and the new role of management consultant. Originally these institutions 
and other agencies were considered to be a form of diagonal accountability, whereby 
they are meant to foster parliamentary control, but are not part of the direct chain of 
principal-agent relationships (Magnette et al. 2003:836, qtd. in Bovens, 2007a:196). 
These agencies were instituted to help the political principals control the great variety of 
administrative agents, but with time they have acquired a legitimacy of their own, they 
have become independent accountees in the sense of horizontal accountability (see 
Bovens, 2007a:197).  
The third limitation of my analysis concerns its reliance on “a monocentric, state-
oriented mode of governance” while recent research on European governance and pub-
lic-private partnerships point out “the increasingly pluricentric, multilevel, networked, 
hybrid and fluid nature of governance” (Bovens, Schillemans and ‘T Hart, 2008:239). 
The same reservations qualify for governance in developing countries, where donor 
influence and informal networks in a situation of weak rule of law question the explana-
tory potential of the assessment tool.   
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3.4. Summary and Conclusions 
To conclude, the objective of this chapter was to assess whether SAIs qualify as ac-
countability arrangements and to define what accountability purpose (democratic, con-
stitutional, learning) they pursue. I have come to the conclusion, that SAIs committed 
themselves in the ISSAIs to serving public accountability in all three senses, whereby 
their main rationale is to be a guarantor of constitutional accountability, in the sense of a 
“powerful government watchdog” (Bovens, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008).  
This tool can also be useful for the analysis of particular SAIs as part of a requirements 
analysis at the initiation stage of capacity building projects. Indeed, without having as-
sessed how the head and staff of a SAI understand the purpose of the SAI, it will be 
impossible to develop a common understanding of the scope of a capacity building pro-
ject. Different stakeholders have different perspectives and understandings. This not 
only concerns differences across SAIs but also the fact that different stakeholders have 
different perceptions of the very same SAI.  
The constructivist approach in political science recognizes that reality is always selec-
tive and therefore unreal. For the individual person, and every person needs to develop 
an understanding of its own self, it is however real. Nevertheless, this reality is con-
structed and not real in the holistic sense. Hence, many different realities or comprehen-
sions of the world exist, that can stay in tension to each other. (Filzmayer et al. 2006:98) 
From a constructivist approach, the purpose of a SAI can therefore also be seen as a 
social construct. In the face of reform initiatives, the various stakeholders do not only 
act according to their rational interests (realist school) but are also strongly influenced 
by psychological processes. The central question from a constructivist point of view 
according to Filzmaier (et al. 2006:98) is, how societies adopted and developed their 
identities and interests. Transferring this question to our case, the question is then, how 
different SAIs adopted and developed different conceptions of their accountability pur-
pose. Here I have already anticipated some of the points which will be discussed further 
down this dissertation. I assume that SAIs do not only differ in their technical capacities 
and institutional designs, but that their roles are equally framed by the social construc-
tion of their accountability purpose (their vision, mission and organizational strategy).  
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Table 3.3 Overview of Research Results of Chapter Three 
Part One (Chapters 3.1. and 3.2.) 
qual data collection qual data analysis 
Procedures: 
 Literature reviews 
 
Procedures: 
 Thematic development 
 Theory analysis 
Products: 
 Literature summaries 
Products: 
 Thematic analysis of the role and func-
tion of SAIs 
 Definition of the concept of public ac-
countability and development of a 
method to assess the accountability 
purpose of SAIs 
 
 
 
 
 
Part Two (Chapters 3.3. and 3.4.) 
qual data collection qual data analysis 
Procedures: 
 Read ISSAIs 
Procedures: 
 Deductive qualitative content analysis 
of ISSAIs – code the ISSAIs by using the 
assessment tool (table 3.1.) 
Products: 
 Decision which ISSAIs to use 
 
Products: 
 Coded ISSAIs 
 List of ISSAI quotes which fit into each 
(sub-)category 
 Discussion of results 
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4. Taking Stock – The Power of SAIs World-Wide 
4.1. Measuring the Accountability Practice of SAIs  
4.2. The Gap – a Literature Review  
4.3. A Comparative Assessment of the Power of SAIs  
4.4. Summary and Conclusions  
 
“[S]upreme audit institutions can accomplish their tasks 
objectively and effectively only if they are independent of 
the audited entity and are protected against outside in-
fluence;”84 
4.1. Measuring the Accountability Practice of SAIs  
So far I have developed the overall research question, namely: “How do institutions 
providing for public accountability develop, consolidate and endure?” I have also decid-
ed to conduct a case study of Supreme Audit Institutions. I have introduced the reader to 
SAIs and to the concept of public accountability. An assessment of the accountability 
purpose of SAIs has revealed that both the SAIs’ self understanding as agreed in the 
International Standards for Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs) and the recent United 
Nations General Assembly resolution representing the agreements by the heads of states 
clearly recognize the important role of SAIs as serving constitutional accountability. 
While there is official consensus on the purpose of SAIs, the question now is whether 
this accountability understanding is also institutionalized in the form of standards im-
plementation.  
In a next step I therefore will compare the accountability practice of SAIs across coun-
tries. In order to compare SAIs I first need to decide the criteria by which I will compare 
them. My specific objective is to analyze to what extent the practice of SAIs reflects 
their commitment to guarantee accountability as laid out in the ISSAIs. I expect that 
there will be quite some difference between the formal commitment to guaranteeing 
constitutional accountability by SAIs as laid out in the ISSAIs and the practice of audit-
ing.  
                                                     
84
 66th United Nations General Assembly, Security Council Resolution A/66/209 on  “Promoting the 
efficiency, accountability, effectiveness and transparency of public administration by strengthening 
Supreme Audit Institutions”; December 22, 2011; http://www.un.org/en/ga/66/resolutions.shtml (Last 
Accessed on January 23, 2012) 
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In order to measure the accountability practice of SAIs, I am interested in not only look-
ing at de jure provisions but at the de facto application of these provisions. In many 
countries there is a huge gap between laws and regulations and their actual application – 
de jure often does not reflect de facto practices. SAIs but also other accountability ar-
rangements (anti-corruption bodies, the judiciary, ombudsmen, electoral commissions 
etc.) often fail to investigate abuses of power in the public or private bodies over which 
they exercise jurisdiction for reasons of weak rule of law leading to both elite capture 
and political bias.
85
 The budget process is particularly prone to capture and rent seek-
ing,
86
 which makes public finance control extremely difficult and explains why there is 
often a gap between the formal and the actual power of SAIs. SAIs thus face a difficult 
challenge. They need to assert themselves against powerful groups within the state, 
which try to keep privileges and the status quo unchanged. In order to measure the ac-
countability practice of SAIs I therefore not only need to compare the national situation 
with the provisions in the ISSAIs but to also take the gap between the de jure and the de 
facto situation into account.  
De facto applies if specific rules of the game do not only exist by law but are also prac-
ticed, i.e. when they are actually institutionalized. Andrews, McConnell and Wecott 
(2010:52) develop a simple model explaining the five stages in a change process. The 
five stages are pre-conceptualization, conceptualization, initiation, transition and institu-
tionalization. Based partly on Isabella (1990), Schein (1996) and Armenakis and 
Bedeian (1999) they define institutionalization as the final stage in the process of 
change, where the change becomes  
“the de facto reality, through reinforcement of the new ideas, processes, etc. (in 
formalized authorizing mechanism, organizational narratives and ability pro-
files, for example), measurement of results (particularly against the needs identi-
fied as a reason for change), and refinement of the change.” 
I call the de facto strength of SAIs their power. Basically, I consider the power of SAIs 
as their capacity to conduct audits without systematic political bias or capture. The con-
cept of power is one of the main contested termini in political science, as it is not only 
subject of controversial debates but it is also developed from descriptive-analytically 
different perspectives. There exist a wide range of theoretical approaches debating the 
concept of power (for an overview see Nohlen and Schultze, 2005:522-530).  
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 See Goetz and Jenkins (2005) for a detailed discussion of the meanings of capture and bias. 
86
 Economists often define rents as excess returns above normal levels in competitive markets. More 
specifically, rent is “a return in excess of the resource owner’s opportunity cost.” (Tollison, 
1982) 
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I use power in the sense of “the action oriented concept” whereby power is conceived 
as a “practical-technical opportunity of having an impact supported by instruments”.87 
According to this concept, power can be understood as the “current resources to obtain 
some future apparent Good”88 and as “each chance, within such a social relation to 
impose your own will, also against resistance, regardless of what this chance relies 
on”89. It is particularly this second part of this definition derived from Weber (1921, 
qtd. in Nohlen and Schultze, 2005:522) which is most relevant to me.  
The means which enable social stakeholders to realize their objectives can be under-
stood as power resources. They include legitimacy, expertise, information, authority and 
the possibility to reward and sanction
90
 and thus ressemble the definition of an account-
ability arrangement (see chapter 3.2, particularly figure 3.1). These power resources and 
the criteria as defined in chapter three can serve to construct indices comparing the 
“power of SAIs” across countries. Thus, the power of SAIs can, as generally conceived, 
be measured by their output (such as the delivery of end of year reports on time) or by 
their capacity (such as their number of staff, infrastructure, audit methodologies ap-
plied), but most importantly it should be measured by their power resources, i.e. wheth-
er public organs are obliged to justify and explain their conduct to the SAI.
91
  
I started developing a framework with detailed survey questions for assessing and ulti-
mately ranking the power resources and accountability practice of SAIs. However, be-
fore going on to develop a ranking of SAIs and comparing their power across countries, 
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 Author’s translation from German into English: “… der handlungstheoretische Begriff von Macht als 
instrumentell verstärkte praktisch-technische Wirkungsmöglichkeit.“ (Nohlen and Schultze, 
2005:522) 
88
 Author’s translation from German into English: „gegenwärtigen Mitteln zur Erlangung eines zukünfti-
gen anscheinenden Guts.“ (Hobbes: Leviathan, chapter 10 qtd. in Nohlen and Schultze, 
2005:522) 
89
 Author’s translation from German into English: „jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den 
eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzten, gleichviel worauf diese Chance be-
ruht“ (Weber 1980:28, first published 1921/22 qtd. In Nohlen and Schultze, 2005:522) 
90
 While traditional models of power relationships have concentrated on the analysis of a hierarchical 
power relationship, new dependency and network models (including coalition and negotiation 
models) acknowledge the complex process of power transformation and circulation, which 
seems more adequate for the analysis of modern systems. (Nohlen and Schultze, 2005:523) 
91
 The most important aspects of the power resources of a SAI (i.e. information provision and 
consequences, see figure 3.1) have been defined by the INCOSAI in the INTOSAI Mexico 
Declaration for SAI independence (ISSAI 10, endorsed in 2008). The eight crucial principles for 
de facto independence and power of a SAI are: „1.The existence of an appropriate and effective 
constitutional/statutory/legal framework and of de facto application provisions of this framework  
 2. The independence of SAI heads and members (of collegial institutions), including security of 
tenure and legal immunity in the normal discharge of their duties. 3. A sufficiently broad 
mandate and full discretion, in the discharge of SAI functions. 4. Unrestricted access to 
information. 5. The right and obligation to report on their work. 6. The freedom to decide the 
content and timing of audit reports and to publish and disseminate them. 7. The existence of 
effective follow-up mechanisms on SAI recommendations. 8. Financial and 
managerial/administrative autonomy and the availability of appropriate human, material, and 
monetary resources.“ http://www.issai.org/media(626,1033)/ISSAI_10_E.pdf (Last Accessed on 
November 01, 2012) 
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I will first of all conduct a literature review. What data do other studies use and what do 
they conclude? To what extent have SAIs implemented the ISSAIs and to what extent 
have they realized their roles as accountability arrangements? Which countries have 
succeeded in implementing the ISSAIs quite well and which countries have the largest 
gap between the ISSAIs and national implementation? 
4.2. The Gap – a Literature Review 
Recent studies and data reveal major weaknesses in government auditing in many coun-
tries. The 2010 Open Budget Survey (IBP, 2010:6) suggests that overall SAIs are rather 
weak. Among the 94 countries assessed in the 2010 Survey, the average score for the 
strength of SAIs was just 49 of 100. Only 24 of the 94 countries surveyed have strong 
SAIs while 32 countries have weak SAIs. Some of the challenges of SAIs as presented 
in the Open Budget Survey 2010 are
92
: 
- A lack of independence from the Executive:  
In 24 countries the executive decides the SAI head. In 35 countries the executive 
also decides the budget of the SAI, of which 19 SAIs consider the funding not to 
be sufficient. In 11 countries the SAI has limited freedom to decide what it will 
audit.  
- A lack of follow-up by the legislature:  
In 21 countries there is no follow-up at all and in 19 countries there is only min-
imal follow-up on the audit findings by the legislature. 
- This leads to the fact that audit reports risk having no consequences:  
In 78 countries the executive does not reveal steps taken to the public and in 72 
countries neither the SAI nor the legislature reports steps taken.  
- In 34 countries the public is not informed about the annual accounts of its gov-
ernment as the final audited accounts are not completed within 24 months after 
the end of the fiscal year or they are not released to the public.  
- Furthermore, in 45 countries the public cannot give input to the SAI’s work as 
the SAI does not maintain formal mechanisms of communication with the pub-
lic.  
Other studies and data also reveal major weaknesses in government auditing in many 
countries. For example, de Renzio (2009) analyzing PEFA
93
 data shows that while most 
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 Covering 94 countries and using data as of September 15, 2009; http://www.internationalbudget.org 
(Last Accessed on  June 13, 2012). For a detailed discussion of the survey and the ranking see 
chapter 4.2.  
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 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Program was started in 2001 as a multi-donor 
partnership with the goals goal “to strengthen recipient and donor ability to (i) assess the 
condition of country public expenditure, procurement and financial accountability systems, and 
(ii) develop a practical sequence of reform and capacity-building actions.” One important tool 
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countries fare quite well in regard to the initial stages of the budget process, their per-
formance is rather weak when it comes to the final stages of the budget process includ-
ing external scrutiny and audit. Similarly, Andrews (2010) differentiates in his study of 
public finance management (PFM) reforms in Africa between various performance 
leagues. Thus, some countries are making more progress than others. Still, there are 
some findings which are typical for nearly all African countries, one of which is that 
budget preparation processes are comparatively stronger than budget execution and 
oversight processes.
94
  
The INTOSAI Development Initiative’s Stocktaking Report (IDI, 2010) also shows 
substantial variations among SAIs in the different INTOSAI Regions and across World 
Development Indicator (WDI) classifications as well as some astonishing results
95
:   
 While financial audit coverage is high among SAIs in AFROSAI-E and 
ARABOSAI, the corresponding figures for SAIs in CAROSAI and CREFIAF are 
much lower.  
 … Compliance audit coverage appears to be slightly lower than for financial 
auditing, with the exception of SAIs in the OLACEFS Region. 
 While 91 percent of the respondents have the mandate to carry out performance 
auditing, the data suggests that many SAIs are of the view that they do not ade-
quately meet demands, expectations and their own plans in terms of perfor-
mance auditing.  
 … 75 percent of the respondents, or 130 SAIs, indicated that their annual re-
ports were issued to the legislature or other designated recipients in a timely 
fashion. Timeliness appears particularly high among SAIs in ASOSAI and 
EUROSAI where no SAIs have reported delays. (IDI, 2010:6-7) 
This Stocktaking Report also cautiously questions the current methods of capacity 
building as not showing clear results. While the success of capacity building of SAIs 
according to the PEFA indicators seems to vary strongly across countries
96
, the SAIs 
themselves report largely positive results. This positive effect is confirmed by case stud-
ies on the comprehensive follow up by peers on SAI capacity building, which also sug-
gests that SAI support to other SAIs can have a crucial impact. (World Bank, 2010) 
                                                                                                                                                           
of the PEFA program is the development of PEFA assessment reports of country performances. 
For more information visit www.pefa.org (Last Accessed March 06, 2011)    
94
 Andrews, 2010:1 
95
 The Stocktaking Report was distributed to 204 SAIs globally and eight INTOSAI regions and subre-
gions. This includes, in addition to the INTOSAI members, those SAIs that are members of an 
INTOSAI Region but not INTOSAI, as well as SAIs that are not members of INTOSAI or any of 
the INTOSAI Regions. It achieved an overall response rate of above 90 percent.  
96
 “The overall analysis of PEFA Indicator 26 for the 14 LI and LMI countries that have been assessed 
twice or more in 2005-2010 shows improvements for five SAIs. The results are however varied, 
and for six countries the results have remained identical, while three countries have had their 
scores reduced. “Taking into consideration that the SAIs in all these countries have been recipi-
ents of capacity development support during this period, this raises questions about the impact 
and sustainability of the support. … These results are also in contrast to the perceived success of 
capacity development support as reported by both providers and recipient SAIs in the stocktak-
ing, where around 92 percent of projects are categorized as successful.” (IDI, 2010:7-8) 
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There is thus a discrepancy between positive and negative findings on the success of 
SAI reforms, the reason for which might be due to the limited sample for the PEFA data 
used as well as the time aspect of reform. IDI (2010:8) suggests that support needs to be 
long-term and predictable. Thus it may take more than ten years according to the au-
thors to see any real impact of capacity development interventions. Apart from the time 
factor, other authors criticize the largely technical approach taken in reforming budget 
institutions in poor countries.
97
 Positive experiences with reforms would then result 
from political economy approaches, which emphasize a systemic approach to reform. If 
the SAI is not independent, then the priority of reform might not be improving the in-
ternal governance of the SAI but rather strengthening the demand for accountability. 
Andrews (2010:ii) concludes in his review of PFM reforms in Africa that there needs to 
be a shift in focus from technicalities to creating  reform ‘space’, that reform needs to 
expand engagements across a larger set of stakeholders and that a stronger emphasis 
needs to be placed on analyzing the particular political economy of reform, on the basis 
of which context-appropriate reforms can be developed.  
In sum, only recently scholars have started comparing SAIs and their success of reforms 
across countries and time. This brief literature review has already shown that the politi-
cal economy of reform is crucial to SAI reform success.  
“Ultimately the success of efforts to build the capacity of the audit body will de-
pend on whether the parliament is prepared to utilize the auditor’s report.” 
(World Bank, 2010: 33)  
Appearances might thus be deceiving. SAIs might be in place in nearly all countries, 
and some are even granted with large constitutional powers. However, this power might 
only be in place de jure, while de facto they might fail to realize their aspired role as 
accountability arrangements.  
To conclude, this brief look at existing studies suggests that there is a variation across 
SAIs but that very few SAIs qualify to date as powerful accountability arrangements. 
Next, I will further examine this statement which resulted from a literature review of 
SAIs by looking more closely at survey data of SAI performance. Chapter 4.3 will now 
review and compare existing data on SAIs and based on these findings develop, con-
struct and compare indices measuring the power of SAIs.   
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 such as Allen (2008, 2009); Santiso (2006, 2009); Pretorius & Pretorius (2008); Shah (2007); 
Stapenhurst et al (2008) 
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4.3. A Comparative Assessment of the Power of SAIs  
There exists a wide range of data on public finance transparency and accountability 
(such as the World Bank IDA’s Country Profile and Institutional Analysis (CPIA)98, 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Kaufmann Governance Data 
etc.), but data specifically on SAIs has only recently been developed by a number of 
organizations. The problematic of measuring SAI indicators is very similar to the gen-
eral problems which have been identified for measuring “the rule of law” and other 
governance indicators. Haggard and Tiede (2011:676) on the example of rule of law 
data explain that we can differentiate between two basic groups of indicators: subjective 
and objective ones. The subjective indicators include aggregate indices and are based on 
evaluations of experts, investors, or citizens. The purportedly objective indicators in-
clude discrete features of political institutions that are however subject to measurement 
error and proxies designed to capture features of the institutional and legal environment. 
The authors further elaborate that the difference between subjective and objective indi-
cators has been an ongoing point of controversy. While some scholars (Glaeser et al, 
2004; Kurtz and Schrank, 2007; qtd. in Haggard and Tiede, 2011:676) argue against 
subjective measures because of the risk of bias, others have demonstrated that subjec-
tive measures may capture interesting gaps between de jure and de facto institutions 
(Woodruff, 2006; Feld and Voigt, 2003; Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 2008; qtd. in Hag-
gard and Tiede, 2011:676).  
The power of Supreme Audit Institutions has mainly been measured through subjective 
indicators, there are only a few institutional features (one such example is the question 
for the legal basis of the SAI, thus whether external auditing is enshrined in the consti-
tution, legal framework or based on internal rules of the government) which have been 
measured and could by themselves serve as indicators for SAI power.  
Originally I planned to construct my own ranking of SAIs based on the theoretical in-
sights above and using data from various surveys. However, I had to accept that the data 
availability for individual indicators was very diffuse across surveys. Even for questions 
which were asked in similar fashions by several surveys, there was wide inconsistency 
across countries, probably due to slightly different ways of asking the question and dif-
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 The World Bank’s IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) is based on the results of the annual CPIA 
exercise that covers the IDA eligible countries. The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 
criteria grouped in four clusters. Particularly criteria 16 on “Transparency, Accountability, and 
Corruption in the Public Sector” includes judgments on the effectiveness of external audit insti-
tutions. For each of the 16 criteria, countries are rated on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high). The rat-
ings depend on de facto implementation of legislation rather than on the legislative provisions 
per se. The CPIA is an annual exercise and reflect the judgments of the World Bank staff. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:213594
77~menuPK:2626968~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html (Last Ac-
cessed October 31, 2011) 
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ferent respondents. Furthermore, some countries were covered by only one survey for 
one year while others were analyzed by up to four surveys with strongly differing re-
sults per survey. For these reasons I decided to abandon the idea of a comprehensive 
index of the power of SAIs and to instead test my hypotheses on separate indices which 
are based on the following surveys:  
(1) The Open Budget Surveys 
(2) The Global Integrity Reports 
(3) The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Assessments 
(4) The OECD International Database on Budget Practices and Procedures 
(5) The INTOSAI Development Initiative Stocktaking Report (IDI, 2010) 
(6) Others 
I will now discuss each of these surveys in turn, the methods used, the questions cov-
ered and the rankings which have been developed on the basis of these data sources. I 
will test my hypotheses on seven separate indices measuring the de facto power of 
SAIs. In order to increase the country coverage three of the rankings combine data for 
several years.  
The Open Budget Surveys  
The research and publication of the biannual Open Budget Surveys (OBS) are an im-
portant activity of the International Budget Partnership (IBP). The International Budget 
Partnership (IBP) was formed in 1997 within the Washington based Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities to “collaborate with civil society to undertake budget analysis and 
advocacy in order to improve governance and reduce poverty.”99 The Open Budget 
Survey is based on a questionnaire containing 123 questions, which are filled out by an 
individual or a group of civil society researchers or academic institutions in each sur-
veyed country. The 2010 OBS covers a sample of 94 countries that vary across country 
income levels and geographic location. The 2008 OBS covered 85 countries and the 
first round in 2006 covered 59 countries. The results for each country were analyzed by 
IBP staff, sent to peer reviewers and the respective governments for comments before 
the final scores were decided. Each survey is based on data up to September 15
th
 of the 
previous year, thus the OBS 2010 is based on data, which was available on September 
15
th
, 2009. The scores range along an ordinal scale of 0 to 100 with possible scores at 0, 
33, 67 and 100. The higher the scores assigned, the better is the country’s performance. 
(IBP,2010:1)   
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 http://internationalbudget.org/who-we-are/history/ (Last Accessed on October 29, 2012) 
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The OBS 2010 and 2008 contain 14 questions that concern external auditing legislation 
and practices (the OBS 2006 contained 12 such questions). The IBP-team measured the 
averages of the responses to 10 out of the 14 questions
100
 on SAIs to calculate a 
“strength” score for Supreme Audit Institutions. IBP acknowledges that the dataset of 
questions on SAIs is not as comprehensive as is the data on issues of public access to 
information (which is the main objective of the survey) and thus the measures of SAI’s 
institutional strength are meant as indicative data only. (IBP, 2010:3) A more detailed 
analysis of the power of SAIs could assess a large number of power resources, as for 
instance identified in the Institutional Capacity Building Framework (ICBF), which was 
developed by AFROSAI-E.
101
  
Overall, the ten questions contained in the Open Budget Survey largely correspond to 
my definition of power resources that are necessary for SAIs to fulfil their role as ac-
countability arrangements (figure 3.1, Bovens, 2007). Several survey questions (particu-
larly Q.116 but also Q.114, Q.117, Q.118 and Q119) assess the power resources to ob-
tain information and the actual practice of information provision. There are no questions 
contained in the Open Budget Survey which assess whether there is an opportunity for 
debate between the forum and the actor. On the other hand, the more important aspect 
of the practice of audit consequences is well assessed by this survey (Q. 120, Q.121, 
Q122, Q.123 but also Q.111). 
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 The OBS measure for SAI strength (2010, 2008) is based on the following 10 questions (IBP, 2010:3). 
The OBS measure for SAI strength (2006) was based on only 8 questions (questions 118 and 119 
below were missing). Q.111: How long after the end of the fiscal year are the final annual ex-
penditures of national departments audited and (except for secret programs) released to the pub-
lic? Q.114: Must a branch of government other than the executive (such as the legislature or the 
judiciary) give final consent before the head of the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) can be re-
moved from office? Q.116: Beyond the established year-end attestation audits, does the Supreme 
Audit Institution (SAI) have the discretion in law to undertake those audits it may wish to? 
Q.117: Who determines the budget of the Supreme Audit Institution? Q.118: Does the Supreme 
Audit Institution employ designated staff for undertaking audits of the central government agen-
cies pertaining to the security sector (military, police, intelligence services)? Q.119: Does the 
Supreme Audit Institution maintain formal mechanisms of communication with the public to re-
ceive complaints and suggestions to assist it in determining its audit program (that is, to identify 
the agencies, programs, or projects it will audit)? Q.120: Does a committee of the legislature 
view and scrutinize the audit reports? Q.121: Does the executive make available to the public a 
report on what steps it has taken to address audit recommendations or findings that indicate a 
need for remedial action? Q.122: Does either the Supreme Audit Institution or the legislature re-
lease to the public a report that tracks actions taken by the executive to address audit recommen-
dations? Q.123: Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (military, police, 
intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant commit-
tee)? The following questions also concern external auditing but are not included in the OBS SAI 
ranking: 102, 112, 113, 115. For the full questionnaires with all potential answers see 
http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/research-resources/guides-
questionnaires/ (Last Accessed on October 21, 2011). 
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 http://afrosai-e.org.za/institutional-capacity-building-framework (Last Accessed on November 05, 
2012) 
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Graph 4.1 shows the power of SAIs according to the OBS2010 in the form of a world 
map.
102
 Countries colored in blue have very powerful SAIs (81-100 points), green coun-
tries have SAIs with significant power (61-80), yellow countries have some power (41-
60), orange countries have SAIs with minimal power (21-40) and red countries have 
very weak SAIs (0-20).  
Figure 4.1 The Power of SAIs According to the OBS2010 (Open Budget Survey, year of data collection 
2009, 94 countries, 14 questions) 
 
This figure shows that there is a great variation in the power of SAIs within all regions, 
but also that there are very few powerful SAIs, as blue countries are rare. The weakest 
SAIs seem to be in francophone Africa and in Arab States. On the other hand, the SAIs 
in Southern Africa do have some power. Russia, which is not known for effective dem-
ocratic institutions, has a SAI with significant power according to this survey.  
The Global Integrity Reports 
Global Integrity is a non-profit organization, founded in 2001 at the Center for Public 
Integrity, a US non-for profit investigative news organization. Today Global Integrity 
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 This type of presentation including the choice of colors and categories has been adopted from the 
Open Budget Survey.  
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works with a network of more than 1,200 in-country experts in more than 100 countries. 
The Global Integrity Report understands itself as “a tool for understanding governance 
and anti-corruption mechanisms at the national level.”103 It is written by local research-
ers and journalists, and consists of both a qualitative “reporter's notebook” and a quanti-
tative “integrity indicators scorecard” assessing the “existence, effectiveness, and citizen 
access to key governance and anti-corruption mechanisms through more than 300 ac-
tionable indicators”. Scorecards take into account both existing legal measures and de 
facto realities. They are scored by a lead in-country researcher and blindly reviewed by 
a panel of peer reviewers, a mix of other in-country experts as well as outside experts. 
The Global Integrity Report has been annually published since 2004, covering different 
countries each year. The last Report 2010 assesses data up to June 2010 for 31
104
 coun-
tries or territories. The scores range along an ordinal scale from 0 to 100, with possible 
scores of 0,25,50,75 and 100; whereas the score of 100 indicates the best perfor-
mance.
105
 The Global Integrity Report includes 25 sub-questions
106
 on Supreme Audit 
Institutions. The Global Integrity Report also calculates a score on the strength of Su-
preme Audit Institutions, which is based on the mean of three sub-indices (questions 58, 
59, 60). However, question 58
107
 only asks whether a SAI exists in the country. This 
question is always answered with “yes” and scored with 100 points. It thus strongly 
influences the SAI score, with the effect that the SAI index of the Global Integrity Re-
port is constantly higher than the Open Budget Survey’s SAI index. I have adapted the 
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 http://report.globalintegrity.org/methodology.cfm (Last Accessed on October 29, 2012) 
104
 Global Integrity reports to have assessed 36 countries or territories for the Global Integrity Report 
2010, however the scorecard and downloadable data only includes data for 31 countries or 
territories. Thus, although the methodology white paper indicates that there should be data for an 
additional 5 countries, they are actually missing in the data file and in the online country 
overview. Data for the following countries was found missing: Ecuador, Japan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste. http://www.globalintegrity.org/report;  
http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/methodology/white-paper (Last Accessed on October 24, 
2011) 
105
 http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/methodology/white-paper  (Last Accessed on October 24, 2011) 
106
 Q.58 In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency cover-
ing the entire public sector? Qu58a: In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor 
general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector? Q.59: Is the supreme audit insti-
tution effective? 59a: In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interfer-
ence. 59b: In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant 
justification. 59c: In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff. 59d: In prac-
tice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency. 59e: In practice, the au-
dit agency receives regular funding. 59f: In practice, the audit agency makes regular public re-
ports. 59g: In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency. 59h: In practice, 
the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations. Q.60: Can citizens access reports of the 
supreme audit institution? 60a: In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency. 60b: In 
practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period. 60c: In practice, citi-
zens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost. The following questions also concern ex-
ternal auditing but are not used to calculate the SAI index: 20e, 20f, 21d, 21e, 22f, 29d, 29h, 33d, 
33g, 38c, 38g, 46e, 46i. See http://www.globalintegrity.org/information/downloads (Last 
Accessed on October 24, 2011) 
107
 Question 58 concerns the Global Integrity Report 2010, for the other years, the same problem exists, 
but the question numbers have changed, while not the wording of the questions. 
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GI index by calculating a new GI-SAI index, which is only based on the mean of the 
high-level questions 59 and 60.  
Another problem of the Global Integrity Report is the limited number of countries cov-
ered per year. Therefore I have calculated a new index which covers the years 2008, 
2009 and 2010 (thus the period June 2007 to June 2010) and a total of 70 countries. As 
some countries have been evaluated twice during this period, I had to take a decision 
how I would deal with this problem, to use the last data available or to calculate the av-
erage of the available data per country during this period. I opted for the second option 
and calculated country means for the period under consideration.  
Figure 4.2 The Power of SAIs According to the GI08-10 (Global Integrity, years 2008-2010, 70 countries, 
11 questions) 
 
 
What is particularly interesting in figure 4.2., depicting the power of SAIs according to 
the Global Integrity Report, is the fact that there are hardly any weak SAIs. Further-
more, surprisingly Canada is not rated as being a very powerful SAI, while India and 
some Latin American SAIs are. Again, Southern and Eastern Africa seem quite strong 
compared to what their level of economic and democratic development would suggest. 
Taking Stock – The Power of SAIs World-Wide 66 
 
The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Assessment Reports 
The PEFA Program is a multi-donor partnership founded in 2001. It is governed by a 
steering committee and a secretariat, which is located in the World Bank headquarter 
offices in Washington, DC. The PEFA Program developed the PFM Performance 
Measurement Framework (known as the PEFA Framework)  
“to assess and develop essential PFM systems, by providing a common pool of 
information for measurement and monitoring of PFM performance progress, 
and a common platform for dialogue.”108  
The final version of the PEFA Framework was approved for publication by the PEFA 
Steering Committee in June 2005 and is currently being revised. It can be downloaded 
in 13 languages online.
109
  
The PEFA Assessment Reports can be initiated by a variety of stakeholders, and are 
usually filled out under the leadership of donors or governments. The lead agency estab-
lishes an oversight team (OT) for that purpose.  
“The members of the OT would be drawn from the leading government entity in 
the assessment (typically the Ministry of Finance), other government agencies 
involved and non-government stakeholders, such as the Auditor General’s Of-
fice, Parliament, and development partners.” (PEFA, 2009:4)  
The PEFA Assessment Report incorporates a PFM performance report and scores for 28 
high-level indicators (and three additional indicators assessing donor practices, which 
are clearly only relevant for assessments of aid-dependent countries). It measures per-
formance of PFM systems, processes and institutions. The PEFA Assessment is consid-
ered as one of the elements of a strengthened approach
110
 to supporting PFM reforms. 
(PEFA, 2011:1-9)  
By October 2010, 206 PEFA assessments had been finalized or substantially completed 
for 129 countries or overseas territories.
111
 However, not all reports are publicly availa-
ble. In both 2009 and 2010, well over 60% of reports were not published, compared to 
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http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PEFA/0,,contentMDK:22677693~menuPK:73
13158~pagePK:7313176~piPK:7327442~theSitePK:7327438,00.html (Last Accessed on 
October 29, 2011) 
109
 The PFM Performance Measurement Framework can be downloaded here: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PEFA/0,,contentMDK:22677693~menuPK:73
13158~pagePK:7313176~piPK:7327442~theSitePK:7327438,00.html (Last Accessed on 
October 29, 2011) 
110
 “The Strengthened Approach has three components (i) a country led PFM reform strategy and action 
plan, (ii) a coordinated IFI-donor integrated, multi-year program of PFM work that supports 
and is aligned with the government’s PFM reform strategy and, (iii) a shared information pool. 
The Performance Measurement Framework is a tool for achieving the third objective.” (PEFA, 
2005:1) 
111
See Lawson and Folscher (2011:23-24)  
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approximately 40% in each of the previous three years. (Lawson and Folscher, 2011:33)
 
By October 29, 2011 a total of 98 PEFA assessment reports which assessed the national 
level were available online (own research
112
).  
Performance indicator (PI) 26 in the PEFA Framework analyses “the scope, nature and 
follow-up of external audit in a country”.113 More specifically, it assesses the following 
dimensions of external auditing:  
“(i) Scope/nature of audit performed (incl. adherence to auditing standards), (ii) 
Timeliness of submission of audit reports to legislature, (iii) Evidence of follow 
up on audit recommendations.”114.  
I used indicator PI-26 to calculate a ranking of the strength of SAIs which can be com-
pared across countries and years. I first had to convert the PEFA letter scores to a nu-
meric system along an ordinal scale with higher scores denoting better performance 
(from A=100 to D=0).
115
  I then calculated a simple average of the replies to PI-26 (i), 
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 PEFA assessment reports can be downloaded here:  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PEFA/0,,contentMDK:22687152~menuPK:7313203~p
agePK:7313176~piPK:7327442~theSitePK:7327438,00.html (Last Accessed on October 29, 
2011  
113
 In addition to PI-26, a number of other indicators also ask about the practice of external auditing. Par-
ticularly PI-10 on public access to key financial information, PI-25 on Quality and timeliness of 
annual financial statements, and PI-28 on Legislative scrutiny of external audit reports. (PEFA, 
2005)  
114
 PEFA Table showing the various dimensions of question 26 (PEFA, 2005:47) 
Score  Minimum requirements (Scoring methodology: M1)  
A  (i) All entities of central government are audited annually covering revenue, expenditure and assets/liabilities. A full range of financial 
audits and some aspects of performance audit are performed and generally adhere to auditing standards, focusing on significant and 
systemic issues.  
(ii) Audit reports are submitted to the legislature within 4 months of the end of the period covered and in the case of financial state-
ments from their receipt by the audit office.  
(iii) There is clear evidence of effective and timely follow up.  
B  (i) Central government entities representing at least 75% of total expenditures12 are audited annually, at least covering revenue and 
expenditure. A wide range of financial audits are performed and generally adheres to auditing standards, focusing on significant and 
systemic issues.  
(ii) Audit reports are submitted to the legislature within 8 months of the end of the period covered and in the case of financial state-
ments from their receipt by the audit office.  
(iii) A formal response is made in a timely manner, but there is little evidence of systematic follow up.  
C  (i) Central government entities representing at least 50% of total expenditures are audited annually. Audits predominantly comprise 
transaction level testing, but reports identify significant issues. Audit standards may be disclosed to a limited extent only.  
(ii) Audit reports are submitted to the legislature within 12 months of the end of the period covered (for audit of financial statements 
from their receipt by the auditors).  
(iii) A formal response is made, though delayed or not very thorough, but there is little evidence of any follow up.  
D  (i) Audits cover central government entities representing less than 50% of total expenditures or audits have higher coverage but do not 
highlight the significant issues.  
(ii) Audit reports are submitted to the legislature more than 12 months from the end of the period covered (for audit of financial 
statements from their receipt by the auditors).  
(iii) There is little evidence of response or follow up.  
 
115
 The PEFA data has amongst others already been analyzed by De Renzio, 2009; De Renzio & 
Dorotinsky, 2007; Andrews, 2009, 2010 and De Renzio et al, 2010. They all use a similar con-
version system, namely A=4, B+ = 3.5, B=3, C+ = 2.5,  C=2, D+ = 1.5, D=1. De Renzio, 2009:3 
explains that “the 1-4 scale is of course somewhat arbitrary, but is meant to reflect the fact that 
a “D” score in many cases denotes a deficient system, not a non-existent one… It is difficult to 
assess the impact of missing scores on overall averages, but without any doubt these introduce a 
potential bias. It could be argued that non-scoring due to lack of information should be included 
in the rating scale, but this has not been done because it is not certain if non-scoring should be 
converted to a “D” level (=1) or even lower (e.g. =0)” I checked the replies to the reports where 
they were marked as “D” and came to the conclusion, that a “0” score would be appropriate as it 
indeed mostly marks a non-operational SAI, see f.i. Niger. As I want to compare the PEFA rank-
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(ii) and (iii) for the period 2008 – October 2011, using the 61 national PEFA reports that 
were publicly available for this period. Two countries have conducted two PEFA as-
sessments during this period. Rwanda conducted PEFA assessments in 2008 and 2010 
and Kosovo conducted PEFA assessments in 2009 and 2011. For these two countries, 
the mean of the scores of the two years were calculated. Secondly, I also used the PEFA 
high-level indicator PI-26 as an ordinal variable.
116
 To summarize, while the methodol-
ogy of the PEFA assessment reports assures credibility through a comprehensive review 
process, there is only a limited number of country data publicly available per year and 
there is only a limited focus on the examination of the functioning of SAIs. 
Figure 4.3 The Power of SAIs according to the PEFA-26mean (PEFA indicator 26, years 2007-2011, 61 
countries, 3 questions) 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
ing to the OBS and GI ranking, it also makes sense to start with a 0 score marking non-
operational and very deficient SAIs. I thus changed the numeric scores to a range of 0-100 ac-
cordingly: D=0, D+ = 16,5; D=33; C+=50; B=67; B+ =83,5; A=100. My sample included only 
two reports which had missing scores in the PI-26 ranking, these are the Philippines (PEFA re-
port 2010) and Togo (PEFA report 2009). The Philippines missed a score for PI-26 (ii), which 
was commented in the report as N.A. (not applicable) and thus I did not assign a 0 score but left 
it out of the computation. In Togo the score was not rated as the SAI was not operational at the 
time of the assessment, and thus it deserves a “0” rating. See also PEFA (2009b) for a discussion 
of issues regarding aggregating PEFA scores and comparing them across countries and particu-
larly paragraph 36. on issues of “no scores”. According to the PEFA Framework, the scoring 
method which is to be used for the aggregation of high-level indicators is the scoring method 
M1, whereas the worst score has a disproportionate strong weight on the aggregate score. 
(PEFA, 2005) 
116
 see Andrews (2010) 
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Figure 4.3. shows the ranking of SAIs according to PEFA indicator 26. Francophone 
Africa and Arab States are again very weak, while the Latin American SAIs fare partic-
ularly well. What is astonishing here is the strong power of the SAIs in Yemen and the 
Philippines, as well as of Bhutan and Costa Rica (which are difficult to spot). 
OECD International Database of Budget Practices and Procedures 
The OECD International Database of Budget Practices and Procedures
117
 contains the 
results of the 2007 OECD survey of budget practices and procedures in OECD coun-
tries, the 2008 World Bank/OECD survey of budget practices and procedures in Asia 
and other regions, and the 2008 CABRI/OECD survey of budget practices and proce-
dures in Africa. It includes information on budget institutions from 97 countries and 
territories. The Budgeting and Public Expenditures Division of the OECD first conduct-
ed a survey of budget practices and procedures in 2003 in co-operation with the World 
Bank. The second edition of the survey in 2007/2008 was extensively revised. The 
online survey was completed by official government representatives being aware that 
the full survey will be made available to the public. Thus, the limitations concerning 
this survey are related to the fact that the survey was not peer reviewed or commented 
and only presents the official perspective of governments. In addition, unlike the PEFA 
Assessment reports, government officials did not get training before filling out the ques-
tionnaire. It seems that many questions were interpreted in diverse ways by officials 
from different countries and thus the replies are not consistent across countries. 
The survey contains 99 questions which cover the entire budget cycle: preparation, ap-
proval, execution, accounting and audit, performance information, and aid management 
within developing countries. I have identified six questions (questions 4.1., 67, 68, 69, 
70, 72) in the survey that ask about aspects of external auditing procedures and practic-
es. The possible replies to the questions are not scored along an ordinal scale but are 
categorical variables, thus text replies which needed to be ticked and could be com-
mented on in a separate field. I have developed a ranking for the power of SAIs by 
transforming five
118
 categorical variables into numerical scores along an ordinal scale 
and calculating the mean of the scores. First I calculated an aggregate score for each of 
the five questions, by assigning numerical scores along an ordinal scale for each possi-
                                                     
117
 http://www.oecd.org/gov/budget/database (Last accessed on October 27, 2011) 
118
 I did not include question “Q.67: Approximately what percentage of central Government spending is 
annually subject to performance or value-for-money audits by a Supreme Audit Institution?” in 
the index as the replies were extremely inconsistent across countries with most replies being at 
the extreme ends of the scale (less than 1% and 100%). Some countries replied to the question in 
the comments section as if they had understood which percentage of government accounts was 
audited at all and not the percentage of government accounts which was subject to performance 
audits. http://webnet.oecd.org/budgeting/Budgeting.aspx (Last accessed on October 27, 2011)    
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ble reply.
 119
 In a second step I calculated the mean of the five questions to develop my 
OECD ranking for the power of SAIs.  
Figure 4.4 The Power of SAIs According to the OECD (Budget Practices and Procedures Survey, years 
2007/2008, 97 countries, 6 questions)  
 
Figure 4.4. depicts the results from the ranking of SAIs based on the OECD budget sur-
vey. As we can see, in comparison to the other rankings, the OECD ranking is very pos-
itive about the power of SAIs. The few weak SAIs are once again found in Central and 
Northern Africa. Surprising are the weak SAIs of Chile and Indonesia, which fare much 
better in the other rankings. On the other hand, the Turkish SAI has been rated as very 
powerful, while it is depicted as quite weak in the other rankings.   
                                                     
119
 I calculated the scores for each question included in my OECD ranking on the strength of SAIs accord-
ing to the following method, which has been adapted from Blume and Voigt (2010:6) and is 
based on PEFA best practice criteria:  
Q.4.i: Requirement for audit of Government accounts by the Supreme Audit Institution: Constitu-
tion=100, Legislation=67, Internal=33, No answer, missing, other=0 
Q.68: According to the relevant legal provisions, to whom does the Supreme Audit Institution principally 
report? Principally report to Legislature=100, Judiciary =67, Executive, missing, no answer=0  
Q.69: Are the findings of the Supreme Audit Institution available to the public? Always=100, most=67, 
rare=33, never, missing, other=0 
Q.70: When are the accounts audited by the Supreme Audit Institution publicly available? 1-6m=100, 7-
12m=67, >12m=33, no, missing, other=0 
Q.72: What types of evaluations are commissioned and/or conducted by the following institutions?- Su-
preme Audit Institution: 20 points for a yes for each sub question: “Q.72.a Review of ongoing 
programmes, Q.72.b Ex post review of programmes, Q.72.c Review of new initiatives or pro-
grammes, Q.72.d Sectoral reviews.” 
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The IDI Stocktaking Report (2010) 
The INTOSAI-Donor Cooperation commissioned the INTOSAI Development Initiative 
(IDI)
120
 to conduct a global stocktaking of SAIs with the goal to develop an overview of 
current SAI capacities, support and needs. (IDI, 2010) The stocktaking population en-
compassed 204 SAIs
121
 and the eight INTOSAI regional bureaus and sub-regions. The 
overall response rate was above 90%. According to IDI, this extremely high response 
rate can be attributed to “the efforts of the Regional Secretariats in distributing and so-
liciting responses from their members, and the interest in the initiative”.  
However, the fact that the survey was completely confidential also played an important 
role for SAIs to accept handing out crucial data on their capacities. While this clause 
helped to gain a high response rate, it is obviously a disappointment for researchers. I 
sent a request to get access to the data for research purposes to IDI, which presented the 
request to the Steering Committee of the INTOSAI-Donor Cooperation, responsible for 
the Stocktaking Report. However, the steering committee insisted that the data needed 
to be kept fully confidential. IDI was so kind to arrange a fully anonymous version of 
the data for me, which I analyze in chapter 6.4. 
The stocktaking questionnaire includes more than 35 high-level questions organized in 
six overall categories (institutional facts; strategic and development action plans; receipt 
of capacity development support; indicative needs assessment and funding gaps; provi-
sion of capacity development support; additional information) and can be accessed to-
gether with the full report online.
122 
 
The variable “IDI SAIstrength” is a composite variable, which I calculated from the 
mean of the variables “legal base”, “audit types” and “time limit”:  
Legal base: This variable was calculated from the mean of the two questions: 
1.2 Does your SAI form part of the Constitution? (yes =1, no/other/missing=0), 
1.3 Is there a specific national law on public sector auditing? (yes=1, 
no/other/missing=0) 
Audit types: This variable was calculated from the mean of the following five 
questions (each question was coded as follows: yes=1, no/other/missing=0): 
                                                     
120
 The IDI is a non-profit organization that acts as the capacity building secretariat of the International 
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). IDI aims to “enhance the institutional 
capacity of Supreme Audit Institutions in developing countries through needs-based, 
collaborative and sustainable development programmes in INTOSAI regions and groups of SAIs 
to meet the existing and emerging needs of stakeholders.” 
http://www.idi.no/artikkel.aspx?MId1=91&AId=547 (Last Accessed on October 28, 2011) 
121
 This includes, in addition to the INTOSAI members, those SAIs that are members of an INTOSAI 
Region but not members of INTOSAI itself, as well as SAIs that are not members of INTOSAI 
or any of the INTOSAI region. (IDI, 2010:6) 
122 http://www.idi.no/artikkel.aspx?MId1=24&AId=407 (Last Accessed October 28, 2011) 
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1.6.a Does your SAI have a legal mandate to carry out Financial audit (as part of 
regularity audit), 1.6.b Does your SAI have a legal mandate to carry out Compli-
ance audit (as part of regularity audit), 1.6.c Does your SAI have a legal mandate 
to carry out Performance audit, 1.6.d Does your SAI have a legal mandate to car-
ry out IT audit, 1.6.e Does your SAI have a legal mandate to carry out Other 
specialized audits.  
Time limits: 1.8 When was the latest consolidated annual audit report from your 
SAI issued to Parliament (or other recipients of the audit report as determined by 
law)? The replies were coded as follows: Within the stipulated legal time limit: 
1; within one year after stipulated legal time limit: 0.5; more than one year after 
stipulated legal time limit: 0; other/missing:0. 
The variable “IDI 1.8.time.limit.new1” is a binomial variable, based on question “1.8. 
When was the latest consolidated annual audit report from your SAI issued to Parlia-
ment (or other recipients of the audit report as determined by law)?” The replies were 
coded as follows: “Within the stipulated legal time limit: 1”; ”Within one year after 
stipulated legal time limit: 0”; “More than one year after stipulated legal time limit: 0”; 
“Other/missing:0”. 
The variable “IDI 1.8.time.limit.new” is a multinomial SAI variable based on question 
1.8 When was the latest consolidated annual audit report from your SAI issued to Par-
liament (or other recipients of the audit report as determined by law)? The replies were 
coded as follows: Within the stipulated legal time limit: 1; within one year after stipu-
lated legal time limit: 0,5; more than one year after stipulated legal time limit: 0; oth-
er/missing:0. 
Other surveys and data sources on SAIs 
In this section I present and briefly discuss alternative studies which have collected data 
on SAIs.  
INTOSAI 
As part of the activities of the INTOSAI Working Group on IT Audit, the SAI of India 
has prepared an electronic compilation of the mandates and statutes of INTOSAI mem-
bers. The data covers the legislative framework of 142 SAIs and was first compiled in 
1998 and updated in 2001 and 2004.
123
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 http://www.intosaiitaudit.org/mandates/ (28 Oct. 2011) 
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INTOSAI under the leadership of the SAI of Canada conducted a survey on the “Inde-
pendence of SAIs” over the period June 01, 1999 to March 30, 2001.124 The survey 
reached 126 SAIs and 113 (90%) responded. However, there seems to have been little 
assistance in filling out the survey. The final report acknowledges f.i. that it was diffi-
cult for the project team to differentiate between “no” responses and responses that have 
been omitted in the survey. (INTOSAI, 2001:4). The final conclusion of the report is 
little surprising in that it states  
“a considerable number of the SAIs surveyed are not really in a position to ful-
fill their mandates in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Lima 
Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts.” (INTOSAI, 2001:18) 
 
European SAIs 
Clark et al. (2007) examine the legislation of 25 EU member country Supreme Audit 
Institutions and the European Court of Auditors as of March 2003.  
Milagros García Crespo (ed.) (2005) presents theoretical discussions and case study 
research of external auditing practices in EU member states and within the EU frame-
work.  
Pollitt et al. (2002) compare performance audit practices in a qualitative study covering 
five EU member countries.  
While these studies can serve as reference documents for comparing European SAIs, 
they are not optimal for a construction of a dependent variable measuring the power of 
SAIs as these studies only cover specific aspects of SAIs and only cover European 
SAIs. 
Latin American SAIs 
Melo et al. (2009) conduct econometric tests on a unique data set of 33 local Brazilian 
audit institutions explaining political and institutional factors which determine the per-
formance of SAIs. They do not construct a single variable for the power of SAIs but test 
various independent variables on four characteristics of SAIs.
125
 They basically con-
clude their study in line with empirical evidence in the comparative scholarship on judi-
                                                     
124
 The project report can be accessed online at: http://www.intosai.org/blueline/upload/1indepe.pdf (Last 
Accessed on October 28, 2011) 
125
 Melo et al. (2009) develop four dependent variables measuring the power of SAIs, namely (1) general 
activism of the audit courts measured as the ratio of the number of audit cases performed by each 
court and the number of administrative units under its jurisdiction, (2) endogenous self-initiative 
of an audit court measured as a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the court has a senior audi-
tor (which according to their argument increases activism) and 0 otherwise, (3) appointing of a 
senior auditor by the governor measured as a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the court of 
account has an independent senior auditor on board and 0 otherwise, (4) propensity to reject the 
executive or legislature’s accounts measured as the number of episodes of recommendations for 
the rejection of accounts rendered by mayors and governors. 
Taking Stock – The Power of SAIs World-Wide 74 
 
cial independence and rational choice institutionalism (see chapter 5.6) that elite compe-
tition is crucial to explaining the emergence of effective audit bodies in Brazil. 
Santiso (2006, 2009) develops an index for the strength of SAIs in ten Latin American 
countries based on four sub-indices, namely (i) independence, (ii) credibility of audit 
findings, (iii) timeliness of audit reports, and (iv) the enforcement powers of audit agen-
cies. The data sources are presented in detail in Santiso (2009:68) and mainly include 
own internet research in the year 2005 and survey results from Lavielle et al. (2003) and 
UNDP (2004).  
African SAIs 
Moussa (2004) compares 12 francophone African public expenditure management 
(PEM) systems with the French system and against each other. The study is based on an 
IMF-led study including the organization of two seminars with country representatives 
and the conduct of a survey, with 49 questions on expenditure management, which was 
filled out by senior officials from 12 African countries and was reviewed by IMF ex-
perts at headquarters. This study does not develop an index for strong auditing practices, 
but only analyzes the extent of similarities between PEM systems. It concludes inter alia 
that the francophone African audit and external control systems differ widely from the 
French reference model and also highly differ among themselves.  
The Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI) in cooperation with the 
African Development Bank has conducted a survey in 26 African countries on budget 
practices and procedures (CABRI and ADB, 2008) along the OECD budget survey 
methodology and framework and has been integrated into its International Database on 
Budget Practices and Procedures (see above). 
SAIs as the independent variable 
Blume and Voigt (2010) conducted a quantitative study which analyzes the effect of a 
SAI’s organizational design on three groups of economic variables, namely on (1) fiscal 
policy, (2) government effectiveness and corruption and on (3) productivity. The au-
thors do not calculate a dependent variable “SAI strength” but instead use six SAI char-
acteristics as independent variables and individually test their effect on economic varia-
bles. The authors use SAI data from the World Bank/OECD survey on budget practices 
and procedures for the year 2003 and an INTOSAI survey “from the early 1990s”.126 
Schelker and Eichenberger (2003, 2007) also analyze the effect of SAIs on economic 
variables. Particularly, they conduct econometric analyses of local audit institutions 
from 26 Swiss cantons and come to the conclusion that  
                                                     
126
 The authors were so kind and provided me with their data set, which I used to cross-check my own 
data on SAI institutional models.  
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“the extent of the rights of auditing institutions has a systematic and highly rele-
vant negative effect on the tax burden and on public expenditures”. (2007:37)  
Thus, they propose to generally enhance the rights of SAIs in order to make them strong 
competitors to governments.    
Standardized qualitative information on SAIs 
Apart from individual case studies by researchers, articles in the INTOSAI Journal on 
Public Auditing,
127
 peer reviews by SAIs and project reports, the following organiza-
tions provide regular qualitative reports on external auditing procedures and practices: 
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank regularly publish Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) of member countries.
128
 These reports do 
not include scores but provide useful country analyses based on qualitative research. In 
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the Standards and Codes 
Initiative was launched in 1999 as part of the international community’s efforts to 
strengthen the international financial architecture.
129
 Of particular interest here are IMF 
reports on the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency (2007), particularly code 
“4.3 Fiscal information should be externally scrutinized”130 and the World Bank re-
ports on the ROSC Accounting and Auditing (2004).
131
 
The global non-governmental network Transparency International (TI) was founded in 
1993 and has developed a number of tools to assess corruption practices around the 
world, of which the Global Corruption Perception Index is the best known but unfortu-
nately does not include any questions on SAIs. TI however also publishes assessments 
of the National Integrity System (NIS), which are based on extensive qualitative re-
search by country teams. The NIS country reports present the results of the NIS assess-
ment including an assessment of the country’s supreme audit institution. Since 2001, TI 
has conducted more than 70 NIS country assessments, as well as a number of related 
regional overviews.
132
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 http://www.intosaijournal.org/ (31 Oct. 2011) 
128
 Reports can be accessed at: http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc.html; 
http://www.imf.org/external/NP/rosc/rosc.aspx?sortBy=Topic&sortVal=Fiscal%20Transparency 
(Last Accessed on October 31, 2011) 
129
 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2011/pn1138.htm (Last Accessed on October 31, 2011) 
130 “4.3. Fiscal information should be externally scrutinized: 4.3.1 Public finances and policies should 
be subject to scrutiny by a national audit body or an equivalent organization that is independent of the 
executive. 4.3.2 The national audit body or equivalent organization should submit all reports, including 
its annual report, to the legislature and publish them. Mechanisms should be in place to monitor follow-
up actions.” http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code.htm (31 Oct. 2011)   
131
 http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa.html (31 Oct. 2011) 
132
 http://transparency.org/policy_research/nis/nis_reports_by_country (31 Oct. 2011) 
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4.4. Summary and Conclusions  
In order to investigate to what extent the formal agreement of SAIs as accountability 
arrangements have been institutionalized at country level, I first discussed the criteria 
for comparing SAIs. I then conducted a literature review of previous qualitative and 
quantitative studies on SAIs and developed and constructed rankings measuring the 
power of SAIs. Now I will discuss the findings in order to decide which indices can 
serve as my dependent variable measuring the power of SAIs for the econometric analy-
sis of this dissertation (chapter 6).  
Based on the available survey data, I have developed the following five main indices. In 
order to increase the country coverage the rankings combine data for several years
133
:  
1. The ranking “OBS2010” presents results of the last OBS survey, which is based on 
data up to Sept. 15, 2009 and covers 94 countries. 
2. The “GI08-10” ranking covers 70 countries and is based on the GI reports 2008, 
2009 and 2010 covering data from the periods June 2008 up to June 2010. 37 coun-
tries were covered more than once during this period, for which the mean of all an-
nual scores was calculated. As discussed above this ranking is calculated without 
question 58. 
3. The PEFA index includes data for 61 countries covering the period 2008-2011. 
There are basically two versions of this ranking, “PEFA-26” consists of a numeri-
cal conversion of PI-26 while “PEFA-26mean” is an average of the scores PI-26 
(i), (ii) and (iii). Two countries have conducted two PEFA assessments during this 
period. Rwanda conducted PEFA assessments in 2008 and 2010 and Kosovo con-
ducted PEFA assessments in 2009 and 2011. For these two countries, the mean of 
the scores for the two years were calculated.  
4. The “OECD” ranking provides the data for 97 countries for the period 2007/2008, 
which was calculated as discussed above.  
5. The IDI dataset offers three possible indices: the composite, numerical variable 
“IDI-SAIstrength”, the binomial variable “1.8.time.limit.new1” and the multino-
mial variable “1.8.time.limit.new” 
 
Tables B.3-B.10 in Annex B show the SAI rankings. Of particular interest is table B.9., 
which compares the OBS2010 results with the Global Integrity, the PEFA and the 
OECD rankings. The scores in all tables have been rounded for better readability. In the 
econometric analysis I use the exact scores, including decimal figures.  
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 For a discussion of the survey methods and the questions included in each survey, see chapter 4.2. 
Taking Stock – The Power of SAIs World-Wide 77 
 
Table B.1. provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of these SAI rankings and 
table B.2. depicts the histograms and kernel density curves of the variables. The 
OBS2010 covers a high number of countries and territories (n=94), the mean is 48.35 
with a median of 50, a minimum value of 0, a maximum value of 100 and quite a high 
standard deviation of 24.27. It is not strongly skewed and its small kurtosis points to a 
normal distribution. Variable GI0810 is skewed to the right, which is also reflected in 
the high mean of 56.36, the median of 56 and the minimum value of 14. Another prob-
lem is the unequal distribution with some values being disproportionately little repre-
sented (see histogram). Variables PEFA-26 and PEFA-26mean have very low means, 
which derives from the fact that most data stem from developing countries. Another 
problem is the high standard error and large discrepancies between the mean and the 
median value pointing out to the existence of large outliers. As Andrews (2010) points 
out it might be better to treat the PEFA data as ordinal data instead of numerical data, 
which is particularly valid for the PEFA-26 indicator. I will thus also conduct tests on 
the PEFA-26 variable treating it as an ordinal (or even categorical) data. Finally, the 
variable OECD has a large number of observations (n=97) but also a very high mean 
and median values (68.72 and 71 respectively), and a minimum value of only 31, all of 
which reflects the problem of this specific survey. Government officials were filling out 
the survey without support by the organizers and without checks through a peer review 
mechanism, thus I suspect that some might have overestimated their country’s perfor-
mance. From this analysis of the descriptive statistics I would conclude that the 
OBS2010 is the most appropriate variable to measure the power of SAIs. 
I also conducted pair-wise correlations of the SAI variables to explore the similarities 
among the different indices (table B.11). There are many different types of tests of the 
association/correlation between paired variables, of which the Pearson's product mo-
ment correlation coefficient, Kendall's tau and Spearman's rho rank order correlation 
coefficients are the most commonly used measures. There are several issues that I thus 
needed to take into account before choosing which type of correlation test would be 
adequate for my data. In general, the Kendall and Spearman tests are said to be more 
robust to outliers and are more adequate for ordinal data.
134
 First of all, the indices are 
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 Pearson’s r measures the strength and direction of the linear relationship between two interval or ratio 
variables. While a strong monotone association between two variables usually leads to high 
correlation coefficients for all three measures, the values of the correlation coefficients 
differKendall’s and Spearman’s correlation coefficients can be used for either ordinal or 
continuous data. They are non-parametric measures of correlation between variables and assess 
how well an arbitrary monotonic function could describe the relationship between two variables, 
without making any assumptions about the frequency distribution of the variables. The Kendall 
tau correlation coefficient and the Spearman rank correlation coefficient are thus considered to 
be used on similar data. While Spearman rank correlation coefficient is like the Pearson 
correlation coefficient but computed from ranks, the Kendall tau correlation rather represents a 
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not true interval variables. They are aggregate indices based on ordinal scales and 
PEFA.26 even remains an ordinal scale. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics have 
shown that their distributions are not truly normal. This tendency is even reinforced 
when observations are deleted due to missing pairs. This suggests that the Spearman or 
Kendall correlation tests are more adequate than the Pearson correlation test. My indices 
cover different countries. For this reason it was also not possible to calculate a correla-
tion matrix from a complete table where all missings are excluded (only 13 observations 
would remain). Instead, I used a method called pair-wise complete observations.
135
 I 
conducted all three types of correlation tests and got similar results for each test. The 
correlations between the indices are not very strong in all three tests and do not attain a 
degree of association of 50% (apart the correlation between the very similar indices 
PEFA.26 and PEFA.26mean). This confirms my previous analyses that the indices dif-
fer considerably. They measure different aspects of the power of SAIs and they use dif-
ferent research methods. Another observation is that the indices based on the OECD and 
the PEFA data show relatively strong correlations. The reasons for this similarity could 
be that both are mainly based on government information and on similar questions.   
When comparing the results for each SAI index, I again conclude that the OBS2010 
seems to be the most adequate SAI index to be used as my main dependent variable. It 
has the strongest similarities with all other SAI indices, all coefficients are statistically 
significant and no correlation coefficient goes below 0.28. I will thus use the OBS2010 
as my main dependent variable and the other indices as alternative dependent variables. 
The OBS2010 is the most adequate variable for reasons of both theoretical 
compatibility with the concept of SAIs as an accountability arrangement (guaranteed 
independence, transparent reporting, and effective follow-up) and for statistical reasons 
such as the number of observations, its statistical distribution and its correlation with the 
other indices.  
                                                                                                                                                           
probability. The Pearson product moment correlation furthermore is a powerful test for normally 
distributed data only. For non-normal data (large skewness or curtosis, usually caused by one or 
more strong outliers), it is usually not recommended. The Spearman and Kendall correlations 
prove to be more robust to outliers. See http://www.statisticssolutions.com/resources/directory-
of-statistical-analyses/correlation-pearson-kendall-spearman (Last Accessed on August 31, 
2012); Chok, 2008; Bolboaca and Jantschi, 2006;  Croux and Dehon, 2010 
135
 The following number of observations thus remained for each pair: OBS2010-GI08.10: n=57; 
OBS2010-OECD: n=57; OBS2010-PEFA.26/PEFA.26mean: n=38; GI08.10-OECD: n=43; 
GI08.10 – PEFA.26/PEFA.26mean: n=24; OECD-PEFA.26/PEFA.26mean: n=26; PEFA.26-
PEFA.26mean: n=61 
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Table 4.1 presents data values of the OBS2010 organized by country rank
136
, illustrating 
two main research findings:  
- There is an implementation gap. Few countries have very powerful SAIs or SAIs 
with significant power. Most SAIs thus do not realize their role as accountability 
arrangements.  
- There is a strong variation across countries, which at first sight cannot be easily 
explained by per capita GDP, the level of democratization or regional affiliation 
of a country.  
Why does the young country Timor-Leste have no SAI while the young country of 
Macedonia has a SAI with significant power? Why does the SAI of Mozambique have 
only minimal power while the SAI of Botswana has significant power? Why does the 
SAI of Trinidad and Tobago have some power while Fiji has a SAI with very weak 
power? What factors explain that the SAIs of Indonesia and the Philippines are stronger 
than the SAI of Malaysia? Why is the Peruvian SAI stronger than the Argentinean one? 
Why is the Russian SAI slightly stronger than the French SAI? And why does Saudi 
Arabia have a SAI with only minimal power? Why do Norway, Slovenia and the USA 
have the highest scores? Next, in chapter five, I will develop the argument proposing 
seven potential determinants for powerful SAIs, which explain the different scores of 
these SAIs.  
To conclude, this chapter has illustrated that there is a great variation in the power of 
SAIs across data sources. Some of the problems can be associated to the subjectivity of 
the data, to different years and methods used. The main research problem stemming 
from this analysis is: There is an implementation gap between the formal commitments 
as laid out in the ISSAIs and the accountability practice of SAIs. The implementation of 
the ISSAIs is a challenge for most SAIs. Furthermore, there is a strong variation across 
countries. Assuming that all SAIs have tempted to implement reforms to align them-
selves with the ISSAIs, starting with the adoption of the Lima Declaration in 1977, I 
find that these reforms show different results across countries. This leads to the specific 
research question of this dissertation:  
Why does citizen-focused, independent external public auditing thrive in some coun-
tries and fail in others?  
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 This type of presentation including the choice of colors and categories has been adopted from the 
Open Budget Survey. Countries colored in blue have very powerful SAIs (81-100 points), green 
countries have SAIs with significant power (61-80), yellow countries have some power (41-60), 
orange countries have SAIs with minimal power (21-40) and red countries have very weak SAIs 
(0-20). 
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Table 4.1 The Power of SAIs Across Countries According to the OBS2010 (Legend: Blue: Very Power-
ful, Green: Significant Power, Yellow: Some Power, Orange: Minimal Power, Red:  
Weak or No SAI) 
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Table 4.2 Overview of Research Results of Chapter Four 
Part One (Chapters 4.1. and 4.2.) 
qual data collection qual data analysis 
Procedures: 
 Research literature on how to meas-
ure the accountability practice of SAIs 
 Research secondary literature on SAI 
power across regions 
Procedures: 
 Develop a measure for the power of 
SAIs based on the concept of public ac-
countability, the concept of power, the 
concept of de facto institutionalization 
and the ISSAIs 
 Compare secondary literature on SAIs 
across regions and look for patterns 
Products: 
 A literature review discussing the re-
quired components of an index measur-
ing the power of SAI 
 A literature review discussing the ac-
countability practice of SAIs according 
to secondary literature 
 
Products: 
 Components of a measure for the pow-
er of SAIs based on theoretic insights 
developed 
 Thematic analysis of the accountability 
practice of SAIs based on a literature 
review  
 Decision that there is a research gap 
which needs to be filled  
 
 
Part Two (Chapters 4.3. and 4.4.) 
quan data collection quan data analysis 
Procedures: 
 Research availability and suitability of 
data on SAIs 
 
Procedures: 
 Research methods used in existing sur-
veys and discuss which surveys are 
most suitable to serve as a dependent 
variables 
 Develop and construct seven depend-
ent variables based on 5 datasets 
 Compare the dependent variables 
measuring the power of SAIs concern-
ing their theoretic validity and statistical 
suitability 
Products: 
 A list of surveys and standardized quali-
tative data sources which measure var-
ious aspects of SAIs 
 
Products: 
 A decision not to develop own ranking 
of SAIs based on several sources as the 
sources cannot be easily combined 
 Seven rankings (dependent variables) 
measuring the power of SAIs 
 A discussion of the dependent varia-
bles, a decision on the most suitable 
variable (OBS2010) and a graphical 
presentation of the dependent varia-
bles and thus the power of SAIs across 
regions in the form of world maps.  
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5. The Argument - Seven Determinants for 
Powerful SAIs  
5.1. Institutional Model Theories 
5.2. Theories on the Source of National Income 
5.3. Theories on Institutional Diffusion 
5.4. Modernization Theories 
5.5. Conventional Institutional Capacity Theory 
5.6. Rational Choice Institutionalism 
5.7. Organizational Theories of Leadership-Led Change 
5.8. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The same institution produces different results depend-
ing on the context.”137  
 
The next step of my research investigates what potential explanations exist to explain 
the variation in the de facto power of SAIs across countries. Why does citizen-oriented 
independent external public auditing thrive in some countries and fail in others? Why do 
some countries succeed in closing the implementation gap between the de jure and the 
de facto power of SAIs? Why do some countries succeed in establishing rule of law and 
strong institutions providing for public accountability and others fail to do so? 
There exist numerous explanations and no consensus in the scholarly debate on the po-
tential determinants for the effective institutionalization of public accountability. I will 
now proceed to discuss some of the arguments in turn.  
5.1.  Institutional Model Theories 
H1a: Although the institutional model and linked to that the colonial heritage do 
have some influence (with court/Napoleonic institutions performing worst and 
the monocratic/Westminster model performing best), institutional features are 
not the main determinants for the variation in SAI power.  
Several authors have conducted research on the effect that the institutional design of 
SAIs can have on their strengths per se as well as on national economic features. Exist-
ing qualitative research  (f.i. Santiso, 2009) supports the hypothesis that the institutional 
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 North, 1990: 54 
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model, although influential to some extent, is not a main explanatory factor for the vari-
ation of SAI’s political strengths. Blume and Voigt’s quantitative study (2011) suggests 
that the court model is associated with higher levels of corruption. However, the authors 
also believe that the reason behind is the relative lack of parliamentary and public in-
volvement in the auditing process under the court model and not the institutional model 
per se. The advantage of the monocratic system seems to be the assignment of clear 
personal responsibility and thus leadership to one person.
138
 
 
H1b: Countries with electoral rules supporting strong personal competition are 
more likely to also have effective SAIs.     
The political economy of fiscal institutions indicates that institutional design of fiscal 
institutions matters for fiscal performance. This strand of research also shows that dif-
ferent political and constitutional environments demand different institutional solutions. 
Of particular importance seem to be electoral rules and the degree of decentralization, 
next to budgetary procedures. Van Hagen (2006:468 quoting Persson and Tabellini 
2004; Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002; Lizzeri and Persico 2001) supports 
the hypothesis that plurality electoral rule is stronger associated with personal accounta-
bility by politicians, particularly in small districts and if votes are cast for individual 
candidates. On the other hand, proportional representation is less associated with per-
sonal competition by candidates and thus there is less inclination to putting a check on 
rent extraction, corruption as well as excessive public spending.
139
   
5.2.  Theories on the Source of National Income  
H2a: The higher is the share of Oil endowments in a country’s national income, 
the less likely accountability systems including SAIs work properly. 
The literature exploring the so called “resource curse” is very rich but also inconclusive. 
New insights (Haber and Menaldo, 2011) suggest that the supposed link between natu-
ral resources and the large probability of an authoritarian regime might be mistaken. 
Instead of natural resource endowments causing authoritarianism, authoritarian gov-
ernments decide to invest in natural resource exports as this highly specialized industry 
sector cannot easily be expropriated and used by potential opposition forces. Despite the 
question of what causes what, there seems to be a strong correlation between large rents 
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 There is no research so far on the effect of decentralized SAIs. Some countries have a SAI for each 
region, others have regional branches with or without decision making powers. There is thus 
scope for further research in this area, starting with data collection.  
139
 See Wehner and de Renzio (2012) for a more in depth discussion of the literature on the effect of insti-
tutional design and public finance transparency. 
The Argument - Seven Determinants for Powerful SAIs 84 
 
stemming from natural resource endowments and authoritarian regimes, and by defini-
tion also weak independent public auditing.  
 
H2b: Public financial management support is associated with stronger SAI pow-
er if it the country is truly committed to implementing reforms.   
Apart from the effect of natural resource endowments, scholars also study the effect of 
aid on institutional development. In the “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” 
(OECD, 2005), donors committed themselves to strengthen “good governance” in recip-
ient governments. The World Bank particularly focuses on analyzing and supporting 
governance reforms in recipient countries through the mechanism of “Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Papers”. Many donors have also committed themselves to supporting and 
particularly also rewarding good governance by the introduction of “General Budget 
Support” as aid mechanism. Of particular interest for this study, is not only whether the 
amount of aid is correlated to strong or weak SAIs, but whether aid that was specified 
for the strengthening of public financial management systems has had any effect in 
strengthening the power of SAIs.  
The question whether aid plays a role in the development of accountability is currently a 
hotly debated issue.
140
 There is no consensus in the (particularly US-American based) 
academic debate on the role of aid on macro-development and democracy. Furthermore, 
a generalization is difficult as we have to differentiate between various aid modalities 
and priorities. For the purpose of this study, I suppose that the share of PFM aid only 
has an effect on the de facto power of SAIs, if the country is truly committed to reform, 
i.e. if it is implementing broad overall reforms.  
 
H2c: The higher is the share of tax endowments of a country’s national income, 
the more likely the SAI is effective.   
The early development of Supreme Audit Institutions was part of a long process of eco-
nomic and political institutional development in Europe and the USA. State theories (f.i. 
Tilly, 1992) explain how through the process of institutionalizing taxation, wars were 
financed and states were formed.  There is a broad scholarship investigating the ques-
tion whether the source of national income has an influence on the institutions that a 
state develops and on the way these institutions function. For instance, the recent study 
by Broms (2011) compares the effect of tax systems and incomes on the governance of 
African states. He suggests that it is not the tax level per se but the type of taxation 
which makes a difference, whereas direct tax (income tax) as a percentage of GDP 
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 See also chapter 2.3. Donors realize the difficulties in building institutions. 
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should have the strongest impact on the quality of government. Indirect taxes such as 
VAT (value-added tax) on goods and services also contribute to a bargaining process in 
society (particularly in democratic developing countries). Furthermore, the collection 
process of direct/indirect taxes tends to be more demanding than taxes on trade and nat-
ural resources and therefore supports the need for rationalization of the bureaucracy, 
and thus a step towards increasing state capacity.  
5.3.  Theories on Institutional Diffusion 
H3a: The stronger is the regional influence by good performers, the more likely 
a country implements similar reforms.  
Theories on the diffusion of democracy suggest that external influence in several ways 
can have a strong effect on the probability for the creation and endurance of democracy. 
The strand of transformation literature first of all argues that the stronger the regional 
influence of good performers is, the more likely a country is to also adopt reforms of 
accountability. This snowballing effect explains how early transitions stimulate and 
provide models for subsequent efforts at democratization and are particularly important 
within regions or among culturally similar countries. (Diamond, 2009:108 quoting Hun-
tington, 1991a:2 and Huntington 1991b:101)  
 
H3b: The more influence the international community has in building state ca-
pacity (i.e. in a post-conflict situation with international involvement) the more 
likely it is that institutions of accountability can effectively be put in place.  
Under this rubric I also classify the concept of institutional inertia caused mainly by 
“path dependency”141. Here it is assumed that some exogenous shock at different critical 
junctures sets a state or institution on its development trajectory. The more influence the 
international community has in building state capacity (i.e. in a post-conflict situation or 
after a total regime change such as South Africa, Rwanda, Liberia, Kosovo etc.) the 
more likely it is that institutions of accountability can effectively be put in place as there 
is less resistance from powerful elite groups as they have been substantially weakened 
through the conflict. (Andrews, 2010:3; Diamond, 2009) 
 
H3c:  Countries comply to international norms only formally, and do not trans-
form these values into de facto institutions.  
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 North 1990; Putnam, 1993; Acemoglu et al., 2001.  
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Finally, “world society” or “decoupling theory” argues that countries choose institutions 
to comply to international norms, even if those institutions do not meet the countries’ 
needs but because they want to seem modern. (e.g. Meyer et al. 1997)  
5.4.  Modernization Theories142 
H4a: The higher is the level of socio-economic development of a country the 
more likely is the country to become democratic and to stay democratic once 
democracy has been established, thus the more likely institutions for accounta-
bility develop and work effectively.  
H2b: The stronger is a society’s demand for accountability, the more likely it is 
that the ruling elites will make democratic concessions. Thus, the stronger is a 
society’s capacity to understand and request audit reports and to organize cam-
paigns, the more likely are SAI reforms and thus the stronger is a SAI in the 
country.  
Modernization theories and other structural accounts of democratization occupy a large 
share of scholarly research on the development of democracy including public account-
ability.
143
 Basically, the assumption is that economic and social development of a coun-
try is both a prerequisite for the development and for the endurance of democracy. In 
this perspective an educated middle class demands more voice in society, which sets the 
conditions that ultimately lead to democratic institutions. The policy consequence 
would then be to support socio-economic development in poor countries and build the 
capacity of the wider public to demand their rights.  Thus, the stronger is society’s de-
mand for accountability, its capacity to understand and request audit reports and to or-
ganize campaigns, change national discourse and norms, the more likely it is that the 
SAI will gain in power.   
5.5.  Conventional Institutional Capacity Theory (function follows 
form) 
H5a: The technical capacity of a SAI including staff number and professionalism 
as well as infrastructure has a positive effect on the development of de facto SAI 
power.    
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 I adopted the following three types of classifications from Krasner (2009, 2011a,b) who differentiates 
between modernization theory, institutional capacity theory and rational choice theory as the 
three main paradigms in the current aid debate.  
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 Lipset, 1959, Przeworski et al, 2000; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Sachs, 2005, 2008; Inglehart and Welzel, 
2008 
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According to institutional accounts of development, development is only possible with 
political institutionalization. The essence of the institutional capacity theory is that de-
velopment will only occur if states succeed to build effective autonomous institutions 
able to organize politics. Samuel P. Huntington famously wrote: “The most important 
political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their 
degree of government.” (Huntington, 1968:1) The institutional capacity approach has 
emerged in the aid debate after the influential comparative study of democratic transi-
tions by Linz and Stepan (1996), the World Development Report - The State in a 
Changing World (World Bank, 1997), and the insights by Fukuyama (2004). He ex-
plained that although it was necessary to limit the scope of state functions in poor coun-
tries as part of structural adjustment programs during the 1990s, it was a mistake to also 
reduce state capacity. The mainstream of development policy today follows this institu-
tional capacity approach and stresses the need for building capacity of state institutions 
in order for them to become effective and for development to occur. Thus, while mod-
ernization theory believes that economic development will lead to political develop-
ment, institutional capacity theory stresses that states need to build political institutions 
first in order to develop.  
 
H5b: Different measures of capacity building have different effects on SAI pow-
er.      
The literature review in chapter 4.2. has shown that capacity building needs to be pre-
dictable and needs to take the political economy into account. The most effective capac-
ity building programs are then those that are long-term and include activities that aim to 
strengthen the external relations of the SAI.  
 
POLITICAL WILL 
While modernization theory and institutional capacity theory assume that the provision 
of enough external support will lead to development, I agree with North et al (2009a; 
2009b) and others that there is no such teleology and that we need to put politics at the 
heart of development processes. In my opinion political will to institutionalize account-
ability develops not automatically if there is the demand for public accountability (just 
think of the various developments as a result of political revolts during the ongoing Ar-
ab spring). The demand for public accountability (be they led by public outcry, donor 
conditionality or within the elite itself) is met de facto as well as de jure only if there is 
1) the presence of specific inter-elite relationships which are conducive to reform as 
proposed by rational choice institutionalism and 2) if there is (SAI) leadership that cre-
ates a momentum for reform as explained through organizational theories. 
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5.6.  Rational Choice Institutionalism 
H6a: The more the doorstep conditions of North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 
2009b) are realized the more reforms of institutions of accountability can suc-
ceed.  
Rational choice institutionalism investigates the question why democratic institutions at 
times do not work. This work can be allocated among the ‘new institutional economics’ 
literature, which studies the role of institutional designs on economic performance. 
However, the main focus of North, Wallis and Weingast (2009ab) is on studying how 
these institutions come about, and by doing so they touch on a very topical debate in 
current development scholarship and practice. Their work is part of a new approach to 
studying the integrated political economy of democracy and capitalism, institution-
building, state-development and authoritarianism: rational choice institutionalism.144 In 
recent years, the rational choice institutionalist literature has exploded, particularly in 
the US political science academia.145 This approach agrees with institutional capacity 
theory that institutions are a prerequisite for development but criticizes its focus on in-
stitutional functionality rather than possession. Rational choice sees economic growth 
and effective governance as the result of decisions taken by key stakeholders, who are 
self-interested. As individuals and groups act according to their available options, the 
results of various political deals are always open and not linearly defined. Contrary to 
conventional institutional capacity theory, for rational choice scholars institutions can 
never be autonomous and a concentration of power is detrimental. Instead, institutions 
must be embedded in the interests of all powerful elite groups to make them stable. 
Consequently, contrary to the assumption of the conventional policy approach of insti-
tutional capacity building, democratic institutions will not work only because enough 
resources have been provided for organizational development, training and infrastruc-
ture. Instead, institutions will work if they are in the interests of the elites because they 
have been put into a position, where they lose less by making democratic concessions 
than by holding on to power. This stream of research gained in prominence in the USA 
since the mid 2000s, partly as a response to the negative experiences of “building de-
mocracies” in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
One of the most influential studies in this stream of research was Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2006). Their study is based on the fact that most sustainable democracies were de-
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 North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009:269) have called this stream of research an “integrated political 
economy approach”, Iversen (2006:617) has defined it as “new structuralism” and Krasner 
(2009a,b, 2011 a,b) has named it “rational choice institutionalism”.’  
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 see f.i.: Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Fisman and Miguel, 2008; Collier, 2009; Carothers, 2002; 
Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong, 2006; Greif, 2006; Haber et al., 2003, 2006; Persson and 
Tabellini, 2000, Spiller and Tommasi; 2007; Magaloni, 2008; Khan, 2005, 2006, Fisman, 2001; 
and Meisel and Ould Aoudia, 2008 
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veloped by elites. They then ask why elites give up power to non-elites? The authors 
develop four ideal-typical development paths to democracy or dictatorship and illustrate 
their theory by the example of the development paths of Great Britain, Argentina, South 
Africa and Singapore. They conclude that elites make democratic concessions, when 
they fear to lose privileges anyway and believe that they lose less through democratic 
reforms than through a revolution. Democracies are only sustained over time if they are 
in the interest of the elites themselves, i.e. when they are based on voluntary conces-
sions by the elites who need to give up privileges. Otherwise democracy collapses and 
authoritarian rule is established again or a pseudo-democracy develops.  
North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 2009b) build on these insights but explain that the 
elites are not a unified group and thus cannot intentionally decide on anything. North 
and his colleagues point out that the crucial aspect for understanding democratic transi-
tions is to analyze various types of inter-elite relationships as these condition success or 
failure of reform. The authors address the problem identified by Fukuyama (2004) and 
others who acknowledge the importance of institutions for development but do not pro-
vide answers on how a state can develop effective institutions.
146
 The main research 
problem which North, Wallis, and Weingast address is that  
“despite a great deal of attention and effort, social science has not come to grips 
with how economic and political development are connected either in history or 
in the modern world.” (2009a:55)  
Their main research aim is to explain “why poor countries stay poor.” (2009a:57) They 
start their investigation by conducting a statistical analysis of per capita income for 184 
countries between 1950 and 2004 and concluded that  
“poor countries are not poor because they grow more slowly; they are poor be-
cause they experience more years of negative income growth and more rapid 
declines during those years.” (2009a:57)  
Thus, the main thesis of their paper is that poor countries stay poor not because they 
grow more slowly but because they are less able to adapt to crises and change. In their 
words,  
“…modern development is not the result of faster growth per se, but instead re-
sults from new forms of political, economic, and social organization that make a 
society much better able to handle change.” (2009a:57)  
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 “Michael Woolcock and Lant Pritchett talked about the problem of “getting to Denmark,” where 
“Denmark” stands generically for a developed country with well-functioning state institutions. 
We know what “Denmark” looks like, and something about how the actual Denmark came to be 
historically. But to what extent is that knowledge transferable to countries as far away histori-
cally and culturally from Denmark as Somalia or Moldova?” (Fukuyama, 2004:30 citing Wool-
mark and Pritchett, 2002) 
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They then develop their argument through a detailed historic analysis of the develop-
ment paths of primarily Great Britain, the USA and France but also make reference to 
other country examples. The central points of their argument are: 
- The state is not a single actor and thus cannot intentionally decide to do any-
thing, is “an organization of several stakeholders rather than a single actor.” 
Doing so, they address one of the main criticisms of the framework by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). (2009a:59) 
- “The process of controlling violence is central to how individuals and groups 
behave within a society and how a coalition emerges to structure the state and 
society.” (2009a:59) 
- They point out that the patterns of social order differ fundamentally in so called 
“open access orders” and “limited access orders”. 
- The transition from a limited to an open access order has two stages and is not a 
linear process. The transition starts with the realization of three so called door-
step conditions, which result in the development of impersonality among elites 
as the most important characteristic of open access orders.  
Before I will go on to explain each of these points in more detail, I will discuss the main 
argument their theory builds on a bit in detail, namely that sustainable political orders 
and institutions with de facto power must be self-enforcing and pareto-improving.  They 
are the result of a conclusion of mutually beneficial bargains as they solve commitment 
problems.  
Democracy endures only if it is self-enforcing. It is not a contract because there 
are no third parties to enforce it. To survive, democracy must be an equilibrium 
at least for those political forces which can overthrow it: given that others re-
spect democracy, each must prefer it over the feasible alternatives.” (Przeworski 
1991, qtd. in Przeworski, 2006:300) 
This logic of a self-enforcing equilibrium contradicts the contractarian theorem that 
democracies develop out of constitutions
147
. Rational choice scholars see institutions as 
mechanisms that can make political bargains stable and enduring, in the sense that form 
follows function and not the other way around.
148
 Thus, there needs to be a political pro-
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 “Constitutions are not necessary because democracy survives not because of exogenous rules but for 
endogenous reasons, they are self-enforcing. The rules that regulate the functioning of a 
democratic system need not be immutable or even hard to change. When a society is sufficiently 
wealthy, the incumbents in their own interest moderate their distributional zeal and tolerate fair 
electoral chances. Democratic governments are moderate because they face a threat of 
rebellion. Democratic rules must be thought of as endogenous.” (Calvert, 1994, 1995, qtd. in 
Przeworski, 2006:320-321) 
148
 As explained above, institutional capacity theory assumes that function follows form. 
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cess which leads to bargains and commitments, to so called “elite pacts”, which are then 
institutionalized.  
Figure 5.1 Democratization With and Without Elite Pacts (Merkel, 2010:92 based on Burton et al. 1992) 
 
North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 2009b) explain that the transition from authoritari-
an to democratic structures must be consistent with the logic of the current social or-
der.
149
 The authors differentiate between social orders with open and such with limited 
access orders, meaning access to both political and economic activities. Social orders 
with limited access, also labeled natural states, exist on a continuum ranging from frag-
ile states, characterized by political instability and violence, at one extreme, to mature 
natural states— such as emerging markets—that are close to satisfying the doorstep 
conditions. The new contribution of their framework is the concept of how societies 
reduce or control the problem of violence. They first explain that the control over vio-
lence is disbursed in many groups in natural states, which would make them very fragile 
to civil wars. However, natural states solve the problem of violence through rent-
creation, granting powerful individuals and groups’ privileges so that they have incen-
tives to cooperate rather than fight. The resulting rents, limits on competition, and lim-
ited access to organizations hinder long-term economic development. In contrast, open 
access orders use competition, open access to organization and institutions to control 
violence and are characterized by rent-erosion and long-term economic growth.
 150
 The 
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 cf. Huntington’s distinction of countries according to their political order, 1965, 1968, see above 
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 While I agree basically with this classification of political orders, and I also acknowledge the fact that 
the authors mentioned in their book that no country has achieved full open access, I think the au-
thors could have said more about the political order in the so called open-access countries. While 
equality before the law and other features of open access orders are definitely more secure in the 
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idea that Western institutions cannot easily be transferred to other contexts is not new 
but the theory why the dynamics in developing countries at times resist the development 
and consolidation of democratic institutions or transform them to hollow institutional 
shells (namely to prevent violence) is new. 
According to North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 2009b) in order to trigger a transition 
to an open access society, it is important to create preconditions that put the elites in a 
position where it is in their own interest to transform personal and privileged deals 
among themselves into impersonal laws, so that all members of the elite groups are 
treated the same way. In a second step it can then be possible that elites transform their 
unique and personal rights to impersonal rights for all citizens.  
“The natural tendency of powerful groups faced with uncertainty and novel situ-
ations, is to consolidate privileges, not to expand them to include more elites. 
The transition proper is the process by which elites open access within the dom-
inant coalition, secure that open access through institutional changes, and then 
begin to expand access to citizenship rights to a wider share of the population.” 
(North et al. 2009:190) 
Thus, contrary to modernization theory, there is no direct link between public demand 
and the development of sustainable democratic institutions but the public demand is 
only met if the elites are put into a position where it is in their own interest to make the-
se concessions and make the institutions work. North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 
2009b) call the preconditions for open access for elites to develop the “doorstep condi-
tions”. They are: 
DC#1: Rule of law for elites. (The objective is to separate personal identity from 
privilege and thus to contribute to new ways for impersonal exchange and trade.) 
DC#2: Perpetually lived organizations in the public and private spheres. (These are 
sophisticated organizations that last and are not tied to one specific person, 
which increases impersonal exchange as one can count on the firm or public en-
tity to last and therefore one is more inclined to invest in or trade with this or-
ganization or to take on the regulations of this public entity.) 
DC#3: Consolidated control of the military. (This is important to prevent the dis-
bursement of violence among various groups and get stability for economic and 
political development.) 
To sum up, North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 2009b) provide a conceptual frame-
work for understanding social orders. The authors show that the analysis of violence, 
institutions, organizations, and beliefs is central for an understanding of economic and 
political development processes. They base their insights on detailed historic analysis, 
                                                                                                                                                           
rich industrialized OECD countries than in the rest of the world, here too, I think, inequalities 
persist and crises (such as the recent financial crisis and the debt crisis) reveal vulnerabilities of 
the apparently stable political order.  
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mainly of the USA, Great Britain and France. While this method allows them to paint a 
clear picture of the processes in concrete historic contexts, it is not clear to what extent 
the same processes can be observed today (and even less so whether it is a desirable 
development). Furthermore, even in their historic analysis they leave out several aspects 
such as the international political economy and the role of the non-elites, including the 
role of gender relations, for development. Despite these limitations
151
, I consider their 
framework a useful tool for the analysis of inter-elite relationships.      
 
H6b: The power of SAIs in autocracies differs depending on the strategy that the 
autocrat uses in order to stay in power.   
Recent scholarship on authoritarianism agrees with rational choice institutionalism. This 
scholarship first of all observed that many autocracies have created façade democratic 
institutions, which however leave the autocratic essence of the regimes unchanged.
152
 
Why are some appearances deceiving? Interviewee 5 (see chapter seven) described the 
practice of public auditing in his country as a farce. Although the institution is fully in-
dependent from the executive by law, in fact it is not and everybody knows that it is 
only an “empty-shell” institution. He expressed this situation with the following prov-
erb, “A camel hides his head behind a tree and thinks nobody sees it, but in fact every-
body does.” 
Many of the SAIs that lack independence and perform poorly can be found in such 
semi-authoritarian regimes. Thus it is my main interest to particularly explore potentials 
for reform in (semi-) authoritarian regimes. Under what conditions do (semi-) authori-
tarian regimes successfully implement accountability reforms? What strategies do 
(semi-) authoritarian regimes employ to successfully resist reforms?  
Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003) explore the question of who can threaten a dictator 
with removal from power, and the mechanism that they use to do so. A major threat to 
dictators constitutes political entrepreneurs who lead organized groups. This presents us 
according to Haber (2006) the autocrat with a paradox: if dictators fear political entre-
preneurs and the groups they lead, why don’t they simply stamp them out?  Haber 
(2006) suggests that there is an inevitable set of strategic interactions among dictators 
and the organized groups that launch them to power. Haber (2006) as well as Magaloni 
(2008) claim that there are three distinct political equilibriums, depending on the power 
struggles between the dictator and what Haber calls the “launching organization”.  In 
the first scenario, the dictator eliminates the power of the launching organization 
through terror, torture, and purges. The second strategy is one of collusion, where the 
                                                     
151
 For a critical discussion of this book see f.i. Hartzell (2010), Elsthain (2010), Diamond (2010) or Snid-
er (2010).  
152
 See also chapter 3.2. 
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dictator ensures a stream of rents to leaders of the launching organization. A third polit-
ical equilibrium is characterized by organizational proliferation, whereby the dictator 
encourages the creation of competing organizations to increase the costs of collective 
action by the launching organization.  
Each of the three strategies applied by autocrats generates quite different property rights 
systems, and each of those property rights systems has consequences for economic 
growth, distribution and accountability reforms. Dictatorships in which the power of the 
launching organization was curbed by terrorizing or co-opting its leadership tend to al-
locate property rights to a restricted set of individuals. As a result, the economies of 
these countries tend to grow very slowly, and public accountability is impossible. Dicta-
torships in which the power to the launching organization was curbed by proliferating 
yet more organizations, however, tend to allocate property rights to a much larger set of 
individuals. As a result, the economies of these countries tend to grow more rapidly. 
Accountability reforms are more likely, therefore, to be successful in those countries in 
which a dictatorship was characterized by organizational proliferation, rather than terror 
or co-optation. These accountability institutions can gain strength in situation of politi-
cal conflict. (Haber, 2006) 
To summarize, I assume that the three strategies have the following effect on the devel-
opment of powerful SAIs
153
: 
Strategy 1: In autocracies with high levels of terror, there might be a SAI in order to 
control subordinates but the SAI will never be independent or very powerful.  
Strategy 2: In autocracies where the autocrat deals with the “launching organization” 
mainly through rent creation and clientelism, the SAI will function very badly.  
Strategy 3: Autocrats who apply the strategy of organizational proliferation might also 
establish SAIs, which however remain façade institutions. 
5.7.  Organizational Theories of Leadership-Led Change154 
H7a: Leadership commitment by heads of SAIs is associated with stronger SAI 
power.
155
 
                                                     
153
 This hypothesis also includes the statement, that reform can be easier in post-conflict countries as the 
local elites have been weakened. Another argument goes that the doorstep conditions are more 
relevant in large than in small countries. In large countries elite groups have a stronger incentive 
to formalize their relationships and an authoritarian leadership has a stronger incentive to formal-
ize accountability of low and mid level officials. 
154
 This title is an adaptation of Andrews et al. (2010) who entitle their report “Development as leader-
ship-led change” 
155
 This hypothesis was not part of my original hypotheses as developed on the basis of the literature 
review. Instead it was one result of the expert interviews, conducted at a later stage of the re-
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H7b: Long periods of reform commitment foster progress. 
The second theory that my argument on the development of political will builds on is 
organizational theory and more specifically, leadership as an important driver of 
change. I adopt the approach by Andrews, Mc Connell, and Wescott (2010b) for under-
standing the role of leadership in the process of change. Their definition of leadership is 
based on an extensive literature review and a qualitative study comprising 140 in-depth 
interviews covering 14 development projects in fragile countries.  They define leader-
ship as involving  
“the set of actions that intentionally creates change space and mobilizes people, 
ideas, meaning and resources to achieve a change purpose” (Andrews, McCon-
nell, and Wescott, 2010b:13) 
This definition speaks about leadership and not leaders because the authors consider 
leader plurality as important, thus they talk more about groups than individuals. This 
definition is driven by the functional approach to leadership, thus leaders are identified 
more because of their functional contribution to change than their personal traits or au-
thority. In answering the question what leadership does in the change process, they 
mainly refer to transformational, transactional and relational leadership models.  
According to Andrews, McConnell and Wescott (2010b:14), change space develops 
when the three A’s are present, i.e. if leadership (1) builds Acceptance (by managing 
attention and meaning, framing facts, coaching, etc.), (2) ensures that appropriate Au-
thority and accountability structures are established (by empowering followers, delegat-
ing responsibilities, buffering the organization from external influences, etc.) and (3) 
when leadership enhances Ability (by fostering new productive relationships, accessing 
new finances, etc.). Change space can then emerge at the intersection of these three 
conditions (see the AAA model in figure 5.2.) 
Space does not have a static importance in their model, but emerges as important in a 
process where different stages have different space requirements. In early stages of re-
forms the major challenge may be to facilitate contextual acceptance while in later stag-
es it might be to introduce new abilities or formal or informal authorization mechanism 
to institutionalize the change. (Andrews, Mc Connell, and Wescott, 2010b:9, Andrews, 
2008b
 
) I understand this concept of space change as resembling the idea of a momen-
tum of change as defined by the sociological term of tipping points.
156
  
  
                                                                                                                                                           
search project. The SAI leaders themselves pointed out that leadership abilities and commitment 
by SAI leaders is one of the main factors that explain success or failure of SAI reforms.  
156
 Research on tipping points: Grodzins, 1958; Schelling, 1972; Granovetter, 1978; Gladwell, 2000. 
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Figure 5.2 The AAA Model of Change Space (Andrews, Mc Connell, and Wescott, 2010b:6) 
No change space exists because the AAA’s are 
all deficient and/or non-convergent. 
Some change space exists because the AAA’s 
are all sufficient in size and converge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Andrews, Mc Connell and Wescott (2010b), in the development context, it 
is vital to ask whether the psychological issues and learning dimensions of change re-
ceive enough attention and particularly also whether the change process addresses a 
problem which has been identified by the persons who should lead the change process, 
and thus whether there is local ownership of the process.  Referring amongst others to 
North (1995
157
) this study also considers aspects of the rational choice institutionalism 
theory in that contextual factors affect the costs of exercising leadership that leads 
change: 
“…contexts are not always ready for the type of leadership we believe leads 
change. ...some contexts were more flexible than others and accommodated the 
move from change initiation to transition more readily… Where contextual fac-
tors make it too costly to either initiate change or to ensure it is sustained, lead-
ership will be lacking. Where contextual factors make it less costly or allow cost 
sharing across a team, coalition or network, such leadership will be more ap-
parent” (Andrews et al., 2010b:49-50) 
Despite these context specificities, successful leadership-led change events shared a 
number of key characteristics in their study, namely plurality, functionality, problem 
orientation and change space creation (Andrews, Mc Connell and Wescott, 2010b:9, 
Andrews, 2008b): 
 Plurality indicates that leadership is more about groups than individuals  
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 Qtd. explicitely in Andrews et al. 2010b: endnote xxiv  
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 Functionality is important because ‘leaders’ have been identified more because 
of their functional contribution to change than their personal traits or authority  
 Problem orientation and change space creation defines leadership which con-
tributes to the acceptance for change, which grants authority to change, and in-
troduces or frees the abilities necessary to achieve change. 
To summarize, leadership actions are required at all stages of the reform process to ex-
pand change space and by doing so they create the political will necessary for a de facto 
institutionalization of SAI reforms. And this leadership most importantly has to come 
from the heads of SAIs themselves. But there can also be leadership by parliamentari-
ans, political parties, the media, public pressure groups and of course external stake-
holders such as INTOSAI bodies, donors and regional organizations.  
5.8. Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the argument explaining the variation in the de facto power of 
SAIs to hold to account. Seven strands of theory and their proposed hypotheses for po-
tential determinants of powerful SAIs have been presented and discussed. I conclude 
this chapter with my main argument:  
While the institutional arrangements for government auditing, the nature of the source 
of national income, the external influence on reform, the local demand for public ac-
countability and the technical and organizational capacities of SAIs matter, the political 
economy of inter-elite relations and the existence of plural, functional and problem-
oriented leadership creating reform space ultimately explains the development, consoli-
dation and endurance of powerful of SAIs. 
In a next step, I will test my argument by exploring the potential relationships between 
my independent variables and the power of SAIs through econometric analyses.  
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Table 5.1 Overview of Research Results of Chapter Five 
qual data collection qual data analysis 
Procedures: 
 Semi-structured expert interviews 
(see chapter 2) 
 Feedback loop from semi-structured 
expert interviews  (see chapter 7) 
 Literature reviews 
Procedures: 
 Argument/hypotheses development 
through in depth literature analysis 
 
Products: 
 Interview transcripts including recom-
mendations for further study, potential 
hypotheses 
 Literature summaries 
Products: 
 Argument consisting of seven main hy-
potheses with many sub-hypotheses 
 Discussion of strand of theoretic litera-
ture of several disciplines (democratiza-
tion/transitology, development studies, 
international relations, political econo-
my, authoritarianism, organizational 
theories)  
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6. The Objective View – Exploring Relationships 
Through Econometric Analyses 
6.1. Model Building 
6.2. Model Testing 
6.3. Data Analysis 
6.4. Exploring INTOSAI Data 
6.5. Mini-Case Analyses 
6.6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
„All models are wrong but some are useful.”158 
6.1.  Model Building 
The introductory quote from the famous statistician George Box on the one hand points 
out that models are just models and therefore can never fully reflect the complex social 
world but that at the same time they are useful tools in the social sciences. The statisti-
cal models that are used to analyze social data – and particularly the models used in this 
dissertation – are, in contrast to social reality, quite simple. The assumption of this 
chapter is then that simple statistical models can help us to understand a complex social 
reality. (Fox, 2008:1)  
After the preliminary research phase, which resulted in the formulation of the specific 
research question and according hypotheses, this second phase of the dissertation pro-
ject consists of the so called “objective construction of the object”, that is, the construc-
tion and testing of an explanation from an observer’s perspective through the use of 
statistical techniques. According to Bourdieu (1973 and Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and 
Passeron 1991, both qt. in Harrits, 2011:156) this outside perspective presents a view of 
the research object (or subject) not accessible to itself and thus it can be seen as an epis-
temological advancement within the social sciences compared to purely phenomenolog-
ical knowledge, which only describes or reconstructs meanings and experiences. This 
research phase in Bourdieu’s words then constructs the “opus operatum”, that is the 
way things operate, the structures and regularities that we can find behind a problem.  
This understanding of causal mechanisms is founded within the paradigm of critical 
realism (George and Bennett 2005, qt. in Harrits, 2011:155). Harrits (2011:155) refer-
                                                     
158
 George Box, 1979:202 qt. in Fox, 2008:1 
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ring to Bashkar (1978) explains that this scientific approach is based on a three–layered 
ontological model including the empirical domain, consisting of experiences; the actual 
domain, consisting of events; and the real domain, consisting of causal mechanisms. 
Thus the realist ontological model accepts continuity between the actual domain 
(events) and the real domain (mechanisms). There is however also a lot of criticism of 
this ontological model and approach. Critics mainly point out the problems associated 
with the establishment of causality, such as controlling for spuriousness and establish-
ing the causal order, and more fundamentally the problem of causal heterogeneity and 
causal complexity. (Collier & Mahoney, 1996; Ragin, 1987; both qtd. in Harrits, 
2011:155)   
Despite the acknowledged limitations, deductive theory testing may offer an insight into 
potential regularities. According to Hendry and Richard (1983 in Gujarati and Porter, 
2009:468) the selection of a model should be data admissible, consistent with theory, 
should have weakly exogenous regressors, exhibit parameter constancy and data coher-
ency and be encompassing. This said, it is actually very difficult to develop such a mod-
el, particularly if there are few (or as in my case hardly any) studies available to build 
on and if the data that is to be used is not fully reliable and robust. The statistical infer-
ences that I will draw are based on samples and as I have discussed in chapter 4 con-
tains subjective methods and measurement errors. There remains a substantial risk that 
my data is quite far away from a random sample so that the statistical probability of the 
inferences from this sample will not reflect the total observations.
159
 There is particular-
ly a problem of measurement error or bias. Finally, the model specification can be erro-
neous and the ontological assumptions underpinning the whole model might also be 
deficient or even flawed, which will be partly captured by the error term in the model.  
To conclude, there are many potential problems when testing theory through economet-
ric techniques in general and particularly as in my case when the tests are based on sub-
jective data and on data which has been measured only one point in time (see chapter 
4.2.).
160
  However, within these limits I can explore the data and critically reflect on the 
results. I thus primarily consider my regression diagnostics as a tool to explore and de-
                                                     
159
 Globally, there are 189 national SAIs which are members of INTOSAI. I trust that in the future data 
will become available for the total population of SAIs, and so future research will not have to 
think about the random nature of the sample anymore. 
160
 The development of powerful SAIs is a process which occurs over time, thus it would be most appro-
priate to examine whether that time series process actually occurred. Unfortunately there is only 
very limited data available on SAIs today and thus all that is possible at this stage is to examine 
the variance between countries at one point in time. Another method which would me more ap-
propriate is structural equation modeling, whereby the researcher actually examines the causal 
relationships that exist among all variables, including the independent ones. This indeed seems to 
be a promising method, and is envisaged by the author for post-doctoral research. Another possi-
bility would be to apply qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). However, while QCA has the 
advantage of using qualitative data and thus potentially could use variables for which there is 
currently no quantitative data available, it also has the problem that there is no error term in the 
regression specification, and thus all the errors are integrated into the coefficients.  
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scribe the data, to generate some stylized facts and relationships, which always have to 
be perceived from an angle of uncertainty. The main objective of this chapter is then not 
to proof causality but to engage in hypotheses exploration, the results of which can then 
serve as a basis to engage in more specific quantitative and qualitative research.   
This chapter is organized as follows. Overall, the aim of this chapter is to apply a simple 
nested analysis approach, simple because the small-N verification will only consist of 
short literature analyses of several mini-cases (while the small-N analysis could also 
consist of extensive qualitative case studies including field research and interviews). At 
the expense of comprehensive small-N case study verification, I decided to conduct 
expert interviews with an inductive research approach as proposed by the mixed-method 
strategy of “praxeological knowledge”. I thus incorporate qualitative research not pri-
marily as a way of testing the quantitative results but instead as a means to incorporate 
reflexivity into objective knowledge (see chapter seven).  
After an introductory discussion of the method used, I present the main model based on 
the hypotheses as discussed in chapter five (chapter 6.1.) I then conduct diagnostic tests 
of my main table (chapter 6.2.) before I engage in an analysis of the findings and a de-
tailed discussion of each of the hypotheses (chapter 6.3.). In a next step I test some of 
my hypotheses on the anonymized dataset from the IDI Stocktaking Report 2010 (chap-
ter 6.4.). Based on the findings from the econometric tests I then test my findings 
through mini-case analyses (chapter 6.5.). Finally I summarize the overall findings of 
this chapter and draw conclusions (chapter 6.6.). 
To start, I first tested each hypothesis as presented in table 5.1. in preliminary simple 
(mostly bivariate) regressions and graphical examinations on a large set of independent 
variables. Basically, the preliminary regressions largely confirmed my hypotheses. But 
how do the variables perform when put together, i.e. when testing each variable while 
holding the others constant? As discussed above, I am using observational data and 
therefore must be aware that what I am actually finding are only conditioned correla-
tions between two variables. This does therefore not mean that the relationship which I 
am finding between variables is necessarily causal. Particularly when comparing coun-
tries, the demonstration of causality becomes very problematic. The variance between 
countries could be caused by many other factors than the ones I am testing. And these 
factors might be at the root of both my dependent and my independent variables.  
In general, a multiple regression model can be expressed as follows: 
Yi = β1 + β2
 
X2i + β3X3i
 
+ ui                                   (Eq.6.1.) 
where Y is the dependent variable and measures the power of SAIs (as discussed in 
chapter four). The Xs are the explanatory variables, u is the stochastic disturbance term, 
and the i indicates the ith observation and t indicates the year the data was measured. As 
you can see, I use data for the independent variables which is measured two years be-
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fore the SAI data. By doing so I take into account the time lag that any condition will 
need to have an impact on SAI reforms. Wherever data is available I do not only use 
data from 2007 (two years before the SAI data), but a mean of the years 2004-2007 
(please see table B.12 in Appendix B for a list and description of all variables cited). 
The β1 is the intercept term (also called constant) and gives the mean effect on Y of all 
the variables excluded from the model. The β -coefficients are also called the partial 
regression coefficients.
 
Their meaning is as follows: β2 measures the change in the mean 
value of Y per unit change in X2, holding the value of all other X constant; β3 measures 
the change in the mean value of Y per unit change in X3, again holding the value of all 
other X constant, and so on. That is, a partial regression coefficient gives the “direct” or 
“net” effect of a unit change in the corresponding X on the mean value of Y, net of any 
effect that all other X may have on mean Y. (Gujarati & Porter, 2009:188-191)  
My model as suggested by my main argument can then be expressed as follows: 
Main Model:  
Y(de_facto_SAI_power_to_hold_to_account)i = b1SAI_ Monocratic_SAI_modeli – 
b2Oil_reliancei + b3External_influencei + b4Public_demandi + b5SAI_staff_capacityi 
+b6Favorable_inter_elite_relationshipsi + b7SAI_leadershipi + b8 + ui 
 
The main test of the hypotheses is an OLS multiple regression on the dependent varia-
ble OBS2010 presented in table 6.1. below. Unfortunately, due to a shortage of data and 
concerns of multi-collinearity between some of the independent variables, it was not 
possible to include all independent variables in the same regression. I therefore compute 
and discuss additional tests of several hypotheses as I go along in the data analysis.  
Table 6.1. is organized as follows: You can see four regression calculations. Regression 
(1) includes all observations for which data was available. Regression (2) only includes 
non OECD member states. Haggard and Tiede (2011:677) suggest that “the components 
of the rule of law “hang together” in very different ways in advanced industrial and 
developing countries.” This argument corresponds to the argument of North, Wallis, 
and Weingast (2009a; 2009b) that the logic of political processes in limited and open 
access orders differ fundamentally. Following Haggard and Tiede (2011:676), I exclude 
OECD member states from my model in regression (2) to compare the effect. Regres-
sions (1b) and (2b) exclude influential cases with large values in a test of Cook’s Dis-
tance for the models (1) and (2) respectively. As we can see, their exclusion did not 
substantially change the results, but increased the significance of the coefficients and 
the measure of the overall model fit (R² of 89%). 
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Table 6.1 "The Main Table":  OLS Regression of All Hypotheses on OBS2010 SAI Power 
Regressions:  (1) All (2nonOECD)  (1b)  (2b)  
H1a:  
SAImodel_09Board 
 47.79 
(2.51) 
* 54.42 
(4.13) 
*** 53.34 
(3.46) 
** 56.15 
(5.74) 
*** 
H1a:  
SAImodel_09court 
 42.51 
(2.25) 
* 51.82 
(3.89) 
*** 42.72 
(2.82) 
** 47.92 
(4.93) 
*** 
H1a: 
SAImodel_09monocratic 
 56.25 
(3.00) 
** 64.61 
(4.95) 
*** 60.00 
(3.97) 
*** 64.53 
(6.76) 
*** 
H1b: dpi_checks 
Political competitiveness 
 3.14 
(2.85) 
** 2.76 
(2.28) 
* 4.23 
(4.57) 
*** 4.07 
(4.43) 
*** 
H2a:  
Oil_02.07 
 -0.42 
(-3.83) 
*** -0.47 
(-3.93) 
*** -0.48 
(-5.30) 
*** -0.55 
(-6.05) 
*** 
H2b:  
IMF_1 
 -13.14 
(-2.96) 
** -13.69 
(-2.97) 
** -11.37 
(-3.09) 
** -11.10 
(-3.17) 
** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionAFROSAI-E 
 -12.14 
(-2.51) 
* -14.51 
(-2.73) 
** -13.08 
(-3.36) 
** -15.18 
(-3.88) 
*** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionARABOSAI 
 -22.51 
(-3.59) 
***
 
-26.31 
(-3.83) 
*** -22.67 
(-4.53) 
*** -26.27 
(-5.22) 
*** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionASOSAI 
 -8.07 
(-1.75) 
 . -13.19 
(-2.41) 
* -9.54 
(-2.55) 
* -14.21 
(-3.53) 
*** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionCAROSAI 
 -25.29 
(-2.03) 
* -25.32 
(-1.88) 
 . -29.78 
(-2.98) 
** -29.98 
(-3.04) 
** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionCREFIAF 
 -12.29 
(-1.91) 
 . -16.82 
(-2.35) 
* -14.21 
(-2.74) 
** -19.25 
(-3.61) 
*** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionNRM 
 -6.32 
(-0.47) 
 NA  -3.91 
(-0.36) 
 NA  
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionOLACEFS 
 -10.86 
(-2.63) 
* -11.61 
(-2.56) 
* -13.74 
(-3.95) 
*** -14.01 
(-4.00) 
*** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionPASAI 
 -46.05 
(-5.20) 
*** -46.20 
(-4.87) 
*** -47.91 
(-6.79) 
*** -47.44 
(-6.85) 
*** 
H3b: 
battledeaths_02.08 
 0.003 
(-3.52) 
*** 0.003 
(3.61) 
*** 0.003 
(1.12) 
 0.002 
(1.00) 
 
H4b: log(fh_press) 
Press restriction 
 -5.29 
(-1.16) 
 0.94 
(0.14) 
 2.37 
(0.55) 
 12.97 
(2.12) 
* 
H6a: ciri_injud1.  
Partially indep. judiciary 
 9.07 
(2.79) 
** 9.99 
(2.73) 
** 11.53 
(4.33) 
*** 13.04 
(4.69) 
*** 
H6a: ciri_injud2. 
Generally indep. judiciary 
 11.44 
(2.20) 
* 15.08 
(2.50) 
* 21.36 
(4.27) 
*** 29.58 
(5.23) 
*** 
H7a:  
SAIleader_total1 
 1.19 
(3.40) 
** 0.99 
(2.54) 
* 0.92 
(2.94) 
** 0.67 
(2.11) 
* 
Constant (Ref. category:  
SAImodel_09. ministry; 
INTOSAIregionEUROSAI; 
IMF_0; ciri_injud0.Not indep.) 
10.20 
(0.40) 
 -18.92 
(0.65) 
-24.69 
(-1.09) 
 -68.37 
(-2.68) 
* 
N    85 73                                 79  67 
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
 0.8212 
0.769 
 0.7806 
0.7074 
 0.8929 
0.8585 
         0.8902 
        0.8491 
F-statistic p.value  < 2.2e-16  5.777e-12  < 2.2e-16  <2.2e-16  
Significance levels reported as: ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1; t-values in brack-
ets. Model tests: Multi-collinearity tests GVIF^2(1/(2*Df)) <2 = True. Outlier tests and influential ob-
servations: Examination of qq-plots and leverage plots satisfying, no studentized residuals with 
Bonferonni p < 0.05, Largest |rstudent|: Bulgaria. Large Cook Distance reported for Bulgaria, Iraq, 
Brazil, Mexico, Malawi and Sri Lanka. However an exclusion of these influential cases did not substan-
tially change the results but increase the significance of the overall model (see models 1b and 2b). Non-
normality: graphical examination of distribution of studentized residuals, QQ plots. Non-constant error 
variance: BP test no significance reported, plots of studentized residuals (and their squares) vs. fitted 
values show outliers but no heteroscedasticity. Nonlinearity: scatterplots and component and residual 
plots examined, independent variables accordingly linearly transformed. Non-independence of errors: 
DW and BG tests not significant. Assessment of the linear model assumptions using the global test on 
4df: all assumptions acceptable. The variables of hypothesis 5 were not included here because the num-
ber of observations is very small, the data is unreliable and not significant. 
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Table B.13 (see Appendix B) shows the same regressions as table 6.1 but uses standard-
ized
161
 continuous variables to facilitate the comparison of the relative importance of 
slope coefficients as part of the data analysis. However, as I find it more interesting to 
discuss the relationship between variables in their original units of measurements in-
stead of standard deviations and because my main model includes many categorical 
variables, which cannot be standardized, I prefer to primarily discuss the results of table 
6.1. When analyzing the regression results, I concentrate on the direction and statistical 
significance of the slope coefficients. Secondly, I am interested in gaining a large over-
all model fit.  
In order to test the robustness of my model, I also computed it on the alternate variables 
measuring the power of SAIs, namely the GI08-10, the OECD and the PEFA variable as 
presented in chapter four (see table B.14). The problems associated with these depend-
ent variables have already been discussed. As a consequence of the unreliability of these 
variables, the results are not as clear as in table 6.1. and the measures of the overall 
model fit (R²) are much lower (65% for the GI0810, 50% for the OECD variable and 
74% for the PEFA variable). Despite these limitations, I argue that the main conclusions 
from table 6.1 also hold in table B.14. 
6.2. Model Testing 
The classical normal linear regression model was used to estimate model coefficients 
and test my hypotheses. This model is based on ten assumptions, which need to be test-
ed for the model to be considered as valid. These are (Gujarati and Porter, 2009:315, 
Italics in Original): 
“1.  The regression model is linear in the parameters. 
2. The values of the regressors, the X’s, are fixed, or X values are independent of 
the error term. Here, this means we require zero covariance between ui and each 
X variable. 
3. For given X’s, the mean value of disturbance ui is zero. 
4. For given X’s, the variance of ui is constant or homoscedastic. 
5. For given X’s, there is no autocorrelation, or serial correlation, between the dis-
turbances. 
                                                     
161
 „A variable is said to be standardized if we subtract the mean value of the variable from its individual 
values and divide the difference by the standard deviation of that variable.” (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009:157) The regression coefficients of the standardized variables, denoted by 1* and 2*, are 
known in the literature as the beta coefficients and are interpreted as follows: If the standardized 
independent variable increases by one standard deviation, on average, the (standardized) depend-
ent variable increases by 2* standard deviation units. Also note that there is usually no intercept 
in a model with standardized variables, however as I also include categorical variables, which of 
course cannot be standardized, the intercept remains present. (Gujarati and Porter, 2009:157-8) 
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6. The number of observations n must be greater than the number of parameters to 
be estimated. 
7. There must be sufficient variation in the values of the X variables. 
8. There is no exact collinearity between the X variables. 
9. The model is correctly specified, so there is no specification bias. 
10. The stochastic (disturbance) term ui is normally distributed.”  
ad Assumption 1: Linear parameters: 
Yi = i + 2X2i + 3X3i + ui   (Eq. 6.2.
162
) 
The term linear refers to linearity in the parameters and not necessarily in the varia-
bles.
163
 I have computed a linear regression model in the parameters, which has several 
advantages to nonlinear regression models, most importantly that the mathematics and 
the theory of inference are easier. There was no theoretical or practical reason for using 
another method (see also Gujarati and Porter, 2009:535). 
ad Assumption 2: Fixed versus stochastic regressors: 
In multiple regression analysis, we assume that the X’s (regressors) are fixed 
(nonstochastic, i.e. they assume fixed values in repeated sampling) and that we predict 
the values of the Y. The X’s values thus need to be independent of the error term. This 
means we require zero covariance between ui and each X variable. 
cov (ui, X2i) = cov (ui, X3i) = 0  (Eq.6.3.
164
) 
However, in political science unlike physical sciences, we generally have no control 
over the data we use. This is also the case for this research, which depends on secondary 
data. I cannot be sure that the regressors are nonstochastic, still the results of the regres-
sion analysis are conditional upon these given values. Measurement errors in the ex-
planatory variables thus pose a serious problem as they make consistent estimation of 
the parameters impossible, they create biased estimators. The strategy suggested is to 
use instrumental or proxy variables. This is why I tested each of my hypotheses on a 
large number of similar explanatory variables.  I will discuss the alternative variables 
which I tested in the discussion of each hypothesis.  
                                                     
162
 Gujarati and Porter, 2009:188 
163
 “A function is said to be linear in the parameter, say, ß1, if ß1 appears with a power of 1 only and is not 
multiplied or divided by any other parameter (for example, ß1ß2, ß2/ß1, and so on).” (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009:38, Italics in Original) 
164
 Gujarati and Porter, 2009:189 
The Objective View – Exploring Relationships Through Econometric Analyses 106 
 
ad Assumption 3: Zero mean value of disturbance ui: 
E(ui | X2i, X3i) = 0 for each i  (Eq.6.4.
165
) 
If assumption 3 is not fulfilled, we cannot estimate the original intercept ß1 but a biased 
estimate of it. However the intercept is of little actual importance, the more meaningful 
results are the slope coefficients, which remain unaffected by a biased intercept. (Guja-
rati and Porter, 2009:64, 189, 317) 
ad Assumption 4: Homoscedasticity or constant variance of ui: 
E (ui
2
) = 2   i=1,2,…n  (Eq.6.5.166) 
Homoscedasticity is the assumption of equal (homo) spread (scedasticity) or equal vari-
ance. The variation around the regression line is the same across the X values. If this 
assumption is violated we speak of heteroscedasticity, or unequal spread or variance. 
Heteroscedasticity does not destroy the unbiasedness and consistency properties of OLS 
estimators, but these estimators are no longer efficient; they are not BLUE (Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimators
167
). Non-constant error variance can be caused by outliers, model 
misspecification, skewness of the regressors and incorrect data transformation. The 
most common methods of detecting heteroscedasticity are based on the examination of 
the OLS residuals ûi which we can observe, whereas the disturbances ui are usually not 
known. (Gujarati and Porter, 2009:365-401)  
I examined the residuals and plotted them against the fitted values. I discovered several 
outliers (which were subsequently excluded in models 1b and 2b) but no systematic 
relationship between the estimated mean value of Y and the (squared) residuals. I also 
conducted the Breusch and Pagan (1979) test of heteroscedasticity, which was not sig-
nificant in all models.   
ad Assumption 5: Autocorrelation or correlated error terms 
The classical linear regression model assumes that there is no autocorrelation in the dis-
turbances ui, i.e. that the disturbance term relating to any observation is not influenced 
by the disturbance term relating to any other observation. 
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 Gujarati and Porter, 2009:189 
166
 Gujarati and Porter, 2009:365 
167
 The Gauss-Markov Theorem states that “[g]iven the assumptions of the classical linear regression 
model, the least-squares estimators, in the class of unbiased linear estimators, have minimum 
variance that is, they are BLUE.” (Gujarati and Porter, 2009:72) 
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cov (ui, uj | xi, xj) = E (uiuj) = 0   (Eq.6.6.
168
) 
I conducted the Durbin-Watson test
169
 and the Breusch-Godfrey
170
 test for serial corre-
lation, which were not significant.  
ad Assumptions 6, 7 and 8: Multicollinearity or correlated regressors 
These assumptions are closely related and are therefore discussed together. If there is an 
exact or approximately exact linear relationship among the X variables, then we speak 
of multicollinearity. Micronumerosity or the smallness of sample size (Goldberger, 
1991 in Gujarati and Porter, 2009:321) and having independent variables with small 
variances also has the same effect as multicollinearity, namely they remain BLUE. The 
problem is that the estimators in the presence of multicollinearity have large standard 
errors, which makes precise estimation difficult. (Gujarati and Porter, 2009:320-351) 
I tested the regressions in table 6.1. for multicollinearity by calculating partial correla-
tion coefficients and by calculating the variance inflation factor, which did not suggest 
any multicollinearity between the regressors.
171
 
Ad Assumption 9: Model specification 
The most frequent specification errors are omitting a relevant variable, including unnec-
essary variables, adopting a wrong functional form, committing measurement errors, 
incorrectly specifying the error term and assuming that the error term is normally dis-
tributed even though it is not (see also assumption 10).  
I particularly tested my models for the correct functional forms through scatter plot 
analysis between the regressors and the regressand and then adopting the functional 
form (in table 6.1., the variable restriction of press freedom (fh_press) was transformed 
by taking its logarithm). Another important topic in econometric modeling is to detect 
outliers, and residuals with strong leverage and influence. I examined QQ-plots
172
 and 
                                                     
168
 Gujarati and Porter, 2009:413 
169
 Gujarati and Porter, 2009:434ff 
170
 Gujarati and Porter, 2009:438ff 
171
 GVIF^(1/(2*Df)) <2 is true in all models of table 6.1. The VIF cannot assess collinearity for sets of 
related regressors such as a set of dummy regressors. The generalized variance inflation factor 
(GVIF) however, can accommodate sets of related regressors. The adjusted GVIF = 
GVIF^(1/(2*Df))  also accounts for degrees of freedom. We see here that collinearity is not a 
problem - the GVIF is moderate, thus the standard error is not really affected. 
172
 A Quantile-Quantile plot (or Quantile Comparison plot) is a probability plot, which is a graphical 
method for comparing two probability distributions by plotting their quantiles against each other. 
See Fox, 2008:268ff. 
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leverage plots
173
 and detected some influential residuals. However the exclusion of the-
se did not substantially change the results, It however increased the significance of the 
overall model (see model 1b and 2b, table 6.1.) 
ad Assumption 10: Normality of the disturbance term ui 
If the objective of the multiple regression exercise is estimation only, then this assump-
tion is not essential. The OLS estimators are BLUE no matter if the ui are normally dis-
tributed or not. However, the objective of this chapter is hypothesis testing, for which 
the regression coefficients need to follow the normal distribution.  
ui ~ N (0, 
2 
)    (Eq.6.7.
174
) 
The normal linear regression model thus assumes that each disturbance term is distrib-
uted (~) following the normal distribution (N) with 0 mean and constant variance. (Gu-
jarati and Porter, 2009:130) If the assumption of the normality distribution of the resid-
uals does not hold, then the usual t and F statistics may not follow the t and F distribu-
tions. Non-normal error distribution, such as skewed and multimodal errors, compro-
mises the interpretation of the least-squares fit and threatens the efficiency of the esti-
mation. Non-normality can best be detected by examining the distribution of the residu-
als and frequently can be corrected by transforming the data. (Fox, 2008:270) Due to the 
bounded nature of the dependent variable, I expect that there is a problem with the nor-
mality of the errors. The tests however showed that the left tail and the pointed kurtosis 
are only minimal and that the residuals are within the 95% confidence interval of the 
normal distribution. Data transformation (such as taking the log of Y, the square root of 
Y or the power of the X) did not correct the problem and would make the interpretation 
of the coefficients more difficult. I thus decided to neglect the problem (see figure 6.1.). 
                                                     
173
 See Fox, 2008:263ff quoting Sall (1990) 
174
 Gujarati and Porter, 2009:98 
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Figure 6.1 QQ-Plot and Density Plot of the Residuals of Model 1, Table 6.1. 
 
6.3. Data Analysis 
The main objective of this chapter is to analyze the results of table 6.1. I will now dis-
cuss each hypothesis in turn. Are my hypotheses confirmed or falsified? I will explain 
how I measured the hypothesis and what could be instrumental variables. Also, how do 
the findings compare with findings in table B.14, which tests the same variables on my 
alternative dependent variables? And which inferences can be drawn from additional 
regressions? 
H1: Institutional model theories  
H1a: The institutional model and linked to that the colonial heritage partly ex-
plain the variation in SAI power (with court/Napoleonic institutions performing 
worst and the monocratic/Westminster model performing best).  
I created a categorical variable differentiating between SAI institutional models – 
SAImodel_09 (please refer to table B.12 in appendix B for a detailed description of all 
independent variables cited). I adopted the basic classification of SAI institutional mod-
els as proposed by the IDI Stocktaking report (2010), consisting of the following four 
categories: board (collegiate) model, court (Napoleonic) model, ministry (auditing is 
part of the executive’s tasks) and monocratic (Westminster) model. Preliminary regres-
sions as well as my main model as presented in table 6.1. confirm the hypothesis; SAIs 
which are organized along the monocratic institutional model (Westminster model) have 
a higher statistical probability of ranking high on the OBS2010 SAI index than SAIs 
with a Board model (collegiate model) or court model (Napoleonic model).  
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The monocratic model (Westminster model) predicts a value for the power of SAIs of 
between 46 points higher than the reference category (56.25-10.20=46.15; see model 
(1), table 6.1.).
175
 The monocratic model is followed by the board model (collegiate 
model) with a predicted Y value of around 38 percentage points higher than the ministry 
model. The court (or Napoleonic model) fares worst with only 32 points higher than the 
ministry model. All three results for the effect of the institutional models are statistically 
significant. These findings also confirm my hypothesis as discussed and presented 
above. Thus, holding all other variables constant, there is a difference of around 14 per-
centage points in the SAI power between the court and the monocratic institutional 
model in this regression; a finding, which was confirmed in many other regression spec-
ifications. 
I also tested a categorical variable differentiating between SAIs with and without judi-
cial function
176
, which also confirmed the hypothesis. The negative effect of the court 
system is reinforced, once I exclude Brazil (see f.i. models (1b) and (2b) in table 6.1.). 
The Brazilian SAI has a judicial function and a board decision making structure, but 
receives high scores in the OBS and other rankings. The tendency of a positive effect of 
the monocratic SAI institutional design is very robust across regression specifications 
and was even confirmed when regressed on the three alternate dependent variables, alt-
hough with weaker statistical significance (see table B.14). 
I furthermore tested the effect of colonial heritage
177
 and the origin of commercial legal 
codes
178
. All confirmed with statistical validity that French colonial history and legal 
codes are associated with weaker SAIs. However, these findings do not automatically 
confirm that the link between French colonial history and weak SAIs is due to the court 
system of the SAI. There might be other factors, omitted in this regression, which are 
specific to former French colonies and affect the power of SAIs. As Moussa (2004) 
concluded in his comparative study of francophone African SAIs, they differ widely 
from the French reference model and also highly differ among themselves. I could also 
observe, although not with such strong statistical validity, that countries with Belgian 
and Spanish colonial heritage, which also often have the court model of auditing, are 
equally more strongly associated with weak SAIs than are countries with Anglophone 
and German/Scandinavian colonial heritage. To conclude, overall the institutional mod-
el and the colonial history do partly explain the variation in SAI power.  
H1b: Countries with electoral rules supporting strong political competition are 
more likely to also have effective SAIs.     
                                                     
175
 The reference category SAImodel_09ministry stands for SAIs which are part of the executive or min-
istry of Finance and is measured by the Constant. 
176
 Measured through the variable SAIjurisdiction 
177
 Tested through ht_colonial 
178
 Tested through lp_legor 
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I first tested whether a plurality electoral system has a positive effect on the power of a 
SAI, which could not be confirmed. The effect was at times even contrary to what I ex-
pected and was in all regressions minimal.
179
 When testing the type of regime
180
, par-
liamentary democracies fared best, but there was no clear result concerning the differ-
ence and the extent of the effect of mixed democracies or presidential democracies as 
well as between various types of authoritarian regimes. Thus, I suggest that the existing 
regimes cannot easily be classified into the various categories but instead there are 
many mixed types.  
I therefore opted for a variable (dpi_checks) which counts the number of veto players in 
both the executive and the legislature, and thus the overall political competitiveness, in 
any regime.
181
 This variable showed a stable positive and significant effect in table 6.1. 
and on a range of alternative specifications on the OBS2010. On the other hand, the 
positive effect could not be confirmed when regressed on the alternative SAI variables 
(see table B.14). Taking into account the unreliability of these alternative SAI variables, 
I still suggest that the institutional hypothesis based on the public finance literature (van 
Hagen, 2006) might be true, i.e. a larger number of veto players and thus stronger per-
sonal political competitiveness reduces corruption or otherwise put, increases the prob-
ability that a powerful SAI develops.  
H2: Theories on the source of national income  
H2a: The higher is the share of Oil endowments in a country’s national income, 
the less likely accountability systems including SAIs work properly. 
                                                     
179
 Tested through the dpi_pluarlity and dpi_pr variables for the year 2007. What might explain the lack 
of effect? One explanation is that the model is wrong, otherwise put the hypothesis might be 
wrong. A second explanation is that the type of electoral system only has an effect in 
consolidated democracies. In a next step, I tested the same variables only on countries which are 
classified as “free” by the freedom house classification of regime types (fh_status = ‘1. Free’). 
The signs of the coefficients now showed in the expected directions, but the coefficients were 
still not statistically significant and the measures for overall model fit (R²) were extremely low 
for both variables (dpi_pr and dpi_pluarlity). I also conducted a model test where I put the 
variable measuring the type of electoral system in interaction with the measure of political 
freedom. This method has the advantage that I can test my hypothesis on a larger number of 
observations than the previous method, where all countries that were not classified as ‘free’ were 
excluded. Again, the interaction was not statistically signficant. However, countries which are 
considered as ‘free’ and have plurality electoral systems had a large positive coefficient. The test 
of ‘free’ countries in interaction with proportional systems resulted in a smaller but still positive 
coefficient. I conclude, that there is no evidence, that the type of electoral system has a direct 
effect on the power of a SAI. 
180
 Tested through the chga_hinst variable for the year 2007 
181
 cf. to Wehner and de Renzio, 2012 for a more in depth discussion of this hypothesis and variable alter-
natives 
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Table 6.1 shows that the effect of a large share of Oil rents (as % of GDP) is indeed 
associated with weaker SAIs.
182
 This effect is highly statistically significant and very 
stable across all types of regressions (on the OBS2010 but also the other dependent var-
iables, see table B.14). We can also see that Oil resources only explain a small part of 
the variation across SAIs; an increase in one percentage point on the share of Oil rents 
in a country’s GDP decreases the SAI power by 0.4 percentage points, holding all other 
variables constant (see model (1), table 6.1.)
183
. Furthermore, as suggested by Haber and 
Menaldo (2011) the correlation between resource reliance and weak accountability does 
not automatically confirm the resource curse. It is not clear whether it is the abundance 
of resources which causes bad governance or whether bad governance and particularly 
autocratic regimes, tend to concentrate on natural resource extraction only.
184
 To con-
clude, overall my tests confirmed the hypothesis H2a, that the larger is the oil reliance 
the lower is the probability of a strong SAI.   
 
H2b: Public financial management support is associated with stronger SAI pow-
er if the country is truly committed to implementing reforms.   
Model 6.1. does not truly test this hypothesis. The presence of an IMF led Poverty Re-
duction and Growth Facility (PRGF)
185
 (IMF) is associated with a decrease in SAI 
power by 13 percentage points in table 6.1. This can be explained by the fact that coun-
tries that qualify for an IMF led PRGF have high levels of public debt which is general-
ly due to low levels of income and/or bad public financial management. Both of these 
factors would suggest a weak SAI. Thus, what I have tested is actually not the effect the 
IMF support has had on SAI power but the existence of a relationship between the two 
                                                     
182
 I also have to take into account, that the way I measure natural resource dependency affects the regres-
sion. Resource reliance was also tested through the dummy variable “HMResRel” which 
measures resource reliance as defined by Haber and Menaldo (2011) and showed a positive and 
statistically significant result. Their criteria exclude resource-rich, mature democracies, whereas 
it includes authoritarian countries that produce trivial quantities of oil, gas, and minerals. On the 
other hand, the variables ‘Oilmineral’ and ‘resourcespc_02.07’ do not have any effect on the 
power of a SAI. The variable ‘resourcespc_02.07’ includes revenues derived from ‘coal’ and na-
tional endowments from coal, measured through coal_02.07, actually had a positive effect on the 
power of SAIs. I assume that this effect is caused by the high probability that it is particularly 
emerging economies and industrialized countries which extract carbon for the production of 
power. Thus, carbon might have the effect of being a proxy for high level of industrialization. 
This test would then also be a confirmation for hypothesis four, namely that economic develop-
ment is associated with stronger accountability systems. 
183
 The R² for bivariate regressions of all these natural resource variable on the OBS2010 are very low, 
namely HMResRel (R²=0.05), Oilmineral (R²=0.02), resourcespc_02.07 (R²=0002), Oil_02.07 
(R²=0.11), log(coal_02.07) (R²=0.35) 
184
 There is ample scope for further research; particularly interesting would be analyses that test whether 
the introduction of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) mechanism has any ef-
fect on the relationship between oil revenues and weak SAIs. 
185
 The IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) is usually framed around a World Bank 
Poverty Reeducation Strategy Paper (PRSP). In 2010 the IMF replaced the PRGF with the “Ex-
tended Credit Facility”.   
 See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/prgf.pdf (Last Accessed October 29, 2012).  
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variables.
186
 The results from the alternative dependent variables (table B.14) are also 
inconclusive as they showed a positive effect and in the case of the GI0810 even with 
large statistical significance.  
Figure 6.2 The Combined Effect of Per Capita Aid for Public Financial Management Reforms and an 
IMF Led Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Program on SAIs
187
 
 
I then included targeted Public Financial Management (PFM) support
188
 in the regres-
sion and interacted it with an IMF led Poverty Reduction and Growth Framework (IMF 
PRGF) or a World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (WB PRSP) and indeed, the 
coefficient of the interaction term turned positive. This suggests that PFM support bene-
fits SAI reforms particularly at the presence of comprehensive poverty reduction re-
forms (see figure 6.2.). Still, the conclusions are not very robust and there is need for 
further research, ideally using time series analysis.
189
 
                                                     
186
 It would be more appropriate to test the effect of particular aid mechanisms on the power of SAIs 
through time series analysis or structural equation modeling, which the author plans to do in 
post-doctoral research. 
187
 See regression (8), table B.15.  
188
 I owe gratitude to Jack Mills and Paolo de Renzio for providing me with the data on PFM support, 
which they analyzed in de Renzio et al. (2010). 
189
 I tested this hypothesis through additional regressions. First I regressed the total share of aid (as % of 
GDP) on OBS2010 SAI power, which was negative but not statistically significant. However, 
when I took the per capita share of total aid (as a % of GDP) and regressed it on OBS2010 SAI 
power, the coefficient turned significant but stayed negative. Second, I tested the effect of the to-
tal amount of PFM-aid (US$m/year) on OBS2010 SAI power, which was positive but not statis-
tically significant. When taking the per capita share of PFM-aid (US$), the coefficient turned 
negative and significant. De Renzio et al. (2010) refrain from taking the per capita share of PFM-
aid but instead to weigh the regression results by country size. I calculated a regression of 
log(tot_pfmaid_02.07) regressed on OBS2010 and weighing the results by country area and pop-
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To conclude, my test can neither confirm nor falsify any effect of aid on the de facto 
power of SAIs. My tests point out that there is a statistically significant probability that 
in general the presence of a country wide reform program (IMF) suggests that the coun-
try also has a weak SAI. Furthermore, among countries that are recipients of specific 
PFM support, the regressions suggest that the larger the PFM support, the stronger is the 
SAI, but only if the country is part of a country-wide reform program. 
 
H2c: The higher is the share of tax endowments of a country’s national income, 
the more likely the SAI is effective.   
The main reason why I did not include any of the taxation variables in the main regres-
sion table 6.1 is the limited number of observations available, which would reduce the 
overall dataset while it does not add any significant explanatory power. Overall, the 
effect of taxation on the power of a SAI was confirmed in preliminary regressions, alt-
hough with quite low explanatory power.
190
 However, particularly interesting are the 
results from tests where I tested the combined effect of taxation with the status of politi-
cal freedom. Graphical examination also strongly supports the hypothesis H2c, i.e. large 
shares of tax endowments, but only in politically free countries, increases the incentives 
                                                                                                                                                           
ulation size respectively, which resulted in positive, although statistically largely insignificant, 
coefficients. The statistical significance of both coefficients – total share of aid as well as PFM-
aid – increases further when excluding Macedonia, an influential outlier. The amount of general 
budget support (GBS) as a % of official development assistance (ODA) also resulted in a nega-
tive, although not statistically significant, coefficient. Two more tests, namely dummy variables 
for IMF and PRSP support respectively, also received negative effects, which were also statisti-
cally significant. All of these results would suggest that aid is associated with weak SAIs. In a 
next step, I argue that countries, which have completed a PRSP during at least one year in the pe-
riod 2002 to 2006 and have received large amount of PFM support, should have strengthened 
their SAIs. I test the interaction of the two variables, which results in a positive although not sta-
tistically significant coefficient. I get however statistically significant coefficients when interact-
ing the share of GBS with the presence of a PRSP. This finding however does not necessarily 
test the positive effect of GBS support or a PRSP, but might instead demonstrate that countries 
which have relatively good governance also qualify for GBS and PRSP support. The positive ef-
fect of per capita total PFM support becomes even more statistically significant when I interact it 
with the presence of an IMF-led PRGF program. However, we have to take into account that the 
statistical significance of the overall model (F-statistic) is comparably low in all models, which 
might point out to model specification errors or a violation of OLS assumptions. See table B.15 
for all regression results. 
190
 I tested the following tax variables: CPIArevenues_05.07, tax_02.07, directtax_02.07 and EFW5Cvii. 
The largest explanatory power and also large statistical significance has the variable 
‘CPIArevenues_05.07’ which measures the effectiveness of revenue mobilization in aid recipient 
countries. The caveat is here on the one hand that this variable has only been tested on a quite 
low number of observations (n=41) and secondly, that this variable might actually not measure 
the relationship between revenue collection and external auditing, but instead proxies such as the 
general organizational capacity of a state or the level of corruption.  “Tax compliance 
(EFW5Cvii)” as measured by Economic Freedom of the World showed a positive and significant 
effect on OBS SAI power. However this variable might also be a proxy for rule of law as it actu-
ally measures the cost of tax compliance and not tax endowments per se. I then tested the hy-
pothesis on tax revenues as a percentage of the GDP (tax_02.07) and found a positive effect. 
However, this variable has many outliers, of which Algeria showed particular strong leverage 
and was subsequently excluded, which strengthened the effect. 
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for public accountability. This relationship is strongest when testing the effect of direct 
taxation in politically free sub-Saharan countries. This confirms Broms (2011), who 
suggests that it is not the level of taxation per se but particularly the level of direct taxa-
tion (income tax) which influences the degree of good government, including strong 
SAIs. Figure 6.3 shows that the larger is the share of direct taxation in a politically free 
sub-Saharan African country, the stronger is the probability that it also has a powerful 
SAI.  
Figure 6.3 The Effect of Direct Taxation (as a % of GDP) and Political Freedom on OBS2010 SAI Power 
in 27 Sub-Saharan African Countries
191
 
 
H3: Theories on institutional diffusion  
H3a: The stronger is the regional influence by good performers, the more likely 
a country implements similar reforms.  
The region a country belongs to does have a strong effect on the power of a SAI. In ta-
ble 6.1 (as in the table B.14) we can see that there is a very high statistical probability 
that holding all other variables constant, the SAIs in countries belonging to the Pacific 
region have the weakest SAI. In concrete terms, the regression results point out that 
these countries on average have a SAI score in the OBS2010 which is 48 percentage 
points below the average for countries belonging to the EUROSAI region (measured by 
the constant). The Pacific region is characterized by small, economically weak and po-
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 See regression (1), table B.16 
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litically undemocratic states, which also lack a strong influence by good performers.
192
 
However, these findings refer to the year 2009 and I have seen on the website of 
PASAI
193
 that a number of projects have been initiated to change this situation. 
The fact that an INTOSAI regional body can have a strong effect on its member SAIs 
becomes particularly clear when looking at Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It is said that 
South Africa has taken on a strong leadership role and together with INTOSAI partners 
and the donor community has put a lot of effort in building the capacities of AFROSAI-
E and recently also of CREFIAF.  And really the results suggest a better performance of 
the SAIs in AFROSAI-E than for other regions which might face similar challenges 
concerning poverty and authoritarianism, namely ARABOSAI and CAROSAI, but also 
ASOSAI and OLACEFS (see particularly regression (2b) in table 6.1 but also table 
B.14).  
Figure 6.4 shows how a countries’ SAI power differs according to its membership in a 
specific INTOSAI regional group. SAIs in countries with a similarly high child mortali-
ty rate
194
 perform differently depending on which INTOSAI region they belong to.
195
 
Members of AFROSAI-E perform much better than SAIs from the other regions or 
without regional membership, with nearly all regions showing statistical significance. 
AFROSAI-E performs best according to this regression specification. This positive ef-
fect of belonging to the AFROSAI-E region holds very robustly in all kinds of regres-
sion specifications; even after excluding South Africa itself, which has a very powerful 
SAI (OBS2010=73.3).
196
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 New Zealand, a strong SAI in the PASAI region, has been excluded because of missing data for the 
dependent variable. Australia primarily associates itself with ASOSAI, besides the data on the 
dependent variable is missing and it is not included in the dataset.  
193
 http://www.pasai.org, last accessed on May 25, 2012 
194
 This regional effect is most clear at x = 4.2-4.5, which corresponds to a child mortality rate of around 
67-90 (the logarithm of 67=4.2 and the logarithm of 90 = 4.5).  
195
 Several SAIs belong to more than one INTOSAI regional body. Please refer to table B.12 for a discus-
sion of the methods and sources used and a list of all SAIs and their main regional INTOSAI af-
filiation.  
196
 I also tested the effect of belonging to ht_region, a variable measuring the effect of politico-geographic 
regions, which resulted in similar findings. SAIs in North Africa and the Middle East perform 
worse than their peers with similar levels of GDPpc or child mortality rates.
 
SAIs from Eastern 
Europe and post-Soviet Union perform very well, as do SAIs in South-East Asia, and relatively 
also SAIs in Sub-Saharan Africa. I suggest that the regional ties and influence from the EU, East 
Asia and South Africa respectively can explain these findings. I decided to use the INTOSAI re-
gional membership variable in table 6.2. instead of the ht_region because the INTOSAI regional 
measure also differentiates African countries between AFROSAI-E, CREFIAF and ARABOSAI 
for an SAI’s main regional membership. 
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Figure 6.4 The Effect of INTOSAI Regional Membership and Child Mortality Rate on OBS2010 SAI 
Power
197
 
 
To conclude, table 6.1., table B.14 as well as the graphical examination suggested that 
H3a can be confirmed, i.e. regional affiliation has a strong effect on the power of an 
SAI, even when holding economic or democratic development constant. 
 
H3b: The more influence the international community has in building state ca-
pacity (i.e. in a post-conflict situation with international involvement) the more 
likely it is that institutions of accountability can effectively be put in place.  
The second part of the diffusion theories pointed out that a post-conflict situation might 
be an opportunity for institutional development as elite relationships are weakened and 
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 See regression (2) in table B.16 
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the influence of the international community can be particularly strong. This positive 
effect is depicted in table 6.1 through a measure of the number of battle-related deaths 
during the period 2002 to 2008.
198
 Although this variable is highly statistically signifi-
cant in table 6.1 (while not in table B.14.) its coefficient is very low. For an increase by 
one battle-related death, the SAI power increases on average by 0.003 percentage points 
on the OBS2010, holding all other variables constant. Thus, a conflict which resulted in 
1000 battle-related deaths would suggest an increase by 3 points on the OBS2010, hold-
ing all other variables equal. In chapter five, I argued that the vacuum of stable elite 
relationships can be exploited by a committed SAI leader and the international commu-
nity and facilitate reform efforts. On the other hand, a post conflict situation is also a 
particularly challenging environment for a SAI to operate in and is characterized by the 
lack of all three doorstep conditions, a lack of human capacities as large shares of the 
educated middle class will have moved abroad and by disrupted social structures. I also 
observed that conflict measured through the number of battle-related deaths has the 
strongest effect on the power of SAIs in partly free countries.
199
  
 
H3c:  Countries comply to international norms only formally, and do not trans-
form these values into de facto institutions.  
Finally, the third strand of the theories on democratic or institutional diffusion (sociali-
zation or decoupling theory) points out that countries only pretend to reform their insti-
tutions to comply to international norms, while de facto these reforms are not imple-
mented. I tested whether the ratification of the UN Convention Against Corruption 
(CAC) had any effect on the power of a SAI. I would assume that countries, which rati-
fied the CAC would have taken initiatives to strengthen their SAIs. I developed three 
                                                     
198
 I also tested this hypothesis through a number of related variables such as the strength of international 
cooperation as measured by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Q17). This variable is high-
ly statistically significant, has a positive effect and explains around 16% of SAI variation (R² of 
0.16). I also tested the effect of the presence of UN peace keepers in the country (un_combined 
and unpresence_n, two variables that are based on de Renzio et al. (2010)) which were not sig-
nificant. However, these variables left out important conflict sites such as Afghanistan where 
UNPK operations started in 2009 with 20 persons only, whereas there were 2424 battle related 
deaths counted for the period 2002-2008 in Afghanistan.  
199
 See regression (1) in table B.17. I also tested the effect of external intervention as measured by the 
Failed States Index (FSIext) and it showed a negative and statistically significant effect on the 
power of SAIs. I then tested the combined effect of FSIext with an aggregation of countries by 
their World Development Indicator country income classification (WDIclass). And now FSIext 
turns positive for all income groups (see regression (2), table B.17). This regression furthermore 
confirms previous reflections, namely that the positive effect of external intervention is not 
equally relevant for all types of countries but strongest for low middle income countries (LMI), 
probably as there is some administrative infrastructure present and a basic level of HDI, but very 
weak political structures, which the international community can then influence. Again, these are 
only indicative findings and there is ample scope for further research because it is not clear what 
the power of the SAI was before the intervention. I have only compared the power of SAIs be-
tween countries with and without intervention. 
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dummy variables for CAC ratification before the end of the years 2005, 2007 or 2009 
respectively
200
. However, none was significant. This indeed points out a lack of CAC de 
facto implementation. This finding inevitably brings us back to the quote at the begin-
ning of this thesis (p.VI); the main challenge today lies not in the establishment of in-
ternational law but in its implementation.  I did not include the CAC variables in table 
6.1. to avoid including unnecessary variables.  
To summarize, all three parts of H3 on institutional diffusion were confirmed by my 
statistical tests. 
H4: Modernization theories  
H4a: The higher is the level of socio-economic development of a country the 
more likely is the country to become democratic and to stay democratic once 
democracy has been established, thus the more likely institutions for accounta-
bility develop and work effectively.  
Preliminary statistical tests revealed a strong correlation between the level of the socio-
economic development of a country
201
 and the power of a SAI. The strongest explanato-
ry strengths have the variables ‘child mortality’ and ‘Human Development Index’, as 
each explains by itself about 43% of the variation in a SAI’s power.202 I did not include 
any of these variables in table 6.1. in order to avoid problems of multicollinearity with 
other variables. 
 
H2b: The stronger is a society’s demand for accountability, the more likely it is 
that the ruling elites will make democratic concessions. Thus, the stronger is a 
society’s capacity to understand and request audit reports and to organize cam-
paigns, the more likely are SAI reforms and thus the stronger is a SAI in the 
country.  
I first tested this hypothesis on a large number of independent variables including varia-
bles measuring the expected years of education, the level of ‘voice and accountability’, 
‘empowerment’ and the attainment of associational and organizational rights and civil 
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 See variables CAC2005, CAC2007, CAC2009 
201
 Measured through the variables childmort_02.07, HDI_00.07, GDPPC02_07, phone_lines_02.07, 
netusers_02.07, severs_02.07 
202
 It would be interesting to test this hypothesis on time series data in order to show that an increase in 
the living standards is indeed associated with an increase in the power of a SAI. Furthermore, 
there is scope for further research on the effect of economic growth rates and other macroeco-
nomic data (such as inflation, debt rate) in a time series analysis with the development of the 
level of a SAI’s power. As Haggard and Tiede (2011) demonstrate, it can be expected that par-
ticularly the volatility of the growth rate has a strong effect on the power of a SAI and not the 
growth rate per se. Thus, a non volatile growth rate indicating steady, uninterrupted growth facil-
itates the development of rule of law (Haggard and Tiede, 2011) and probably also powerful 
SAIs. 
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liberties.
203
 All tests confirmed my hypothesis with very high statistical significance and 
large measures of model fit. All of this confirms the modernization theory that socio-
economic development as well as political rights and civic liberties go along with the 
development and endurance of institutions providing for public accountability.
204
  
However, as we can see, table 6.1. could not reliably confirm this hypothesis. If we as-
sume as the modernization theory suggests, that powerful SAIs develop out of public 
demand, freedom of the press (measured through the Freedom House measure of press 
restriction fh_press) becomes particularly important. However, press restriction is most-
ly insignificant, when tested together with other political variables and at times even 
changes the sign.
205
 The same is true for many other features of political freedom, social 
or economic development, they lose explanatory power when put together with other 
seemingly more important variables.  
I argue that this insignificance is not due to multicollinearity but suggests that powerful 
SAIs indeed do not develop simply because of the public’s capacity to demand account-
ability, but only if public demand meets a specific set of elite relationships. This finding 
was also confirmed in the expert interviews (see chapter seven below). Several inter-
view partners suggested that SAI reforms were not implemented because of direct pub-
lic demand. The main reason for this might be the technical nature of public auditing. 
The large part of the society might not know about public auditing and its potential ben-
efits for public accountability. This does however not indicate that investigative journal-
ism and civil society budget groups do not have a role to play. On the contrary, I sug-
gest that the public has not yet effectively taken up its role and that there is thus a need 
to raise public awareness on the potential role SAIs can play. Case study research clear-
ly points out the positive effect of public campaigns (see f.i. Robinson, 2008; 
www.internationalbudget.org) on the effective functioning of SAIs, where they already 
enjoy some independence. Where there are no functioning democratic institutions pub-
lic demand clearly can put pressure on the elites to make democratic concessions, and 
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 Measured through education.exp_02.07, fh_press, wbgi_vae, ciri_empinx,  fh_aor, fh_cl 
204
 Modernization theory claims that the higher the economic development of a country, the larger is also 
the probability that it will be democratic and particularly, that it will stay democratic, once dem-
ocratic institutions have been established. I suggested that the same mechanisms might work for 
the establishment of powerful SAIs. My tests could not investigate the modernization theory in 
detail and particularly I could not investigate, whether, once established powerful SAIs remained 
powerful if there was also social empowerment. Instead, what I found is that there is indeed a 
strong positive relationship between high economic development, social empowerment and the 
power of a SAI. 
205
 The higher is the score of fh_press, the more restricted is the press. Table 6.1 confirms in regression 
(1) that a restricted press has a negative effect on SAIs (see also regression (3) in table B.16 and 
regression (4) in table B.19), while model (2b) would suggest that a restricted press has a posi-
tive effect on SAIs. Tests on alternative SAI variables are also inconclusive. Global Integrity and 
OECD data suggest a negative influence of restricted press freedom, while the PEFA data sug-
gests a positive influence (see table B.14).   
The Objective View – Exploring Relationships Through Econometric Analyses 121 
 
thus change elite relationships (see the ongoing process in the Arab region). In the wake 
of reforms, the SAI might gain in independence and the right to publish its reports (as 
was the case for the Tunisian SAI), while some governments also reply to growing pub-
lic demand for accountability by tightening their means of public control even more 
firmly (see Syria, Bahrain etc.).  
In order to test the effect of public demand on the development of powerful SAIs, I 
would need differential data particularly measuring public demand that is targeted on 
strengthening SAIs and time series data to analyze the development of SAIs over time 
in addition to comparing them across countries. To summarize, although my tests can-
not confirm the modernization theory, they also cannot falsify it.    
H5: Institutional Capacity Theory 
H5: Although the technical capacity of a SAI does has a positive effect on the 
power of a SAI, political economy and management factors are more important.   
I could not include any variable measuring this hypothesis in table 6.1 due to the limited 
number of observations available and the unreliable nature of the data.
206
 I found that 
the large budgets for capacity building activities of SAIs are negatively related to pow-
erful SAIs and that the length of such capacity building activities on the other hand is 
positively related to the OBS2010. There are several possibilities for explaining these 
tentative findings. It is possible that long term commitment does indeed have a positive 
effect on a SAI’s development, while supporting SAIs with budget intensive support 
(such as infrastructure support) is correlated with low SAI power. My tests however do 
not prove a causal relationship. Similarly to the tests above on the effect of official de-
velopment aid, the correlation of SAI capacity building with weak SAIs might also 
show that very weak SAIs qualify more strongly for budget intensive support.  
When looking at particular capacity building initiatives I found that strengthening the 
capacity to deal with the external environment is positively associated while strengthen-
                                                     
206
 The data is based on the INTOSAI Capacity Building Committee’s SAI Capacity Development Data-
base, which has recently been newly launched and is currently being filled with new data. I use 
the old dataset, which was online until mid 2011 and was kindly provided to me by IDI, thanks 
particularly to Yngvild Arnesen. I used data for the years up to 2007 only, which comprises 54 
SAIs and 10 variables. The data has to be used with caution, the fact that there are no Capacity 
Building projects documented for many SAIs does not necessarily indicate that these SAIs did 
not receive any CB support, as the database is not complete. While acknowledging the unrelia-
bility of a full dataset (where the missings were replaced with 0_no_CB_support), I still explored 
the dataset and received similar results as for the limited dataset which only contains the docu-
mented cases. The 10 variables are: CBC_y, CBC_budget, Organisational.capacity, Finan-
cial.audit.capacity, Performance.audit.capacity, IT.audit.capacity, Forensic.audit.capacity, Oth-
er.audit.capacities, External.environment.capacity, Support.services 
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ing the capacity to conduct performance audits is negatively related to powerful SAIs.
207
 
One explanation, as pointed out by some of my interview partners, might be that SAIs 
in semi-authoritarian regimes prefer improving their performance audit capacity as this 
type of auditing is less politically sensitive than financial auditing or compliance audit-
ing. While financial and compliance auditing locates responsibility for financial conduct 
with a particular person, performance auditing analyzes the efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy of particular policies and thus locates responsibility within a system or institu-
tion. 
H6: Rational choice institutionalism  
H6a: The more the doorstep conditions of North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 
2009b) are realized the more reforms of institutions of accountability can suc-
ceed.  
One of the main objectives of this thesis is to explore the effect of the doorstep condi-
tions as defined by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 2009b) on the power of Su-
preme Audit Institutions. This strand of theory is part of my main argument that politi-
cal will is the most crucial prerequisite for the development of powerful SAIs; and that 
political will depends on the rational choice of elite groups based on the nature of inter-
elite relationships and the existence of (SAI) leadership creating change space.  
I first tested the composite indicators for the doorstep conditions as developed by 
Gollwitzer and Quintyn (forthcoming), improving the initial indicators of Gollwitzer 
and Quintyn (2010).
208
 The results of the preliminary regressions are striking. Despite 
the limited number of observations (n=66) and all the limitations of their data.
209
 All the 
coefficients are highly statistically significant, show in the expected direction and re-
ceive very high measures of model fit. Particularly doorstep condition number one 
stands out for its exceptionally high model fit (R² = 0.57), which is closely followed by 
doorstep condition number two with a model fit of R=52%. On the other hand, doorstep 
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 See table B.18 and model (5) in table B.19 
208
 For the development of their indicators Gollwitzer and Quintyn (2010) use variables from five differ-
ent databases, mostly for the year 2009, and publicly available information on political institu-
tions, such as constitutions and other pillars of legislation for a total of 77 low, middle and upper 
middle income countries. (see table B.20 for a description of the variables measuring the door-
step conditions by Gollwitzer and Quintyn).  
209
 One of the limitations of their dataset is the bias of country samples as their database does not include 
high income countries. Another limitation concerns the fact that some variables were only avail-
able for a part of their country set and thus where the data was not available it was substituted by 
similar data from another dataset, which also increases the probability of bias. Finally, their indi-
cators are based on data from several years, mostly 2009, which also increases the probability of 
bias and which does not allow me to add a time span for the doorstep conditions to have an effect 
on the SAI reforms. In particular, this means that I can only test their variables on the OBS2010 
SAI variable, which uses data as of September 15, 2009, while the other SAI variables also in-
clude data of earlier periods. 
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condition number three did not achieve such exceptionally high scores for the overall 
model fit (R² = 0.27). The composite indicator ‘DCOverall’ which combines the effect 
of all three doorstep conditions, is also highly statistically significant, positive and 
achieves an extremely high measure for the model fit (R=53%).
210
  
In a next step I tested the doorstep conditions through alternative variables.
211
 There 
exist just so many variables which would fit somehow into the broad categories of 
North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 2009b). It is hardly contested, that functioning 
SAIs need a functioning justice system, impersonality and perpetual organizations and a 
stable state. Not surprisingly, all variables are highly statistically significant, show in 
the expected direction and achieve high measures of model fit (R²).
212
  
To sum up, the preliminary regressions indicated that rule of law among the elites 
(DC#1) has the strongest and most robust correlation with powerful SAIs among the 
variables measuring the doorstep conditions. I thus decided to include a measure of 
DC#1 in my main table 6.1. As North, Wallis, and Weingast (20091,b) pointed out, we 
can assume that basic rule of law develops only if DC#2 and DC#3 are also satisfied to 
some point as the three doorstep conditions are interrelated. By not including any 
measures of DC#2 or DC#3 I avoided the fallacy of including too many variables in a 
model. The North, Wallis and Weingast (2009a; 2009b) theory also suggests that the 
development of democratic institutions proceeds in two phases, whereas rule of law for 
the wider public can only develop if first of all, rule of law for the elites has been real-
ized. I decided to use the Cingranelli and Richards’ measure for the independence of the 
judiciary (ciri_injud) in table 6.1 as it differentiates between the categories of a ‘not 
independent’, ‘partially independent’ and ‘generally independent’ judiciary. It measures 
the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as 
another branch of the government or the military as a two-stage process, similar to the 
framework developed by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 2009b).
213
  
The findings confirm my hypothesis that a growing extent of an independent judiciary 
partly explains the variation in SAI power. An SAI can only gain in power, independ-
ence, impartiality and credibility if there is rule of law. Particularly significant and large 
                                                     
210
 See table B.21 and model (4) in table B.16. Gollwitzer and Quintyn argue for using this composite 
indicator because it is particularly the interlocking of all three doorstep conditions which facili-
tates the opening of access to political and economic institutions and thus the implementation of 
de facto accountability reforms. 
211
 Please refer to table B.22 for a description of the doorstep conditions, which served as a basis to 
choose variables reflecting several aspects of a doorstep condition. 
212
 The same holds for variables measuring the overall institutionalization of democracy such as 
p_polity2, p_democ, fh_ipolity2, SI, fh_status, fh_pr. 
213
There are so many indicators which assess the rule of law of countries, which have all proven highly 
statistically significant and all show in the expected directions in my regressions. I also tested the 
following rule of law measures: fh_rol, wbgi_rle, BTI Q3, EFW2, EFW5Cv, ti_cpi, A6010, 
A6032, A606, B702, A3070, B710, A605, Q3.3. which all are highly statistically significant.  
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are the coefficients of “ciri_injud” in model (2b in table 6.1; figure 6.5). This model 
excludes OECD member states and shows that in countries where the judiciary is par-
tially independent of control from other sources, the power of a SAI increases on aver-
age by approximately 13 percentage points and by 30 percentage points if the judiciary 
is considered generally independent, holding all other variables equal. These findings 
were confirmed by the PEFA data and to some extent by the OECD data. However the 
Global Integrity data would suggest a negative effect of an independent judiciary (see 
table B.14). 
Figure 6.5 Conditional Variable Plot of Judicial Independence (DC#1) on OBS2010 SAI Power
214
 
 
My tests for DC#2 (the existence of perpetually lived organizations in the private and 
public domain) and DC#3 (consolidated control of the military) were also positive and 
statistically significant. One variable measuring DC#2 is the existence of executive con-
straints as measured through decision rules (p_xconst).
215
 As expected it had a positive 
effect on the power of SAIs. The existence of DC#3 was tested amongst others by the 
existence of polity fragmentation (p_fragment).
216
  The higher is the polity fragmenta-
tion the lower is the power of a SAI, holding all other variables constant. However, I 
also found that very serious fragmentation (>25%) is correlated with very powerful 
SAIs (see figure 6.6.) This finding also confirms my hypothesis H3b that in situations of 
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 See regression (2b), table 6.1 
215
 I also tested the following variables measuring DC#2 components: p_durable (PolityIV Regime Dura-
bility), p_parreg (Polity IV Regulation of Participation), partyage (DPI Average age of parties), 
Q1.4. (BTI basic administrative structures), Q.1.2 (BTI state identity), Q7.4 (BTI Banking sys-
tem), A1001 (IPD Acceptance or contestation of most recent change at highest level of govern-
ment), A1000 (IPD freedom and legality of elections), FSIlegst (FSI legitimacy of the state), 
poleff (SFI Regime/Governance stability). which all are highly statistically significant when re-
gressed on OBS2010. For a description of the variables mentioned see table 12 in Appendix B. 
216
 I also tested the following variables measuring DC#3 components: EFW2D (EFW military interfer-
ence), defmin (DPI Defense minister a military officer), military (DPI Chief executive a military 
officer), p_fragment (Polity IV polity fragmentation), secleg (SFI Fragility in security legitima-
cy), Q1.1 (BTI monopoly on use of force), A1002 (IPD participation of armed forces in political 
life), ffp_fsi (FFP Failed States index), FSIsecapp (FSI Security apparatus operates as a “state 
within a state”), wbgi_pse (WBGI Political stability) which all are highly statistically significant 
when regressed on OBS2010. For a description of the variables mentioned see table 12 in Ap-
pendix B 
The Objective View – Exploring Relationships Through Econometric Analyses 125 
 
conflict, elite structures are weakened and the international community can set an insti-
tution on its development trajectory (the SAIs which qualified here for serious fragmen-
tation were Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq and Colombia).  
 
Figure 6.6 Conditional Variable Plots of Executive Constraints (DC#2) and Polity Fragmentation (DC#3) 
Respectively on OBS2010 SAI Power
217
 
 
 
H6b: The power of SAIs in autocracies differs depending on the strategy that the 
autocrat uses in order to stay in power.   
What is new in the North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 2009b) theory is the idea that 
economic and political development is really an issue of stabilizing inter-elite relation-
ships through the sublimation of inter-elite violence. Haggard and Tiede (2011) take up 
this idea and compare different rule of law complexes and their effect on growth:  
“What distinguishes these complexes is not formal institutional arrangements, 
but corruption, risk of expropriation, and particularly the extent of violence.” 
(Haggard and Tiede, 2011:682)  
They conclude that in fact “rule of law” itself is driven by other factors, which however 
are not yet clear. The scholarship on authoritarianism proposes some hypotheses that 
could in part explain the variation of accountability, property systems and violence in 
autocracies.  
Based on the insights by Haber (2006) hypothesis H6b suggests a number of instrumen-
tal variables to test the rational choice institutionalism theory. To be specific, the hy-
pothesis suggests that the power of SAIs in (semi-)authoritarian regimes depends on the 
strategy that the autocrat uses to stay in power. I tested each of the three basic strategies 
by autocrats that have been identified in the theory through econometric tests. These 
hypotheses have not been included in the main model in table 6.1. because they are only 
relevant for (semi-) authoritarian regimes and the available number of observations of 
the data is low.  
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 See regression (2b), table 6.1 
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The first strategy that autocrats can apply, is to keep in power through terror. Table 
B.23, regression (1) tests the power of SAIs when regressed on ‘political or extrajudicial 
killings’. As expected, in countries where such killings occur, the power of the SAI is 
weaker than in countries, where such killings have not been reported. The variable is 
highly statistically significant and has a large overall fit. It is also interesting to note and 
in line with our hypothesis that the power of the SAI is particularly weak in countries 
where political and extrajudicial killings only occur occasionally, while the SAI is 
stronger in countries where such killings are frequent. In the latter case the SAI is an 
instrument of the autocrat to control subordinates.  
The second strategy applied by autocrats is to keep in power through granting potential 
challengers privileges and rents. These countries are characterized by particularly high 
levels of corruption and weak SAIs. Regression (2) in table B.23 tests this hypothesis. 
In order to test this assumption I first excluded those observations which are rated as 
“free” by Freedom House in 2007 in order not to confuse with mechanisms of corrup-
tion in ‘free’ countries, which leaves me with 55 observations. As expected, I retain a 
wide range of scores for the OBS2010 SAI power, from a minimal value being ‘0’ for 
Equatorial Guinea to ’93.4’ for Bosnia-Herzegovina. This confirms our basic hypothesis 
that the power of SAIs in (semi-)authoritarian regimes varies substantially. The results 
of regression (2) reveal that both variables retain significance and the ‘cleaner’ the 
country, the stronger is the SAI and also that SAIs are stronger in countries which prac-
tice frequent political and extrajudicial killings than in those countries where such kill-
ings have only been reported occasionally (it is assumed here the autocrat in addition to 
terror makes use of clientelism and corruption to stay in power). 
In a next step I tested the third strategy, organizational proliferation. Similarly to North, 
Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 2009b) who suggest that a large number of organizations 
in the political as well as economic domain are required for states to become open ac-
cess societies, the assumption here is that a diversified economy facilitates inter-elite 
competition and thus inter-elite institutionalization of rule of law. I measured economic 
diversification through the variables “ecoleg”, “newbusdens_04.07” and two variables 
which I developed myself, the level of economic diversification (sed) and economic 
concentration (sec) respectively (see table B12 for a description of the variables).
218
 We 
                                                     
218
 When first testing sec/sed on OBS2010, I got statistically highly significant coefficients but they 
pointed into the inverse directions. Having had a closer look at the variables, I realized that high 
diversification of the economic sectors could also be the result of low industrialization and thus 
weak development of the services and industry sectors, which all are common features of low in-
come countries. I thus added per capita GDP (use the square root of per capita GDP. Per Capita 
GDP has been linearly transformed after graphical examination in order to better reflect the true 
relationship between it and OBS2010) to the regression; and by doing so I tested sec/sed while 
holding GDP constant, and really, the signs turned into the expected direction. I attained similar 
results when adding child mortality rate, the HDI or other development related variables or by 
excluding OECD member states from the regression 
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can see in regressions 3-6 (table B.23) that economic diversification is always signifi-
cant and is positively related to the power of SAIs in (semi-)authoritarian regimes. 
Thus, in autocratic countries with strong economic diversification SAIs do exist, how-
ever, they function deficiently.  
This relationship between the strategy of an autocrat and the power of a SAI becomes 
even clearer when examined through graphical tests. Figure 6.7 shows that those coun-
tries which practice occasional political killings (red line) have the worst SAIs. I assume 
this is because these autocrats practice strategies 2 or 3. In order to stay in power they 
grant rents and privileges to potential challengers (strategy 2) or they employ organiza-
tional proliferation (strategy 3). We see that as the business density increases, they ac-
cept the establishment of weak (façade) SAIs. To conclude, this graphs shows that the 
weakest SAIs are found in (semi-)authoritarian regimes with low levels of economic 
organizational proliferation and occasional political killings (strategy 2) and the strong-
est SAIs are found in countries where there are no political killings but high levels of 
economic diversification (strategy 3). Countries with high levels of political killings 
(strategy 1) have quite strong SAIs, but never very powerful and completely independ-
ent SAIs. 
Figure 6.7 OLS Regression of New Business Density and Political Killings (ciri_kill) on OBS2010 SAI 
Power (‘free’ countries have been excluded)219 
 
The next figure (6.8) confirms figure 6.7. I find the weakest SAIs in countries which 
practice occasional political killings combined with high levels of corruption. Countries 
with high levels of political killings can still have strong SAIs, but never very powerful 
and completely independent SAIs.  
                                                     
219
 See regression (4), table B.23 
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Figure 6.8 OLS Regression of status of the corruption perception index and political killings on OBS2010 
SAI power (‘free’ countries have been excluded)220 
 
To sum up, I have examined the three commonly known strategies of autocrats to stay 
in power (Haber, 2006). First, they might apply terror and ‘kill’ potential opponents. In 
such countries, there might be a SAI in order to control subordinates, but it will never 
be completely independent and strong (see figures 6.7, 6.8). Secondly, the autocrat 
might buy off opponents and thus corruption is widespread and the SAI is not function-
ing at all (see figure 6.8.) Finally, the autocrat might opt for organizational diffusion or 
proliferation by creating business opportunities for his opponents mixed with occasional 
killing of very strong challengers. Here the SAI is improving as the economic diversifi-
cation increases (see figure 6.7.) Autocracies with the lowest SAI power are those, 
which practice a mixture such as occasional political killings, high corruption and nepo-
tism (measured as low ti_cpi) and low organizational proliferation. To conclude, this 
section showed that the weakest SAIs are found in (semi-) authoritarian regimes which 
practice a mixture such as occasional political killings, high corruption and nepotism 
and low levels of economic organizational proliferation.  
Finally, I also tested the variable “Information on the structure of shareholdings in local 
firms” (B710) as another instrumental variable. This variable clearly measures relation-
ships among local elites, particularly the impersonality and rule of law of business rela-
tions. As discussed in North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 2009b), the main objective 
of the doorstep conditions is to develop impartiality, first among elites and in a second 
step among the wider population as well. The structure of shareholdings in local firms 
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 See regression (2), table B.23 
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clearly is of interest to local economic elites, and thus can serve as a proxy for the pres-
ence of the doorstep conditions. The variables new business density 
(newbusdens_04.07) and transparency of shares (B710) are based on the assumption 
that elite relationships matter for reforms to have an impact, not only de jure but also de 
facto. If elite groups have other sources of generating rents, then they might more easily 
accept to open government books. As this is a prerequisite for reforms, these variables 
are measured several years before the dependent variable in order to take the time lag of 
reforms into account.  
In my multiple regression tests, this variable stood indeed out as one of the most robust 
and with a strong positive conditional effect on the OBS2010.
221
 However, the problem 
is the limited number of observations available for this variable, which is why I did not 
include it in the main table 6.1. I also tested the relationship between the transparency in 
local shares with the OBS2010 through similar variables from the “Protecting Investors 
Dataset”.222 Unfortunately here the effect does not hold as the coefficients are not statis-
tically significant. There remains thus ample scope for further research. The problem 
could be wrong inference or wrong data measurement or conceptualization.  
H7: Organizational theories of leadership-led change 
H7a: Leadership commitment by heads of SAIs is associated with more powerful 
SAIs.   
In order to measure the effect of the leadership qualities and reform commitment of a 
SAI head, I created a new variable (SAIleadership_total1). It measures the engagement 
of a SAI in INTOSAI groups and the number of speeches held at UN/INTOSAI semi-
nars.
223
 SAI leadership commitment is the only variable which is statistically significant 
and positive in all regression models (with exception of the OECD dataset, where it 
however also suggests a positive effect). A one point increase in SAI leadership 
(through one additional membership in an INTOSAI work group or a speech at an 
UN/INTOSAI seminar) increases the power of a SAI by more than 1 percentage point, 
holding all other variables equal.
224
  
                                                     
221
 See variable B710, table B.24 
222
 The “Protecting Investors” dataset from the World Development Indicators includes the following 
variables of interest: “Extent of disclosure index”, the “Extent of director liability index”, the 
“Ease of shareholder suits index” and the “Strength of investor protection index”. 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/protecting-investors (Last Accessed on No-
vember 05, 2012) 
223
 This variable measures the personal engagement of a SAI head. However, it might also measure the 
influence that INTOSAI has on SAI heads. The more a SAI is involved in INTOSAI the higher 
is the score on this variable, and thus it can also serve as a proxy for INTOSAI’s positive effect 
on SAI leaders. (see table B.12 for a description and discussion of this variable). 
224
 See table 6.1, table B.14, model (4) in table B.16, table B.19, B.24., B25. 
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Figure 6.9 OLS Regression of Democratization (fh_ipolity2) and the Strength of a SAI's Leader 
(SAIleader_totalf) on OBS2010 SAI Power
225
  
 
The effect of the SAI leadership becomes even clearer when engaging in a graphical 
examination (see figure 6.9).
226
 Figure 6.9 pictures how as the level of democratization 
increases, the probability of a powerful SAI also increases. I further discover that the 
extent of the increase is influenced by the strength of the SAI leader. Thus, for similar 
levels of democratization the power of the SAI differs according to the strength of its 
leader. Equally, appendix B.26 shows a graph which depicts a similar effect. As the 
child mortality rate increases, the probability that the country will also have a weak SAI 
increases. However, for countries with similar levels of child mortality rates, there are 
differences in their SAI powers, depending on the strength of the SAI’s leader. It is fur-
ther interesting to note that there are SAIs which have strong and engaged leaders in 
countries with high child mortality rates. So far I have demonstrated that the strength of 
                                                     
225
 See regression (2) in table B.25 
226
 In order to be able to draw these graphs, I transformed the variable SAIleader_total1 from a numeric to 
a factor variable. I coded the variable SAIleader_total1f as follows: " "0:1='low'; 1.01:7='med'; 
7.01:26='high'". The original variable SAIleader_total1 had a range of minimum 0 and maximum 
26, with a medium of 4.00 and a mean of 4.77. Instead of dividing the variable into three roughly 
equal parts, which would result in only one observation having “high” leadership, I opted to di-
vide the variable in three parts, whereas the first quartile (1.0) marks the end of ‘low’ leadership 
and the third quartile (7.0) marks the beginning of ‘high” leadership values. However, the results 
are also confirmed, with equally high statistical power, when dividing the variable into three 
equal parts. The graphical examination is then reduced to only low and medium leadership 
strengths, as there is only one SAI (USA) with high leadership strength in this version.   
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the SAI’s leadership does have a statistically significant impact on the power of the 
SAI. It remains significant, even if the SAI is poor or only partly free.  
Table B.27 shows that leadership by the SAI remains significant, even when holding the 
level of democratization
227
 and the SAI institutional model constant. Model (2) in table 
B.27 also shows that increasing the democracy variable by 1 suggests that the 
OBS2010 will increase by 0.8.228  The SAI leadership variable is not as influential 
(0.25), but it also remains significant, holding the other variables constant. This table 
also confirms that there is a difference between the monocratic and the court SAI mod-
el, namely 0.65 standard deviations () of the OBS2010.229 This is roughly the same 
strength as the democracy variable.  
To sum up, the regression results suggest that a SAI leader cannot do “miracles”. He or 
she can still lift up the power of a SAI by a few percentage points.
230
 How much more 
                                                     
227
 I relied on the Freedom House measure of democratization (fh_ipolity2), which is based on the Free-
dom House measures for political rights and civic liberties and the Polity2 dataset. Hadenius & 
Teorell (2005 qt. in Teorell et al. 2010:45) show that this average index performs better both in 
terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts. Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least 
democratic and 10 most democratic. Through graphical analysis I realized that this variable is 
not linearly related to the OBS2010 variable. I thus transformed it by taking its second power 
(fh_ipolity2^2). The Polity2 measure of democracy covers three theoretical elements of democ-
racy, which can also be related to the doorstep conditions by North et al. (2009). The theoretical 
elements of the polity dataset are based on the elaboration by Eckstein and Gurr (1975) and fo-
cus on three authority patterns that organize political interaction in modern states: the process by 
which the government is selected (executive recruitment); relations among branches of govern-
ment, and between the executive branch and other elements of political society (executive con-
straints); and the scope and character of political participation (political competition). (Ulfelder 
and Lustik, 2007:354) 
228
 A one point increase on the 10 point democratization scale (fh_ipolity2), increases the expected value 
of the OBS2010 by 0.66 percentage points, holding the other variables constant. The coefficient 
of fh_ipolity2^2 i 0.44. As this is the coefficient of the second power of fh_ipolity2, I have to 
take the square root of the coefficient to get the true coefficient of fh_ipolity2. The square root of 
0.44 = 0.66. The beta coefficient of fh_ipolity2^2 is 0.64 (see model (2)). As this is the coeffi-
cient of the second power of fh_ipolity2, I have to take the square root of the coefficient to get 
the true coefficient of fh_ipolity2. The square root of 0.64 = 0.8. Otherwise put, an increase by 1 
standard deviation in the democracy variable, the OBS2010 is expected to increase by 0.8 stand-
ard deviations, holding all other variables constant. 
229
 0.65 of OBS2010 = 15.78 points 
230
 Model (1) in B.27 shows that an increase in 1 point on the SAI leadership variable (by participating in 
one more INTOSAI work group or by conducting a speech at a UN/INTOSAI seminar), the ex-
pected value of the de facto power of SAIs, the OBS2010, increases by 1.3 percentage points 
holding the other variables constant. Otherwise put, an increase by 1 standard deviation (1=5 
points) in the SAI leadership variable, the OBS2010 is expected to increase by 0.25 standard de-
viations (0.25 of OBS2010 = 6.07 percentage points on the OBS2010 scale).  
 The SAI leadership variable also remains significant in model (3) which is regressed on the 
Global Integrity SAI index. While the SAI institutional variables are not significant in this mod-
el, the beta coefficients show in the expected direction and the result resembles the one on the 
OBS2010. The monocratic SAI institutional model is the strongest, followed by the Board model 
and the court model while the SAI which is part of the ministry has of course the weakest SAI 
power. In model (4), regressed on the OECD data, none of the beta coefficients is significant, but 
they very much resemble the expected result. Finally, model (5) which was regressed on the 
PEFA variable, the SAI institutional model is certainly wrong, it cannot be true that the ministry 
model is the best. It is also strange that the democracy variable is not significant and very weak. 
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difficult and out of direct influence of donors, civil society and the SAI itself is it to 
change the institutional model (and linked to it the tradition and culture) of a SAI or to 
increase the overall level of democratic institutionalization of a country! 
 
H7b: Long periods of reform commitment foster progress. 
Next, I created a variable measuring the broad reform commitment of a SAI on the basis 
of the existence of a strategic plan (strategicplan). Management commitment and the 
duration of broad reform commitment was assessed through a dummy variable, indicat-
ing 1 if the SAI has a strategic plan in place at least since 2009 (and usually the plan-
ning process started well before the publication of the strategic plan) and 0 if it has none 
or if it has not even a website.
231
 This variable is not fully reliable as it was not always 
possible to find out whether the SAI had a development plan in 2009 or before. Many 
SAIs have strategic development plans published which started from 2010 or 2011 and 
do not have a previous strategic plan online, thus they were rated with ‘0’. As this prob-
lem mainly concerns OECD members, which might have replaced previous plans, I 
have also regressed the variable “strategicplan” on non-OECD members only, where it 
becomes statistically significant.
232
 The positive effect of the existence of a strategic 
plan, and particularly a development action plan is also suggested by the IDI stocktak-
ing report dataset (see chapter 6.4.).
233
 
Other control variables 
Before I go on to the next section, which will explore the INTOSAI dataset, I want to 
comment on a couple of control variables from my multiple regression analyses on the 
OBS2010 data.  
Ethnic fractionalization seems to have a negative effect on SAI power
234
. However, 
once I test the effect of ethnic cleavages on SAI power while holding FSIelite - a com-
                                                                                                                                                           
Only the Leadership variable is significant and computed the expected result. I have discussed 
the deficiencies of the GI08.10, OECD and PEFA datasets in chapter four, therefore I will not 
analyze the deficiencies of these models here at lengths.  
231
 http://www.intosai.org/en/portal/about_us/organisation/membership_list/ (Last Accessed on December 
5, 2011) If there is no website mentioned, I researched on the net whether the respective SAI 
does have a website or not as this list is not always up to date. Most of the strategic reports are 
also published in English and on the English version of the SAI’s website. When this is not the 
case, I also screened the original language (sometimes using Google translator) to look for a stra-
tegic plan. See appendix B.12 for a variable description. 
232
 See regressions 5 and 6 in table B.25 
233
 Finally, I also tested two composite indicators which measure national leadership and reform commit-
ment and thus overall political will, Q14.1 (BTI prioritization) and M (BTI management index). 
As expected, these two variables are strongly significant and explain large shares of the model 
fit.  
234
 Measured through Ale.fract, Ethnic 
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posite indicator measuring the extent of elite cleavages – constant; ethnic fractionaliza-
tion becomes insignificant.
235
  
Country size also is positively related to powerful SAIs. I thus also conducted some 
regressions weighted by large countries and indeed the significance of the coefficients 
and the R² increases considerably (by 5-10%) while some coefficients lose signifi-
cance.
236
 This indeed suggests that the processes in place in large and small countries 
differ. I assume that particularly in semi-authoritarian regimes, the need to control sub-
ordinates and far-away districts is stronger in large countries than in smaller, where 
people know each other personally. 
Conclusion 
The objective of chapter 6.3 was to test and discuss the results from econometric tests 
for each hypotheses. Most of the hypotheses could be included in my main test, table 
6.1 and were also tested on the other dependent variables (table B.14.). The develop-
ment of this main table was preceded by a large number of preliminary tests of each 
hypothesis. The scope of this dissertation did not allow me to include the detailed pre-
liminary tests for each hypothesis. But wherever necessary, the results were discussed in 
footnotes. Some hypotheses were discussed in separate or additional regression tables. 
Overall, the results suggest that all of my hypotheses can be confirmed. The main con-
clusion is therefore, that there is ample scope for further research along each of the hy-
potheses (using larger data samples as it becomes available, more robust data and more 
advanced econometric methods).  
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, I also regressed my main table 6.1. on stand-
ardized variables (table B.13). When now looking at the relative importance of my hy-
potheses in table B.13 I see that the INTOSAI region has the strongest effect on the 
OBS2010. The difference between belonging to EUROSAI and belonging to PASAI is 
1.9 of the OBS2010.237 On the other hand, the difference between the monocratic and 
the court model is only around 0.6. Next the existence of a partially independent judi-
ciary has a strong positive relationship and increases the OBS2010 by around 0.4 
compared to a not independent judiciary. Interesting is also the fact that the difference 
                                                     
235
 The same does not hold for Q16.3 (a composite measure for the minimalization of elite cleavages and 
thus for the extent of elite unification), where ethnic fractionalization retains some significance, 
although minimal. It is further interesting to note, that all variables lose their significance when 
tested on (semi-) authoritarian regimes only, pointing out that other variables might be more im-
portant. 
236
 See f.i. model (4) in table B.24 
237
 The effect of belonging to a specific INTOSAI region is robust and even holds if I add GDPpc to the 
regression, which results in a difference between EUROSAI and PASAI of 1.6 holding all oth-
er variables constant. 
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between a partially and a totally independent judiciary is only 0.1 in regression (1) 
while it is much bigger in the other regressions. SAI leadership as the only variable in 
the model that can be directly influenced compared to all the structural and institutional 
variables, has a relative effect of 0.2 on the OBS2010. While this is not a very large 
beta coefficient, it still shows that there is space for reform even in difficult environ-
ments.  
6.4. Exploring INTOSAI Data 
As discussed in chapter four, the data from the INTOSAI Development Inititative’s 
(IDI) Stocktaking Report (IDI, 2010) has been anonymized and thus cannot be com-
bined with external variables. However, as this data is extremely rich on variables (with 
35 high level questions and many more sub-level questions) and observations (it covers 
183 SAIs), I still decided to use it and test some of the variables contained in it on each 
other. I start by analyzing table B.28. It depicts the results from four OLS regressions on 
the dependent variable SAIstrength (which is a continuous variable with a range from 
0.13 to 1.00 and is calculated from the variables legal base, audit types and time lim-
it
238
).  
Regression (1) in table B.28 shows the effect of belonging to an INTOSAI region, the 
effect of SAI institutional models, of the number of total SAI staff and of the existence 
of a Development Action Plan (which is always based on an SAI’s Strategic Plan). This 
regression includes 173 SAIs and achieves an overall measure of model fit of around 
36%, which indicates that there are still many unexplained factors left out from this re-
gression. Now I will look at each of the coefficients in turn. Starting with the effect of a 
SAI’s belonging to an INTOSAI region, I see that belonging to the CREFIAF region is 
correlated with the weakest SAIs (although this finding is not statistically significant). 
The second weakest category is CAROSAI followed by PASAI, and thus roughly con-
firming the findings from the regressions on the OBS2010, the GI0810, the OECD and 
PEFA data. However, this regression clearly contradicts the findings from the other de-
pendent variables concerning the effect of membership to ARABOSAI. While in the 
regressions on the other dependent variables, ARABOSAI membership was associated 
with particularly weak SAIs, here it is the second strongest category, nearly approaching 
EUROSAI. One of the reasons for this striking difference might be the way the depend-
ent variables have been constructed. While the other dependent variables and most im-
portantly the OBS2010 include measures for the follow-up of the audit reports and thus 
                                                     
238
 Please recall chapter 4.3 for a discussion of the data and the three types of dependent variables that I 
developed on the basis of the data. 
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some partial measures of its accountability function, the IDIstrength variable can be 
better understood as a measure of a SAI’s capacity. This is also why I labeled it 
SAIstrength and not SAIpower.  
Next, I look at the effect of a SAI’s institutional model on its strength. The results from 
regression (1) suggest that the model does not have any significant effect on the strength 
of a SAI, despite if the SAI is part of the ministry of finance, in which case it performs 
much worse than other SAIs.  
As expected, the number of SAI staff has a statistically significant and positive effect of 
a SAI. For lack of any other variables in the model which would hold equal the level of 
country development (such as its GDPpc), I cannot be sure whether the effect here actu-
ally measures the effect of the SAI staff or whether it is a proxy for a country’s devel-
opment status (with more developed countries having more resources to employ a larger 
number of SAI staff).  
Finally, the existence of a development action plan also has a strong positive effect on a 
SAI’s strength. This result is particularly encouraging for me. It confirms my hypothesis 
on the relevance of a committed SAI leadership to improve the power/strength of a SAI. 
Regressions (2-4) in table B.28 only include recipients of capacity building support.
239
 
For lack of any data on the income status of a country or OECD membership, this al-
lowed me to differentiate between rich industrialized and poorer developing countries. 
“Recipients” thus are a proxy for non-OECD member states. The regression on non-
OECD members roughly gets the same results as when regressed on all observations, 
although some of the coefficients lose significance.  
In a next step (regression (3)), I included various types of capacity building measures to 
see whether they are related to an SAI’s performance. All of the capacity building 
measures are statistically insignificant, despite activities to strengthen IT audit capacity, 
which has a negative effect. The reasons why this is so, can only be hypothesized at this 
point. I suggest, that IT auditing is a very complex activity which in order to deliver 
usable results, requires the existence of a highly developed IT system in the country, 
sufficient professional staff and resources. Poor SAIs might be interested in receiving 
capacity building to conduct IT audits as it might make them look modern and devel-
oped and as IT audit might be less politically sensitive as some other types of audit. 
Finally, regression (4) in table B.28. confirms the positive effect of belonging to 
                                                     
239
 “Recipients” includes all SAIs which have identified themselves as recipients of capacity building 
measures in the past, at present or in the planned future. Thus they replied with a “yes” to the fol-
lowing questions: 3.1., 3.2., 3.2.1., 3.5.,4.9. (identified needs?), 4.10. (recipient?).  SAIs which 
were capacity building providers at any times were coded with “0”. This includes SAIs which 
replied with “yes” to the following questions: 5.1., 5.2., 5.7. SAIs which have replied with “no” 
for both recipients and providers are coded with “0”. SAIs which replied with “yes” in both are-
as, were coded as “both” and have been included in the regressions (2), (3) and (4) above. 
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EUROSAI, the negative effect of belonging to CREFIAF, the negative effect of being 
part of the ministry of Finance and the positive effect of a large number of SAI staff. 
This regression also includes a variable asking whether the recipients considered the 
capacity building measures as successful. It is however surprising, that there is no clear 
result for this question. While successful capacity building measures are correlated with 
stronger SAIs, the difference with not successful ones is very small and both coeffi-
cients are not statistically significant.  
Now I go on to table B.29, which tests the same independent variables as table B.28 but 
on a different dependent variable. Instead of conducting an OLS regression on the de-
pendent variable SAIstrength, I calculate a logistic regression on the binomial SAI vari-
able “IDI 1.8.time.limit.new1”.240. Logistic regression is a statistical technique estimat-
ing the effect of independent variables on a binary dependent variable, i.e. a categorical 
dependent variable with two categories (0-1). Whereas the Linear Probability Model 
(LPM) assumes that the Pi (=probability that Yi =1, that is, the event occurs), the logit 
model assumes that the log of the odds ratio is linearly related to Xi. Thus the dependent 
variable is in effect the log of the odds ratio. 
Li = ln (Pi/(1-Pi))= =i + 2Xi+ui   (Eq.6.8.
241
) 
The coefficients in table B.29 thus measure the rate of change in the log of the odds [ln 
(Pi/(1-P))] for Y (IDI 1.8.time.limit.new1) to be 1, for a unit change in X, given all other 
X. The model parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (this is 
a nonlinear estimation procedure which uses the z statistic). The table tells us the 
McFadden R² which is a measure of goodness of fit and can be compared to the R² of an 
OLS model.
242
  
In general, when looking at table B.29 I see that few variables are statistically signifi-
cant and that overall the results resemble those of table B.28. EUROSAI is the strongest 
INTOSAI region, PASAI is a very weak region and the number of a SAI staff is posi-
tively related to timely submission of the annual audit report. Surprising is the negative 
and statistically significant effect of the Westminster (monocratic) SAI model, which in 
all other regressions had a positive effect. Furthermore in regression (2), table B.29 I see 
that the support of administrative services as a capacity building measure is correlated 
to timely audit report submission, holding all other variables equal.  
                                                     
240
 To recall from chapter four, the variable “IDI 1.8. time.limit.new1” is based on question “1.8 When 
was the latest consolidated annual audit report from your SAI issued to Parliament (or other re-
cipients of the audit report as determined by law)?” The replies were coded as follows: Within 
the stipulated legal time limit: 1; within one year after stipulated legal time limit: 0; more than 
one year after stipulated legal time limit: 0; other/missing: 0 
241
 Gujarati and Porter, 2009:555 
242
 For more on qualitative response regression models see Gujarati and Porter, 2009:541-590. 
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More meaningful interpretations as in terms of the odds ratios, are obtained by taking 
the antilog of the slope coefficients. For instance, belonging to the EUROSAI region 
has a log of the odds coefficient of 2.89. If I now take e
2.89
 = 18.03. Thus SAIs belong-
ing to the EUROSAI region are 18 times more likely to submit the annual audit report 
within the stipulated legal time limit than those belonging to no INTOSAI region. Or 
let’s look at the effect of the number of total staff. The log of the odds ratio is 0.55 for 
the SAI submitting its annual audit report on time. The odds ratio is then e
0.55
 = 1.73. 
However this is now the odds ratio for the logarithmic function of 1.9. staffing.total, as 
this independent variable was linearly transformed. I again take the antilog of 1.73, 
which is e
1.73
 = 5.64. For each additional staff member, the SAI is 5.64 times more like-
ly to deliver its annual audit report within the stipulated legal time limit, which is truly a 
huge effect and must be doubted as being correct. 
Now let’s look at the model effect plots of the regression results (B.30), which will help 
us to better comprehend the regression results of table B.29. I can clearly see that SAI 
staff is not linearly related to the likelihood of timely audit report submission. With very 
few staff, the likelihood is very small, and steeply increases with each additional staff 
member. However at a certain moment there is a break and the likelihood for timely 
submission is hardly affected by the staff number, holding all other variables equal. This 
break seems to be reached at the value of 5000 staff members. But even with around 
2000 staff members the likelihood that the SAI submits its annual report on time is very 
high at about 80%. These are extremely large numbers for SAI staff (the three SAIs 
with the largest total number of SAI staff have 46,777; 12,000 and 8,535 staff and be-
long to ASOSAI, ARABOSAI and ASOSAI respectively). It can be questioned if such a 
large number is necessary and how these SAIs calculated this number (for instance large 
countries might have included staff of regional SAI branches
243
).  
Finally, I come to the last regression table. Table B.31 tests the same independent varia-
bles once more but this time on the dependent variable “IDI 1.8.time.limit.new”, which 
is a multinomial variable
244
. The ANOVA table helps us to understand which coeffi-
cients are statistically significant. However the ANOVA table does not give us the sig-
nificance for each category for categorical independent variables. Thus, I see that the 
INTOSAI region is strongly significant, but I do not know exactly which region is sig-
nificant. The number of staff is again statistically significant, while the type of SAI 
                                                     
243
 For instance, the SAI of China states on ist website that „there are 31 provincial audit offices. The 
number of audit institutions at the Municipal level and the County level has reached 434 and 
3,075 respectively. The staff of audit institutions nationwide has totaled about 80,000.“ 
http://www.cnao.gov.cn/main/AboutUs_ArtID_727.htm (Last Accessed on November 05, 2012) 
244
 To recall from chapter four, the replies are coded as follows: Within the stipulated legal time limit:1; 
within one year after stipulated legal time limit: 0.5; more than one year after stipulated legal 
time limit: 0; other/missing: 0. This regression only includes ‘’recipients” of capacity building 
support. 
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model in table B.31 is not statistically significant, as is the existence of a Development 
Action Plan. Among the various types of capacity building initiatives the following are 
significant: organizational capacity building and capacity building to support the admin-
istrative services of an SAI.  
In total 141 SAIs were included in this model (table B.31). The McFadden R² is 51% 
and thus relatively high. The two columns to the right of the table give us the coeffi-
cients, thus the log of the odds for the probability that P=1 or P=0.5 respectively, versus 
the baseline category Y=0. In order to understand the coefficients I have to take the an-
tilog as above. As this is a tedious exercise, I can also look at the effect plot to get an 
idea of the results. The model effect plot of the multinomial regression (B.32) shows the 
effects of the INTOSAI region on the probability that an SAI submits its annual audit 
report within the stipulated legal time limit (first row of the graph). I see that SAIs 
which belong to no region, ARABOSAI, EUROSAI, OLACEFS and PASAI have the 
strongest probability here. The second row shows us the probability that an SAI submits 
the annual audit report within one year after the stipulated legal time limit. The numbers 
of observations was quite low in this category (n=15) and thus no region has a statisti-
cally significant probability here. Finally, the third row in graph B.32 shows the proba-
bility for belonging to a specific INTOSAI region and to submit the annual audit report 
more than one year after the stipulated legal time limit. All the results have to be under-
stood as the effect of a specific variable, while holding the other independent variables 
in the regression constant or equal. I see again, that CREFIAF is the weakest region 
with the highest probability for late audit report submission.  
This section explored the hypotheses as far as possible on an anonymized dataset from 
the INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI). The tentative results are inconclusive for 
the relative importance of the INTOSAI region (H3a), which supports the assumption 
that SAIs in EUROSAI are strongest and SAIs in CREFIAF are weak. However, the 
regressions on the IDI Stocktaking report data would also suggest that SAIs in 
ARABOSAI are strong, which contradicts previous findings. The SAI institutional 
model (H1a) is not significant, but there the regressions suggest positive relationship of 
SAI strength with the number of SAI staff (H5a) and with the existence of a strategic 
development plan (H7b). The number of SAI staff can on the one hand be interpreted as 
a proxy for the level of economic development of a country, but it also stands for politi-
cal commitment, otherwise the government would not be willing to finance that many 
staff. Finally, the existence of a strategic plan supports my hypothesis of the importance 
of leadership and strategic planning by the SAI head.  
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6.5. Mini-Case Analyses 
The case study selection is based on the results of the statistical analysis in the form of a 
nested analysis as described by Lieberman (2005, see also Harrits, 2011). In nested 
analysis both types of research QUAN and QUAL are connected to each other and in-
form each other. The term nested refers to the way large-N analysis (LNA) and small-N 
analysis (SNA) are mixed within a coherent model, depending on the results of previous 
analysis. The researcher starts with a preliminary Large-N analysis (LNA) and tests it 
for robustness. In a next step he or she should strengthen the causal inference using con-
firmatory SNA. In case the preliminary LNA could not confirm the researcher’s theoret-
ical model, the researcher should use SNA to build a new model. So far this chapter has 
engaged in deductive LNA, which largely confirmed the proposed hypotheses.  
Therefore according to Lieberman (2005) the next step now is to further test my causal 
inferences through confirmatory SNA, whereby particularly those cases which are 
found “on the regression line” should be of interest. The aim of this SNA is to test 
whether or not the correlation confirmed in the regression model is produced by the 
causal mechanisms expected by theory, i.e. whether the researcher can trace the pro-
cesses leading to the outcomes of interest (on the qualitative method of process tracing 
see especially Bennett & Elmean, 2006, 2007; George & Bennett, 2005, Mahoney, 
2005; all quoted in Harrits, 2011:153).
245
  
As discussed above according to the ideal method of nested analysis as proposed by 
Lieberman (2005), case studies should be chosen within those with very small residuals 
(i.e. the cases which can be found “on” the regression line). Alternatively, the researcher 
can investigate cases which are far off the line to engage in new model-building activi-
ties, i.e. to investigate new theories which have been neglected so far.  
Figure 6.10 and figure 6.11 plot the actual dependent variable scores against the regres-
sion predicted scores (Lieberman, 2005:444-445). I chose to investigate the cases of the 
models (1) and (1b) from table 6.1 above. These two are my main models, they include 
a large number of independent variables (9), large numbers of observations (n=85 for 
model (1) and n=79 for model (1b)) and also attain a very high measure of model fit 
(R²=82% for model (1) and R² = 89% for model (1b)).  
                                                     
245
 Harrits (2011) criticizes the mixed methods research as nested analysis (Lieberman, 2005) for prob-
lems of causality and its inherent ontological model of realism. She points out that relying purely 
n causal leverage implicitly assumes that the results of the LNA and SNA translate without prob-
lems into each other and therefore that conflicting evidence will constitute a falsification of the 
theoretical model. Instead, she claims, conflicting evidence might point out different aspects of a 
problem. She therefore suggests the mixed methods approach of praxeological knowledge 
(Bourdieu, 1973) as a more adequate method to engage in both the explaining of causal patterns 
and the understanding of subjective interpretations (Harrits, 2011, see also chapter 1). 
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Figure 6.10 Actual Dependent Variable Scores Plotted Against Regression-Predicted Scores (Table 6.1., 
model (1)) 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Actual Dependent Variable Scores Plotted Against Regression-Predicted Scores (Table 6.1., 
Model (1b)) 
 
Countries that are found on the line (marked in blue) in model (1) are Timor-Leste 
(TMP), Lebanon (LBN), Mozambique (MOZ), Iraq (IRQ), Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), 
Liberia (LBR), Malaysia (MYS), Peru (PER), Czech Republic (CZE), Romania (ROM), 
South Africa (ZAF), France, (FRA), Sweden (SWE), Germany (DEU), United States of 
America (USA). 
In model (1b) the cases on the line are: Timor–Leste (TMP), Guinea-Equatorial (GNQ), 
Fiji (FJI), Mozambique (MOZ), Papua-Newguinea (PNG), Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), 
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Malaysia (MYS), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Croatia (HRV), Russia (RUS), France 
(FRA), Sweden (SWE) and the USA.  
Countries that belong to the latter group, i.e. cases which are far off the line instead, are 
marked in red. These cases “off” the line might point out theories which have been ne-
glected and can be used for model-building activities. They are in model (1): Rwanda 
(RWA), Malawi (MWI), Brazil (BRA), Bulgaria (BGR), Mexico (MEX), Slovakia 
(SVK), Bosnia-Herzegovina (BIH).  
In Model (1b) the cases “off” the line are: Nigeria (NGA), Jordan (JOR), Bangladesh 
(BGD), Bolivia (BOL), Ecuador (ECU), Italy (ITA), Botswana (BWA), Spain (ESP), 
Chile (CHL), Slovakia (SVK), New Zealand (NZL) and Poland (POL). 
The scope of this dissertation does not allow me to conduct an in-depth case study and 
engage in process-tracing research. However, I will now deploy what can be described 
as “mini-case analyses”, which is a brief examination of typical cases (see Reiter and 
Stam, 2002; Huth, 1996; qt. in Lieberman, 2005:441). I will first of all present some 
background information on those eight cases, which have been found “on the regression 
line” in both models and will then compare their scores on the main independent varia-
bles to each other and to the expected results from the hypothesis. The eight cases are: 
Timor-Leste, Mozambique, Trinidad-Tobago, Malaysia, Peru, France, Sweden and the 
United States of America. Now follows a short overview of these countries and their 
SAIs: 
Timor-Leste: Timor-Leste is a very young country, which gained independence from 
Indonesia in 1999 through a UN-supervised referendum. This low income country has a 
country area of 14,874 sq km
246
 and a population of around 984,000
247
. The overall 
Open Budget Index Score for Timor-Leste is 34%, thus much higher than the score for 
the power of the SAI (0%). Despite a constitutional mandate for a supreme audit institu-
tion, no such institution existed as of September 2009 (the submission date of the OBS 
2010 surveys). However, by legislative decree the “Tribunal de Recurso” was finally 
established in June 2011
248
 just a few days before the meeting of the SAIs in Portuguese 
Speaking Countries held its 15
th
 Anniversary in Dili. In October 2011 the SAI was then 
admitted as a full member to INTOSAI.   
Mozambique: Like Timor-Leste, Mozambique is a low-income country, which was col-
onized by the Portuguese from which it gained independence in 1975. It suffered a 16-
year bloody civil war, which was ended by a UN-led peace agreement in 1992. Mozam-
bique has a country area of around 733,000 sq km
249
 and a population of around 
                                                     
246
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html (Accessed on May 28, 2012) 
247
 pop_02.07 
248
 INTOSAI Journal, October 2011; http://www.tribunais.tl/?q=node/48 (Accessed on May 28, 2012) 
249
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html (Accessed on May 28, 2012) 
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20,507,000
250. Freedom House rated the political status in Mozambique as “partly free” 
for the year 2009
251
. The overall Open Budget Index for Mozambique is 28%, thus 
slightly higher than the score for the power of the SAI (26.6%)
252
. The OBS (2010) as 
well as the Global Integrity Report (2007) stress that the “Tribunal Administrativo253” 
has the legal mandate to carry out the audits it wishes to do but that political interfer-
ences are possible. For instance the President of the Republic can remove the head of 
the SAI without consent by another branch of the government. The executive also de-
termines the budget of the SAI, which has been described as far too low. Therefore, the 
main constraints this SAI seemed to face up to 2009 was a lack of human resources and 
capacities. By then the SAI also did not publish any of its audit reports.  
Trinidad-Tobago: These two small Caribbean islands have a total population of around 
1,313,000 and an area size of only 5,218 sq km. This resource rich, high-income, politi-
cally free
254
 democracy enjoys high growth rates due to an open investment climate.
255
 
The Office of the “Auditor General of Trinidad and Tobago”256 exists since independ-
ence from the British in 1962. The Auditor General enjoys the discretion in law to de-
termine the audits she wishes to undertake and the funding is broadly consistent with 
the office’s needs. The overall score on the Open Budget Index is 33% and thus clearly 
lower than for the SAI (43.4%).  
Malaysia: The current boundaries of Malaysia date back to 1965 and cover an area of 
330,000 sq km. This upper-middle income country is a constitutional monarchy and has 
a population of around 25,817,000. Freedom House rated the political status in Malaysia 
as “partly free” for the year 2009257. The “Office of the Auditor General”258 was estab-
lished upon independence from the UK in 1957 and the audit act has not been changed 
since. The overall score on the Open Budget Index 2010 for Malaysia was 39%, thus 
considerably lower than the score for the SAI (53.4%). The OBS2010 points out that 
while this SAI has sufficient funds and discretion to choose its audits, the main chal-
lenge remains effective follow-up.
259
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 pop_02.07 
251
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/mozambique (Accessed on May 28, 2012) 
252
 http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/country-info/?country=mz (Last 
Accessed on May 28, 2012) 
253
 http://www.ta.gov.mz/ (Last Accessed May 28, 2012) 
254
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/trinidad-and-tobago (Last Accessed May 
28, 2012) 
255
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/td.html (Last Accessed May 28, 
2012) 
256
 http://www.auditorgeneral.gov.tt/ (Last Accessed May 28, 2012) 
257
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/malaysia (Last Accessed May 28, 2012) 
258
 http://www.audit.gov.my/ (Last Accessed May 28, 2012) 
259
 http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Malaysia-OBI2010QuestionnaireFinal.pdf 
(Last Accessed May 28, 2012)  
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Peru: Peru has a size of around 1,285,000 sq. km and a population of approximately 
27,388,000. This lower middle income country used to be a Spanish colony and gained 
independence in 1824.
260
 Freedom House rated the political status in Peru as “free” for 
the year 2009
261. The “Contraloria de Peru”262 was created in 1929 and is based today 
mainly on the constitutional amendment of 1993, whereby the Law on the Controller 
General of Peru was last amended in 2002.
263
 The overall Open Budget Score for Peru 
is 65% and thus higher than the score for the power of the SAI (56.6%). While this SAI 
enjoys considerable independence, the main challenges according to the OBS2010 are 
the lack of follow-up on the audit reports and limited resources. 
France: France is a founding member of the European Union, a high income democracy 
and a member of the OECD. It has an area of 644,000 sq km and a population of 
62,753,000. The supreme audit institution is the “Cour des Comptes”264. It was created 
by the law of Sept. 16, 1807 and is a highly respected public body in France. The Court 
is part of the judicial system and operates independently of the executive and legislative 
branches of government. Since a ruling by the Supreme Court (Conseil Constitutionnel) 
in 2001, the Court’s independence as well as its institutional relationship with the exec-
utive and legislative branches has been protected by the Constitution. A revision of the 
Constitution in July 2008 incorporated these important principles (article 47-2).
265
  It 
was only then that the independence and statue of the staff of the court was finally in-
creased and adapted to international standards and that the Court’s relationship with the 
Legislature and public reporting were strengthened.
266
 The Court has also expanded its 
functions from its traditional role of compliance auditing to incorporating other audit 
types, such as financial auditing (with the adoption of the so called “LOLF” Act in 2001 
and another financial law for social security agencies enacted in 2005) and performance 
auditing. (Queyranne and Moretti, 2012). Finally, only in 2009 for the first time, the 
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 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html (Last Accessed May 28, 
2012) 
261
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/peru (Last Accessed on May 28, 2012) 
262
 www.contraloria.gob.pe (Last Accessed on May 28, 2012) 
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http://www.contraloria.gob.pe/wps/portal/portalcgr/!ut/p/b1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOL
dXf29TZwNjAwsTNwNDDwD_AMCvLx9jdx9jYEKIoEKDHAARwM0_X6OrkD9FmZhIR6
GhgYhZqTqR7U_EKYfSYGBoYGnqbuTl7ersaGZpTHJ-
tEVEPB_uH4UuhIMF4AV4PMifkeaEFDgbK7v55Gfm6pfkBsaGhphkOmp66gIABnEAKs!/dl4/
d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/ (Last Accessed on May 28, 2012) 
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 www.ccomptes.fr; (Last Accessed on November 01, 2012) 
265
 Queyranne and Moretti, 2012; http://www.lenouveleconomiste.fr/partout-ou-de-largent-public-est-
engage-la-cour-a-vocation-a-controler-14253/ (Last Accessed on November 01, 2012) 
266
 Before that it was at the discretion of the President of the Republic that the President of the Court of 
Accounts could be removed from office without reason. Furthermore, the Court of Accounts was 
not allowed to audit the office of the President. http://www.senat.fr/rap/l05-410/l05-
4100.html#toc0 (Last Accessed on May 28, 2012) 
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Court at the initiative of President Nicolas Sarkozy audited the expenses of the Presi-
dent of the Republic.
267
  
The overall Open Budget Score for France is 87%, thus somehow higher than for the 
power of the SAI (76.7%). The “Cour des Comptes” today is an independent institution, 
which according to the OBS2010 and the Global Integrity Report 2007 needs to open up 
its channels of communication to the public. With the revision of the Constitution in 
2008, this situation has changed and in 2012 the Court published 42 reports online. 
(Migaud, 2012) 
Sweden: This high-income democracy and OECD member joined the EU in 1995, but 
the public rejected the introduction of the Euro in a 2003 referendum. It has an area of 
450,000 sq.km and a population of 9,021,000. The “National Audit Office (NAO)”268 
was created only on 1 July 2003 after a constitutional change in which the then Parlia-
mentary Auditors and the National Audit Office were closed and the new National Au-
dit Office was created as a new authority under the Riksdag (legislature). The decision 
to establish a coherent audit office highlighted the importance of parliament to strength-
en its supervisory power in the economic field
269
. Sweden has an Overall Open Budget 
Score of 83% and a score for the power of the SAI of 86.7%. According to the Open 
Budget Survey 2010, both the legislature and the SAI in Sweden generally provide 
strong oversight of the budget. However, legislative scrutiny of audits could be im-
proved. The NAO is governed by a Board of three Auditors Generals which are ap-
pointed by the Legislature. The NAO is now closely linked to the Legislature, which 
also decides the budget of the NAO upon a proposal by the NAO. 
United States of America: The USA is a high-income country, member of the OECD, 
covers an area of approx. 9,827,000 sq km and counts a population of 294,517,000. The 
“Government Accountability Office (GAO)”270 was created in its current form in 1921. 
The Overall Open Budget Score is only 82% compared to the maximum score of 100% 
for the SAI. While the OBS2010 does not have anything to object, the Global Integrity 
Report 2011 analyzes the GAO a little bit more critically by pointing out that the GAO 
does not have formal organizational independence. In fact it is a subordinate part of the 
legislature and conducts audits mainly on its behalf. Only sometimes does it also initiate 
research under the authority of the Comptroller General (who has the discretion in law 
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 http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2012/02/19/20002-20120219ARTFIG00137-la-cour-des-comptes-
elargit-son-terrain-d-action.php; http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2009/07/16/controle-de-
la-cour-des-comptes-a-l-elysee-nicolas-sarkozy-rembourse-des-depenses-
privees_1219657_823448.html; http://www.ifrap.org/Reformer-la-Cour-des-comptes-et-
redefinir-sa-mission,904.html; http://www.lefigaro.fr/debats/2008/11/19/01005-
20081119ARTFIG00030-cour-des-comptes-parlement-la-cooperation-.php (Last Accessed on 
November 01, 2012) 
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 www.riksrevisionen.se (Last Accessed on May 28, 2012) 
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 http://www.riksrevisionen.se/sv/OM-RIKSREVISIONEN/ (Last Accessed on May 28, 2012) 
270
 www.gao.gov (Last Accessed on May 29, 2012) 
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to do so, Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, see OBS2010 questionnaire). The 
Global Integrity report however also points out that although the entity is not formally 
independent from other branches of government, in practice the GAO is subject to rea-
sonable checks and balances and is staffed by nonpartisan employees. The GAO is 
highly respected for its accurate and impartial work.
271
 In a next step, I will now analyze 
to what extent these eight cases verify my hypotheses by looking at their scores on the 
main independent variables (see table 6.11).  
H1: Institutional hypotheses: 
Hypothesis (1) assumed that the monocratic model fares best and the ministry model 
has the worst results, which is confirmed by the cases of the USA and the democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste (commonly known as East Timor). I also suggested that the 
French court model is associated with weaker SAIs. And indeed France has quite a 
weak SAIs compared to Sweden and the USA. As part of the institutional hypotheses I 
also suggested that French colonial heritage has a negative effect. Well, none of the cas-
es are former French colonies, but Timor-Leste and Mozambique are former Portuguese 
colonies with similar legal systems than the French. Both are judicial systems (as dis-
cussed the SAI of Timor-Leste was only established in 2011, which is why it has been 
rated as a ministry entity).  
The second part of H1 looked at the electoral system in a country. The number of veto 
players is indeed higher for those countries which also have high OBS scores. If I now 
look at the overall electoral system in these countries I cannot find a clear pattern. The 
USA, Timor-Leste, Malaysia and France use the plurality electoral law while Mozam-
bique, Peru and Sweden use the proportional election system (there was no value in the 
data for Timor-Leste for the year 2007). Looking more generally at the type of regime 
(chga_hinst for the year 2007), I can only observe that democracies have higher scores 
than dictatorships (MOZ, MYS are classified as civilian dictatorships for the year 
2007), but there is no clear pattern between parliamentary (SWE, TTO), presidential 
(USA, PER) and mixed democracies (FRA, TMP). 
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 http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/United-States/2011/scorecard (Last Accessed on May 29, 2012) 
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Table 6.2 Overview of Eight Mini-Cases and Their Scores on the Main Independent Variables (ordered by the OBS2010 Score) 
SAI  OBS2010 SAImodel_ 
09 
dpi_ 
checks 
(Veto 
players) 
Oil_ 
02.07 
IMF Region Battle_ 
deaths_02.08 
fh_press ciri_injud SAIleader_ 
total1 
TMP 0 Ministry 2 0 0 NRM 0 38 1.Partially independent 0 
MOZ 26.6 Court 3 0 1 AFROSAI-E 0 40 1.Partially independent 0 
TTO 43.4 Monocratic 3 13.26 0 CAROSAI 0 23 2. Generally indep. 3 
MYS 53.4 Monocratic 4 7.5 0 ASOSAI 0 65 0.Not independent 5 
PER 56.6 Monocratic 4 1.48 1 OLACEFS 10.57 44 1.Partially independent 10 
FRA 76.7 Court 4 0.02 0 EUROSAI 0 22 2. Generally indep. 13 
SWE 86.7 Board 5 0 0 EUROSAI 0 11 2. Generally indep. 11 
USA 100 Monocratic 4 0.5 0 NRM 0 17 2. Generally indep. 26 
Legend: TMP (Timor-Leste), MOZ (Mozambique), TTO (Trinidad and Tobago), MYS (Malaysia), PER (Peru), FRA (France), SWE (Sweden), USA (United States of America)
The Objective View – Exploring Relationships Through Econometric Analyses 147 
 
H2: The source of national income 
Looking at my eight cases I see that the only country with quite a high value of oil rents 
(as % of GDP) is Trinidad and Tobago, which also has quite a low OBS score. If I look 
at the measure by Haber and Menaldo (2011), I find a different pattern. As discussed 
above, their criteria exclude resource-rich, mature democracies whereas it includes de-
veloping countries that produce trivial quantities of oil, gas and minerals. According to 
their data, apart from Trinidad and Tobago I then include Peru and Malaysia as resource 
reliant countries. However, both of them do not have extremely weak SAIs but rather 
mid-level SAI powers.   
When investigating the tax related variables for these eight cases, I find that Malaysia 
has the highest value for tax compliance (EFW5Cvii =8.4) while Peru has the lowest 
level (EFW5Cvii = 5.2), which does not correspond to our SAI ranking above. If I now 
look at tax_02.07 (tax revenue as % of GDP, WDI data, mean for the years 2002-2007) 
I find that Trinidad has the highest tax revenues (24.5 %) compared to the USA which 
have the lowest tax revenues (10.86%). However, in the theory large incomes from 
taxation was only relevant for early state development, thus I should exclude the USA, 
Sweden and France from this comparison. There is no such data available for Mozam-
bique and for Timor-Leste, but Peru only collects 13.7% of its GDP through tax reve-
nues and Malaysia only 15.6 %, which confirms my hypothesis that tax revenue collec-
tion increases the incentives for the development of public accountability in developing 
countries.  
Finally, I looked at the effect of official development aid on the development of strong 
SAIs. Among the eight cases above, Peru and Mozambique have received an IMF led 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Fund. While both of these countries are quite poor 
(which also explains why the IMF variable has a negative coefficient), their close rela-
tionship with the donors might still be one factor, why their SAIs are not even weaker. 
Mozambique is also part of the PRSP program and receives the highest amount of per 
capita PFM aid (tot_pfmaid_02.07pc = 0.92 US$/year), while the per capita PFM aid in 
Timor Leste and Peru were each 0.6 US$ and for Trinidad it was 0.02 US$ respectively. 
So here again, I cannot see a positive effect of total PFM aid on the OBS2010, Mozam-
bique which has received most PFM aid fares very low.  
Hypothesis 3: Institutional diffusion 
Generally, I assumed that being part of EUROSAI increases the probability of having a 
powerful SAI. However, I also assumed that being part of AFROSAI-E increases the 
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chances of a powerful SAI, which is not supported by our cases. However, the SAI in 
Mozambique might even be weaker if it was not part of AFROSAI-E.  
Next, I said that external intervention as part of a post-conflict situation might be an 
opportunity to strengthen an SAI. Among the eight cases listed above, only Peru has 
suffered battle related deaths during the period 2002 to 2008 (mean of the annual num-
ber of persons dying in battles for the years 2002-2008). Due to violent conflicts be-
tween mostly indigenous groups and the government, 38 persons were killed in 2007 
and 36 persons in 2008 in Peru.
272
 As a consequence to these violent clashes, which 
were sparked by corruption accusations and protests over land rights and oil develop-
ments, Prime Minister Jorge Del Castillo and his cabinet resigned in 2008.
273
 The vio-
lent clashes continued in 2009, which then led to the resignation of Prime Minister 
Yehude Simon.
274
 It would be interesting to investigate these events further and trace 
the processes which might have assisted in strengthening the power of the SAI in Peru. 
Was there external intervention and of what type? Another case is Timor Leste, which 
actually had a UN peace keeping operation with 1552 persons in the country during this 
period. Still, its SAI is very weak which falsifies our hypothesis for this case.  
Hypothesis 4: Modernization theory 
Among the eight cases listed above, Malaysia has the most restricted press (fh_press = 
58 out of 100), while Sweden has the freest press (fh_press =11). As already discussed 
elsewhere, there is no clear relationship between political and civic rights and the power 
of the SAI, particularly when holding other variables constant. I see for instance, that 
France and Trinidad nearly have the same score on press freedom (22 and 23 respective-
ly).  
Hypothesis 5: Institutional capacity theory 
This hypothesis was not included in the regression model of table 6.1.. This is due to the 
lack of data, as discussed above, the CBC database is not complete. Among the eight 
cases of interest, there is only information on Mozambique, which has received 7.3 mil-
lion EUR during the period 2002-2007 by the Swedish National Audit Office. This is a 
very large sum in comparison to other capacity building programs (range between 0 and 
                                                     
272
 Battle-related deaths (number of people), World Bank, World Development Indicators. See also 
battledeaths_02.08, Appendix B.12. 
273
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Peru_oil_scandal; http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2009/peru  (Last Accessed on November 05, 2012) 
274
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/peru; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Peruvian_political_crisis; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yehude_Simon  (Last Accessed on November 05, 2012) 
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9.2 million EUR with the exception of Bulgaria which has received 3000.15 million 
EUR to strengthen its SAI!). The years are medium as the range in the data is between 
1-12 years. The capacity building program in Mozambique included strengthening or-
ganizational, financial and IT audit capacities as well as strengthening so called other 
support services. This confirms some of our findings, namely that large CBC support is 
not directly related to powerful SAIs, and that IT audit capacity is related to weak SAIs. 
There was no strengthening of the capacity to deal with the external environment, which 
is correlated with stronger SAIs and might also explain why the Mozambican SAI is so 
weak.  
Hypothesis 6: Rational choice institutionalism 
Table 6.2 shows that those SAIs with high OBS ranking are also characterized by a 
generally independent judiciary with the exception of Trinidad, which has a lower score 
and should be further investigated. What might also surprise is the case of Malaysia, 
which despite the lack of an independent judiciary has a medium range SAI. However, 
as Malaysia is economically quite well off, the lack of the independent judiciary might 
indicate why it is not even higher up the scale. All of the eight cases “on the line” are 
classified as having no overt fragmentation (p_fragment), thus DC#3 should be fulfilled. 
Concerning the existence of effective implementation of executive constraints (my main 
measure for DC#2) I find some variance. While most countries (USA, SWE, PER, 
TTO, TMP) accept executive subordination, Malaysia and Peru only have 4 out of 7 
possible points. With these results it would be difficult to draw conclusions concerning 
the relevance of the doorstep conditions for the development of SAIs. Therefore, further 
investigation, particularly through in depth case study research is needed. 
Hypothesis 7: SAI leadership 
Finally, our last hypothesis also seems to have the clearest, almost linear results. The 
stronger is the SAI leadership, the higher is the SAI score.  
6.6. Summary and Conclusions 
My aim, of conducting some exploratory tests have proven highly valuable and have 
opened up many directions for further, more detailed research on all hypotheses.  
The objective of this chapter was to test the hypotheses which were developed in chap-
ter five through the exploration of statistical data. This chapter also builds on chapter 
four, which discussed the data that is available for measuring the power of SAIs (de-
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pendent variable) and concludes that the composite index constructed by the Open 
Budget Survey (OBS2010) is best adequate for my purposes. I then proceeded by test-
ing each hypothesis individually through mainly bivariate regressions and graphical 
analysis. This research tool allows the author to investigate a variety of variables which 
all measure similar aspects of the independent variables she is looking for. The tests 
suggested that all the proposed relationships between the independent variables and the 
dependent variables exist. The chapter then continued to conduct multiple regressions, 
where several hypotheses were tested at once and their effects while holding equal all 
other factors were analyzed. Finally, this chapter also conducted eight mini-case anal-
yses as part of the mixed methods approach of nested analysis. 
The results confirmed all my hypotheses as developed and presented in chapter five (see 
table 6.3). It showed that that strong SAI leadership and favorable inter-elite relation-
ships are crucial variables explaining the variation in de facto SAI power. My results 
also suggest that external influence, particularly proximity to and influence by good 
performers as well as external influence in a post-conflict situation of LMI countries, 
can explain some of the variation. The institutional model also partly explains why 
some SAIs are stronger than others, however in some regression specifications this ef-
fect vanishes. Public demand for accountability on the other hand could not stand the 
test, which also confirms the rational choice institutionalism theory that public demand 
does not automatically facilitate effective institutionalization of public accountability. 
Public demand needs to encounter inter-elite relationships which are characterized by 
elite competition and rule of law for elites. I could not clearly show the effect of taxa-
tion or aid modalities on the power of SAIs, but large shares of oil rents seem indeed to 
hang together with weaker SAIs while direct taxation in poor countries seems to facili-
tate the development of accountability. Finally, institutional capacity, particularly as 
measured by the number of its staff, does have a positive effect while capacity building 
seems to have a positive effect if it is provided long-term and with a focus on building 
the capacity of the SAI to deal with the external environment. To summarize, the three 
main variables, which proved to be most robust to model specification (on different de-
pendent variables and when conditioned on a wide set of independent variables) were: 
 H3a: Geographic proximity to and influence by good performers  
 H6a: DC#1: Rule of law for elites 
 H7a: Leadership commitment by the SAI head 
Regional affiliation had a very strong relationship with the power of a SAI, even when 
holding per capita GDP or the level of democratic development constant. I argued that 
this confirms hypothesis H3a, i.e. there is a snowballing effect or direct influence by 
peers on the development of powerful SAIs.  
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Judicial independence and other rule of law measures, as well as variables measureing 
the level of inter-elite competition and other components of the three doorstep condi-
tions as identified by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009a, 2009b) also could not 
falisified in any regression specification.  
Finally, the variable measuring the strength of SAI leadership was also robust to model 
specifications. This variable measured the membership of a SAI leader in INTOSAI 
groups and the number of speeches held at UN/INTOSAI seminars. Other variables, 
which also measuring good SAI management practices, such as the existence ofa strate-
gic plan or a development action plan, also confirmed hypothesis H7.  
To conclude, while this chapter confirms in general the hypotheses of chapter five, it 
also identified a number of limitations and points of departure for future research. The 
main problems identified are related to data scarcity and reliability issues. Thus, there is 
ample scope for further research as more data becomes available. Furthermore, the eight 
mini-cases showed that my hypotheses can broadly explain the ranking of various SAIs 
on the OBS2010. While multiple regression analysis is a powerful tool to detect statisti-
cal significance in variable correlations, it cannot explain causation. One of my sugges-
tions for further research is thus to analyze panel data, which also looks at the develop-
ment over time and to engage in structural equation modeling to detect causal links. 
However, in order to understand the particular country-context better and to further 
specify the theory, in-depth country case studies engaging in process tracing would be 
very useful. The following chapter will compensate some of these limitations by look-
ing at the individual experiences of reform by SAI leaders.  
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Table 6.3 Summary of Determinants and Their Relationships with SAI Power 
Independent variables               Effect on an 
SAI’s de facto power 
H1: Institutional model theories  
H1a: Court/judicial SAI model       - 
H1a: French colonial heritage       - 
H1a: Monocratic/Westminster model*      + 
H1b: Electoral system with strong personal competition     + 
H2: Source of national income 
 H2a: Reliance on oil*, gas or minerals      - 
 H2b: Public Finance Management Aid as part of a country wide reform program + 
H2c: Income (direct) tax in democratic developing countries   + 
H3: International diffusion theories 
 H3a: Geographic proximity to and influence by good performers*  + 
H3b: Strong international presence (particularly in partly free, LMI countries) + 
H3c: Ratification of Convention Against Corruption    0 
H4: Modernization theories 
 H4a: Socio-economic development      + 
H4b: Level of education, political rights, civic liberties of population  + 
H5: SAI capacity and support 
H5a: Number of SAI staff*       + 
H5b: Long term SAI assistance        + 
H5b: SAI technical assistance includes strengthening external relations  + 
H6: Inter-Elite relationships* 
H6a: Attainment of doorstep conditions/institutionalized democratization* + 
H6a: DC#1: Rule of law for elites*      + 
 H6a: DC#2: Perpetually lived organizations in the public and private spheres* + 
 H6a: DC#3: Consolidated control over the military*    + 
 H6b: Economic diversification in (semi-)authoritarian regimes   + 
H6b: Political terror in (semi-)authoritarian regimes    + 
H7: Leadership* 
 H7a: Leadership commitment by the SAI head *     + 
H7b: Reform commitment measured through the existence of a strategic plan + 
Other:  Country area         + 
 
Notes: + positive effect; 0 no effect; - negative effect.  
*  had the most robust and/or strongest effect among the variables listed.  
  
The Objective View – Exploring Relationships Through Econometric Analyses 153 
 
Table 6.4 Overview of Research Results of Chapter Six 
Part One (Chapters 6.1., 6.2., 6.3. and 6.4.) 
QUAN data collection QUAN data analysis 
Procedures: 
 Research availability and suitability of 
independent variables 
 Contact other scholars with the re-
quest to provide data on specific vari-
ables 
 
Procedures: 
 Hypotheses testing through bivariate 
and multiple regression analysis 
 Model diagnosis tests 
 Comparison of multiple regression re-
sults on  five different data sets meas-
uring the dependent variables 
 Decide on main table and research for 
typical cases which lie “on the regres-
sion  line” 
Products: 
 A table of independent variables has 
been prepared for the statistical com-
putations. 
 Independent variables which did not 
yet exist in other databases were de-
veloped by the author. 
Products: 
 Coefficients (including size, direction 
and significance) 
 Statistical estimates of the robustness 
of the theoretical models 
  
 
 
Part Two (Chapters 6.5 and 6.6..) 
qual data collection qual data analysis 
Procedures: 
 Research data and information on 
eight mini-cases 
Procedures: 
 Discussion of eight mini-cases to further 
verify the hypotheses 
Products: 
 Basic data and background information 
on eight mini-cases was documented. 
Products: 
 Insights into eight mini-cases  
 Overall chapter synthesis concluding 
with three main factors explaining dif-
ferences across SAIs 
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7. The Subject’s Perspective - What the Heads of 
SAIs Think  
7.1. Introduction 
7.2. How is Reform Initiated? 
7.3. Which Strategies are Employed? 
7.4. Which Support Factors Facilitate Reform? 
7.5. Which Constraints Hamper SAI Reform? 
7.6. Reform Results 
7.7. Summary and Conclusions 
 
”The tendency of many SAIs is to play victim mentality, 
that is not the way you operate as a leader, leadership is 
about influencing events, it is not about being submissive 
to the circumstances, you need to put a lot of effort in 
building a leader.”275 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter depicts the practice of reform from the point of view of SAI leaders. The 
main question that this section addresses is,  
“What do SAI leaders think are the main reasons that explain why reforms to strength-
en citizen oriented, independent public finance auditing thrive in some countries and 
fail in others?”  
I want to find out what the practice of reform looks like for heads of SAIs, which sto-
ries they have to tell and how they feel about reforms which aim at increasing the politi-
cal leverage and the de facto independence of SAIs. For that purpose, I have conducted 
17 semi-structured interviews with SAI leaders
276
 from 6 INTOSAI regions during the 
summer of 2011, which were consequently analyzed from an interpretive perspective, 
using qualitative content analysis to carve out the expert’s “lifeworld” and their logic of 
political practice. 
                                                     
275
 Interview 11 
276
 I use SAI leaders throughout this chapter, however this term also includes high ranking officials such 
as deputy chairs, board members and directors of the cabinet of a general auditor for instance. 
For a complete list of all interview partners see annex C.1.  
 An 18
th
 interview is added, which differs from the other interviews, as it was not an interview as 
such but an informal phone discussion and email exchange with a staff member of an INTOSAI 
body. 
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The “theory of practice” was strongly influenced by Pierre Bourdieu (1973, 1984, 1991 
qtd. in Harrits, 2011:157) who defined “praxeological knowledge” as a combination of 
“explaining” (Erklären) and “understanding” (Verstehen) or as “bringing the lifeworld 
back in.” Harrits (2011:157) explains that  
“this implies the recognition of the fact that if our theoretical model is true, 
there must be practices producing the regularities that we can observe in quanti-
tative analyses”.  
As Bourdieu (1984) put it, “Systematicity is found in the opus operatum because it is in 
the modus operandi” (p173, qtd. in Harrits, 2011:157). Therefore, the third logical step 
of the research process involves the explicit investigation of the modus operandi, that is, 
the logic of the practices that produce the systematic patterns in actions and events that I 
have observed in the quantitative studies.
277
  
The objective of this chapter is thus on the one hand to add valuable information which 
was neglected in the quantitative study and to test the model produced in phase two with 
qualitative/interpretive analysis. The deductive part of research has shown that the polit-
ical economy of reform matters and that particularly the options available to elite groups 
are crucial in achieving holistic SAI reforms. Qualitative expert interviews are a valua-
ble source of additional information in order to break with the external and static view 
constructed by the statistical modeling, and to understand more closely the modus op-
erandi of this relationship. This chapter thus intends to present a qualitative study of 
political practice. As Harrits (2011:160) referring to Benhabib (1986) explains, the es-
sence of praxeological knowledge is to solve the epistemological problem of double 
hermeneutics, of the outside as well as the inside perspective on social reality.  
“As noted by Benhabib (1986), there is an inherent relationship between argu-
ing that society presents an emergent level of systems or structures, going be-
yond the interactions and comprehensions of stakeholders in their daily life, and 
arguing that society must be analyzed from an observer’s perspective, that is, 
from an outside and explanatory perspective. Complementarily, there is an in-
herent relationship between the concept of the lifeworld and arguing that society 
must be analyzed from a participant’s perspective that is, from a perspective 
within, focusing on “mutual understanding.” Conceptualizing society as a sys-
tem and lifeworld means, then, that social analysis must be done both from out-
side and from within, or as Bourdieu argued, that explaining and understanding 
are one.  
Furthermore, the possibility of the two perspectives conflicting is inherent within 
this paradigm. In other words, it should come as no surprise that an objective 
                                                     
277 Besides Bourdieu’s “theory of practice” approach (Bourdieu, 2004; 1973; Bourdieu and Wacgant, 
1999) other influential approaches in praxeology are the “communities of practice” approach 
(Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998; Wenger and Snyder, 2000) and the “narrative ap-
proach” (Swidler, 1986; Rouse, 1996; de Certeau, 1984). For a further discussion on “praxeolo-
gy” as a research method, the “practice turn in political science” and a discussion of various ap-
proaches of praxeology see http://practice-theory.net/ (Last Accessed on October 07, 2011).  
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model produces a different story about a social reality than what can be ex-
plored in an interpretive analysis, since such different “stories” may be inherent 
to reality itself.”  (Harrits, 2011:160) 
Praxeological knowledge as a mixed method strategy is of paradigmatic difference 
compared to another popular mixed method strategy – nested analysis. Distinct from 
this deductive approach, praxeological knowledge is set up to address a different epis-
temological problem, namely to integrate the research subject’s own understanding into 
the research, even if this competes with the researcher’s understanding of social reality. 
(Harrits, 2011:159-162 citing Bourdieu et al., 1999; Bourdieu, 2000, 2004; Giddens, 
1993; Pitkin, 1972; Makkreel, 1975; Harrington, 2000; Weininger, 2002; Bachelard, 
1968; Fries, 2009) While the quantitative analysis (chapter six) provided objective 
knowledge from an observer’s perspective (Erklären), the qualitative knowledge here 
provides interpretations from the subjective perspective of SAI leaders (Verstehen). 
(Harrits, 2011:162).  
Bourdieu has developed the terms “habitus” and “field” in his “theory of practice”, as 
some argue this was an early attempt to reconcile the dichotomical understanding of the 
relation between “agency” and “structure”. This dichotomy between “structure” and 
“agency” is a characteristic of decades of sociological and political debate, and has par-
ticularly also dominated the scholarship on democratic transitions for many years. 
While no consensus has been reached in the scholarly debate so far on the preconditions 
necessary and the processes involved in the creation, evolution and consolidation of 
democracy and of effective states
278
, there is however a new understanding that research 
needs to combine both structural and actor-centered approaches. Thus, Bourdieu’s at-
tempt to reconcile the concepts of “agency” in the form of “habitus” and “structure” in 
the form of the “field” very well fits the current scholarship on democratization and 
state-building. 
 
The research method and the process of making inferences: 
 
I conducted 17 expert interviews between 12 July 2011 and 22 August 2011
279
. The 
interview partners cover 6 INTOSAI regions (AFROSAI-E, ARABOSAI, ASOSAI, 
CREFIAF, EUROSAI and OLACEFS). I could not get interview partners from the 
CAROSAI and PASAI region as well as from INTOSAI members without any regional 
                                                     
278
 Handler (2010:7), referring to lectures and discussions with Stephen Krasner, identifies five main 
approaches to state- and institution-building processes in the current scholarly debate. These are: 
1) Modernization theory, 2) Path dependence, 3) Socialization or decoupling theory, 4) Conven-
tional institutionalization and 5) Rational-choice institutionalism. See also Krasner (2009a,b) 
279
 Unfortunately none of my mini-case studies served as an interview partner. 
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affiliation. The distribution of the interview partners according to their regional affilia-
tion is as follows: 
 AFROSAI-E: 3 interviews 
 ARABOSAI: 2 interviews 
 ASOSAI: 3 interviews 
 CREFIAF: 2 interviews 
 EUROSAI: 6 interviews 
 OLACEFS: 1 interview 
The distribution of the SAIs according to their WDI income classification is as follows: 
 Low Income: 5 interviews 
 Low Middle Income: 5 interviews  
 Upper Middle Income: 6 interviews 
 High Income: 1 interview 
There is also quite a good distribution of the SAIs according to the status of political 
freedom as indicated by the Freedom House Classification 2011: 
 Not Free: 6 interviews 
 Partly free: 4 interviews 
 Free: 7 interviews 
There is however an unequal distribution of interviews according to their institutional 
model, which also reflects reality, where most SAIs have adopted the Westminster 
model. As several of my interview partners are leaders of SAIs with mixed institutional 
designs, I have to explain the three institutional categories as I used them more clearly. 
The Westminster model stands here for all SAIs which are headed by one person which 
can take decisions, even if this leader is not called “Auditor General” or if this leader 
has a small board attached to it acting more as an advisory body. The Board model is 
used for SAIs where decision taking is done in the framework of Board discussions. The 
terminus court model is used for all SAIs which have judicial powers.  
 Monocratic model: 10 interviews 
 Board Model: 4 interviews 
 Court model: 2 interviews 
The gender distribution of the interview partners is also highly unequal as most SAI 
leaders are male. In total the 17 interviews involved 20 persons that were replying to my 
questions, out of which only 2 were female. (In total 30 persons were present during the 
17 discussions as five interviews required interpreters and three interviews were con-
ducted in the presence of other people.)  
The selection of interview partners was mainly based on the availability of the SAI 
leaders. I first contacted 71 SAI leaders asking them for a meeting during their stay in 
Vienna for the 21
st
 UN/INTOSAI Symposium, which took place from July 13-15, 2011 
at the Vienna International Centre. The selection of SAI leaders that were contacted 
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depended first on the availability of secondary information on their SAI, primarily 
whether their SAI was analyzed in the OBS survey 2010. As I already got enough re-
plies after a first round of emails, I could not be sure to make available enough time for 
more interviews in this limited time space and thus stopped to contact the remaining of 
the 189 full INTOSAI members via email. Later on, once the timetable of the interviews 
got more precise, I initiated additional interviews during the three days of the confer-
ence in the hotel lobbies of the conference participants. Also, some SAI leaders replied 
to my interview request that they would accept an interview but were not travelling to 
Vienna, so I conducted the interview on the phone. The interviews have then been tran-
scribed, and analyzed from an interpretive perspective, using qualitative content analy-
sis to carve out the logics of their lifeworld or personal perspective on political practice. 
King, Keohane, and Verba in their groundbreaking work of 1994 distinguished between 
descriptive and explanatory inferences. A descriptive inference “is the process of un-
derstanding an observed phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations” (p.55, qtd. 
in Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009:288). Explanatory inferences on the other hand build 
upon descriptive inferences, but they go beyond them by “connecting causes and ef-
fects” (p34, qtd. in Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009:289). According to Teddlie & 
Tashakkori (2009: 300ff) the quality of good explanatory inferences should be evaluat-
ed in relation to design quality and interpretive rigor. The next section analyses this 
chapter’s research based on the ten research criteria for inference quality by Teddlie & 
Tashakkori (2009). 
Design suitability (appropriateness) 
The main aim of this qualitative part of research was to contribute to the overall re-
search question of this dissertation, namely “Why do reforms to strengthen citizen ori-
ented, independent public finance auditing thrive in some countries and fail in others?” 
Particularly the expert interviews should provide an insight into the lifeworld of the SAI 
leaders, thus the perspective and the particular know-how of the SAI leaders themselves 
on the practice of SAI reform. More precisely, the interviews addressed the following 
research questions:  
 What are the reasons that some SAIs succeed in implementing reforms to 
strengthen citizen-focused, independent public auditing while others fail to do 
so? 
 How are reforms initiated? 
 Which strategies are employed? 
 Which factors support reform initiatives?  
 Which factors constrain reform initiatives?  
 What stories of success/failure do they have to tell?  
 How do SAI leaders experience reform?  
 How do SAI leaders feel about reforms? 
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 Why do they engage in reform processes? 
Thus, the qualitative research answers broadly the same research question as the quanti-
tative research in chapter six, but includes further sub-questions, which were not and 
could not have been included in the quantitative part of the research. These additional 
sub-questions on reform experiences could have also been examined through several 
intensive case studies, a content analysis of project reports and PFM studies covering 
several countries or alternatively in the form of a questionnaire.  
I opted for the option of conducting expert interviews because of several reasons. First, 
the fact that a large INTOSAI conference was organized in Vienna where I could get in 
contact with the SAI leaders and at a time when I was ready to conduct my qualitative 
research was a unique opportunity which I did not want to miss. Second, I did not have 
the choice of conducting several case studies for time as well as resource constraints. 
Third, conducting a content analysis of project reports and PFM studies covering sever-
al countries could have been an option but written documents lack the emotional aspects 
and often present accomplished facts rather than how processes were perambulated. 
Finally, I had considered conducting a large survey and sent out a trial version to 13 
SAI leaders. However, only 4 respondents filled out the questionnaire and despite the 
stated anonymity it turned out to be more of a self-presentation of their SAI than a criti-
cal analysis of their struggles and achievements in their position as SAI leaders. Thus, I 
did not further proceed with the survey. To conclude, the method of conducting expert 
interviews with SAI leaders was the most appropriate option for me to answer the spe-
cific research questions above.  
Design fidelity (adequacy) 
With this quality criterion Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009: 300ff) want to highlight that the 
qualitative research procedures need to be “implemented with the quality and rigor nec-
essary for capturing the meanings, effects and relationships”.  
The data collection procedure involved the following steps. First I made contact with 
the SAI leaders through email introducing myself and my research and asking for a 
meeting for an expert interview. When there was a general interest in meeting me, I then 
sent them a list of research questions which I would like to discuss (see Appendix C.2) 
and a briefing of my research project, including a discussion of several theories and 
hypotheses. The objective of this method was to get expert feedback on my conclusions 
so far on the one hand and to be sure to utilize the limited time that experts usually have 
to spare for an interview to the best by making clear what my research interests are. It 
turned out that hardly any experts had found the time to read through my project de-
scription and could not give feedback on it, but all had appreciated the list of questions 
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and two respondents even had prepared written replies to the questions. The actual in-
terviews were then conducted on a semi-structured basis, i.e. I did not strictly follow the 
interview guideline but adapted it so that it was possible to engage with the interview-
ee’s personal experiences and know-how. 
Thus the experts were not purely selected randomly but on the basis of availability. The 
final respondents covered roughly 9 % of all full INTOSAI members and 6 out of 8 
INTOSAI regions. The quality of the qualitative design could have been improved 
through a larger sample or a true random sample. It turned out that the SAIs that were 
available for an interview were those that had success stories to tell and wanted to pre-
sent themselves. Some exceptions, i.e. interviews with SAIs which had not succeeded in 
implementing reforms, could be included because during the conference period I made 
contact to potential SAI leaders at the hotel lobbies where the conference participants 
were hosted, thus making it difficult for some respondents to avoid a conversation with 
me as it was obvious that they had some time to spare at that moment. Secondly, some 
interviews were made possible by committed SAI staff which supported my work and 
arranged the interview for their SAI leader at their own initiative. Finally, the fact that I 
promised full confidentiality to the interviewees increased their cooperation. For in-
stance, interviewee 5 started the conversation by asking me whether I had already con-
ducted an interview with the [country name] SAI. I answered that as I am promising full 
confidentiality to my respondents I cannot answer this question, but they are of course 
free to ask their colleagues themselves. Interviewee 5 laughed and said that he had al-
ready done this during an official reception the day before. My impression was that my 
confidentiality helped this interviewee to develop trust and to confide some delicate 
information on his SAI to me which even surprised the present interpreter and staff 
member a lot (see also below).  
Finally, the data analysis was conducted according to the step model of inductive cate-
gory development (Mayring, 2000
280
). First the interviews were transcribed into At-
las.ti, then the interviews were coded according to the criteria defined beforehand, based 
on the research question. I have worked through the material and step by step deduced 
tentative categories. Within a feedback loop those categories were revised, eventually 
reduced to main categories and checked in respect to their reliability. Finally, the identi-
fied categories are discussed in the conclusion of this chapter and the interviews them-
selves are presented in the form of a thick description throughout this chapter (7.2.-
7.6.).  
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For a summary of the book and the research steps see also http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1089/2383 (Last Accessed on October 11, 2011) 
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Within-design consistency 
This criterion analyses whether the components of the qualitative design (interview 
preparation, conduct and analysis) fit together and achieve the intended results. My re-
search design worked out very well. The interview preparation (making contact via 
email and sending out interview guidelines), the semi-structured completely confiden-
tial interview technique and finally the inductive content analysis of the interviews sup-
ported my research goal. The interviews were focused on my research question and the 
interviewees opened up to me and told me at times confidential information and delicate 
information about the practice of auditing. While I was not sure at the beginning wheth-
er it was possible to compare such different SAIs as lessons from one SAI should not be 
thought of as valid for another SAI, which confronts a different context and thus differ-
ent challenges. However, it turned out that the SAI leaders did not see this as a problem; 
on the contrary, they even encouraged the comparison of experiences across SAIs. 
To conclude, the comparison of experiences by SAI leaders representing SAIs of differ-
ent development status, different political, economic and geographic contexts worked 
out very well. One of the results of this study is thus, that SAIs no matter of which 
country, primarily identify themselves as technical service providers which are based on 
commonly shared standards (ISSAIs) and thus believe that their experiences can be 
compared across countries. As interviewee 11 and 15 put it, no SAI has yet reached the 
point where it can say that it has fully implemented all ISSAIs and thus all SAIs are still 
learning and improving and can learn from each other. It was surprising, that the SAI 
leaders, at least during the time of the conference, identified themselves strongly as be-
ing part of the INTOSAI community and thus of an international movement with the 
objective of strengthening SAIs and that they see huge opportunities for the transfer of 
experiences across countries.  
Finally, the various strands of my mixed-method study also fit together and complement 
each other. The qualitative research not only complements the quantitative research but 
is also linked to it and to some extent based on it. The aspect of how these two parts fit 
together as well as how they are linked to the preliminary part of my doctoral research 
(see chapter one) is discussed at full length in chapter eight. 
Analytic adequacy 
I considered the data analysis procedures and strategies that were selected and imple-
mented as the most appropriate and adequate to provide possible answers to the research 
questions for the following reasons: The choice of inductive category development over 
deductive category development was chosen in order to allow for new ideas to be incor-
porated into the study.  
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During the interviews I could so identify new variables which were not included in the 
original research design and explanatory theories. This had confirmed my original intent 
that the primary purpose of the expert’s interviews was to acquire new inputs and col-
lect stories explaining the relationships between the variables and aspects such as emo-
tions and beliefs which could not be covered in the quantitative research part.  
I cross-checked the facts and stories of my interview partners for their adequacy as far 
as possible through a literature research on the internet before including them in my 
analysis.  
Interpretive consistency 
The inferences of the qualitative research are made on the basis of all interviews. How-
ever it needs to be acknowledged that some interviewees are covered more intensely 
than others. This is because some interviews lasted longer than others and some inter-
view partners were more open and more informative than others. However, the interpre-
tation of the interviews is based on all interviews and there are no interviews or passag-
es of interviews which are left out of the analysis on purpose or which are inconsistent 
with the analysis.  
Theoretical consistency 
To what extent are the inferences consistent with theory and the state of knowledge in 
the field? To what extent do the findings from these expert interviews confirm or refute 
my main argument as laid out in chapter five? I will reflect upon these issues in chapter 
eight, where I will compare the research findings of chapters six and seven. 
Interpretive agreement  
This criterion concerns the question whether other scholars would be likely to reach the 
same conclusions on the basis of the same results and whether the inferences match the 
participants’ constructions. An important feature particularly for qualitative research is 
that the researcher explicitly acknowledges that “data are filtered through the research-
er’s unique ways of seeing the world” (Rossman and Rallis, 2003 qtd. in Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009:289). I am fully aware that the same interviews could be analyzed 
differently by a different researcher who looks at the findings from a different theoretic 
background as well as personal perspective. Thus, civil society organizations advocat-
ing for more transparency and accountability would have probably focused more on the 
shortcomings of SAIs while donors probably could have praised the results achieved so 
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far more strongly. My intention was to give a voice to the heads of the SAIs themselves, 
presenting their struggles on the one hand as well as their achievements on the other 
hand. Furthermore, my previous professional experience in capacity building, empow-
erment and advocacy has also shaped the way I make sense of the expert’s statements. 
Finally, in order to reflect the participants’ constructions as best as possible, I have de-
liberately cited many quotes at length in my analysis.  
Interpretive distinctiveness 
This quality criterion for interpretive rigor asks whether each inference is “distinctively 
more credible/plausible than other possible conclusions that might be made on the basis 
of the same results.” (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009:301) There is a problem that at some 
points several inferences could be possible on the basis of the same results. Therefore in 
the conclusion to this chapter, I will conduct a “critical reflection” on my inferences 
pointing out potential limitations and alternative views. I have also added a “reflective 
analysis” as a process of identifying and analyzing my own biases to make sure the in-
terpretations do not reflect my own personal biases (e.g. Creswell, 2003, Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009:305). 
Integrative efficacy (mixed and multiple methods) 
As the headline already suggests, this quality criterion only concerns meta-inferences 
after the integration of several parts of a mixed-methods study. Thus I will come back to 
this criterion later in chapter eight. 
Interpretive correspondence 
In order not to lose track when discussing the inferences made, the research results 
should be organized along the main research questions and should explicitly address the 
purpose of the study, i.e. in my case to depict the lifeworld/perspective of SAI leaders 
and the practice of reform.  
In a next step I will present the research results in the form of a thick description, which 
is organized along the various steps of reform, i.e. reform initiation (chapter 7.2.), strat-
egy development and implementation (7.3.), factors supporting (7.4.) and factors con-
straining (7.5.) reform and stories about reform results (7.6.). I have depicted these main 
categories in appendix C.6. Finally, I am summarizing the research inferences, present-
ing an overview of the categories that have been identified in the inductive qualitative 
content analysis and a critical analysis of the research inferences (7.7.).  
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7.2. How is Reform Initiated?  
Processes of reform are initiated in multiple ways and by multiple stakeholders. Several 
interviewees explained that it was external stakeholders such as the regional INTOSAI 
office or multilateral bodies that gave the first impetus for reform in form of the conduct 
of a situation analysis showing the weaknesses of the SAI. No interviewee said that the 
reform was initiated at the request of the government or the public per se, although the 
political will and public pressure have been identified as crucial to push through the 
reform process.  
Political Change as Prerequisite for Reform Initiation 
Some SAIs pointed out that the reform process was initiated because of general political 
change, thus public pressure to make public finances transparent, combat corruption, 
mismanagement and/or increase financial sustainability. This public pressure often led 
to a change in government through revolutions or electoral mechanisms. The new gov-
ernment in place then engaged in anti-corruption and public finance reforms, which are 
generally accompanied by international support (financial, exchange of expertise etc.). 
These international bodies then analyze the current situation and point out that external 
auditing requires reform too.  
For instance, Mr. Hadi Poernomo, Chairman of the Indonesian Board of State Audit, 
also known as Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK) explained how political change af-
fected the status of the SAI during his presentation at the 21st UN/INTOSAI Symposi-
um (July 13-15, 2011, Vienna, Austria)
281
. The BPK was first mentioned in the constitu-
tion of 1945, but it operated without a clear legal basis until 1973. The audit law of 
1973 however also stated that the SAI could release its audit reports only after approval 
by the President of the Republic. The legal basis of the SAI was amended in 2003-2004 
as part of comprehensive state financial reforms, which had been initiated by the de-
mocratization movement of 1998-1999. As Poernomo (2011:1) explains,  
“The rise of the Indonesian public sector auditing started in 2003 – 2004 as a 
result of the reform movement in 1998-1999. The reform resulted in radical and 
significant changes in social and political systems, which influenced state-
financial management, accountability, and audit. Since 1999, Indonesia intro-
duced a more democratic system, transparent and accountable management, 
and decentralization. Changes in state finance and auditing was begun by 
amendments of the Indonesian Constitution. … In addition, BPK is also further 
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 http://www.intosai.org/blueline/upload/09indonesiene.pdf (Last Accessed on September 29, 2011) 
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strengthened by the enactment of three laws concerning state finance
282
 and a 
law of BPK
283
. The 1999 reform movement relates to public concerns and de-
mand for a clean government, which means free from corruption and good gov-
ernance. One public expectation of that reform is significant roles of BPK to en-
sure the achievement of the public concerns and demand. Hence, the Constitu-
tion secures BPK's independence, strengthen the relation of BPK and (public) 
representatives institutions (parliament and regional representative council), 
and introduce public access to BPK audit results. In order to cope with the 
changes, especially in maintaining public’s trust, BPK carried out public rela-
tion and communication strategies.” 
Interviewee 2 told me a similar story of how reforms were initiated in his country.  
I2: You know since [year] we have intensified relations with the European Un-
ion, you know and since then there have been launched the different projects, 
programs. 
K: The SIGMA project also? 
I2: This is one part, the SIGMA project, but I mean more comprehensive ones, 
for example the public financial management reform, the European Neighbour-
hood policy in [year] etc. such types of programs, financial assistance in [year] 
etc. but the main point of this framework was related to public financial man-
agement improvement and there were different components of these reforms for 
the ministry of finance, treasury etc. some of the most interesting parts of these 
public financial management reforms was the initiative to build the capacity of 
the [country name] supreme audit institution. 
K: So the initiative came from the EU, came from the outside, before there was 
not even any discussion? 
I2: Ok, I will explain that the people, ah this was related to building the capacity 
of all the public administration you know, before [year], before the [name] revo-
lution, the [country name] development rate was very slow, so since this revolu-
tion we started to develop everything, the first impetus was the political will of 
our President, of our government to develop all parts of public administration, 
to completely rebuild and refresh the system, the public system etc. 
K: So it was the President … who started it because of the public revolt and the 
[name] revolution. 
I2: Everything, public sector, business eh simplicity etc. 
K: So the public actually gave the impetus with the [name] revolution 
I2: Of course. 
I1: This was the first time from the public, elect a new President and after that 
the whole process started. 
I2: And this framework that I mentioned from the EU, this does not mean that it 
comes from the outside, but this is the instruments we used ... as the tools for our 
development … 
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 Corresponds to footnote 1 in original document: Law number 17 Year 2003 on State Finance, Law 
Number 1 Year 2004 on State Treasury, and Law Number 15 Year 2004 on Audit of 
Management and Accountability of State Finance.   
 http://www.intosai.org/blueline/upload/09indonesiene.pdf (Accessed on September 29, 2011) 
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Corresponds to footnote 2 in original document: Law number 15 Year 2006 on the Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia (http://www.intosai.org/blueline/upload/09indonesiene.pdf, Last Accessed 
on September 29, 2011) 
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Equally, Interviewee 1 stated that political change was a prerequisite for the reform of 
his SAI: 
K: How did the new Act came about, when did the discussions start, how did 
they start? 
I1: In [year] SIGMA conducted a peer-review of the [SAI] and got a lot of nega-
tive findings, this is when the discussions started. The report pointed out that 
there needs to be adaptations to the legislative framework, there needs to be 
training of staff, improve the structure, we need PCs and audit software. 
K: Did the report also analyze the independence and political economy of audit-
ing? 
I1: They should have also focused on the decision making process and imple-
ment change from the very beginning, but it was impossible to even raise this 
question then because the [name] party, which was part of the ruling coalition 
had 3 persons on the board [of the SAI]. Then there was a meeting with SIGMA 
experts in Paris, they recommended us a small board, to adopt the ISSAIs and 
the internal auditing standards. Then there was an exchange with the Slovenian 
and the Polish SAIs. The head of the Slovenian SAI and the Polish SAI (who is 
also President of EUROSAI) came to [country] to meet with the Chair of Par-
liament and the [country name] Chair of the Parliamentary Budget Committee. 
The objective of the visit was not primarily to convince but to explain the model 
and how to change. …. 
K: Thus the [SAI name] changed because of outside influence? 
I1: Yes, because of outside influence. It would have been impossible to change 
by itself. But there was still local ownership of the process because [the Vice 
President] and the President [of the SAI] supported it.… 
K: What role did the media play? 
I1: The media was really interested and supported this reform because it opens 
the SAI to the public. 
The SAI of interviewee 1 was newly established after national political reforms had 
taken place in 1996, it had benefitted from comprehensive capacity building programs 
since 2002. But it was only after the SIGMA report of 2006, which pointed out the 
weaknesses of the SAI, that a national debate on a reform of the SAI was launched 
within the wider context of corruption scandals and a change of government in 2009. 
Finally, in 2010 the new national audit organization act was adopted in parliament 
which improved the decision-making structure, the independence and the mandate of 
the SAI amongst other issues. Thus the hypothesis that technical capacity building is not 
sufficient to improve the political strength of the SAI is confirmed. Most important was 
a change of the legal basis, which was only possible after political change.  
Initiative from the outside 
As we have seen above, the awareness on the need to reform the SAI has come from 
external stakeholders in the cases of interview 1 and 2. As interviewees 1 and 2 clearly 
pointed out, while it is true that the initiative was started by external stakeholders this 
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did however not mean that the external stakeholders impeded local ownership. On the 
contrary, from their point of view, it was a deliberate strategy by some national stake-
holders to draw on the political support of external stakeholders in order to lobby for 
SAI reforms nationally.  
The INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI) and the INTOSAI regional bodies have also 
been identified not only as important supporters of reform but as the actual initiators of 
reform, particularly in the AFROSAI region. The regional body AFROSAI-E is often 
cited as the model regional INTOSAI body. It has succeeded in successfully strengthen-
ing many of its member SAIs, particularly Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Namibia, 
Ethiopia, Sierra Leone have been cited by interviewee 11 as good examples. The 
AFROSAI-E secretariat has motivated these SAIs to initiate reforms by educating the 
politicians in their respective countries about the role of SAIs, “so as they don’t take the 
SAIs as the last but they should be the first, SAIs are there to work with them.” (I11) 
However, while AFROSAI-E can assist by providing advice and motivation, it is up to 
the SAI leadership to initiate reforms within their national political environment. Thus, 
a lot also depends on the SAI leadership. According to interviewee 11, Nigeria for ex-
ample has not been part of AFROSAI-E for a long time because of lack of interest by its 
leadership. In 2009 the Nigerian federal SAI got a new leadership and was invited to an 
AFROSAI meeting in 2011. Now they have become an active part of AFROSAI again. 
Equally, CREFIAF, the regional INTOSAI body for francophone Africa has now “fully 
embraced all the practices of capacity building and is implementing them”. (I11)  
Interviewee 16 also explained how the SAIs in francophone Africa have started to initi-
ate reforms after strategic guidance from the AFROSAI and the CREFIAF secretariats. 
The SAIs in francophone Africa have constantly been among the weakest globally, 
many of them occupying the last places in SAI rankings. INTOSAI has as objective that 
the regional bodies should be leading the development of SAIs. IDI started the for-
mation of CREFIAF in 1997. AFROSAI already had substantial experience in strength-
ening SAIs in Anglophone Africa and then starting to support CREFIAF in developing 
its member SAIs. CREFIAF has then conducted a study identifying the major weak-
nesses of its 27 members and on the basis of that study it developed a strategy plan for 
CREFIAF as well as for each SAI. Currently CREFIAF is developing a White Paper to 
be used by the SAIs to lobby their national governments. The major weakness identified 
in the CREFIAF study is the lack of an adequate legal framework for the francophone 
SAIs. Thus the priority of reform is to change the legal framework of the SAIs, which 
means strengthening the independence and the mandate of the SAI. As interviewee 16 
explains, this White Paper will mainly draw on the rich experience of English speaking 
African countries. In order to maximize the leverage during the politically difficult ne-
gotiations with governments, the SAIs also count on the support of the donors and the 
public.  
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SAI Leadership as Initiator 
The SAI leadership plays an important role during the reform process as a whole and 
particularly for successful reform initiation. Nearly all interview partners had stories to 
tell how they overcame resistance to reform. While I will be discussing the various 
forms of resistance below under “constraints”, it is important to point out that those in-
terview partners that had success stories to tell considered themselves as being princi-
pally responsible for this success. All of the interviewees were very humble and did not 
present the success as their personal achievement. However, when asking them about 
resistance and how they overcame it, or when asking them about threats of violence or 
the necessity of leadership, it became clear that they saw the successful implementation 
of the respective reform largely as their personal achievement.  
K: So does leadership matter for SAI developments?  
I12: Leadership by the SAI chair matters a lot, I have decided to transform the 
SAI from a traditional to a modern computerized system! 
Interviewee 12 explained how some auditees and all other board members of his SAI 
were resistant to the electronic audit system, which he as the Chair of the Audit Board 
had proposed. Still, he succeeded in convincing all board members, the president of the 
republic and all other state institutions of the advantages of this system for improving 
transparency. When I asked him how it was possible that in the end all the other stake-
holders supported the new act, he replied,  
I12: “I never accept a No. If someone does not agree with me, I will come back 
to him again and again until he agrees with me. A “no” is not a possible answer 
for me.”  
Equally, interviewee 4 became emotional when I touched upon his personal achieve-
ments. I asked about the follow up of SAI reports and that this is often one of the main 
problems that SAIs encounter. He exclaimed “yes,  exactly!” and explained that he was 
responsible for the 2010 report on the state of the national accounts and that he started a 
reform process of this report to address the low follow-up by parliament. He and his 
colleagues from the SAI have held many meetings with parliamentarians in order to 
modify the report and facilitate the follow-up by parliamentary commissions in order 
for them to understand the end-of-year report and draw conclusions about the imple-
mentation of specific policies. While not wanting to appear proud, he clearly stated that 
this is his personal objective and that it was himself with the support from some col-
leagues who has started to adapt the report and raise awareness on the part of the par-
liamentarians. While he agreed that it will be a long process for effective follow-up to 
take root, he already witnesses improvements today.  
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Interviewee 2 equally felt proud for having been successful in lobbying parliament to 
amend the audit act so as to include the right to audit state owned enterprises in the 
SAI’s mandate.   
I2a: Yes, it was also before, but in 2007 the court decided that state owned 
agencies are independent and you cannot audit and in 2009, 2008 when we 
changed the law, we bring to parliament, brought to parliament the Lima Decla-
ration, that there is written that the government conducts this activity with minis-
tries and state owned enterprises.  
K: So it was the initiative of the [SAI name]? 
I2a: It was ours! We also brought this court decision and we argued that this 
court decision is not very reasonable. 
K: So you used the Lima Declaration to lobby for your cause? 
I2: Exactly, exactly! We just, from the time, we just talked to other stakeholders 
by the international standards language, ISSAI language, just everything is writ-
ten, by specifying the points, bullets, paragraphs. 
 
As we can read in this excerpt, advocates for stronger SAIs do rely on the ISSAIs in 
their argumentation for SAI reforms. Interviewee 15 explained that in the last few years 
INTOSAI has realized the importance of the ISSAIs, not only for SAIs to agree among 
themselves on common standards but also as crucial lobbying instruments. INTOSAI 
also successfully initiated a UN General Assembly Resolution on strengthening SAIs. 
INTOSAI has started this advocacy initiative by placing the topic in the CEPA expert 
committee. INTOSAI has also advisory status with ECOSOC and has raised awareness 
in the CEPA expert committee that countries need to adhere to the ISSAIs general prin-
ciples. In 2009 INTOSAI has achieved a CEPA resolution which was lifted to ECOSOC 
opinion in 2011. This opinion recommends the broad dissemination of the obligations of 
SAIs. Austria together with Italy and other states then prepared a UNGA resolution on 
the voluntary commitment by states to strengthen the main principles of the ISSAIs and 
introduced such a resolution in the GA of 2011. Interviewee 15 also explained that this 
was a highly political issue, which they cannot communicate loudly to the public. In 
some countries strengthening the SAIs is a highly contentious and politically sensitive 
issue. There is also the danger that some countries would like to engage in political bar-
gaining, which Austria, Italy and the other initiators want to avoid. Interviewee 15 ex-
plained that,  
“if the ISSAIs are included in international law, they will have another quality 
and it will be easier for SAIs or other political stakeholders initiating SAI re-
forms to convince their governments and parliaments to agree to the reforms. It 
is altogether a different lobbying instrument, if a SAI can refer to a UNGA reso-
lution in their negotiations with governments. They could then argue that in re-
ality the government has agreed to these standards itself.” (I15, own translation 
into English) 
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 Interviewee 15 summarized well how the self-understanding of SAIs changed during 
the last few years. 
 
I15: “What we are witnessing is the development of INTOSAI from an organiza-
tion which was largely oriented towards internal development focusing on the 
exchange of information and experience among SAIs, and which is still im-
portant to INTOSAI, but now INTOSAI is more and more focusing on strength-
ening its external communications, first towards the UN and other international 
bodies, secondly towards national governments and last but not least towards its 
own citizens.” (I15, own translation into English) 
To conclude, SAI reforms are initiated by various stakeholders and recently INTOSAI 
itself has taken on a proactive role to strengthen its external profile, its bodies and 
members. Appendix C.5 shows all the interview quotes which are associated with SAI 
reform initiation. As we can clearly see there are many quotes which identify the SAI as 
an initiator of some kind of reform. Secondly external stakeholders such as donors, the 
EU and INTOSAI bodies also feature prominently. While I have identified some quotes 
where the public could also be qualified as an initiator, when looking closer at the 
quotes, the public is not really an initiator of SAI reforms but more of an initiator of 
general political reforms or a supporter of SAI reforms. Finally, some interviewees have 
identified the political leadership (president, executive, legislative) as an important initi-
ator of SAI reforms.  
7.3. Which Strategies are Employed? 
I identified four main strategies that the interviewed SAI representatives have applied in 
order to achieve their goals. These can broadly be classified as follows:    
 Change legislation, institutional rules and/or standards (53 quotes) 
 Organizational Capacity Building (40 quotes) 
 Improve communication (40 quotes) 
 Strengthen management (47 quotes) 
Strategy: Change Legislation, institutional rules and/or standards 
In order to strengthen SAIs it is necessary to analyze their legal framework, because for 
SAIs to work effectively they need independence and a broad mandate as outlined in 
the Lima and Mexico Declarations (INTOSAI 1977, 2007). Thus for many SAIs priori-
ty is in improving their legal framework. But how are SAIs going about in order to im-
prove their legal framework? As explained above, the CREFIAF secretariat had con-
ducted a situational analysis of all 23 member SAIs, identifying their weaknesses as 
specified domains for the strategic development of the SAIs. On the basis of that study, 
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the CREFIAF secretariat with close participation of its member SAIs then developed a 
strategic plan for the next five years and a White Paper which serves as the main lobby-
ing instrument for the SAIs in their discussions with governments. Apart from lobbying 
governments, the CREFIAF secretariat and the individual SAIs are asking donors to use 
this White Paper in their political dialogue with governments. Interviewee 16 further 
explained that in the development of that White Paper they were drawing a lot from the 
experience of the other INTOSAI regional groups, particularly AFROSAI-E. 
AFROSAI-E has developed a Manual on the Application of ISSAIs, specifically to serve 
as a tool for capacity building and legal reform programs. This manual has been adopted 
by all members of AFROSAI and is even used by other regional INTOSAI groups. 
AFROSAI in cooperation with IDI, the Professional Standards Committee of INTOSAI 
(PSC), and all the regional subgroups has rolled out programs on the implementation of 
the ISSAIs. As we have already seen above, interviewee 2 from the EUROSAI region 
equally explained how his SAI succeeded in reforming the law on the audit of state 
owned enterprises by referring to the Lima Declaration and the ISSAI standards as their 
main lobbying tool.  
Although the context that SAIs operate in differ substantially and the SAIs themselves 
also differ in their institutional design, capacities etc. what unites all SAIs is their com-
mitment to the ISSAIs, which they believe can be implemented with any institutional 
model. At the 20
th 
INCOSAI in South Africa in November 2010, all SAIs committed 
themselves to the ISSAIs.
284
 I wondered, whether there were any debates around the 
Western origin of the SAI as an institution and douts about the ISSAIs as truly interna-
tional norms. Interviewee 11 however firmly rejected this notion.     
K: How would you reply to someone claiming that the ISSAIs are a Western 
model? 
I11: This person is not in touch with the latest developments. At the last 
INCOSAI in South Africa in November 2010 the most moving was to see the uni-
versal acceptance of the ISSAIs by every country and every SAI. Those criticism 
are out of pace with the latest developments. Auditing is the same throughout the 
world. This is the interesting thing about auditing, whether you are auditing in a 
Court system, Westminster system, the gathering of evidence is the same, the on-
ly difference is that they use the report in different ways.  
K: Would you say the institutional model is not relevant for SAIs to be effective? 
N: Yes, the institutional model is not relevant! 
Another very important point, which interviewee 11 as well as interviewee 15 raised, is 
that the ISSAIs are universal also in the sense that no SAI in the world has succeeded to 
fully implement them. Thus, both believe that it is critical that we don’t associate the 
urgency of ISSAI implementation with developing countries only. The USA and the EU 
are currently facing debt crises. Interviewee 11 thinks that, 
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“it was only possible to acquire such huge national debt because of the way that 
these countries disclosed their finances.” (I11) 
He believes that  
“some SAIs have not done enough, particularly they have not been auditing pub-
lic debt sufficiently. Otherwise the SAIs ought to have discovered the huge debt 
before.” (I11) 
And really, the website of the Greek SAI
285
 is not very informative. There are no reports 
in English and the latest activity report in Greek language (searched through Google 
Translator) is available for 2008, the latest audit report that I could find is a special re-
port on the shipping sector, issued in 2003. Mr. Michael Walker, former US Comptrol-
ler General (1998-2008) is well known among the INTOSAI community for criticizing 
the US institutional model of auditing. He faced considerable constraints when intend-
ing to audit national debt and then started the Fiscal Wake-Up tour (see f.i. GAO, 
2007). To conclude, interviewee 11 rightly pointed out that  
“this whole issue of empowering SAIs to audit is a worldwide phenomenon, and 
does not only concern developing countries.” (I11) 
In the last paragraph, I have discussed that ISSAIs are an important lobbying tool for 
SAIs and that they are accepted as universal standards. Another point, which has been 
briefly mentioned, is the role of the institutional design for SAIs to work effectively. 
When enquiring about the role of the institutional design, most interviewees replied that 
the institutional design per se was not a crucial aspect for SAI reforms. As explained 
previously (see chapter 3.1) although there are many different institutional designs for 
SAIs they can be grouped into three main models.
286
 The general agreement is that there 
is not one best model, but that the ISSAIs can be realized with any model. However, 
most SAIs when embarking on substantial reforms adopt the General Auditor model, 
sometimes with a small board attached to it (see f.i. Int.1) 
K: Tell me again; is the institutional model important for gaining independence? 
I1: The General Auditor Model is not good for transition countries but a small 
board. Other countries which have adopted this system are Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. The reason is that there is one person who decides 
and thus has no excuses or pressures from elsewhere but at the same time there 
is some control through the small board. 
Interviewee 4 was an exception in that he very strongly emphasized that the institutional 
design had a crucial effect on his SAI to work properly. This SAI has a mixed institu-
tional design, it has judicial powers but is still closely linked to Parliament. Decisions 
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are taken by a President, but there is a Board which is composed of political representa-
tives and professionals. Interviewee 4 stressed that the composition of this board pre-
vents ideological affiliations, bias and capture to take place as all political forces are 
balanced out.  
Strategy: Capacity Building  
Little surprising, all interviewees agreed that capacity building, including (1) training of 
staff, (2) provision of adequate office infrastructure and ICT and (3) learning through 
mutual exchange
287
 is crucial for SAIs to develop. Particularly SAIs with a weak politi-
cal leverage often start their reforms with capacity building measures (see also inter-
viewee 1 in section 7.3.). Thus, there are SAIs where legal reforms are currently not 
feasible. And there are SAIs, which have an adequate legal framework de jure but de 
facto the laws are not applied due to the authoritarian context and weak rule of law. 
How do heads of SAIs feel in this situation? Interviewee 5 explained that his SAI is 
independent de jure only:  
“The president of the Republic dominates everything, he will not sign laws pro-
posed by the legislature and will not act upon audit reports.” (I5) 
Decision making in his SAI, which has a board model, is always done by unanimous 
voting. The chair of the board would have two votes in case of equal share of votes, 
however this is not of any importance as there is not even a debate in the board and con-
sensus is the rule. Despite this political incapacity of the SAI to conduct and enforce 
unbiased auditing, it enjoys donor support, which focuses on pure technical capacity 
building.  
I5b: We are involved in capacity building initiatives with the World Bank, the 
Swedish SAI etc.. 
K: Is this about technical training or also about political reforms? 
I5b: It is only about technical training. I don't need political support because de 
jure everything is fine, de facto is the problem.  
K:  Is there any prospect for change? 
I5b: No way that things can change for my SAI in the near future if the political 
landscape does not change.  
K: What are the prospects for broader political change? 
I5b: There is no resistance in the country. … But we have 150 staff, we need to 
stay optimistic. (He laughs embarrassed. It seems he does not really believe his 
own words.) 
Although interviewee 5b gave me the impression that he does not really believe in any 
change as being possible, he also does not want to resign totally. He prefers to speak in 
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metaphors to depict the situation. One of the stories he told me stresses that man should 
not simply resign in front of a problem but take initiatives  
“A man asks God for a car. God says he needs to buy a lottery ticket and he will 
help him win the car.” (I5b) 
Very interesting was also to observe the relationship between my interview partner (I5b) 
and his interpreter, who is a staff member responsible for external relations of this SAI 
(I5a). First the interpreter, who had also arranged the interview for me, arrived at the 
interview and explained that he wanted to come early because he is an academic himself 
and thus supports my work. He will speak openly to me while my actual interview part-
ner will not do so, he believes. Shortly, probably too shortly, interview partner 5b, who 
is the deputy head of this SAI, arrives. As the interview proceeds, I5b visibly surprises 
his interpreter when he talks about the political problems the SAI faces. It was obvious 
to me that it was the first time that I5b had spoken so openly to his member of staff 
about how he feels concerning the political stalemate. Both of them were somehow em-
barrassed. I5b who spoke a lot in metaphors, probably wanted to demonstrate that he is 
aware that there is a problem and that he supports reform. As he is only the deputy head, 
his interest might have also been to accuse the Chair of the SAI as the primary person 
responsible for the lack of resistance.  
Furthermore, the interview took place in a hotel lobby during a time when the 21
st
 
UN/INTOSAI Symposium on Government Audit was ongoing. I was surprised that they 
had already left the conference for the day and were available so early. During the inter-
view I also got the impression, that the topic of the conference (“Effective Practices of 
Cooperation between SAIs and Citizens to Enhance Public Accountability”) might have 
also had an effect on I5b and that he was uncomfortable at the conference as he had not 
much to contribute. What could he say to his colleagues that would make him feel good 
or make him feel proud? Probably not a lot, he must have rather felt excluded.  
I had a similar experience with interviewee 9 who was also back in the hotel quite early, 
as the conference program was still going on. His SAI is also independent by law but 
there is no effective follow up and no enforcement of audit reports, which are submitted 
to the legislature, but the parliamentarians, do not follow up on them. The public of this 
very poor, war-torn country also is not of any help to this SAI. I9 explained that one of 
the problems they are facing is that the audit reports are too in arrear and thus not of 
relevance to the parliamentarians who have many pressing problems to deal with. The 
strategy adopted by this SAI is also to invest first of all in capacity building. With the 
help of the EU and other donor assistance, they are currently training 60 staff, they have 
been provided with computers and there are plans for the construction of a new office 
building.  
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There is the interesting account of Brazil (Mainwaring and Welna, 2003:184) which 
argues that the technical capacity of the TCU had outpaced its political leverage and that 
it was largely due to the professionalism of its staff, that in 1992 the TCU succeeded to 
free itself from political bias and capture. To conclude, while institutional capacity 
building cannot be sufficient for SAIs to become effective accountability institutions, 
reforms often have to start with the building of institutional capacity.  
Training of staff 
Interviewee 1 explained that although his SAI has sufficient staff for the moment, the 
challenge was the lack of adequate skills of its staff. With the adoption of legal reforms 
the audit methods had also changed, but many of its staff lacked the capacity and the 
will to adopt new procedures, mainly due to their advanced age.  
I1a: “…5 years ago 40% of our staff were 3 years before pension. They were 
afraid of working with PCs. Now 20% are before retirement. So the staff situa-
tion will change in the next years.”  
Another challenge which my interviewees identified is that it is not always easy to at-
tract the best auditors in the country to work for the SAI. Interviewee 2 mentioned that 
in their country there is a general lack of qualified auditors, mainly because there is no 
specified training centre or University program in modern public and private auditing. 
In addition, many qualified auditors prefer to work for the big international auditing 
companies
288
, who can offer high salaries and international career prospects. The gov-
ernment has now acknowledged the problem, increased the salaries of SAI staff and is 
currently creating training opportunities. 
I2: Ah, one of the important issues is, to develop faster, is related to the devel-
opment of our staff, I mean [SAI name] has new professionals coming from the 
big four auditing companies, they know the private sector, they are learning now 
the public sector, but ahm, we are now interested and it is needed to create such 
kind of training system to develop a ahm professionals from an early stage, 
communicating with the universities, who may be concentrated on the auditing 
because it still remains how to say public sector is still lacking auditors, even 
private sector, so it’s quite difficult to find ahm .. a huge number of auditors, it is 
really competitive with the private as well. 
Equally, interviewee 8 encountered the problem of lack of staff due to the low salary the 
SAI could offer and how he solved the problem: 
I8: Also the recruitment of quality staff was extremely difficult because of low 
salaries that we could provide while at the same time requesting high responsi-
bility. In May 2010 we achieved amendments to increase the salary of our staff; 
all political parties were finally supporting this amendment. We had organized a 
press conference. We dared to press for changes against several political parties 
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and ministries. Then the government composition changed and the amendment 
was adopted. 
Interviewee 7 proudly explained that their capacity building program was funded by the 
World Bank and has the reputation for being the most successful of all such programs. 
The core of this program was a train-the-trainers component and the establishment of a 
“humble” training centre. Equally, interviewee 4 also pointed out that the training of 
staff is of utmost importance. He explained that their staff is highly qualified; it has the 
highest level of training in the country. This SAI has its own corporate University, thus 
its own training and education program to ensure that there is a constant flow of highly 
qualified graduates to meet their demands. He praised this University as providing train-
ing at high standards and that the fact that there are constantly new graduates coming as 
one of the crucial aspects for this SAI to perform so well. He considers the quality of his 
SAI’s technical experts as being of the highest standards in the country, they are better 
qualified than other bureaucrats.  
Provision of adequate office infrastructure and ICT 
It is evident, that without an adequate office infrastructure, the SAI cannot operate ef-
fectively. Sometimes one of the first publicly visible signs of reform implementation is 
the construction of a new office building for the SAI. On the other hand, the govern-
ment can also impede the work of the SAI indirectly by delaying the provision with 
premises and adequate staff for the SAI, as interviewee 8 explained:  
I8: The new law has been enacted in 2005. The council has been enacted in Sep-
tember 2007. …We have had problems obtaining premises for the institution and 
equipment because government did not provide it for two years. We have been 
housed in one room in the parliament building for two years. After our first re-
port the government saw our strength and the support started. In October 2009 
we have finally been given office premises.  
In 2009 this SAI with only eight auditors working in a single room still managed to 
send its first audit report to the National Assembly. This was the first time since 2001 
that the state budget was audited at all. A SIGMA assessment reveals further concerns, 
namely that the new office premises of the SAI are provided by the National Bank, one 
of the SAI’s auditees. 
Besides the office space, office equipment is equally crucial for an adequate work envi-
ronment. On the one hand, new laptops and modern office equipment have an effect on 
staff motivation as interviewee 2 and interviewee 7 proudly explained in their inter-
views. More importantly even, is the use of ICT for improving auditing techniques, par-
ticularly for computerizing audit record management and documentation. Interviewee 
12 is convinced that a new multimedia support corridor will improve public accounta-
bility in his country. This SAI has more than 2000 audit entities in 33 provinces that 
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must be audited within a certain time each year, while the number of auditors is limited.  
To improve its efficiency and effectiveness, this SAI is currently creating an e-audit 
mechanism with a link and match system, where information is regularly provided elec-
tronically by all state institutions and auditees. The auditee data can then be quickly 
compared and matched to the reported central data information.  
At the beginning the President of the SAI encountered only resistance to his suggestion. 
All seven state institutions including the President of the Republic and the Parliament 
among others, the auditees and even all other board members were opposed to the intro-
duction of this new data centre. Although the government spent huge amounts of money 
to build IT systems, those systems are not integrated by themselves, as interviewee 12 
explained. He would like to cluster auditee’s data requirement and use an interface por-
tal for comparison with centrally provided data. The SAI would then ask the auditee to 
explain the difference by correspondence and so reduce the interaction between the au-
ditor and auditee. Electronic correspondence thus would also “provide fewer opportuni-
ties for corruption and bias of all sorts.” After a pilot phase and a lot of political nego-
tiations, the SAI (thus all board members) and the other seven high state institutions 
finally supported the initiative. The establishment of the data centre including the elec-
tronic audit system was concluded in a conference in February 2011.  
Mutual exchange between SAIs 
Finally, organizational capacity is improved through learning from peers and mutual 
exchange. All interview partners stressed the crucial role of INTOSAI in strengthening 
individual SAIs. The statements explained how individual SAIs gain from training and 
exchange programs with other SAIs and the crucial role of exchange and networking 
with peers during conferences, workshops and seminars organized by INTOSAI and its 
regional and thematic bodies for the development of SAIs. Here is an excerpt of several 
statements: 
I2: [The support from the Swedish SAI helped us] a lot. If there was not such 
kind of assistance, it would be really difficult to move forward. The international 
support from well experienced people is a great input. 
I8: … the cooperation with the Norwegian SAI helped us a lot, membership in 
INTOSAI also helped us a lot, it strengthens your own profile. Crucial is that we 
enjoy the awareness and support of the [country] public!!!! 
I11: Why we are here in Vienna: Seminars like these reinforce these aspects. We 
can first exchange and learn and secondly create networks that can help us to 
overcome our shortcoming. Some of this training is about inviting colleagues 
from a SAI that has implemented reforms. [Through] talking to each other we 
establish relationships beyond the seminar. [These are] very inexpensive ways to 
improve SAIs, learning from peers [is] always the best, [we are] working hard 
within INTOSAI [to support the learning from peers]. 
I13: INTOSAI is very helpful to touch base and learn from each other. 
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Strategy: Improve Communication  
What stories did the interviewees have to tell about their strategies to improve their ex-
ternal communication with the public in general, the executive, the bureaucracy, the 
legislature and other stakeholders? Interviewee 4 and Interviewee 14 told me how they 
invested time and efforts into the communication with parliamentarians in order for 
them to better understand the audit reports and as a consequence increase follow up and 
the enforcement of the audit findings. Interviewee 14 summed up his SAI’s success sto-
ry for me. According to him, five years ago, this SAI was extremely weak, the position 
of General Auditor was personalized, the law inadequate, audit reports were far arrear, 
there was hardly any follow-up by the Parliament or the public. Today the situation is 
completely different. Interviewee 14 explained that the main factors for success were 
leadership of the SAI coupled with committed political will. He as the head of the SAI 
has submitted an audit report to parliament and called a full parliamentary meeting with 
the speaker of the parliament there, which made substantive change.  
The parliamentary accounts committee, responsible for discussing and following up on 
the enforcement of the audit reports submitted by the SAI, was overburdened with too 
many reports from all levels. Interviewee 14 discussed the problem with the speaker of 
parliament which led to the formation of two additional parliamentary oversight com-
mittees. Thus today there are in total three parliamentary accounts committees (one 
which oversees central government accounts, one which oversees local authorities and a 
third one which is tasked with overseeing state owned enterprises). The committees 
deliberate on audit reports and by law are now also required to write a report, which has 
substantially improved the situation. Furthermore, the SAI advised the speaker of par-
liament to open the hearings organized by these committees to the public. They are now 
screened on TV and there is a lot of coverage and media pressure on the parliamentari-
ans to act on the SAI’s audit reports now.  
Interviewee 14 saw it as the responsibility of the SAI to strengthen the capacity of the 
parliament to follow up on their audit reports. He explained that the oversight commit-
tees are made out of politicians of different educational backgrounds, not necessarily 
acquainted to understanding rather technical audit reports. The SAI thus trained the 
committee members in reading audit reports and prepared them for holding hearings and 
trained them in interrogation techniques. Finally, the SAI also conducted training to 
media representatives, so that they too can effectively understand their reports and fol-
low up on their enforcement.   
Interviewee 4 also complained that his SAI’s major problem is the lack of effective fol-
low-up on their audit reports by the legislature. This is why in 2010 the SAI started an 
initiative to improve the budgetary capacities of parliamentarians. Interviewee 4 said 
that the parliamentary accounts committee is very good and strong, but the other tech-
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nical committees have not yet understood the significance of the budget and how they 
can influence the budget process to realize policy implementation. Thus, the various 
parliamentary committees on education, health etc. do not have the technical expertise 
to be able to read and analyze the budget and subsequently demand more funds for the 
implementation of educational or health programs. Interviewee 4 explains that this 
problem is not related to any political party but that it is a general problem of most par-
liamentarians. He believes that it is a cultural problem; that most parliamentarians only 
want to have a job and do not have big political ambitions. That was his experience dur-
ing his time as a parliamentarian and head of a parliamentary committee himself. Today 
as one of the eight board members of the SAI, his objective is to improve the relation-
ship between the SAI and the parliamentarians. He personally cultivates the contact 
with parliamentarians in order to change their culture, as he says. As the responsible for 
the annual audit report on the end of year accounts for 2010, he changed the structure 
and style of the report so that it is better understood by parliamentarians. He also orga-
nized many meetings with them where he discussed the content of the report with them. 
He sees some first improvements in their follow-up on government accounts but admits 
that it is a very long process to fully realize budgetary awareness and oversight by ordi-
nary parliamentarians. Interviewee 4 also referred to positive examples such as the 
USA, Canada or Germany, where the budgetary follow-up by parliamentarians is 
stronger.  
This last example brings us back to chapter two and the original motivation behind this 
dissertation, namely how human rights budgeting can be realized. Interviewee 4 pointed 
out that the responsibility of parliamentarians is not only to pass legislature but also to 
oversee the budget process. Unfortunately, apart from the budget committee, the other 
parliamentarians do not live up to this responsibility. They neither have the political 
interest in following up the budget process nor do they have the technical know-how to 
do so. This is why he, first as head of one parliamentary committee and later as board 
member of the SAI, committed himself to improving this situation. His objective is that 
parliamentarians are able to analyze government accounts and draw conclusions for the 
implementation of specific policy issues and that they are able to enforce and follow up 
on the SAI’s recommendations.   
A similar story was told by interviewee 15. This SAI has changed its annual activity 
report to make it easier understandable for ordinary citizens. The SAI’s activity report 
now describes the daily business of the SAI, illustrating the effect of the SAI’s work, 
i.e. how many of the SAI’s recommendations the government has implemented. This 
SAI, like most SAIs, can only issue recommendations but cannot enforce audit conclu-
sions and the government is not obliged to implement the SAI’s recommendations. The 
SAI thus relies on the parliament and the public to put pressure on the government to 
implement the audit recommendations. This SAI can also request further information 
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where it deems it to be important and after two years of issuing the audit recommenda-
tions, it conducts a follow-up examination. Thus the audits remain on the political agen-
da for several years. The objective of the SAI’s activity report is to explain citizens how 
the SAI’s work is organized and how the citizen benefits from it. The SAI has also de-
veloped indicators to measure its own work and is so better able to communicate its 
achievements to the public.  
Another story about the role of communication in SAI reforms comes from interview 2. 
Interviewee 2a explained how external communication was crucial when reforming the 
audit law in his country at the initiative and with the support of external stakeholders. 
The SAI explained the members of parliament what they are really going to do. Public 
auditing is a technical issue and so it was not evident for the ordinary parliamentarians 
let alone for the public to clearly imagine what this new law was going to create. The 
SAI used very intensive external communication to explain that they are going to trans-
form the former Soviet type of control into a modern audit institution. Auditing was a 
completely new concept not just for the parliamentarians and the public but as inter-
viewee 2a said, for themselves as SAI leaders, as well.  
“The former law did not include the word audit but only control, it was about 
controlling and punishing.” (I2a) 
Similarly the relationship between the SAI and the public needed time to develop. The 
interviewee recalled that when they first called the media to a press conference, they did 
not know what to expect and why they should attend. By now, they have become very 
interested in the work of the SAI, there are many headlines of newspapers on audit is-
sues. This is also the result of special training seminars which the SAI has held in order 
to raise awareness about its mandate, the content of audits and the way its internal man-
agement system works. Finally, this SAI also holds meetings with NGOs to communi-
cate their work to them and cooperate with them in the area of budget tracking. Sum-
mary of the audit reports, the audit recommendations and a track up on audit enforce-
ments are published on the website, but not the complete reports. Interviewees 2a and 
2b believed that they are too technical for the large public to understand but that any-
body can access the full audit reports at request. When I pointed out that their rather 
moderate ranking in the Open Budget Survey is mainly due to the missing of the full 
reports on the website they started to reflect about this issue and concluded that in effect 
it might be a good idea and not too difficult to realize. However, when looking at their 
website today (October 18, 2011, thus about 3 months after the interview took place) I 
still could not find any audit reports online but only the short summaries.   
Online publishing of audit reports was also one of the main topics of the 21st 
UN/INTOSAI Symposium on “Effective practices of cooperation between Supreme 
Audit Institutions and citizens to enhance public accountability”, jointly organized by 
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the INTOSAI General Secretariat and the United Nations (UN) and held in Vienna, 
Austria, from 13 to 15 July 2011.
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 Some participants from low income countries, e.g. 
Ethiopia (according to Interviewee 15) apparently criticized the overemphasis of the use 
of internet in the discussions, while in their context the radio is much more important. 
This reminds us that in order to develop an understanding of the adequacy of a SAI’s 
external communication strategy it is always important to take the context in which the 
SAI operates into account.  
Besides low literacy and internet connectivity rates, the political context is also im-
portant to take into consideration. In this regard, I appreciated that interviewee 5 proud-
ly presented a prize which his SAI had won. This prize is awarded by an independent 
media monitoring centre for the best official websites of government authorities and 
municipalities. While from an objective point of view, this website is nothing special 
and even lacks the most important information, namely audit reports, audit summaries 
and an audit program, this SAI is a leader in increasing public accountability within its 
authoritarian context. The website at least informs the public about the SAI’s legislative 
base, its institutional structure, board members, audit methodologies and standards; it 
regularly updates a news section and publishes a summary report of its annual activities 
including short statements on audit findings.  
Finally, interviewees 16 and 17 accused the media of rendering their work more diffi-
cult. Both interviewees reported that their SAI’s did not publish audit reports and hold 
abundant press conferences because of the negative impact journalists have had on their 
work. In their accounts, journalists in these semi-authoritarian, low income countries, 
are generally politically biased and acting largely unprofessional. Instead of reporting 
the audit findings, journalists used to misuse the audit information for political accusa-
tions and in that way positioned the SAI with the opposition. 
K: Maybe, I don’t know if I understood it right, you said that working with the 
media and civil society is difficult because they always take sides? 
I16: … I said, working with the civil society ahm, we would like to work with 
them, we shall work with them, but I don’t see how effective they are … to influ-
ence and convince the government … because civil societies take sides in the po-
litical arguments in these countries and governments will not be willing to work 
with someone who takes sides, you know, they are not apolitical. I would expect 
them to be apolitical, but they don’t want that to be, they take sides. 
… it depends on how the media will treat it, you know it, if the media treats it 
that the opposition thinks that and wrangles the government on that. You know, 
the government might think that you take sides.  
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As many of the SAIs that interviewee 16 is speaking of are not independent by law, 
critical media reports which use the SAI reports as their information source thus place 
the SAI on the opposition side. And this leads the SAI to lose the trust from the gov-
ernment, with the consequence that its financial resources might be cut. When I asked 
him how his SAI can conduct unbiased audits while it is not independent, he replied the 
following:  
K: So the main challenge if I come back to your main point is to have independ-
ence and how to audit the President and the people who are close to the Presi-
dent, that’s the main challenge? 
I16: …, you see the problem is not auditing the people close to the President, 
you can audit them. There are basically two areas where audit institutions have 
problems, the office of the President and the defense ministry. For the rest of the 
ministries we do audits, if it is the case of [country name], we do audits, and 
many that have been sent to jail, are people close to the President.  
Thus interviewee 16 pointed out, while his SAI and many other SAIs in this INTOSAI 
region are conducting audits and are following up on the enforcement of the audit rec-
ommendations, which has led to the prosecution of several persons close to the Presi-
dent, the media has not been of any help so far. He explained that it is vital to first have 
a professional media able to read the audit reports and to use the information wisely, not 
undermining the work of the SAI. While they as SAIs are going to conduct trainings, he 
would also very much welcome the donor community to engage in that area.  
I16: … they are not well trained journalists, …, I would like them to report on 
that but when I see, at times when I give them some of the information, but when 
I see the way they treat them, it is sensational, and through their own interpreta-
tion, which has not anything to do with the findings we have had and the analy-
sis we ourselves have done,  
… they [the donors] should train the media and instead of asking all the time, 
give it to the media, they should train the media first, because I don’t see how 
the media can help me you know... although I would very much want to hand our 
reports out to the media , to me, I can, we want to do it, we hope to do it in the 
near future, but to me, I don’t think they can bring about any other fact, to me , 
they will treat it sensationally, there will be a lot of debate, but to me, you know 
the most important is the recommendation, what is recommended in our reports, 
for corrective measures to report, I don’t think they would dwell on that! 
To sum up, external communication is a crucial strategy within the reform process of 
SAIs. SAIs invest time and resources in improving their communication with parlia-
mentarians, with the media and civil society in order to strengthen their public profile 
and the follow up on their audit recommendations.   
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Strategy: Improve Management, integrity 
Why do some countries succeed in strengthening citizen-oriented, independent public 
finance auditing while others fail? One obvious, but so far neglected variable is SAI 
management. While the statistics were only taking into consideration measurable macro 
data, the expert interviews opened up the role of leadership and management for suc-
cessful SAI reforms. Interviewee 11 most sharply put the responsibility on the SAI 
leaders to reform their SAIs and rejected the notion that the success of SAI reforms de-
pends on the macro context.  
I11: The tendency of many SAIs is to play victim mentality, that is not the way 
you operate as a leader, leadership is about influencing events, it is not about 
being submissive to the circumstances, [you need to put] a lot of effort in build-
ing a leader . 
Interviewee 11 explained that although the independence of SAIs is enshrined in the 
Lima and Mexico Declarations, these declarations are not implemented by SAIs, be-
cause the political support in many countries is not adequate. He believes that the lack 
of political support is only due to a lack of awareness and not because of a deliberate 
strategy to prevent a strong SAI. He gives two reasons why he thinks that there is lim-
ited awareness of the importance of SAIs at the political level,  
I11: First, a lack of leadership as head of SAIs. We are not assertive enough to 
demonstrate the value of SAIs to our governments. Second, at the same time we 
don't have a collective approach to promote the value of SAIs as INTOSAI or as 
regional groupings. So you find that in most instances each country stands alone 
in dealing with its government. That limits our ability to influence our govern-
ments especially the ones that are stubborn. Some SAIs have succeeded on their 
own in achieving this independence. Where you have strong head of SAIs they 
have been able to achieve this.  
Thus, interviewee 11 very much stressed the need of SAIs to demonstrate the contribu-
tion that SAIs can provide to governments and that they need to be more assertive as 
SAI leaders and strengthen the collective support through INTOSAI. He further ex-
plained that in order to really strengthen SAIs, in addition to classical capacity building 
programs it is necessary to master the following three aspects: 1) application of the 
ISSAIs, 2) leadership and management development and 3) strategic plans.  
He believes that it is thus necessary that INTOSAI builds the capacity of every SAI to 
be able to apply these common standards. However, for capacity building measures to 
have an effect, he thinks it is crucial that heads of SAIs take their own initiative to add 
value. This is why he stressed that leadership and management development are a cru-
cial aspect of SAI reforms. Finally, he pointed out that SAI leaders need to become ex-
perts in developing strategic plans. He explains that strategic plans are  
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“the reference point that helps you as a leader to focus, what is reasonable, 
what is achievable/not achievable. This helps to mould our thinking.” Interview-
ee sums up that, “if you master these three aspects you can change a SAI.” (I11) 
A number of other interviewees (particularly int. 2, 7, 12, 14, 15, 16) have equally been 
emphasizing the issue of SAI leadership and the crucial aspect of management skills of 
the SAI head. Even more interviewees have been dwelling on the related aspect of in-
tegrity and professionalism as being crucial for reform success. Integrity is thus again 
an obvious issue, which I had neglected in the preceding theoretical and statistical anal-
yses. Professionalism of SAI leaders has been emphasized particularly by interviewees 
who have themselves a professional background in accounting and auditing and believe 
that this supports their independence as SAI leaders.   
I1a: … The President [and we are] independent because we are professionals, 
we prefer to leave the organization than to go down under. 
Interviewee 1a further explained that in addition to their commitment to public auditing 
they also have the interest of assuring that accounting is an integer profession. On the 
other hand, interviewee 15 believed that a professional background in accounting 
should not be a requirement for SAI heads. In his point of view, it is more important 
that SAI leaders dispose of management capacities.  
SAIs have the difficult role of being a technical service provider, while at the same time 
they are part of the political institutional setting and are thus often considered as a polit-
ical player.  
I16: That’s it, you see, if you talk about political bias, that’s the appreciation of 
the government, I don’t think most of the SAIs work with that in their mind. I 
think they have their audit book and undertake their audit but it’s the apprecia-
tion of the government that … if the SAIs criticize them they are working for the 
opposition.  
Interviewee 15 pointed out, that  
“particularly in countries where the question in politics and economics is about 
life or death and where there are personal threats against the SAI leaders, and 
they still continue doing their work, integrity, is the main aspect for a SAI’s suc-
cess.” (I15) 
Interviewee 6, himself head of a SAI of a country which is currently experiencing high 
levels of violence and endemic corruption, stressed that the most important reason for 
him to have been chosen as SAI leader by the President of the Republic was that he was 
known for his integrity. Interviewee 7 explained that for him the crucial factor for a 
SAI’s success under difficult political contexts is the integrity of the SAI leader and his 
ability to convey this commitment to impartiality and professionalism to his staff. I 
think it is worth giving the full quote of how he feels about integrity here, as it is repre-
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sentative for so many other statements on integrity which were given by nearly all in-
terview partners:  
I7: Actually the work in … [country] is an extraordinary one. The situation and 
the circumstances are extraordinary. We work under a situation which is very 
much tiring. The country is very much tired of lots of things, …, actually we 
work in the absence of legislative and local laws, and also with the absence of 
political agreements among the parties in the government, and we work with the 
absence of the institutional administrative government, and with such circum-
stances we still have to work. Our institutions still have to work. And the main 
source for our independence is that we have to convince our employees, our staff 
first, that the commitment to mutuality and professionalism is very much im-
portant to keep our institution independent. And we should be very much… clear 
to and very much faithful with our staff, concerning this issue. Actually this 
question which you have raised just now brings me back to my first days in of-
fice. And if we succeeded in such case, ah, if we succeeded in all that in our in-
stitution we can prove them of course by the results of the audit work we do, that 
this institution [name of the SAI] is a … purely professional institution. And at 
the same time this also depends on the administrative leadership of the head of 
the institution, that others from outside of the institution feel that he is not an en-
emy for them. And at the same time he is very much eager that they [the adminis-
trative government] succeed but in a very right, a very honest way and that their 
mistakes ... will not be used in burning them politically. You know that means 
not to destroy their political image and at the same time … we should be very 
much clear in our reports, straight, direct, if the … leader of the institution was 
able to achieve this in his first year of office, I think that this leader can remain 
for the rest of his work as a leader of this institution, as an independent leader of 
this institution.  
But how did this leader go about in practice? What decisions did he have to take? How 
could he convince the various political parties and his staff of his integrity? The follow-
ing example shows how interviewee 7 refused to recruit allies out of political or person-
al reasons and why this was crucial in gaining the trust and thus the support by all polit-
ical parties.  
I7: in the first months of office, one of the political parties back home requested 
me to assign or to employ certain individuals, actually my close staff of my of-
fice, they know very much that I am against such aspect, it is important to men-
tion that before I resumed this office I was a previous minister and this staff 
knows my thoughts and my concepts, my staff was already embarrassed to bring 
up this request because they know my stand against these things, actually my di-
rections is that the work in this institution is different than the work in the past in 
the ministry and the solution is very much easy, I addressed a letter to that polit-
ical party, mentioning that I have received their request, their letter and that 
their letter and their letter is going to be under my care and those who are re-
questing for the work should follow up the advertisements in the media, TV, ra-
dio, there is going to be a need for certain workers and that he will then take 
their chance like for the others who will apply for the work and that’s it and that 
sort of party did not repeat their request and even other parties did not submit 
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their request for such  employments, its , eh, they did not do that, certainly after 
they discovered that the employment in my institution follows such procedures. 
Next, interviewee 7 recalls how he went about increasing public accountability by open-
ing the audit reports to the public step by step. First he had to win the trust of all gov-
ernment offices, then the trust of the parliament and finally the citizens.  
I7: We consider ourselves as consultants not policemen! We target the mistake 
not the one who committed the mistakes. We started to publish summary reports 
first, then we started to add numbers and dates of reports on the website and on 
TV, we audit all government sides from the president’s office to the  smallest 
government unities , this is the first achievement, in the third year we submitted 
the reports to parliament, to PAC and government institutions, in the fourth year 
we were talking about important issues, to raise their emotions, that this con-
cerns the [country] citizens, we have specialized teams for the environment, en-
gineers, health etc. we conduct performance audits and specialized audits, be-
fore they reach the concerned institutions the reports are already on the website. 
In order to win the trust of the government, interviewee 7 avoided to give the govern-
ment a reason of believing that the SAI might target it politically. While interviewee 7 
would not avoid accusing high government officials of corruption, it would also not 
take political sides by publishing an explosive audit report during election periods, as 
this would have had an influence on the election and would have undermined the trust 
of the government in the SAI.  
I7: For example the 2010 elections, one parliamentary committee, the political 
background of the head of that committee is with a certain government unit, 
there were remarks of corruption against that unit, the report was accomplished, 
but we sent it after the election, our main capital is the trust of the people [poli-
ticians],that we will not burn them politically. 
Interviewee 7 recalls one particularly interesting story, which shows the status of his 
institution as exemplifying integrity in his country.  
I7: …last month, … a minster was called to parliament for questioning, he de-
fended himself, his office is excluded from corruption, evidence is that there are 
no… [SAI name] reports against him, this was the only method [argument] he 
used to defend himself.  
Interviewee 7 also explains how he created management systems to increase the integri-
ty of his staff; he acted as a good example, motivated them financially, arranged for 
staff rotation and team auditing and changed the fact that auditors requested the infor-
mation directly from the auditees. When he took over the office, he stopped that habit 
but instead decided that he would provide all the information to the auditees. 
I7: We have 2300 staff, more than 1800 laptops, the motivation for staff is very 
important, in 2004 when I assumed office: auditors could get all the information 
from the auditee, this was then prevented by me, I will provide them with the in-
formation, I also provided them with cars and fuel and equipments and support 
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for the children of my staff. …we have work papers, and audit teams, employees 
change position after 5 years, head of team only stays for 3 years. Integrity of 
our staff is more important than anything else. 
Contrary to interviewee 7, interviewee 15 pointed out that in his SAI they prefer the 
auditors to request the information directly from the auditees, in order to increase their 
personal responsibility for the case. If anything was lost it was the auditor’s personal 
fault.  
Finally, creating trust is also crucial for the relationship with donors. Interviewee 7 
characterized his relationship with the donors as a feeling of embarrassment in the be-
ginning, until his SAI had proven that they were integer.  
I7: We have received support by SIGMA, DFID, GAO, which is still continuing. 
In the beginning it was embarrassing until we proved that we are integer.  
Several interviewees (particularly int.7 and 16) stressed that performance auditing was 
particularly important, especially for SAIs working under difficult political circum-
stances, the reason being that performance audits are not targeting individual persons 
but the institutional performance and thus are less politically sensitive. During the con-
duct of the performance audit, it is then still possible to detect fraud and other criminal 
activities.  
K: What is needed for SAIs in authoritarian regimes to evolve? 
I7: Training, work systems, my personal opinion is to expand on performance 
audit, because the financial audit focuses more on the one who spent it, the per-
formance audit gives the institution the chance to rehabilitate and not on the 
person, general knowledge 
To summarize this chapter so far, we have seen that SAI reforms to strengthen citizen-
oriented, independent public finance auditing reforms are mostly initiated by external 
stakeholders in cooperation with the SAI leadership. The main strategies applied to push 
reforms through are legal strategies, capacity building, improving external communica-
tion and strategies focusing on the SAI leadership and management. While ideally a 
SAI would apply all four strategies, the options available and the chances for success 
will also depend on external factors supporting and/or constraining the reform initiatives 
which we will now analyze in the following two chapters.  
7.4. Which Factors Facilitate SAI Reforms? 
We have already been talking about the role of a supportive national and international 
environment as well as personal strength by leaders facilitating reforms, in this section I 
will analyze these various factors in a more structured way.  
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Support: Personal strength of SAI leaders 
Connecting up with the previous topic of integrity is the issue of personal strength. 
Where do successful SAI leaders take their strength to continue their work even under 
dangerous circumstances? Interviewee 13 draws her strength from her religious belief. 
Her trust in God helps her to continue even though her job is politically sensitive and 
could even be life threatening. Interviewee 16 is motivated by his experiences working 
for the government and travelling all over Africa. He has come to the understanding that  
“most of the civil strife which happens in Africa is because of mismanagement of 
government funds, the squandering of public funds with impunity.” (I16) 
 His objective is to  
“convince people that they can only change government through democratic 
systems, particularly by empowering SAIs to ensure that accountability is re-
spected.” (I16) 
Personal strength of SAI leaders plays a crucial role for the empowerment of SAIs. My 
interview partners did not mention personal strength or leadership capacity when talking 
about themselves or their own achievements but several interview partners did mention 
this issue when talking about other SAIs. Interviewee 11 mentioned that the change in 
SAI leadership in f.i. Tanzania and Nigeria made a big difference to these SAIs. Equal-
ly, interviewee 16 mentioned that there are good examples of SAI reforms because of 
their leadership. Several times Iraq was also mentioned by interview partners as a very 
successful SAI because of the SAI’s leadership. Thus, my interview partners do admire 
and recognize successful SAIs and attribute the success amongst other factors to the 
SAI’s leadership, thus to their peers with whom they directly compare each other.  
Support: National environment 
Several interviewees have assigned value to the culture and tradition of auditing in a 
country. On the one hand, some interviewees believed that if a SAI has a long history 
this facilitates its acceptance in society and the notion of political accountability. Also, 
the methods and purposes of auditing have changed over the last decades. These modi-
fications should not only be reflected within national legislation and the SAI itself but 
also need to be communicated to the wider public. Interviewee 2a explained how his 
SAI had to change the SAI’s purpose but also public image from the Soviet type of con-
trol to a modern audit institution.  
First, several interviewees (3b, 4, 1a, 6, 12, 13, 7) explained how the long history of 
their institutions and the related institutional culture within the SAI as well as a tradition 
of a well developed institutional bureaucracy in their country supports their work.   
The Subject’s Perspective - What the Heads of SAIs Think 189 
 
I3b: … institutional culture and historical background are the most important 
thing I think, because of rules, principles, some vital rules are not enough for in-
dependence but culture, institutional culture and background is really important 
because we have 150 years of history. 
Second, the same is also true for the opposite; the lack of an institutional culture of 
transparency constrains the development of powerful SAIs. When I talked with inter-
viewee 1a about the debt crisis in Greece and the apparent lack of an efficient SAI there, 
he explained that Greece does not have effective external and internal auditing and also 
lacked a culture of accountability. To underline how much this notion of accountability 
was lacking among the Greek bureaucracy and culture, he narrated an episode from his 
previous work as the head of internal auditing in his country. When he met with his 
Greek colleagues at that time to exchange experience on the development of efficient 
internal auditing, they laughed at him and told him that he was “crazy to develop inter-
nal auditing”. He understood that his Greek colleagues did not share the notion about 
the need for a professional, responsive and accountable bureaucracy with him.  
Third, interviewees 2a and 2b recounted how for their SAI the most important aspect 
was not to improve the independence of their SAI but instead the audit methodology. 
Before the audit reforms, auditors could put fines on public managers who were found 
to be responsible for misconducts, thus the SAI was also an enforcement agency. It was 
a Soviet type of control organization, feared for its power to penalize. After the reforms, 
the SAI now can only issue its observations and recommendations and submits them to 
parliament for enforcement. Thus, my interviewees explained the biggest challenge was 
to communicate this new role to the parliamentarians and the public at large. 
Next to the institutional culture and tradition, the public and the media can play an 
important role in the empowerment of the SAI. Interviewee 4 explained that the [coun-
try name] SAI encountered a big crisis two years ago. The President of the Republic 
criticized the AI for being too critical about its projects. However, media and the public 
at large strongly supported the SAI in its endeavors. Thus the SAI’s good relationship 
with the public helped it win the battle with the President and as interviewee 4 accounts,  
“the SAI’s insistence on public finance accountability led to an increase of its 
credibility in society”.  
This case shows that even strong SAIs such as the this SAI with its long history, broad 
mandate, huge technical capacity and high marks in the OBS and other rankings, can be 
undermined by the executive if it lacks public support.   
Another story of how public support is crucial for a SAI comes from interviewee 13. 
She called the public “their eyes and ears on the ground” and explained how the public 
supports the work of the SAI’s employees. Her SAI has a citizen desk and includes citi-
zen observations and reports in their audits. The public can however also be a threat to 
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the work of the SAI. The SAI’s auditors have been threatened at the local level and ac-
cording to interviewee 13, extended family ties and personal connections do sometimes 
get in the way. This is why she believes transparency is even more important. In gen-
eral, however, she explains that the SAI’s staff are very courageous and are inspired by 
their power to provoke public and congressional debates, leading to charges being filed 
against persons having unlawfully appropriated public funds. On the other hand, public 
pressure on a SAI to act can also be very strong in some contexts. Public pressure was 
the reason that the former Chairman of the [country name] SAI had to resign for alleged 
misconduct in 2011. (I13)  
Thus, so far I have discussed the role of culture and of public support for the empower-
ment of the SAI; the most important support factor for the prospect of SAI empower-
ment however, is political will. If the executive is not interested in having a strong SAI, 
it is extremely difficult for the SAI to empower itself and live up to its international 
commitments as a member of INTOSAI.  
One of the most recent events which had a direct and visible impact on the work of a 
SAI is the revolution in Tunisia in February 2011. As interviewee 11 explained, the SAI 
of Tunisia has been asked by the interim government of Tunisia to publish its reports in 
their integrity. Interviewee 11 recalled that the SAI was extremely delighted as it had all 
those annual reports but was not allowed to put them online. This statement by inter-
viewee 11 is confirmed by a message on the website of the Tunisian SAI.
290
  
Another story for how political will was crucial in pushing through reform comes from 
interviewee 16, who explained how the procurement law in his country was reformed 
against initial resistance by the government. Initially the procurement law stated that 
only the minister or government officials managing the case were responsible for a pro-
curement decision. For any government contract above a certain amount there is how-
ever a bidding committee assigned which decides on the best bidder and a control 
committee which will regularly monitor the progress of construction and infrastructure 
projects. While it is these committees which are most susceptible to corruption and nep-
otism, it was only the minister or the government official signing the contract which 
were held to account while the members of these committees were going free (besides 
the two committees already mentioned there are also other committees which also were 
immune to prosecution, such as supervisory boards of state owned enterprises etc.). The 
SAI made the experience in their audit that the government paid for roads that have not 
                                                     
290
 “Publication des rapports annuels de la Cour des Comptes: Suite à ce qui a été ordonné par Mr.Foued 
Mbazaa, président de la république par intérim, le 26 avril 2011, concernant la publication des 
cinq derniers rapports annuels de la Cour des Comptes dans leur intégralité sur son site web, la 
Cour a procédé à l'insertion de ses rapports annuels, notamment du 21ème au 25ème rapport, 
dans ce site (seule la version arabe est actuellement disponible)” 
(http://www.courdescomptes.nat.tn/template.php?code=3&page=2, Last Accessed on September 
29, 2011) 
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been constructed or the work has not been completed as provided for by the contract. 
The SAI recommended that managers and those involved in all those committees had to 
be punished, which was not possible as according to the existing procurement law only 
the manager was responsible and the committee members went free. So the SAI initiat-
ed a review of that law. As interviewee 16 explained,  
“it took about a year and a half to pass this law because there were so many ob-
stacles.”  
The head of the SAI sent the proposal for the amendment of the procurement law to the 
Prime Minister to be discussed in government, then to be forwarded to the President of 
the Republic to sign and finally to be sent to the Parliament for approval. However, as 
nothing was happening, the Chair of the SAI went to see the President of the Republic 
directly to ask where this document was. However, according to interviewee 16 the 
President had never heard about such a proposal as it had been blocked by some indi-
viduals who had vested interests to impede the amendment of the procurement law. It 
turned out that the President was easily convinced by the head of the SAI about the ne-
cessity of this amendment and “suddenly the document reappeared from the draw 
where it had been kept”. (I16) As the political weight in this semi-authoritarian country 
is clearly on the President’s side, this bill was passed in Parliament without problems. 
Thus, it was crucial to gain the support of the President to pass the law.    
Finally, support for SAI reforms can also come from Parliament; particularly the Par-
liamentary Accounts Committee has proven to be an important ally in SAI reforms in 
many countries. Interviewee 8 explains how the PAC in Parliament was a crucial ally 
for their empowerment. As the members of this committee are professionals from ac-
counting and finance, it is also in their interest to improve public financial management, 
including external public auditing. The SAI organized workshops with the PAC and 
other Parliamentary committees on how to follow up on its recommendations and won 
the full support by Parliament. This support was crucial for the SAI to empower itself. 
First it only audited 30% of budget expenses and then it has slowly been able to in-
crease the percentage. As I have explained above because of the lack of political will by 
the government of this post-conflict, middle-income country, the establishment of the 
new SAI was delayed for two years and it took another two years until the SAI was pro-
vided with adequate premises and started to recruit more staff. According to interviewee 
8 the SAI had to press for changes against several political parties and ministries and 
reform was only possible because finally the government composition changed to their 
favor. Interviewee 8 believes that crucial for their success was the trust and support 
from parliament, most importantly the PAC, which they had slowly been building up. 
Interviewee 8 also recalled that they had also received support from the public, from 
NGOs such as Transparency International, from the media, from donors (EU, OSCE, 
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OECD, UNDP, the World Bank etc), from neighboring SAIs as well as from the Nor-
wegian SAI, INTOSAI and EUROSAI.  
Interviewees 2a and 2b also recounted how the public, particularly also the NGOs, sup-
port their work. Especially in the health sector there are some very active NGOs that 
conduct evaluations and provide the information to the SAI, they also provide external 
experts who are more experienced in this domain than the SAI staff itself. Finally, the 
active involvement of these NGOs in public affairs and their reports gives the SAI di-
rections in what to audit, to find out what the essential issues and the problems are.  
I conclude this subchapter with interviewee 15, who reasoned that  
“reforms to strengthen SAIs often succeeded if the interests of several stakehold-
ers in a country meet. These interests differ across countries and their develop-
mental stage, but what is crucial is that the SAI can find partners who share and 
support its interests.” (I15) 
Support: international environment 
As I have already discussed above all interviewees highly appreciated the support by 
INTOSAI as well as by its regional groupings, support provided by individual SAIs and 
by the donor community in general. Thus international support has been identified as 
being crucial for SAIs during all stages of reform.  
My interview partners from EU member states and of states, which aspire EU member-
ship, explained how the anti-corruption framework, the related GRECO monitoring and 
the pressure by the EU particularly through the monitoring as part of the Acquis 
Communitaire supported their cause. Three of my African interview partners praised the 
work of AFROSAI, which has also been named by two other interview partners as the 
most active and successful regional organization. My Asian and Latin American inter-
view partners also supported the idea that international exchange is crucial for SAI re-
forms but in general I found that they focused less on the international community but 
more on the support they received from national stakeholders.    
Some other interview partners of SAIs which have not been progressing however admit-
ted that the technical support they are receiving by the donors in the form of infrastruc-
ture and training is not making a huge difference as the political situation in the country 
is not about to change and thus they were rather negative about the prospect of success. 
However, other interviewees from similarly desperate countries were more positive 
about the prospect of reform.  
This leads me to the conclusion of this chapter on factors supporting SAI reforms. It is 
not necessarily the political and economic situation in the country which is the primary 
condition for successful SAI reforms, but as interviewee 11 most clearly pointed out, it 
The Subject’s Perspective - What the Heads of SAIs Think 193 
 
is very much about an empowerment process of the SAI. First of all, the head of the SAI 
needs to empower him/herself from the “victim role” and assume a role of leadership. 
Then it is important that the SAI leadership identifies and gains allies who share and 
support the SAI’s interests. Then it is possible for any SAI to improve its situation de 
jure as well as de facto, even under difficult situations as the positive success stories of 
Iraq and others exemplify.  
K: What about the [country name]? One of my interview partners explained to 
me the difficult situation of this SAI.  
I11: It is a typical case of playing victim. But look at other very difficult envi-
ronments like Iraq. The SAI of Iraq has an assertive leader, thus the World Bank 
is supporting them wholeheartedly, we should not say that the circumstances 
prevent us from acting; our duty is to assure citizens about the public funds. 
7.5. Which Constraints Hamper SAI Reforms? 
While the previous chapter looked at factors supporting the political process of SAI 
reforms, this chapter analyses the opposite side of the coin, thus factors constraining the 
strengthening of SAIs. Basically, the main constraints which my interview partners 
identified, concern the national environment and the SAI itself such as its institutional 
design, the capacity of the SAI and the SAI management. The international environment 
was not mentioned a single time as a constraining factor but only as a support to the 
SAI’s cause.  
Constraint: national environment 
As I have discussed several times above, the national political environment is a major 
obstacle for the development of citizen-oriented independent external public auditing. I 
have already told most of the stories concerning the constraints from the national envi-
ronment, such as low awareness on the importance of SAIs among the government, par-
liamentarians, the media and the public in general, low political participation and inter-
est by the public due to political frustration or other problems such as political instabil-
ity or poverty. 
Interviewee 9 explained that his SAI works in a transparent manner, it is free to inspect 
everything apart from political parties, the problem is not the access to information or 
the SAI’s independence but the enforcement of its audit recommendations. The impuni-
ty of the public officials is the real problem. When the SAI submits its audit report to 
the Parliament, the parliamentarians do not organize audit hearings because they have 
so many other more pressing issues to deal with in this large, impoverished, post-war 
country and because the audit reports are far arrear.  
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Interviewee 5a is Board member from a SAI which is independent de jure and reports to 
Parliament, but de facto the President of the Republic dominates and blocks everything. 
Thus, the parliament is incapable of following up on the SAIs work. The problem of his 
country is a lack of rule of law and a President who dominates everything. He believes 
that the situation for his SAI cannot improve if the political landscape does not improve 
and that everybody knows about the fake democratic state of his country. “A camel 
hides his head behind a tree and thinks nobody sees it, but in fact everybody does.” 
With this anecdote he wanted to recount that everybody in his country knows that the 
President only pretends to establish democratic institutions while in reality he continues 
to dominate everything so that the Parliament, the SAI and other institutions remain 
ineffective.  
While the last stories concerned the general constraints to SAI reforms stemming from 
the political environment, interviewee 1a and 1b recounted how SAI reforms were actu-
ally blocked by three political parties who also held seats in the SAI board. The SAI 
board consisted of 11 members, of which four were from political parties resisting re-
forms. Thus, it was only after parliamentary elections which brought a new government, 
a lot of public and outside pressure that it was possible to finally reform the decision 
making process in the SAI. The discussions on the reform of the SAI were launched by 
a SIGMA report in 2006. In 2009 the government changed and in 2010 the new national 
audit act was finally adopted. Before that there was only technical assistance, training, 
provision of infrastructure but the crucial aspect concerning the independence and the 
decision making structure of the SAI were only possible after a change in government.  
Interviewee 10 explained how his SAI, which enjoys quite high scores in ratings, only 
looks good de jure while de facto it is also constrained by the government. The execu-
tive has no interest that the SAI uncovers mismanagement and fraud but has an interest 
in the SAI doing some work to show off in the public and get re-elected, but the SAI 
should not have enough resources to be able to look deep into the matter. So the main 
constraint to the SAI working effectively is financial constraints which are a deliberate 
strategy by the executive to control the SAI. The performance management system has 
been introduced between 1999 and 2004, but was by far too ambitious. The head of civil 
service and the Vice President of the country review if they have achieved their objec-
tives of the year, they use a balanced score card format. In 2005 the SAI started to focus 
on the conduct of performance audits to measure whether the government has achieved 
its objectives. The problem was a lack of capacity; the SAI needed economists, statisti-
cians, accountants and specialists for many policy areas.  
I10: Officially we have political support. Let's say 40 million are approved but 
50 million would be required to adequately implement the performance auditing. 
So if the observations are negative of ministries, we cannot properly investigate. 
We can do only minimal work due to resource constraints. 
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Finally, interviewee 17 as well as interviewee 16 both explained that although both of 
them are pressing for stronger independence for their SAIs, the fact that the President of 
the Republic appoints the head of the SAI is not a disadvantage per se for them in their 
political context as it gives the SAI political leverage. Both interview partners are from 
semi-authoritarian countries which are democratic de jure but where the President of the 
republic has each served for around 30 years in office and several requirements for true 
democratic politics have not been implemented. One of these characteristics concerns 
the independence of the SAI. Interviewee 17 explained that the fact that the President of 
the republic appoints the head of the SAI gives it “more moral powers”, which he con-
siders as helpful within their country context. Interviewee 17 explains that if the SAI 
was under the control of the Parliament, it would be subject to the control by political 
parties, which have as their only intention to use the SAI as a stick to hit the govern-
ment, which in turn would undermine their independence and position them as taking 
sides. The cooperation in form of access to information and particularly the provision of 
necessary funds by the executive would then be under threat.  
Thus, interviewee 17 explained that their SAI aspires more independence from both the 
President as well as from Parliament. Concerning the current political crisis, interviewee 
17 further explains that the opposition parties have been delaying the parliamentary 
elections which were due since 2007 with the objective to build some grounds to gain 
majority. The presidential election is due in 2013 which  
“creates a nightmare for them as up until now they cannot get the confidence 
that they would succeed. This is why they have pushed another path to seize 
power”. (I17) 
Interviewee 16 is from a SAI that is even less independent than the SAI of interviewee 
17. The head of the SAI is not only appointed by the President and can be removed 
without any justification, the SAI also has to only report to the President and does not 
publish reports. However, there is political commitment by the President of the Repub-
lic to have a strong SAI and the financial constraints that interviewee 17 faces are much 
less than those by interviewee 16. This means that the legal status is not the only factor; 
the work of the SAI is very much influenced by the financial resources that the govern-
ment provides for it to carry out its work, conduct regular staff training etc. Interviewee 
16 explained how their lack of independence only partly affects their work and why he 
prefers having to report to the President’s office rather than to Parliament.  
I16: You see in most of these countries the office of the president was claiming 
it, so most of them report to the President, in Tunisia it is the same thing, Tunisia 
was reporting to the President and also reports to the Parliament, Egypt it re-
ports to the President, you see, Parliaments in most of these African countries it 
is not different from the President because you have one governing party that 
dominates, that has about 90% of the members in Parliament, 90% of the mem-
bers in Parliament are members of the same party, so you see there is no effect, 
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you understand what I am saying. … I am always in favor that they [SAIs] 
should report to the President … this is African diplomacy ... and the office of 
the President is always very powerful and can affect changes as regards the rec-
ommendations of the audits and I am seeing that in [country] , you see ... to re-
port to Parliament is a waste of time to me, the Parliament is so weak, and their 
working methods, their internal regulations, they don’t meet every day, they 
meet 3 times per year, so not even every month.  
K: And they don’t read the reports even if they meet. 
I16: They don’t! They are politicians who don’t even understand anything of 
those reports so if you send it to the office of the President who even has a sepa-
rate department that deals with those reports it is advantageous to me and I am 
seeing that in my country. 
I will conclude this section on political constraints with interviewee 14c who said that,  
“in order for an auditor to be effective no matter how good you are, if the execu-
tive is not interested, the audit reports will end up in the shelves. As auditors we 
recommend, so if the other stakeholders are not interested, the audit reports 
cannot have any effect, so it is very, very important.”  
To sum up, the reform of SAIs depends a lot on the national political context and the 
political will. In order for SAIs to improve their legal status as well as their de facto 
power it necessitates broad political reforms consolidating democratization. Further-
more for audit reports to be enforced by parliamentarians these need to be well trained 
and all political parties need to value and trust the SAI for being apolitical. The fact that 
SAIs constantly have to prove that they are apolitical and only want to focus on the pro-
vision of a technical service seems to be a constant issue for all SAIs to various degrees.  
Another issue which came out from the interviews is the issue of threat, intimidation 
and even violence against auditors. I was surprised about the extent to which nearly all 
interview partners raised the fact that auditing is a “dangerous job”, that auditors are 
very “courageous” and that there have been “threats against individuals at low as well 
as at high levels”. (Int.1, 6, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17) Even interviewee 15 from a high 
income, democratic country reported that “their auditors face intimidation and re-
sistance”, but because of their strong legal powers, they can still continue their work 
and access all the information they require to conduct the audit.  
Institutional constraints 
There are institutional concerns inside the SAI, when there is no clear decision making 
structure or reforms are blocked by members of the board which put their party affilia-
tions before their responsibility as heads of the SAI. Some studies (Blume and Voigt, 
2011, Santiso, 2009) suggest that between the three main SAI models (the auditor gen-
eral, the board model and the court model), the SAIs with the court model have the least 
political strength. Traditionally they focused on ex-ante auditing in the form of legality 
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audits.
291
 SAIs with a traditional court system often focus on only one aspect of finan-
cial control and do not give any opinion on the efficiency, effectiveness or economy of 
public financial management. Furthermore they are often considered as being too inde-
pendent which hampers the enforcement of the audit recommendations. They usually do 
not submit their reports to Parliament for enforcement but instead dispose of their own 
judges that organize court hearings on the correctness of the audit reports.   
However, the court model is not a problem per se and there are hybrid institutional 
models that combine the court system with parliamentary control such as it is the case in 
Brazil. Also, the SAI of [country name] is a case of a court system and very independ-
ent institution. Interviewee 3b thinks that it is not good to be too independent because of 
the weak relations with Parliament. On the other hand he also believes that too close 
links with Parliament are equally not good. He underlined his statement with the case of 
the US GAO, which he believes is an office of Congress and conducts the majority of 
its audits at the request of deputies. Coming back to the case of I3b, he explained that a 
new national audit act has been adopted by the Parliament in December 2010, which 
among other issues has as objective to strengthen the parliamentary follow-up of the 
courts’ audit reports.  
In order for parliamentary follow-up to become effective, interviewee 3b thinks it will 
however also be crucial to train the parliamentarians and possibly also to form a specific 
parliamentary committee dealing with the audit reports. Interviewee 3b explained that in 
the 1960s there was a special committee in the Parliament dealing with the Court of 
Accounts. In the 1970s this committee was abolished in order to unite three financial 
parliamentary committees. While the new planning and budgeting committee became 
very strong, it soon neglected the auditing reports as it was too busy with the budgeting 
process.  
Another major constraint to a SAI’s effectiveness concerns the follow up by public 
prosecutors. When a SAI discovers fraud or other criminal offences during its audit ac-
tivity, it usually has to forward the findings to the public prosecutors for follow up. In-
terviewee 6 told me that in 2010 his SAI detected 250 criminal cases, when they report-
ed them to the Attorney General Office for follow-up, only around 30 persons were pe-
nalized. Because of the high levels of corruption and lack of rule of law in his country, 
it is an easy task for persons who are accused of wrongdoings to bribe the Prosecutor 
                                                     
291 The traditional task of Supreme Audit Institutions is to audit the legality and regularity of financial 
management and of accounting. In addition to this type of audit, which retains its significance, 
there is another equally important type of audit--performance audit--which is oriented towards 
examining the performance, economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public administration. 
Performance audit covers not only specific financial operations, but the full range of government 
activity including both organisational and administrative systems.”, The Lima Declaration 
(INTOSAI, 1977, Section 4.1. and 4.2.; http://www.issai.org/media(622,1033)/ISSAI_1_E.pdf. 
Last Accessed on October 04, 2011) 
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and go free. This SAI leader now prefers not to report to the Prosecutor any longer, as 
this neither helps to deter public officials from committing criminal activities, nor has it 
brought any money back to the public purse. Thus he now asks the responsible person 
to correct the mistake, thus to pay the missing amounts. By doing so, he believes, it 
helps at least to fill the state budget and thus be of a bigger benefit to the taxpayers than 
if the case is transferred to the Prosecutor.  
Similarly, interviewee 16 recalled the same problem of a lack of follow up on criminal 
cases by the Prosecutors. However, while bribe also seems to be a problem in this coun-
try, the main issue which interviewee 16 pointed out is the lack of expertise of financial 
offences by the Prosecutors. Thus, the SAI started to assist the Prosecutors in preparing 
the criminal case for the court proceeding. The SAI staff in their role as public finance 
experts’ advice the magistrates in preparing the criminal cases to be judged in court. 
When the case is then sent to court, the SAI’s auditors who worked on the file and did 
the investigations, sometimes even attend the court session as state witnesses.  
To sum up, when SAIs together with their allies go about pushing for reform with the 
objective to strengthen external public auditing, they often face numerous constraints. 
Most importantly, they face a lack of awareness of the role and purpose of SAIs, politi-
cal resistance and finally institutional constraints inside the SAI and within the parlia-
mentary committees and other stakeholders. 
7.6. Reform Results 
Finally, I close this chapter with some stories that interview partners told me about their 
reform success. When talking about success, I have to start talking about Africa as the 
African SAIs can be proud of having achieved a lot in the last few years. Under the 
guidance of South Africa, most countries in the AFROSAI-E region have succeeded in 
implementing SAI reforms, and the SAIs in AFROSAI-F are currently following the 
example of AFROSAI-E.  
Most of the SAIs are still dependent on the finance ministry for funding and have not 
yet succeeded to have discretion in deciding on their budget needs, still, overall the 
SAIs of Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Namibia, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone are all 
good examples for successful SAIs as  
“they have succeeded in educating the politicians about the role of SAIs, that 
they should not take the SAIs as the last but should be their first priority.” 
(Int.11)  
Tanzania is a very good case study for successful SAI reforms. The audit reforms in 
Tanzania were part of comprehensive PFM reforms. The debates about the necessity for 
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PFM reforms were initiated by the international community, particularly by two critical 
ROSC reports (IMF, 2002; World Bank, 2005). There was strong political will, led by 
the President of the Republic, which created the necessary environment for broad re-
forms. True SAI reform however became only possible because of the appointment of a 
new, motivated SAI leader in August 2006. Mr. Utouh led the negotiations for a new 
Audit Act, which was passed in 2008 (Tanzania Public Audit Act, No. 11 of 2008
292
). 
Mr. Utouh by the way has been appointed as the new Chair of AFROSAI in 2011. 
The new law has given him the mandate for recruitment of staff; it requires that when 
the audit reports get to Parliament, the speaker and the appropriate committees have to 
act upon. The government has to formally respond to the SAI’s observations and rec-
ommendations. The SAI also gets a copy of the report which the government has to 
send to Parliament, this ties the accountability loops. The new law has also improved 
the SAI’s financial independence. Before, the SAI had to send its budget proposal to the 
Ministry of Finance for approval and inclusion in the general government budget. Now 
the Ministry of Finance has to hold a consultative meeting with the Parliamentary Ac-
counts Committee to critically go through the SAI’s budget proposal. This budget pro-
posal then goes to Parliament for approval. Through this approach the SAI’s budget has 
more than doubled in three years and it is able to do more audits now. The new audit 
law also gives it also free access to information and documentation. Thus it has become 
illegal for anybody to hinder the auditors from obtaining information; there is a penalty 
on it. The public and the media are also very supportive. The Parliamentary hearings on 
the audit reports are held in public with live TV coverage, which has attracted a lot of 
public interest. In addition, there are some very active NGOs which have contributed to 
improving the public interest in audit reports by writing up summaries and publishing 
them in form of leaflets. Finally, the new law also regulates how the SAI itself is audit-
ed. The PAC chooses a private auditing firm which has the task to audit the SAI.
293
   
In several countries, the SAI was able to create strong public support, amongst others 
through the engagement of citizens. With the help of participatory audit the South Afri-
can SAI has been able to convince the executive, the legislative and citizens to be part 
and parcel of the audit process. The social audits have helped to increase the level of 
participation and the level of confidence in South Africa, but also in the Philippines, in 
India and in the Republic of Korea (UN DESA, 2007). 
Concerning the SAIs in the CREFIAF region, my interview partners were also optimis-
tic. Interviewee 16 f.i. believes that the “time will come” where the President’s of the 
francophone African countries will also accept to be audited. He further underlined that 
the SAIs are “very enthusiastic now and fully embrace SAI reforms.”  
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 http://nao.go.tz/?page_id=25 (Last Accessed on October 29, 2012) 
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K: And what encourages you that you will overcome these problems? 
I16: Ah, first of all with the engagement of the SAIs themselves, they are so en-
thusiastic, ah, there is a wide attention and adherence to our strategic plan be-
cause everybody was consulted, second we have ah, the donors are prepared to 
help us finance most of our activities, and then the CREFIAF itself as an organi-
zation is starting to become well respected in our region. 
However, while he is positive that the political leaders are realizing that the time of self 
service from public resources without impunity has come and the SAIs enjoy a high 
respect in the public, their work is not evident as auditors continue to face threats.  
K: the rate of prosecution as increased dramatically last year, what lead to that?  
I16: … and it is on the basis of our reports.  
K: What led to that? 
I16:  Well, I think the political state, the government, the president, they have 
realized that they … shall stop impunity because if you have a lot of corruption 
in a country, corruption will strive if there is a lot of impunity, and most of our 
reports who have been calling on that and on the politicians, impunity shall stop 
and so they started to act upon that - that’s it. 
K: Is there not a threat of violence if you uncover some difficult fraud or corrup-
tion cases, are you not of violence? 
I16:  Ah, we are not really afraid, you know we , our SAIs , I think we are re-
spected, if not feared now, ah, there has never been any case of violence but 
there have been threats, but never violence as of now. 
K: But threats against the auditors, low level auditors, technical auditors or 
threats against the leaders? 
I16: Everybody, low level as well as much as high, threats against auditors’ low 
level and high level and managers, everybody, there have been threats to indi-
viduals.  
Interviewee 8 explained that there is a lot of progress in the Balkan region. The Sloveni-
an SAI is a huge success and role model for many other SAIs. In Croatia and Macedo-
nia, they have passed a new law in 2011 to become independent and in Serbia the par-
liament passed a new law in 2011 to include auditing of political parties and auditing of 
defense spending.  
I want to close this chapter with a story underlining the importance of ICT in the SAI’s 
efforts to fight political capture. Interviewee 12 told me a story which regards a disa-
greement between the SAI and the mayor of a city regarding the spending of a construc-
tion project. The auditee took this case to court to defend himself. There was even polit-
ical pressure from Parliament to the auditors as the mayor tried to clean his image. Fi-
nally, the SAI won the case and key for the success was the evidence that the SAI had 
gathered. The SAI had even scanned the evidence to have electronic documentation, 
which it has to keep for 18 years.  
Coming now to the failure of reform efforts, my interviewees had much less stories to 
tell. While they were obviously talking a lot about the problems they are facing and the 
factors constraining reform efforts, hardly anybody had a story to tell where actual re-
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form efforts failed. Interviewee 17 was in effect the only one who told me at length how 
his SAI had initiated legal reforms, but which failed due to the political crisis which 
developed in the meantime in his country. Interviewee 17 explained how constitutional 
amendments improving the status and the independence of their SAI were halted due to 
political unrest. This SAI has initiated legal reforms to strengthen the independence of 
the SAI, particularly concerning the appointment and removal of the head of the SAI, 
which would give it additional leverage to demand for financial resources and carry out 
the SAI’s mandate.  
The SAI proposed an amendment to the Constitution of the Republic to the President of 
the Republic, which approved the amendments and forwarded them to his consultative 
council, which in turn also approved it and forwarded the proposed amendments togeth-
er with other proposed amendments of the Constitution to Parliament for approval. The 
proposed amendments to the Constitution regarding the independence of the SAI were 
discussed in Parliament and approved by all political parties without any objections. In 
order for these amendments to come into effect, they need to be approved by the citi-
zens in the framework of a referendum. However, the package of proposed amendments 
to the Constitution also included one disputed proposal concerning the term of office of 
the President of the Republic, which was not approved in Parliament.  
As a consequence of these political debates, which also coincided with the Arab Spring, 
a political crisis developed in the country and the referendum could not be held. This 
political crisis has also affected the SAI in its daily work. According to interviewee 17, 
power shortages, fuel shortages and other political constraints have however not pre-
vented it from continuing its auditing tasks altogether. The SAI staff is extremely com-
mitted to carrying out its work even under difficult conditions and to issue their individ-
ual audit reports to the respective government entities that are subject to the SAI’s audit. 
Also, the SAI is determined to submit its annual audit of final accounts to the Parlia-
ment.   
7.7. Summary and Conclusions 
Why do reforms to strengthen citizen-oriented, independent public finance auditing 
thrive in some countries and fail in others? The research design in the form of confiden-
tial expert interviews was confirmed to be highly suitable for answering this research 
question. The SAI leaders were willing to contribute to my study. They were speaking 
openly about their achievements, the constraints they are facing, the process of reform 
but also about their impression on the situation in other countries and their analysis of 
crucial factors for the successful implementation of comprehensive SAI reforms. In to-
tal, I identified 124 categories and assigned them to the 17 interviews (see appendix C.4 
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for a list of all category codes). Consequently I analyzed the findings with the help of 
graphical network views of the categories and corresponding quotes (see appendix C.5 
for an example of a network view). Concerning the groundedness within the quotes, i.e. 
how often a code has been applied, the following codes stand out: 
STRATEGY_legal_institution (19 quotes): This category was assigned if the interviewee 
pointed out that the SAI needs legal reforms in order to change its institutional design, 
mandate or independence. 
INITIATOR_SAI (17 quotes): This category was assigned if the interviewee identified 
the SAI itself as being responsible (by itself or together with partners) for the initiation 
of SAI reforms.  
SUPPORT_national environment_political will (15 quotes): This category was assigned 
when the interviewee identified the political will as a crucial support factor for the suc-
cessful completion of SAI reforms.  
Despite these interesting results, I have to acknowledge that the groundedness of the 
codes is neither important for me nor can it give any reliable information as the inter-
views have different lengths and reflect neither a statistically significant nor random 
sample of all SAIs. Next I will summarize the main research results of chapters 7.2.-7.6. 
How is reform initiated? (chapter 7.2.) 
 Most interviewees said that external influence as part of broader public financial 
management reforms or INTOSAI networking and capacity building initiatives 
gave the first impetus for SAI reforms.  
 In a second step, there needed to be some committed individuals, usually SAI 
leaders themselves, who take on responsibility, look for allies and convince na-
tional stakeholders of the need for SAI reforms. 
 Finally, several interviewees explained how comprehensive SAI reforms were 
not possible until the political leadership changed, or how comprehensive public 
financial management reforms including SAI reforms were only possible be-
cause of a more general political change in the country.  
Which strategies are employed? (chapter 7.3.) 
 Most respondents started by pointing out the prerequisite of legal reforms in or-
der to strengthen a SAI. These reforms should focus on the independence of the 
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SAI according to the Lima and Mexico Declarations, the adoption of the ISSAIs 
in general and thirdly the rules for the recruitment of SAI staff.  
 Capacity building, including staff training, provision of adequate infrastructure 
and ICT as well as the learning through the exchange with other SAIs, has also 
not sparked any controversy but has been agreed to by all respondents as im-
portant features for the strengthening of SAIs. 
 The communication with the parliament, the government and the public at large 
are also important features of a successful reform program.  
 The crucial importance of management strategies in the sense of strategically 
developing the SAI’s empowerment was a variable which was neglected during 
the hypothesis development and quantitative study. Several of my respondents, 
particularly the successful ones though, assigned the success of their SAIs to the 
strategic choices, the personal assertiveness/leadership, the personal integri-
ty/professionalism, the successful identification of stakeholders to align with in 
the reform process, the motivation of SAI staff and the strategic choice of audit 
types and methods according to the context by SAI leaders. These management 
strategies guide the actual empowerment of the SAI and the successful imple-
mentation of other reform strategies such as improving the external communica-
tion, capacity building and most importantly the successful implementation of 
legal reforms.  
Which factors facilitate SAI reforms? (chapter 7.4.) 
 The national environment and here particularly political will, but also cul-
ture/history, an active civil society/media, support by the Parliamentary Ac-
counts Committee, change of the political system per se (in form of a democrati-
zation process) and economic growth can support SAI reforms.  
 The international environment has been stated as the second most important fac-
tor supporting reform processes and here particularly the support SAIs gain 
through INTOSAI and the benefits through their common standards (ISSAIs) 
but also support through donor, EU and GRECO observations and conditionali-
ty. 
 Finally, SAI leaders draw support from their personal motivation, engagement 
and strength, at times even guided by religious belief.  
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Which constraints hamper SAI reform? (chapter 7.5.)  
 Again, the national environment has been cited most frequently and most in-
tensely. Again political will is the most important answer in this respect. Other 
factors hampering reform implementation are poverty/illiteracy, low awareness 
of SAI importance, weak rule of law, lack of protection of auditors against 
threats and low political interest by the public.  
 My respondents have not identified a single constraint stemming from the inter-
national level. 
 Several respondents believed that the institutional characteristics of the SAI it-
self prevent successful reform implementation. This includes the institutional 
design, a lack of adequate capacities and weak management.  
To sum up and come back to my main research question, while all interviewees agreed 
that the political (but also the socio-economic) environment of the SAI is the single 
most important factor for some SAIs succeeding and others failing in transforming the 
SAI into a citizen-oriented, independent external audit institution, some SAI leaders 
pointed out that it is also in the power of the SAI itself to empower itself and strengthen 
its legal framework as well as its reception in society. The term “empowerment” of the 
SAI, was not introduced by me but by interviewee 11, who very much insisted on the 
power of the SAI leaders to transform their SAIs. When having a closer look at the in-
dividual accounts of reform initiation, strategy and success, it becomes clear that it is 
not leadership by the head of the SAI alone. Instead, I find that reforms were successful 
if there was “plural, functional and problem-oriented leadership” in the sense of An-
drews, McConnell and Wescott (2010, see hypothesis seven, chapter 6.5). This includes 
the aligning of the head of the SAI with external and internal stakeholders. The qualita-
tive research thus has identified two main variables which explain the success or failure 
of SAI reforms:  
 “Political will” 
 “SAI Leadership”  
Critically reflecting on these most important factors for success I have to admit the fol-
lowing limitations to my study. First, the interview guideline which was sent out to my 
interview partners already pointed out my hypothesis that the de facto independence and 
leverage of SAIs depends on the political environment, particularly the political will. 
Also during the interviews themselves, I used to come back to this hypothesis and thus 
it is not surprising, that it has been discussed and confirmed by all respondents.  
Concerning the importance of SAI leadership for SAI empowerment and consequently 
the strengthening of their political leverage, this variable probably featured strongly 
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among my respondents as this concerned their own roles, thus assigning importance and 
value to their work. On the other hand, SAI leaders which could not show any positive 
results of reform initiatives might incline to accord all responsibility to the political 
leadership and refuse to see the potential for agency by the SAI head to initiate reforms.  
It is questionable if interviews with donors, parliaments or civil society would have 
equally pointed out the importance of the SAI’s leadership. Civil society might instead 
criticize their SAI for not taking enough agency and cooperating with a potentially cor-
rupt government, thus considering any investment supporting the capacity development 
of their SAI as a waste of funds. Donors on the other hand might want to point out the 
improvements which their technical support has brought about within the SAI staff, 
which can in the medium run become an initiator and carrier of reform. Alternative 
views on the conditions for the strengthening of SAIs have been discussed in chapter 
five (development of the argument). They include inter alia the influence of internation-
al donors, the institutional design, technical capacities and the resource base of the SAI. 
My own biases which might have been filtered into the process of making inferences 
concerns my interest in SAIs as important institutions, and my personal belief in their 
agency to transform institutions and political developments through empowerment and 
the implementation of advocacy strategies. However, personally, I would have also 
liked to assign a stronger role to civil society as a motor for change, which was not re-
flected in the expert interviews. On the contrary, several interviewees (Int. 16, 17) 
pointed out the problems which civil society organizations and the media have brought 
about. 
To conclude, in order to discard my inferences, negative case analysis would be helpful. 
If there are any cases, where despite a favorable political environment and/or despite 
strong SAI leadership, the SAI did not succeed to empower itself and improve its politi-
cal leverage, my inferences could be refuted. As I have not come across any such case 
so far, there is no reason for me to believe so at this point. Finally, on the basis of the 
research findings of this chapter I have developed a theoretic model which links causes 
with effects, i.e. it explains how SAI political reforms can succeed in order to transform 
the SAI into true accountability arrangements as intended by the ISSAIs (improving the 
legal status of the SAI, its independence, access to information, follow-up, transparen-
cy). As this model concerns the point of view of experts and thus the strategies em-
ployed by individual stakeholders, I have used the perspective of rational choice (which 
particularly addresses the perspective of individuals) to develop my model. Rational 
choice methodology puts preferences, beliefs and constraints in the centre of its analytic 
models.
294
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The Subject’s Perspective - What the Heads of SAIs Think 206 
 
Table 7.1 Model Based on QUAL Research - "How SAI Political Reforms Can Succeed" 
SAI reform succeeds if: 
a) The SAI’s leadership 
 prefers to truly commit to 
SAI reform 
Due to personal commitment 
Due to peer pressure 
Due to external pressure 
Due to internal pressure 
 and has the belief that it is 
possible 
Because of learning through peers 
Because of personal experience that a lot is possible 
Because of religious beliefs 
 and can overcome existing 
constraints. 
Through aligning with parliamentarians  
Through aligning with civil society and the media 
Through aligning with external partners 
Through employee motivation, institutional rules  and capac-
ity building 
Through new technologies 
Through improving management and strategic planning 
and/or b) The political leadership 
 prefers to implement SAI 
reform (de facto as well as 
de jure) 
because of personal commitment 
because not doing so will cost votes 
because not doing so might cause revolts 
because it is required through donor conditionality or EU 
conditionality 
 and has the belief that lost 
privileges will be compen-
sated through new oppor-
tunities 
Such as EU membership or donor aid 
Votes  
Business opportunities  
 and can overcome existing 
constraints.  
through winning the national discourse 
through aligning with other stakeholders and building up 
internal pressure 
through aligning with other stakeholders and building up 
external pressure 
 
This model suggests that if third party stakeholders with the intent to support SAI re-
forms in a country (i.e. civil society groups, media, donor agencies) should analyze the 
current preferences of a SAI leadership and political leadership in a country, their belief 
systems, including their understanding of the role, vision and mission of the SAI. What 
is the accountability purpose of the SAI (see chapter 3)? And on this basis develop 
strategies how existing constraints can be overcome.  
To conclude, the objective of this chapter was to present the practice of reform from the 
perspective of the subjects themselves, i.e. the SAI leaders. Their accounts have provid-
ed us with useful information which has explained the relationship between variables 
such as external influence, empowerment of the society, democracy, a favorable busi-
                                                                                                                                                           
suites their preferences (or „desires“) – given the „constraints“ (amongst others the ability of sta-
keholders) and the „beliefs“ (kausal opinions). (Dür, 2011:2; see also Beck, 2006, Weingast, 
2002) 
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ness environment and strategies of elite groups in their countries. This chapter has also 
opened new variables to this study, particularly the impact strong SAI leadership can 
have on SAI reforms, even in politically unfavorable environments. Finally, this chapter 
has closed with a theoretic model that explains the conditions which are prerequisite to 
successful SAI reform from a rational choice perspective.  
 
Table 7.2 Research Results of Chapter Seven 
QUAL data collection QUAL data analysis 
Procedures: 
 Semi-structured interviews (n=17)  
 Screening of country-specific back-
ground literature 
 
Procedures: 
 Feed transcripts, interview notes and 
background literature into software 
for qualitative data analysis 
 Create quotations in interviews 
 Inductively develop codes  
 Coding of the transcripts and inter-
view notes 
 Develop network views 
 Analyze and discuss themes identi-
fied in the interviews 
 Screening of the questionnaires and 
cross-check with results from inter-
views 
 Development of theoretic model  
Products: 
 17 Transcripts and interview notes 
 Literature summaries 
 
Products: 
 17 coded interviews 
 239 quotations 
 124 codes 
 29 memos 
 13 network views 
 Cross-case themes identified 
 Thematic analysis written 
 Overall chapter synthesis concluding 
with two main factors explaining dif-
ferences across SAIs 
 Development of theoretic model de-
picting “how effective SAI reforms 
can succeed” 
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8. Discussion and Conclusions 
8.1. Triangulation of Findings 
8.2. Synthesis  
8.3. Conclusions 
 
“[T]he particularity of the social sciences requires [the 
researcher] to work … towards constructing a scientific 
truth capable of integrating the observer’s vision and the 
truth of the practical vision of the agent as a point of 
view which is unaware of being a point of view and is ex-
perienced in the illusion of absoluteness.”295 
8.1.  Triangulation of Findings  
The introductory note exemplifies that the mixing of the quantitative and the qualitative 
research has as objective to address “the basic epistemological problem of the social 
sciences, namely, that the research object is a research subject”. (Harrits, 2011:159, Ital-
ics in original) The people we study (in my case leaders of Supreme Audit Institutions) 
have their own understanding of their social reality that might compete with my under-
standing based on objective knowledge. This is the problem of double hermeneutics, 
whereby researchers face the question whether they should rely on the reasons people 
give for their actions (interpretative knowledge) or whether they should causally explain 
people’s behavior independently of what they might think they are doing.  (Harrits, 
2011:160 citing Bourdieu, 2000, 2004; Giddens, 1993; Habermas, 1981; Behabib, 1986; 
Tönnies, 1964) Whereas the mixed methods strategy of nested analysis (Lieberman, 
2005, see also chapter 6.5.) solves the epistemological problem of causal inference by 
supplementing qualitative and quantitative data in the attempt to gain causal leverage, 
the epistemological problem of double hermeneutics is solved by praxeological 
knowledge.  
This strategy suggests that quantitative analysis can supply an objective or observer’s 
perspective that can then be reflexively contextualized by an interpretive perspective 
based on the views of the subjects themselves. (Harrits, 2011:161) The objective of this 
chapter is to integrate the research findings as in the strategy of praxeological 
knowledge and then to draw the overall conclusions of this dissertation. This chapter 
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first triangulates or converges the findings of chapters six and seven into a common 
discussion or interpretation. In the second part of this chapter, it will then develop a 
synthesis or summary of the overall findings of this dissertation, which will lead the 
reader to the final conclusions.  
This chapter starts with a discussion of the research methods; i.e. how I am going about 
to mix the quantitative and qualitative data. Creswell (et al. 2007:7) explain the problem 
of mixing quantitative and qualitative data,  
“it is not enough to simply collect and analyze quantitative and qualitative data; 
they need to be “mixed” in some way so that together they form a more complete 
picture of the problem than they do when standing alone.”  
The authors further point out that  
“a study that includes both quantitative and qualitative methods without explic-
itly mixing the data derived from each is simply a collection of multiple meth-
ods.” (Creswell et al., 2007:83)  
They then propose several methods to mix the data such as embedding, connecting or 
merging the datasets, all of which has been applied in this study and will be discussed in 
turn now. 
Embedding data at the design level:  
I have embedded qualitative case studies (the mini-case analysis) into the design of the 
quantitative data analysis. The results were discussed in chapter six. 
Connecting from data analysis to data collection 
This connection can occur in various ways such as in specifying research questions, 
selecting participants, or developing an instrument or other materials. I have applied this 
method several times in this dissertation. (Creswell et al, 2007) 
The first part of this dissertation (chapter 2-4) was based on qualitative research which 
led to the identification of the specific research question and to the design of the other 
two research methods, including the selection of variables and participants and the de-
velopment of instruments and materials.  
Second, after having conducted large parts of the statistical analysis of chapter six, I 
conducted the expert interviews for chapter seven. Although the selected interviews 
were semi-structured and the method of analysis was inductive, it was inevitable and at 
points also intended that certain insights which had been obtained through the statistical 
analysis filtered into the interviews as well as their analysis. One of the results from the 
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quantitative data was that the doorstep conditions of North, Wallis, and Weingast 
(2009a; 2009b) did indeed matter for the development of powerful SAIs. Thus, during 
the expert interviews I also sometimes asked about the business environment in the 
country and of aspects of the three doorstep conditions such as contract viability among 
elites, transparency in shares and the threat of violence against SAI employees.  
Finally, I also connected the results of the qualitative research of chapter six with my 
quantitative research. One of the results from the expert interviews with SAI leaders 
was that SAI leadership matters. Thus, some experts defended the view that even in 
challenging semi-authoritarian country environments, it is possible for SAIs to develop 
factual independence, if only the SAI leadership is determined to stand up for it, find 
partners to align with and advocates for the development of a more powerful SAI. Alt-
hough I was aware of the necessity for strong SAI management, I had neglected the idea 
of leadership being a crucial variable for institutional development in my first statistical 
analysis. After the analysis of the expert interviews of chapter seven, I thus went back to 
chapter six to finalize the statistical analysis. In order to do so, I developed some new 
variables measuring the strength of the SAI’s leadership and management and included 
the findings in my regressions and analyses.  
To summarize, this research project consists of four distinct research parts, which are 
connected to each other (see also chapter 1.3. Research design).  
Merging data sets 
Finally, I will now take the two datasets (quantitative data of chapter six and qualitative 
data of chapter seven) and explicitly bring them together in a common discussion or 
interpretation. Thus, the results of the two data sets are brought together into a common 
results section in order to draw valid conclusions about a research problem based on 
data from various methods. This methodological design is also called triangulation de-
sign or convergence model (Creswell et al, 2003, qtd. in Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2007:62) and has the objective “to obtain different but complementary data on the same 
topic” (Morse, 1991:122, qtd. in Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007:62) in order to better 
understand the research problem. Teddlie and Tashakkorie (2009:37) provide a very 
general definition of the triangulation method, which could address both epistemologi-
cal problems (ie. causality and double hermeneutics),  
“Triangulation refers to the combinations and comparisons of multiple data 
sources, data collection and analysis procedures, research methods, investiga-
tors, and inferences that occur at the end of a study.” (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 
2009:37)  
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Converging the findings of chapters six and seven 
The convergence model is the traditional model of a mixed methods triangulation de-
sign.
296
 In this model, the different results of the quantitative and the qualitative re-
search are converged or merged by comparing and contrasting the different results dur-
ing the interpretation with the purpose to end up with valid and well-substantiated con-
clusions about a single phenomenon.  
I have cross-tabulated/converged three main findings from the QUAN research (H3 
regional/international influence, H6 open access for elites and H7 plural SAI leadership, 
see chapter six) with quotes and interpretations from the QUAL research (see table C.7 
in appendix C). I find that the three main findings from the QUAN research are sup-
ported by interview quotes from the QUAL research. This convergence table proofs that 
both research methods confirm the hypotheses that external influence is a major driver 
for reform, that strong and reform-committed leaders can make a difference even in 
difficult environments and that political will can develop if there is not only public de-
mand for accountability but even more importantly if the pattern of relationships among 
elites supports the development of rule of law among elites, of organizational prolifera-
tion and of a state monopoly on the use of force.  
Equally, table 8.1. depicts how the QUAL findings confirm the main QUAN findings. It 
investigates whether the causality as suggested in the econometric tests has been sup-
ported by my interview partners. While table C.7 provides the full quotes, table 8.1 
summarizes and analyzes the QUAL findings in relation to the three main variables as 
proposed in my argument and tentatively confirmed in chapter six (H3, H6, H7).  
Table 8.1. confirms that political will is crucial for the success of SAI reform. Inter-
viewees painted different pictures of their SAI’s power and how it got there. Many in-
terviewees could tell stories of SAI reforms, most of which were introduced as part of 
broader political reforms in the country. In the wake of overall political reforms consti-
tutional amendments often become possible. However, my interviewees also confirmed 
the hypothesis that it then still takes a lot of effort to ensure that the legal provisions 
also become effective in practice. When analyzing the reform context I find that SAI 
reform was possible not only in societies which are characterized by open access for 
elites but also in very fragile countries. In these countries the implementation of com-
prehensive SAI reforms was however only possible if there was particularly strong SAI 
leadership and strong external support.  
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Table 8.1 Convergence Table Explaining the Role of Political Will in Reform and How It Develops 
Int. 
Nr.  
SAI Reform Successful? Political Will Important? Open Access for Elites? (H6) SAI Led Reform Process? (H7) Other Leaders - External Stake-
holders? (H3, H4) 
1  Yes, new SAI Act approved in 
2010 
 Yes, new Act was delayed 
until change of composition 
of parliament 
 Yes, lately lots of efforts to 
curb corruption 
 Yes, two board members led 
the reform process. 
 Yes; EU study, other SAI 
leaders, political party 
2  Yes, new SAI Act approved in 
2008 
 Yes, governance reform is led 
by President of the republic 
 Yes, strong economic growth, 
overall democratic reforms 
?  Yes, revolution started dem-
ocratic process, EU neigh-
borhood support   
3  Yes, new SAI Act approved in 
2011 
 Yes, delays due to opposition 
in Parliament 
 Yes, strong economic growth, 
overall democratic reforms, 
political consolidation of the 
military ongoing 
 Yes. ? 
4  Yes, audit reform in 1988, 
subsequent gradual imple-
mentation 
 Yes, overall constitutional 
reforms 
 Yes, overall democratization, 
strong economic growth 
?  Yes, recent SAI reforms were 
part of overall democratic re-
forms.  
5 No, audit reform in 1999 but only 
de jure, de facto not implement-
ed 
 Yes, blockade by President of 
the republic 
No, semi-authoritarian regime, 
no rule of law for elites, high 
corruption, strong growth but 
largely due to petrol exports. 
No, SAI Board members are 
complacent. 
There is no resistance from the 
public. 
6  Yes, new SAI Act adopted in 
2011 but not yet fully im-
plemented 
 Yes, President of the republic 
resisted reform for a long 
time 
No, very fragile country with 
ongoing violent conflicts 
 Yes, SAI pushed for reform  Yes, strong support by exter-
nal stakeholders and the 
public  
7  Yes, SAI Act amended in 2004   Yes, post-conflict situation, 
overall governance reforms 
No, very fragile country   Yes, SAI gained trust by pol. 
parties, also internal culture 
of integrity, slowly increased 
de facto power.  
 Yes, strong support by exter-
nal stakeholders 
8  Yes, new SAI Act enacted in 
2005 but only came into ef-
fect in 2007 
 Yes, executive delayed im-
plementation for years (first 
draft of Act was presented in 
2001) 
No, post conflict country, slowly 
implementing democratic re-
forms  
 Yes, SAI led process  Yes, external stakeholders, 
parliamentarians and public 
pressure groups supported 
the reform 
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Int.  SAI Reform Successful? Political Will Important? Open Access for Elites? (H6) SAI Led Reform Process? (H7) Other Leaders ? 
9 No, no SAI legal reform initiated.   Yes, lack of political support 
impedes reform.  
No, very fragile country with 
ongoing conflicts. 
No. Donor support for SAI capacity 
building has been initiated. 
10 No, SAI scope has been reformed 
in 1999 but still not implemented 
properly. 
 Yes, executive only officially 
supporting but de facto 
blocking SAI work. 
Partly. ? ? 
11  Yes, comprehensive SAI re-
forms adopted in 1992-1995. 
 Yes, reform part of overall 
change of political system. 
 Yes.   ?   Yes, external pressure and 
internal pressure led to de-
mocratization.  
12  Yes, overall SAI reforms in 
2004, new monitoring sys-
tem launched in 2010.  
 Yes, SAI reforms part of 
overall democratic reforms  
Partly, strong growing economy, 
successfully consolidating demo-
cratic reforms 
 Yes, SAI led reform process 
and had to overcome many 
constraints 
 Yes, the public supports re-
form.  
13  Yes, constitutional reforms in 
1984, in 2011 dismissal of 
head of SAI due to public 
outcry. 
 Yes, President of the republic 
ordered change of SAI head. 
 Yes, but weak rule of law for 
the wider public.  
Not clear about SAI’s role in 1984 
but SAI leader resisted his dis-
missal in 2011. 
 Yes, public outcry led to 
change of head of SAI.  
14  Yes, new SAI Act adopted in 
2008 
 Yes, President of the republic 
supported reform 
Partly, consolidated control over 
the military, few organizations, 
improvements in governance. 
 Yes, SAI led the reform pro-
cess.  
 Yes, regional INTOSAI sup-
port, donor support, public 
support.  
15  Yes, new SAI strategy 
launched in 2004 to increase 
its public profile.  
 Yes, interviewee confirmed 
hypothesis when speaking 
about other countries.  
 Yes, OECD member.  Yes, SAI improved end of 
year audit and supports pub-
lic admin. reforms.  
 Yes, INTOSAI, learning from 
peers, support from parlia-
mentarians and the public.  
16 No, SAI legal reforms not yet 
achieved but gradual improve-
ments such as a new procure-
ment law approved in 2011. 
 Yes; President not yet sup-
ports reform of SAI but sup-
ported new procurement 
law; proposal was first 
blocked by Prime Minister.   
Partly, semi-authoritarian regime 
with high levels of corruption and 
weak rule of law but organiza-
tional proliferation.  
 Yes, procurement law reform 
was led by SAI and current 
efforts for SAI legal reforms 
are led by the SAI. 
 Yes, support by INTOSAI. SAI 
plans to approach donors. 
Media counter-productive. 
Parliament dominated by 
one party. 
17 No, constitutional reforms were 
approved in parliament but could 
not be adopted due to national 
political crisis. 
 Yes, all parties supported SAI 
reform. 
No, fragile country with ongoing 
violent conflicts, semi-
authoritarian system, low 
growth.  
 Yes, SAI initiated reform.   Yes, support by all political 
parties but political context 
impeded reform implemen-
tation. 
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Table 8.1 also shows that SAI reforms were not initiated or could not be implemented in 
countries which were neither characterized by open access for elites nor strong SAI 
leadership initiatives. In accordance with our definition of leadership, the interviewees 
have confirmed that leadership always involved multiple stakeholders who aligned be-
hind a common issue and so created a momentum for reform (change space, tipping 
point). 
When contrasting the findings of chapter seven and chapter six, I find that chapter six 
identified three main variables while chapter seven concluded with two main variables 
explaining the success or failure of SAI reform. As I have already discussed in the con-
clusion of chapter seven, this is because the definition of the leadership concept differed 
between the quantitative and the qualitative research parts. While chapter six defined 
leadership only through two measurable activities by the head of the SAI (participation 
in INTOSAI groups and speeches at UN/INTOSAI seminars), the qualitative research 
used the comprehensive concept of leadership as it was originally discussed in chapter 
five. It showed that reform was possible where “plural, functional and problem-oriented 
leadership created reform space” (Andrews, McConnell, and Wescott, 2010). While 
chapter six concluded that institutional diffusion, particularly the proximity to good per-
formers (H3a) was one of the main variables, regional peers and other stakeholders are 
contained in the concept of plural leadership in chapter seven.   
The findings also contrast each other in that the quantitative research resulted in the 
listing of many variables which have an influence on SAIs while the qualitative research 
discusses strategies which have been tried to solve the problems of SAIs; how these 
strategies have been developed, which kind of support or constraints facilitated or ham-
pered reform and what the result of the reform was. The two parts also contrast each 
other in that the findings from the quantitative research give very general statements 
while most of the statements from the interviewees concern particular events and situa-
tions. The interviewees were generally hesitant to make generalizations and would refer 
to the particularity of each country and circumstance in which a SAI finds itself. To 
come back to my research question, while all interviewees agreed that the political (but 
also the social, economic) environment of the SAI as the most important factor for some 
SAIs succeeding and others failing in transforming the SAI into a citizen-oriented, in-
dependent external audit institution, some SAI leaders pointed out that it is also in the 
ability of the SAI itself to empower itself and strengthen its legal framework as well as 
its reception in society. The term “empowerment” of the SAI, was not introduced by me 
but by interviewee 11, who very much insisted on the power of the SAI leaders to trans-
form their SAIs.  
Thus, leadership by the SAI head was identified by some interview partners as an essen-
tial variable explaining the success or failure of SAI reforms. This relationship was con-
firmed by the econometric tests. However, the effect does not seem to be as strong as 
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suggested by the subjective feeling of some interview partners. The variable measuring 
the SAI leadership strengths was very robust to model specifications and always 
showed in the right direction and kept its statistical significance. However, the existence 
of SAI leadership increases the power of a SAI only minimally while regional affiliation 
or judicial independence had a much stronger relationship. This is an example of “dou-
ble hermeneutics” when analyzing a particular phenomenon. The two findings in fact, 
do not contract each other. If I only look at the size of the coefficients, SAI leadership is 
not the strongest variable. On the other hand, this variable is very strong from a subjec-
tive point of view, because it can easily be influenced by a SAI leader himself/herself. A 
SAI can not influence the regional dynamic, the source of national income, the level of 
judiciary independence or even the institutional model of a SAI or its number of staff. 
On the other hand, management practices and agency by the SAI leaders themselves is 
something they can and have observed as influential variable.  
In addition to confirming the QUAN research, the QUAL research complements the 
QUAN research in that it captures the practice of reform as a subjective experience of 
SAI leaders and by explaining the relationship between variables. For instance, while 
the QUAN research only showed that the level of democratization of a country, includ-
ing the level of the attainment of civil and political rights, the level of social empower-
ment including expected years of education do have an influence on the power of a SAI, 
the influence of these kind of variables vanish when put together with variables measur-
ing the attainment of rule of law among elites and other doorstep conditions. The inter-
views provide us with further information. All interviewees recognize the important 
influence that the public has on political developments including SAI reforms. Howev-
er, they also pointed out that the political will of the executive and the general political 
game in place strongly condition whether the publid demand is met or not. Furthermore 
the interviews revealed that in a number of countries it is the SAI which raises the 
awareness of the public of its role and potentials and not the other way around. Thus 
public auditing for its technical nature is often little known by the public which then 
also leads to low levels of public demand for stronger SAIs.  
The findings of the quantitative research and the qualitative research also build upon 
each other. After a first round of statistical tests, I conducted the qualitative interviews. 
One of the revelations of the interviews was that SAI leadership turned out to be a cru-
cial variable to explain the difference across SAIs. As a consequence I developed a var-
iable which could capture this aspect and tested it on the statistical data. It turned out as 
statistically significant and confirmed the positive influence on SAIs. There was also 
influence the other way around. During the interviews, I also at times asked concrete 
questions about the attainment of the doorstep conditions. Thus although the objective 
of the qualitative research part was inductive theory building, there was also some space 
to engage in deductive theory testing.  
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In order to further test my hypotheses, I also engaged in a final round of feedback from 
the practitioners. I presented my research findings at the 26
rd
 Annual International Con-
ference of the International Consortium on Governmental Financial Management 
(ICGFM), which took place from April 29 to May 4, 2012 in Miami, Florida, USA.  
The feedback to my presentation was extraordinarily positive. Many conference partici-
pants approached me (including the representatives of the SAIs of the USA, Uganda, 
Pakistan, Cameroon) to tell me how important they consider my research. I also re-
ceived several invitations for publication. At the conference, there is also a possibility 
for the speakers to receive direct feedback on specific questions from the audience. The 
conference organizers provide the speakers with an interactive response technology that 
allows yes/no or multiple choice questions to be posed to the audience. The conference 
participants can anonymously vote on the answers with individual voting devices that 
are distributed each day. Their cumulative responses are then displayed immediately. I 
incorporated this technique into my presentation before giving any information on my 
own hypothesis or research findings on the role of SAI leadership. I posed the following 
question during my presentation: 
Figure 8.1 ICGFM Participants' Opinion 
© Grant Thornton. All rights reserved.
Can a committed and engaged head of a 
supreme audit institution implement reforms 
even in an unfavorable political environment?
1 2 3
44%
13%
44%
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not sure
 
The polling result clearly shows that the participants were inconclusive.
297
 There might 
be several reasons for this. Maybe the question was not clearly formulated. It should 
have said initiate reforms or create political will instead of suggesting that the head of 
the SAI can fully implement the reforms. Another reason might be the different experi-
ences by the participants themselves. As suggested above, those conference participants 
with positive records of reform might be inclined to vote “Yes”, while those with nega-
tive personal records might be inclined to vote “No”. I also need to note that this was 
not a conference of SAI leaders but of PFM specialists. While some of the participants 
were SAI leaders, others probably drew on their personal reform experiences from other 
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PFM institutions. To conclude, the polling results were indecisive, which points out a 
need for further research.  
To sum up, the choice of a mixed methods design to investigate explanations on the 
variation across SAIs was an adequate method as it yielded very interesting findings. In 
addition this project benefits from the strength of each method and has to some extent 
leveled out the weakness of the other method. Finally, the comparative analysis of SAIs 
serves as a case for studying institutionalization processes of public accountability. This 
research has indeed helped me to draw general inferences on the proposed hypotheses, 
which should also contain validity for other arrangements providing for horizontal ac-
countability, most importantly anti-corruption bodies.  
8.2.  Synthesis  
Now I will discuss the overall results of this dissertation. This subchapter shows how 
my findings confirm, refute or modify existing theory. This discussion will then lead to 
the overall conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
The original motivation behind this dissertation was the interest in understanding how 
the gap between human rights commitments and the often appalling factual situation on 
the ground can be closed. Based on an advocacy perspective my original question asked 
how citizens can participate in budget processes in order to claim the realization of their 
rights not only in the form of laws but also in the form of budget allocations that actual-
ly reaches the intended purpose. Instead of right away engaging in detailed field re-
search I conducted what Harrits (2011 quoting Bourdieu, 1973) calls a break with 
common sense. I tested the validity and innovative nature of my preliminary question 
through twenty semi-structured interviews with experts in various fields of research in 
England and at Stanford University. The outcome of this preliminary phase of research 
was that I changed my overall question and the research design. I had realized that insti-
tutions matter. Instead of asking how the newly created participatory mechanisms can 
be institutionalized, it first of all makes sense to understand how the existing formal 
institutions created to assure public accountability can become more effective. Citizen 
pressure on the government and citizen cooperation with these institutions can of course 
play an important role. However, as I discovered in the preliminary interviews, other 
factors too might influence the effective institutionalization of public accountability. I 
concluded chapter two with the formulation of the adapted overall research question: 
How do institutions providing for public accountability develop, consolidate and en-
dure? Otherwise put: How is public accountability institutionalized? 
The objective of chapter three was to justify the method of case study research, particu-
larly the choice of a comparative analyisis of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) from a 
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gloal perspective as a case study. Chapter three started with an introduction of the role 
and function of SAIs and a discussion of the concept of public accountability. Based on 
this background information, I then assessed whether SAIs can be understood as ac-
countability arrangements. I conducted a content analysis of the International Standards 
of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs) and so examined whether SAIs understand 
themselves as accountability arrangements and if yes what accountability purpose they 
aim to serve. I concluded this chapter with the following insights: SAIs have a common 
understanding of being accountability arrangements, mainly providing for constitutional 
accountability, but partly also guaranteeing democratic accountability and increasingly 
also taking on roles for assuring a learning accountability. Therefore, SAIs qualify as a 
case study for the research on the effective institutionalization of public accountability 
arrangements.  
Chapter four then took stock of the current situation of SAIs from a global, comparative 
perspective. A first literature review concluded that there is hardly any research on SAIs 
available and therefore instead of quickly going to developing a theory-based argument, 
I first needed to take time to develop some more background information. I therefore 
conducted a cross-national assessment of the power of SAIs world-wide. I developed 
sevenl rankings based on five surveys and analyzed the results. I compared the methods 
used and the distribution of powerful SAIs across regions. I concluded this section that 
there is a wide variation of powerful SAIs across countries but also within regions. 
Based on this insight I developed the specific research question of this dissertation, 
“Why does citizen-focused, independent external public auditing thrive in some coun-
tries and fail in others?” 
These three chapters constitute the first phase of the research, i.e. the background or 
thesis on which my own research builds. The development of the background actually 
already comprised several original pieces of research: the preliminary expert interviews 
on the state of research and potential research gaps, the definition of SAIs as accounta-
bility arrangements through a content analysis of the ISSAIs and the cross-national as-
sessment of the power of SAIs through the development and comparison of SAI rank-
ings.   
I then proceeded to chapter five or phase two of the research. In chapter five I devel-
oped the argument. Again, due to the lack of previous similar studies available, I devot-
ed a whole chapter to the discussion of potential determinants for the development, con-
solidation and endurance of powerful SAIs. I developed hypotheses which are based on 
seven strands of theory. Based on a review of these theories, my main argument sug-
gested that,  
while the institutional arrangements for government auditing, the nature of the 
source of national income, the external influence on reform, the local demand 
for public accountability and the technical and organizational capacities of SAIs 
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matter, the political economy of inter-elite relations and the existence of plural, 
functional and problem-oriented leadership creating reform space ultimately 
explains the development, consolidation and endurance of powerful SAIs. 
In chapter six, I investigated the argument through econometric models. The objective 
of chapter six was to explore relationships between potential determinants and the pow-
er of a SAI from an objective view. This chapter used the data developed in chapter four 
on the rankings of SAIs as the dependent variables. While the low quality of the data 
and the fact that the model is only tested one point in time does not allow drawing relia-
ble causal inferences, it provides an exploration of the data and the development of ten-
tative conclusions. These conclusions can be investigated through more elaborate econ-
ometric research; once more data on SAIs become available. This overall exploration of 
the data gives a bird’s view, an overview, of the potential causes for the variation in SAI 
power around the world. While the scope of this dissertation did not permit to conduct 
in depth-case study research of one SAI, I chose to conduct mini-case analyses in order 
to carry out a limited form of nested analysis (Liebermann, 2005). Overall, this chapter 
confirmed my main argument. I suggested that the three variables which were most ro-
bust to model specification were regional influence (H3a snowballing effect), the level 
of independence of the judiciary (H6a rule of law for elites) and SAI leadership (H7). 
In a next step, I explored the research question through qualitative, interpretative re-
search. The objective of phase three, or chapter seven, was to learn about the subject’s 
perspective. What do the heads of SAIs think are the main factors explaining the varia-
tion across SAIs and how do they experience the reform process? How do they think 
institutions for public accountability develop, consolidate and endure? The objective of 
this part of the research was not primarily to test the argument, but to gain additional 
information. And indeed, while the interviewees confirmed many hypotheses that were 
already developed before, they also contrasted some of the findings, and most im-
portantly they added new insights, not only on the actual process and their personal, 
subjective views but also a new hypothesis, which I had neglected before (i.e. the role of 
leadership). I then went back to chapter five and six and developed and tested the final 
hypothesis.  
Chapter eight is the final part of the research. Instead of simply adding up the various 
pieces of research, I mixed the research parts through triangulation methods. I used the 
main findings from the QUAN research and contrasted them with findings from the 
QUAL research. The convergence tables (C.7 and 8.1) show that both research parts can 
be united as they support and confirm each other. The quantitative research tested the 
existence and the direction between variables and the qualitative research explained the 
processes in place. I concluded, that overall, the two main factors explaining the varia-
tion of the power of SAIs across countries are (1) the political economy of inter-elite 
relations (rule of law for elites) and (2) the existence of plural, functional and problem-
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oriented leadership (led by the head of the SAI, but also involving peers, donors, media, 
civil society, parliamentarians etc.) creating reform space. Finally, I also engaged in 
another round of feedback from the practitioners (by holding a presentation at an inter-
national conference). Here again, my argument was not falsified.  
To sum up, I started this dissertation with a discussion of the concept of accountability 
and first analyzed whether SAIs qualify as accountability arrangements. I could show 
that SAIs as defined in the ISSAIs clearly aspire to be accountability arrangements, par-
ticularly providing for constitutional accountability. I continued with a literature review 
and analysis of descriptive statistics of SAIs and concluded that SAIs often lack the 
power to implement their accountability aspirations in practice. The main reason for this 
gap in many countries despite the lack of capacity and resources is the lack of political 
will to implement reform. I then proposed three main factors which condition the devel-
opment of this political will, namely external influence and support (by peers and do-
nors), specific inter-elite relationships, particularly characterized through open access 
relations among elites, and plural, functional and problem-oriented leadership (by the 
head of the SAI) creating space where reforms can take place. I tested these proposi-
tions through multiple regression analyses and semi-structured expert interviews, which 
were analyzed from an interpretative perspective using inductive qualitative content 
analysis. Both research methods verified or at least did not falsify my main argument. 
The main findings of this thesis then are: 
 The question how institutions guaranteeing public accountability develop, con-
solidate and endure is an important research gap from a human rights, develop-
ment and public finance perspective. 
 Supreme Audit Institutions have evolved to understanding themselves as ac-
countability arrangements in all three aspects (democratic accountability, consti-
tutional accountability, learning accountability) and thus as crucial links within 
the chain of public finance accountability. 
 However, there are huge differences across countries and when comparing the 
de jure situation with the de facto implementation of legal requirements. 
 Recent research points out that political economy factors are the most important 
determinants for the de facto institutionalization of independent external audit 
institutions. Based on an extensive review of seven strands of literature, I devel-
oped a main argument.  
 The QUAN analysis confirmed hypothesis H1. Holding other variables constant, 
the court institutional model of a SAI is associated with weaker SAI power. 
However, the QUAL research pointed out that the institutional model does not 
matter and that the experience of Brazil as well as recent reforms in France and 
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Turkey show that SAI’s with a court system have opened themselves up to the 
public, increased their cooperation with the legislature and expanded their audit-
ing roles.  
 The QUAN and QUAL analyses confirmed, although with weak statistical valid-
ity and view interview responses, hypothesis H2. The nature of the source of na-
tional income matters, whereby natural resource endowments are associated with 
weak SAIs and high levels of income tax are associated with stronger SAIs in 
the context of developing countries. Public finance management support seems 
to be associated with stronger levels of SAI power if they are part of country 
wide reform programs.  
 The QUAN and QUAL research also confirmed the hypothesis H3 on interna-
tional diffusion. The snowballing effect through the proximity to good perform-
ers matters a lot, while international commitments do not automatically translate 
into national implementation, and a post-conflict situation can be an opportunity 
for reform. 
 The richer and the more democratic a country is, the more likely it is also that its 
SAI is strong (H4). The QUAL research revealed mixed experiences by SAIs 
with civil society and the media. Several SAIs mentioned the public as an im-
portant ally in the struggle for reform. Some SAIs pointed out that they had bad 
experiences with publishing the reports because journalists did not have the ca-
pacity to make use of them and instead misused the reports for party propagan-
da. Again another SAI pointed out that the public was too illiterate to be able to 
engage in such technical issues as public finance oversight.   
 QUAL research supported the hypothesis that technical capacity building was 
essential for SAIs to succeed in their reform efforts (H5). The results from the 
QUAN research tentatively pointed out that capacity building was associated 
with stronger SAIs if it is provided on long term and if it incapacity building on 
how to deal with the SAI’s external environment.  
 Overall, both the QUAN and the QUAL research confirmed my main argument. 
The findings have been converged and contrasted. The expert interviews provid-
ed an insight into the practice of reform, explaining processes linking various 
variables. The quantitative model was confirmed through the inductive theory 
building in chapter seven. The main factors explaining the variation in SAI 
strength according to the experts were political will and SAI leadership, which 
included the support by external and internal stakeholders. Some interviewees 
highlighted that while the political, social and economic environment matters for 
the effective institutionalization of SAIs; assertive leaders can find partners and 
mobilize support and finally still be successful, even in difficult settings. 
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 Although it is important to recognize the specificities of each reform context, 
this study has succeeded to develop some general models. They can help to con-
duct a situational analysis as a basis for the development of adequate, context-
specific reform strategies.  
 This dissertation has confirmed the theory by North, Wallis, and Weingast 
(2009) and other studies on authoritarianism and rational choice institutionalism, 
which suggest that the nature of the relationship among elites is more important 
for the institutionalization process of public accountability than are public de-
mand or technical capacity.   
 This dissertation has equally confirmed the validity of theories on development 
as leadership-led change (Andrews, McConnell, and Wescott, 2010). 
8.3. Conclusions 
„When I had all the answers, the questions changed..."298  
This dissertation investigates the topical issue of public accountability and how it is 
effectively institutionalized. How do institutions providing for public accountability 
develop, consolidate and endure? In order to answer this overall research question a 
case study approach was chosen. Supreme Audit Institutions are an example of a formal 
institution with the purpose to guarantee public accountability. A comparative assess-
ment of the power of SAIs world-wide has revealed that there are strong differences 
across countries. Based on this insight, I asked the specific research question, why does 
citizen-focused, independent external public auditing thrive in some countries and fail in 
others? This dissertation has shown that while the institutional arrangements for gov-
ernment auditing, the nature of the source of national income, the external influence on 
reform, the local demand for public accountability and the technical and organizational 
capacities of SAIs matter, the political economy of inter-elite relations and the existence 
of SAI leadership ultimately conditions the effective institutionalization of SAIs as ac-
countability arrangements. This dissertation’s reply to its overall research question is 
then: Institutions providing for public accountability develop, consolidate and endure if 
there is plural, functional and problem-oriented leadership strategically advocating for 
reform and if elite groups are brought into a situation where they lose less by accepting 
reform than by resisting reform. 
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This research addresses a huge research gap as Supreme Audit Institutions have largely 
been neglected in practice and particularly also in research. This dissertation has how-
ever not only contributed to the literature on SAIs but more generally on the scholarship 
on development, democratic transition and public expenditure management.  
The development literature has in the last few years been highlighting the need for more 
studies from the disciplines of political economy and new institutional economics, and 
for adopting a positivist approach. Instead of focusing on what should be realized in an 
ideal world, several research institutes now stress that it is crucial to first understand 
why things are the way they are. Development defined as the realization of all human 
rights for all requires effective state institutions. But, why do formal institutions provid-
ing for public accountability often not work effectively? This study has shown through 
qualitative and quantitative methods that the institutionalization of public accountability 
is primarily a political and an agency problem and that external influence matters. What 
is particularly interesting and provocative is the notion that changing inter-elite relation-
ships may be more important than creating pressure from below for SAI reforms to suc-
ceed. In the past, citizen participation has been praised as a solution to many develop-
ment problems. However, today several scholars stress that political will, local owner-
ship and elite relationships are the most crucial factors for governance reforms to suc-
ceed. Furthermore, this dissertation also suggests that adopting a political economy ap-
proach for aid programs seems promising. One of the statistical findings was that where 
donors had included the aspect of building the capacity of SAIs to deal with their exter-
nal environment, the SAIs were stronger than where capacity building measures did not 
include this aspect, holding all other variables constant.  
Second, this dissertation contributes to advancing the scholarship on democtratic transi-
tions, including the scholarship on authoritarianism. This field of research has been 
highlighting the hybrid nature of many regimes; with democratic institutions that are de 
jure in place but de facto do not deliver on their promises. The quantitative and the 
qualitative data have confirmed this observation. There are hardly any very powerful 
SAIs, not in old and in new democracies. The question how the three doorstep condi-
tions develop remains a very topical and largely unresolved one. Equally, the role of the 
threat of violence in society generally and versus auditors in particular is an important 
field of further research.  
Third, this dissertation has contributed to the literature on public expenditure manage-
ment. This field of study has highlighted the need for transparency and accountability 
and thus for an effective institutional environment where PEM reforms can take place. 
This field of research has also highlighted in recent years the need for a systemic ap-
proach to reform and for more studies on the inter-institutional linkages. Few studies 
have linked research on PFM reforms with the literature of transitology and the political 
economy of development.  
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Now that I have answered my research questions, new ones open up. This dissertation 
suggests that there is a promising potential for further research on institutionalization 
processes in general and SAIs in particular. There is a huge need of in depth country 
case studies and historic analyses of SAI developments. As Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012:462) point out in their new book, whether public demand for accountability is 
met and ultimately durable political reform occurs, depends a lot “on the history of eco-
nomic and political institutions, on the many small differences that matter and on the 
very contingent path of history”. Instead of open access they use the term inclusive in 
their book. Specifically, they speak of inclusive development and of inclusive institu-
tions. This brings me back to the starting point of my thesis, where I asked how budget 
processes can be made inclusive. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that inclusive 
institutions are the result of open societies and open economies. They show that small 
institutional changes matter and that critical junctures can put countries on a certain 
developmental path. I therefore strongly encourage future research to engage in histori-
cal analyses of SAIs’ developmental paths. Andrews (2012) also argues in his recent 
blog entry that lessons from Sweden’s success in PFM reforms are “less about the 
mechanisms and systems and rules they have in place today, and more about the pro-
cesses they went through to find and fit these mechanisms, systems and rules.” 299  
Furthermore, there is equally a huge need for more statistical data and analysis, particu-
larly time series analysis. There is a need for anthropological studies such as studying 
elite motivations to agree or resist the institutionalization of public accountability. There 
is also scope for research within the discipline of political economy, particularly game 
theoretic and spatial models of rational choice in order to develop more elaborate ex-
planatory models on the decision making processes.   
Prospective future research should test my main conclusions. Does leadership truly mat-
ter, even in difficult political environments? Is the nature of the inter-elite relationship 
indeed more crucial for the success of reform initiatives than public demand? Does in-
ternational influence, pressure and support indeed make a difference to the success of 
reform initiatives? Future research should also explore the question how more effective 
synergies between formal and informal institutions of public finance accountability can 
be developed. Particularly, what are the opportunities and challenges for a stronger col-
laboration of civil society organizations with Supreme Audit Institutions? There is 
scope for the study of SAI reforms including policy auditing and how such reforms can 
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be linked to donor strategies and human rights monitoring processes
300
 in line with an 
analysis of the inter-institutional linkages, particularly a stronger cooperation with civil 
society organizations.  
I close this dissertation with a number of recommendations for strengthening SAIs. I 
suggest five main strategies for a comprehensive approach to consolidate SAIs as pow-
erful accountability arrangements that endure: 
I. Analyze the problem correctly. 
II. Invest in capacity building. 
III. Empower the SAI leadership. 
IV. Build up coordinated pressure from all sides 
V. Nurture and spread a culture of integrity. 
 
I. Analyze the problem correctly:  
In order to be successful in strengthening the power of any SAI, first of all it is neces-
sary to analyze and understand the problem correctly. Sok (2012), Budget Director, 
Cambodian Ministry of Economy, highlighted at his speech at the 26
th
 Annual Interna-
tional Conference of the International Consortium on Governmental Financial Man-
agement (ICGFM), “First you need to understand the problem correctly. Then 50% of 
the problem is solved.” Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock also “call for development 
projects that are (i) problem driven, (ii) iterative--where future steps build on lessons 
learned from past steps, and (iii) involving many agents working together across space 
and time.”301 
Any reform program should thereofore be based on a profound problem analysis. This 
problem or situational analysis should not only examine the capacities and internal or-
ganization of the SAI and its direct environment (parliamentary budget committee, in-
ternal audit department, ministry of finance, public pressure groups), but it also needs to 
include an overall analysis of how elite groups currently preserve social order and how 
they prevent violence.  
INTOSAI, under leadership of the INTOSAI Working Group on the Value and Benefits 
of SAIs (WGVBS), is currently developing a SAI Performance Measurement Frame-
work (SAI PFM). The draft structure of the SAI PFM suggests that performance will be 
measured by indicators in seven domains and a narrative report, which will analyze “ex-
ternal factors like country context and political economy, which may enable or hamper 
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the SAI’s performance.” (INTOSAI-Donor Cooperation, 2012:2) Such an approach is 
very promising and will help the SAI and donors identify which areas need strengthen-
ing and where they should target efforts.
302
  
II. Invest in capacity building 
The qualitative interviews but also tentative results from the statistical analyses confirm 
that there is no question about the fact that SAIs need competent staff and adequate in-
frastructure.  
It is very encouraging to see that the INTOSAI-Donor Cooperation has launched a wide 
range of new programs to strengthen the capacity of SAIs worldwide. It has established 
a global pooled fund for SAI capacity development, launched the ISSAI Implementa-
tion Initiative (3i programme) and the SAI Capacity Development Database.
303
 Howev-
er, this research project has also shown that capacity building by itself is not enough. 
So, donors should not stop there. 
III. Empower the SAI leadership 
The qualitative interviews suggested that SAI leadership capacity and commitment is 
crucial for a SAI’s reform success.304 This was consequently tested and confirmed 
through statistical analyses. I therefore claim that the empowerment of the SAI leader-
ship, to believe in reform success, to engage in learning processes and to build alliances 
with partners and create a momentum for change (“change space”) is indeed essential 
for strengthening SAIs.  
INTOSAI is currently implementing a number of programs and activities to support the 
empowerment of SAI leaders, including management workshops for SAI leaders. The 
interview partners suggested that the networking opportunities in working groups, re-
gional groups and at the international level and visiting other SAIs are very important 
tools in this respect. The INTOSAI Journal on Government Auditing also provides a 
popular space for SAI leaders to publish their achievements and promote their cause.  
IV. Build up coordinated pressure from all sides 
Today all studies on PFM reforms (see chapters 2.3., 4.2.) as well as the results of this 
dissertation suggest that a political economy approach to reform is necessary. However, 
this is more easily said than practiced. It is easier for donors to implement technical ca-
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pacity building programs than programs which are based on a political economy ap-
proach to reform. My own experience as project coordinator of a large advocacy project 
in Tanzania taught me the lesson that such projects are risky, need to be based on a long 
time frame and that the outcome of political and social processes is by definition always 
uncertain. It requires a lot of effort and know-how to implement an advocacy project 
with the objective to strengthen the independence and role of a SAI at the national level. 
The SAI could develop alliances with the donor community in its country, civil society, 
the media, academia and private business, but of course most importantly with parlia-
mentarians and the political parties. It needs to convince key persons of the need to 
strengthen its independence as well as inform the public on its mission and role. The 
crucial point however is that SAIs cannot be autonomous from the elite structure in the 
country; they need to be embedded in their interests. They need to be pareto-improving 
and self-enforcing; otherwise they risk becoming so called “empty-shell” institutions. 
Thus powerful groups actively resisting reforms need to be put into a position where the 
benefits outweigh potential costs of accepting reforms. This can be achieved if there is 
pressure from above and below, exit strategies in the form of rewards or incentives and 
above all leadership advocating for SAI reform. 
My outlook on developing such pressure for strengthening the independence and legal 
framework of SAIs, overall is promising, despite the global trend of declining political 
rights and civil liberties. In the policy area of public finance transparency and accounta-
bility, there seems to be a momentum for change as a consequence to the global finan-
cial, economic and debt crises. The interview partners were also overwhelmingly posi-
tive and motivated and recent INTOSAI initiatives, above all the first UN General As-
sembly resolution on SAIs
305
, suggest that there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic 
on the future of SAIs worldwide. The UN resolution is part of INTOSAI’s efforts to 
strengthen the independence of SAIs. It is a very powerful advocacy tool for SAIs as  
the Lima and Mexico Declarations have for the first time been recognized by all UN 
member states. This initiative supports two strategic priorities of INTOSAI, as laid out 
in its Strategic Plan for the period 2011-2016, namely to “Help Ensure Independence of 
SAIs” and to “Demonstrate the Value and Benefits of SAIs”.306 It is very encouraging 
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that INTOSAI has developed such a proactive and comprehensive approach to strength-
ening the power of SAIs on a national level but also as a community of like minded 
institutions world-wide. Given the success of the INTOSAI-Donor cooperation, 
INTOSAI could also envisage developing other partnerships to strengthen its advocacy 
work on the national and international level. It could strategically engage with parlia-
mentarians through the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)
307
 and with governments and 
civil society through the Open Government Partnership (OGP)
308
, the Global Civil So-
ciety Movement for Budget Transparency, Accountability, and Participation (BTAP)
309
 
and the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT)
310
. Finally, while INTOSAI 
actively maintains its website and publishes news and case studies of public sector au-
diting reforms in its freely available International Journal of Government Auditing
311
 it 
has not yet been active in social media networks (such as facebook, twitter and others). 
Such an engagement could however help bringing INTOSAI closer to citizens and sup-
port its international activities. 
V. Nurture and spread a culture of transparency and integrity 
Informal norms, belief and habits do matter. North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a; 
2009b) provide a conceptual framework for understanding social orders. They show that 
the analysis of violence, institutions, organizations, and beliefs is central for an under-
standing of economic and political development processes. The importance of personal 
beliefs, motivations but particularly also organizational and national culture, tradition 
and history has been highlighted by many interview partners. INTOSAI has the im-
portant function to act as role model and to support the promotion of SAIs that are role 
models in their region and understand themselves as arrangements whose mission it is 
to guarantee public accountability. Donors are particularly challenged in this respect to 
implement their own commitments to transparency, integrity and mutual accountability 
as signed in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
312
, the 2008 Accra Agenda 
for Action
313
 and at the 4
th
 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 29 Nov-01 Dec, 
                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.intosai.org/uploads/intosaispenglishv9web.pdf (Last Accessed on September 20, 
2012)   
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 http://www.ipu.org/ (Last Accessed on November 20, 2012) 
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 INTOSAI and ist work groups should register as expert organizations in the Open Government 
Partnership Roster or organizations that are available to work with governments on developing 
and implementing their Open Government Commitments.  
http://www.opengovpartnership.org/suppliers (Last Accessed on October 31, 2012) 
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 http://www.makebudgetspublic.org/ (Last Accessed on September 20, 2012) 
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 http://fiscaltransparency.net/ (Last Accessed on November 20, 2012) 
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 http://www.intosaijournal.org/ (Last Accessed on November 20, 2012) 
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Accessed on September 20, 2012) 
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Accessed on September 20, 2012) 
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Busan, Korea where 150 countries and 45 international organizations signed the new 
Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.
314
     
It is the task of future research to evaluate to what extent these five strategies proofed 
valid for effectively strengthening the independence, capacity and value of SAIs.   
To sum up, structural factors, technical capacities and institutional design have been 
identified as important factors explaining the variation across SAIs. However, this does 
not mean that SAIs can hide behind the constraints inherent in their set up or stemming 
from an unfavorable socio-political environment. As interviewee 11 pointed out, head 
of SAIs should empower themselves and courageously initiate reforms: 
I11:”The tendency of many SAIs is to play victim mentality that is not the way 
you operate as a leader. Leadership is about influencing events, it is not about 
being submissive to the circumstance. You need to put a lot of effort in building 
a leader.” 
I close this dissertation by encouraging everybody who is working on making external 
public auditing more citizen-focused and independent, to stay persevering like inter-
viewee 12 when convincing others of the need to reform,  
I12: “I never accept a “no”. If someone does not agree with me, I will come 
back to him again and again until he agrees with me. A “no” is not a possible 
answer for me.”  
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http://www.oecd.org/dac/aideffectiveness/49650173.pdf; 
http://www.oecd.org/development/aideffectiveness/ (Last Accessed on October 31,2012);  
 See also Atwood (2012) on the process that led to the formation of the Global Partnership. 
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Table 8.2 Research Results of Chapter Eight 
qual data collection qual data analysis 
Procedures: 
 Research potential triangulation 
methods 
 Present and discuss research findings 
with experts at an international con-
ference and discuss research findings 
with conference participants during 
the five days 
 Prepare a question for the confer-
ence poll and use an interactive re-
sponse tool to ask a question during 
the conference presentation 
 Send the conference paper to inter-
ested persons for feedback 
Procedures: 
 Converge the research findings from 
chapters 6 and 7 by cross-tabulating 
QUAN with QUAL results 
 Analyze how the two main data sets 
support each other or differ 
 Develop an overall synthesis combin-
ing findings of all chapters 
 Develop overall conclusions 
Products: 
 A list of potential triangulation 
methodologies and methods availa-
ble 
 Notes from informal discussions with 
participants at the international 
ICGFM conference 
 1 question asked and instantly re-
plied by conference participants 
 Written feedback on conference pa-
per by two experts 
Products: 
 Convergence tables 8.1. and C.7 
combining QUAN + QUAL results 
 Discussion of how variables relate to 
each other 
 Discussion of benefits of merging to 
different data sets 
 Discussion of how my research vali-
dates, falsifies or modifies existing 
theory 
 Feedback from SAI leaders and other 
experts at an international confer-
ence 
 Answering the research question  in 
the conclusion and providing direc-
tions for research and policy devel-
opment 
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Appendices 
A) Appendices to Chapters One - Three  
Appendix A. 1 Common Elements of Worldviews and Implications for Practice (Creswell and Clark, 
2007:24 based on Lincoln and Guba, 2000; Creswell, 2003) 
Worldview Ele-
ment 
Postpositivism Constructivism Advocacy and 
Participatory 
Pragmatism 
Ontology (What 
is the nature of 
reality?) 
Singular reality 
(e.g., research-
ers reject or fail 
to reject  hy-
potheses) 
Multiple reali-
ties (e.g., re-
searchers pro-
vide quotes to 
illustrate differ-
ent perspec-
tives) 
Political reality 
(e.g., findings 
are negotiated 
with partici-
pants) 
Singular and 
multiple realities 
(e.g., research-
ers test hypoth-
eses and provide 
multiple per-
spectives) 
Epistemology 
(What is the 
relationship 
between the 
researcher and 
that being re-
searched?) 
Distance and 
impartiality 
(e.g., research-
ers objectively 
collect data on 
instruments) 
Closeness (e.g., 
researchers visit 
participants at 
their sites to 
collect data) 
Collaboration 
(e.g., research-
ers actively in-
volve partici-
pants as collabo-
rators) 
Practicality (e.g., 
researchers 
collect data by 
“what works” to 
address re-
search question) 
Axiology (What 
is the role of 
values?) 
Unbiased (e.g., 
researchers use 
checks to elimi-
nate bias) 
Biased (e.g., 
researchers 
actively talk 
about their bi-
ases and inter-
pretations) 
Biased and ne-
gotiated (e.g., 
researchers 
negotiated with 
participants 
about interpre-
tations) 
Multiple stances 
(e.g., research-
ers include both 
biased and un-
biased perspec-
tives) 
Methodology 
(What is the 
process of re-
search?) 
Deductive (e.g., 
researchers test 
an a priori theo-
ry) 
Inductive (e.g., 
researchers start 
with partici-
pants’ views and 
build “up” to 
patterns, theo-
ries, and gener-
alizations) 
Participatory 
(e.g., research-
ers involve par-
ticipants in all 
stages of the 
research and 
engage in cycli-
cal reviews of 
results) 
Combining (e.g., 
researchers 
collect both 
quantitative and 
qualitative data 
and mix them) 
Rhetoric (What 
is the language 
of research?) 
Formal style 
(e.g., research-
ers use agreed-
on definitions of 
variables) 
Informal style 
(e.g., research-
ers write in a 
literary, informal 
style) 
Advocacy and 
change (e.g., 
researchers use 
language that 
will help bring 
about change 
and advocate 
for participants) 
Formal or in-
formal (e.g., 
researchers may 
employ both 
formal and in-
formal styles of 
writing.  
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Start: Model building (breaking with common sense) 
Assessment: Possible to 
suggest a coherent model? 
Model-testing quantitative analysis 
(Opus operatum) 
Assessment: Does the 
analysis fit the model? 
Appendix A. 2 Mixed Methods Research as Praxeological Knowledge (Harrits, 2011:158) (“Phases are 
my own addition”) 
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Appendix A. 3 The PEFA Performance Framework
315 
 
 
Appendix A. 4 Accountability Cycles of the Budget Process (DFID, 2005)
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 http://www.pefa.org/en/content/pefa-framework (Last Accessed on August 20, 2012) 
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B) Appendices to Chapters Four - Six  
Appendix B. 1 Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variable Measuring the Power of SAIs 
Variable name Variable 
Description 
N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Median Min Max Range Skewness Kurtosis  Standard 
error  
Variance 
 
OBS2010 See 5. 1.(1) 94 48.35 24.27      50 0 100 100 0.07     -0.71 2.50 589.09 
GI0810 See 5.1.(2) 70 56.36 23.25      56 14 97   83 -0.08     -1.00 2.78 540.76 
PEFA-26 See 5.1.(3) 61 35.69 26.65      17 0 84 84 0.51     -0.98 3.41 224.93 
PEFA-26mean See 5.1.(3) 61 43.80 26.69 44 0 89 89 -0.09     -1.16 3.42 710.35 
OECD See 5.1.(4) 97 68.72 15.00      71 31 93 62 -0.74     -0.07 1.52 712.09 
SAIstrength (IDI) See 5.1.(5) 183 0.8027 0.2 0.83 0.13  1.00 0.87 -1.05 0.56 0.01 0.04 
1.8.time.limit.new1 
(IDI, binomial 
var.) 
See 5.1.(5) 183 0.71 0.45 1 0 1 1 -0.92 -1.16 0.03 0.21 
1.8.time.limit.new 
(IDI, multinomial 
variable) 
See 5.1.(5) 183 0.75 0.41 1 0 1 1 -1.15 -0.52 0.03 0.17 
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Appendix B. 2 Histograms and Kernel Density Curves for all SAI variables 
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Appendix B. 3 Scores for SAI Power in Country Order 
Scores for SAI 
Strength 
OBS2010 GI08-10 OECD PEFA-26 PEFA-26mean 
number of countries 
surveyed 
94 70 97 61 61 
period assessed data as of 
15.9.2009 
GI 2008, 
2009, 2010 
covering 
data be-
tween June 
2008-June 
2010 
2007/2008 2008-2011 2008-2011 
number of questions 
used to calculate score 
10 11 6 3 3 
survey respondents NGOs incl. 
peer review 
process 
NGOs incl. 
peer review 
process 
Government 
officials 
governments 
incl. donor 
review pro-
cess 
governments incl. 
donor review 
process 
Afghanistan 27   
 
33 33 
Albania  50 88 80   
Algeria 13 28    
Angola 10 16     
Argentina 47 62 71   
Armenia    17 22 
Australia   81   
Austria   89    
Azerbaijan  20 47    
Bangladesh 30 54    
Belarus  23  17 44 
Belgium   80   
Benin   57   
Bhutan    84 89 
Bolivia 37 84 77 17 56 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 93 51 56   
Botswana 73  79 17 45 
Brazil 83  69 50 67 
Bulgaria 33 68 75   
Burkina Faso 23  59 17 33 
Burundi    17 11 
Cambodia 33 27 51   
Cameroon 3 29    
Canada  66 79   
Cape Verde    17 22 
Central African Republic    0 0 
Chad 7     
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Scores for SAI 
Strength 
OBS2010 GI08-10 OECD PEFA-26 PEFA-26mean 
Chile 80 44 33   
China 57 55    
Colombia 67 55  67 67 
Congo   44   
Congo (Dem. Rep.) 20   17 22 
Costa Rica 70  77 84 89 
Côte D'Ivoire    0 0 
Croatia 73  71   
Cyprus   53   
Czech Republic 67 91 53   
Denmark   93   
Dominican Republic 33   17 44 
Ecuador 40 28    
Egypt 30 17    
El Salvador 53   50 67 
Equatorial Guinea 0     
Ethiopia  54 67 50 55 
Fiji 7  93   
Finland   69   
France 77  64   
Georgia 53 49  17 56 
Germany 87  87   
Ghana 63 59 81 17 33 
Greece   77   
Guatemala 53 77  50 67 
Guinea   57   
Guinea Bissau    0 0 
Haiti   47 17 11 
Honduras 40   50 56 
(Hong Kong)   51   
Hungary  69 75   
Iceland   85   
India 67 89  17 33 
Indonesia 60 63 31   
Iraq 47 30    
Ireland   81   
Israel   60   
Italy 73 75 77   
Japan  50 85   
Jordan 27 65 64   
Kazakhstan 43 42    
Kenya 57 64 71 50 56 
Korea, Republic of (South 
K.) 
77 97 77   
 Appendices 239 
 
Scores for SAI 
Strength 
OBS2010 GI08-10 OECD PEFA-26 PEFA-26mean 
Kosovo  86  42 65 
Kyrgyz Republic 47 28 71 17 22 
Lao People's Democratic 
Republic 
   17 56 
Latvia   75   
Lebanon 13 65    
Lesotho   67   
Liberia 50 92 64 0 0 
Lithuania  41 79   
Luxembourg   73   
Macedonia 80 61    
Madagascar   33   
Malawi 23 84 67 17 22 
Malaysia 53 24    
Maldives    50 33 
Mali 53  67 0 0 
Malta   73   
Mauritania    17 22 
Mauritius   92 84 78 
Mexico 50 94 65   
Moldova  60 67 50 78 
Mongolia 57 58 71   
Montenegro  20    
Morocco 13 52 32 17 33 
Mozambique 27  60 17 33 
Namibia 50  73   
Nepal 57 53  17 33 
Netherlands   87   
New Zealand  93  81   
Nicaragua 23 23    
Niger 23   0 0 
Nigeria 17 35 53   
Norway 97  89 84 78 
Pakistan 43 55    
Papua New Guinea 33  45   
Paraguay    50 44 
Peru 57 91 65 84 78 
Philippines 60 38 81 84 84 
Poland 80 71 79   
Portugal 53  67   
Qatar   51   
Romania 63 53 67   
Russia 77 61 69   
Rwanda 53 81 85 50 61 
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Scores for SAI Strength OBS2010 GI08-10 OECD PEFA-26 PEFA-26mean 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
   17 33 
Samoa    17 11 
Sao Tome 30     
Saudi Arabia 23   17 22 
Senegal 23   33 33 
Serbia 30 14 40 67 67 
Seychelles    33 33 
Sierra Leone  68 60   
Slovakia 67  81   
Slovenia 97  73 50 56 
Solomon Islands   73   
Somalia  16    
South Africa 73 65 88 84 78 
Spain 50  77   
Sri Lanka 57     
Sudan  33     
Suriname   40   
Swaziland   71   
Sweden  87  68   
Switzerland   81   
(Taiwan)   77   
Tajikistan   40   
Tanzania 50 86  67 67 
Thailand 57  83   
Timor-Leste 0   50 67 
Togo    0 0 
Tonga    38 17 
Trinidad and Tobago 43   67 67 
Tunisia   36 17 67 
Turkey 37 57 83   
Uganda 33 49 64 50 67 
Ukraine  63 83 79   
UAE   53   
UK 80  89   
US 100 95 87   
Uruguay   67   
Venezuela 47 89 80   
Vietnam 43 50 64   
(West Bank and Gaza)  41    
Yemen 27 20  84 89 
Zambia 57  67   
Zimbabwe  70 71   
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Appendix B. 4 OBS2010 Ranking of SAI Power
Country OBS2010 
US 100 
Norway 97 
Slovenia 97 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
93 
New Zealand  93 
Germany 87 
Sweden  87 
Brazil 83 
UK 80 
Chile 80 
Macedonia 80 
Poland 80 
Korea, Repub-
lic of 
77 
France 77 
Russia 77 
Croatia 73 
Italy 73 
Botswana 73 
South Africa 73 
Costa Rica 70 
Colombia 67 
Czech Repub-
lic 
67 
India 67 
Slovakia 67 
Ghana 63 
Ukraine  63 
Romania 63 
Philippines 60 
Indonesia 60 
China 57 
Mongolia 57 
Nepal 57 
Sri Lanka 57 
Zambia 57 
Kenya 57 
Peru 57 
Thailand 57 
Malaysia 53 
Rwanda 53 
El Salvador 53 
Georgia 53 
Guatemala 53 
Mali 53 
Portugal 53 
Liberia 50 
Tanzania 50 
Albania  50 
Mexico 50 
Spain 50 
Namibia 50 
Argentina 47 
Kyrgyz Re-
public 
47 
Venezuela 47 
Iraq 47 
Pakistan 43 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
43 
Kazakhstan 43 
Vietnam 43 
Ecuador 40 
Honduras 40 
Bolivia 37 
Turkey 37 
Sudan  33 
Bulgaria 33 
Cambodia 33 
Papua New 
Guinea 
33 
Dominican 
Republic 
33 
Uganda 33 
Bangladesh 30 
Egypt 30 
Sao Tome 30 
Serbia 30 
Afghanistan 27 
Jordan 27 
Yemen 27 
Mozambique 27 
Saudi Arabia 23 
Burkina Faso 23 
Malawi 23 
Nicaragua 23 
Niger 23 
Senegal 23 
Azerbaijan  20 
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.) 
20 
Nigeria 17 
Algeria 13 
Lebanon 13 
Morocco 13 
Angola 10 
Chad 7 
Fiji 7 
Cameroon 3 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
0 
Timor-Leste 0 
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Appendix B. 5 GI0810 SAI Ranking
countries and 
territories 
GI08-
10 
Korea, Republic 
of 
97 
US 95 
Mexico 94 
Liberia 92 
Czech Republic 91 
Peru 91 
India 89 
Venezuela 89 
Albania  88 
Kosovo 86 
Tanzania 86 
Bolivia 84 
Malawi 84 
Ukraine  83 
Rwanda 81 
Guatemala 77 
Italy 75 
Poland 71 
Zimbabwe 70 
Hungary 69 
Sierra Leone 68 
Bulgaria 68 
Canada 66 
Jordan 65 
Lebanon 65 
South Africa 65 
Kenya 64 
Indonesia 63 
Argentina 62 
Macedonia 61 
Russia 61 
Moldova 60 
Ghana 59 
Mongolia 58 
Turkey 57 
Pakistan 55 
China 55 
Colombia 55 
Ethiopia 54 
Bangladesh 54 
Nepal 53 
Romania 53 
Morocco 52 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
51 
Japan 50 
Vietnam 50 
Georgia 49 
Uganda 49 
Azerbaijan  47 
Chile 44 
Kazakhstan 42 
Lithuania 41 
West Bank and 
Gaza 
41 
Philippines 38 
Nigeria 35 
Iraq 30 
Cameroon 29 
Algeria 28 
Ecuador 28 
Kyrgyz Republic 28 
Cambodia 27 
Malaysia 24 
Belarus 23 
Nicaragua 23 
Montenegro 20 
Yemen 20 
Egypt 17 
Angola 16 
Somalia 16 
Serbia 14 
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Appendix B. 6 PEFA-26 SAI Ranking
Countries and 
territories 
PEFA-
26 
Bhutan 84 
Costa Rica 84 
Mauritius 84 
Norway 84 
Peru 84 
Philippines 84 
South Africa 84 
Yemen 84 
Colombia 67 
Serbia 67 
Tanzania 67 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
67 
Brazil 50 
El Salvador 50 
Ethiopia 50 
Guatemala 50 
Honduras 50 
Kenya 50 
Maldives 50 
Moldova 50 
Paraguay 50 
Rwanda 50 
Slovenia 50 
Timor-Leste 50 
Uganda 50 
Kosovo 42 
Tonga 38 
Afghanistan 33 
Senegal 33 
Seychelles 33 
Armenia 17 
Belarus 17 
Bolivia 17 
Botswana 17 
Burkina Faso 17 
Burundi 17 
Cape Verde 17 
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.) 
17 
Dominican Re-
public 
17 
Georgia 17 
Ghana 17 
Haiti 17 
India 17 
Kyrgyz Republic 17 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 
17 
Malawi 17 
Mauritania 17 
Morocco 17 
Mozambique 17 
Nepal 17 
Saint Vincent 
and the Grena-
dines 
17 
Samoa 17 
Saudi Arabia 17 
Tunisia 17 
Central African 
Republic 
0 
Côte D'Ivoire 0 
Guinea Bissau 0 
Liberia 0 
Mali 0 
Niger 0 
Togo 0 
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Appendix B. 7 PEFA-26mean SAI Ranking
countries and 
territories 
PEFA-
26mean 
Bhutan 89 
Costa Rica 89 
Yemen 89 
Philippines 84 
Mauritius 78 
Norway 78 
Peru 78 
South Africa 78 
Moldova 78 
Colombia 67 
Serbia 67 
Tanzania 67 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
67 
Brazil 67 
El Salvador 67 
Guatemala 67 
Timor-Leste 67 
Tunisia 67 
Uganda 67 
Kosovo 65 
Rwanda 61 
Bolivia 56 
Georgia 56 
Honduras 56 
Kenya 56 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 
56 
Slovenia 56 
Ethiopia 55 
Botswana 45 
Belarus 44 
Dominican Re-
public 
44 
Paraguay 44 
Burkina Faso 33 
Ghana 33 
India 33 
Maldives 33 
Morocco 33 
Mozambique 33 
Nepal 33 
Saint Vincent 
and the Grena-
dines 
33 
Afghanistan 33 
Senegal 33 
Seychelles 33 
Armenia 22 
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.) 
22 
Kyrgyz Republic 22 
Mauritania 22 
Saudi Arabia 22 
Cape Verde 22 
Malawi 22 
Tonga 17 
Burundi 11 
Haiti 11 
Samoa 11 
Central African 
Republic 
0 
Côte D'Ivoire 0 
Guinea Bissau 0 
Liberia 0 
Mali 0 
Niger 0 
Togo 0 
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Appendix B. 8 OECD SAI Ranking
countries and 
territories 
OECD 
Denmark 93 
Fiji 93 
Mauritius 92 
Austria 89 
Norway 89 
UK 89 
South Africa 88 
Germany 87 
Netherlands 87 
US 87 
Iceland 85 
Japan 85 
Rwanda 85 
Thailand 83 
Turkey 83 
Australia 81 
Ghana 81 
Ireland 81 
New Zealand  81 
Philippines 81 
Slovakia 81 
Switzerland 81 
Albania  80 
Belgium 80 
Venezuela 80 
Botswana 79 
Canada 79 
Lithuania 79 
Poland 79 
Ukraine  79 
Bolivia 77 
Costa Rica 77 
Greece 77 
Italy 77 
Korea, Republic 
of 
77 
Spain 77 
(Taiwan) 77 
Bulgaria 75 
Hungary 75 
Latvia 75 
Luxembourg 73 
Malta 73 
Namibia 73 
Slovenia 73 
Solomon Islands 73 
Croatia 71 
Kenya 71 
Kyrgyz Republic 71 
Mongolia 71 
Swaziland 71 
Argentina 71 
Zimbabwe 71 
Finland 69 
Russia 69 
Brazil 69 
Sweden  68 
Ethiopia 67 
Moldova 67 
Portugal 67 
Romania 67 
Uruguay 67 
Zambia 67 
Lesotho 67 
Malawi 67 
Mali 67 
Mexico 65 
Peru 65 
France 64 
Jordan 64 
Liberia 64 
Uganda 64 
Vietnam 64 
Israel 60 
Mozambique 60 
Sierra Leone 60 
Burkina Faso 59 
Benin 57 
Guinea 57 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
56 
Cyprus 53 
Czech Republic 53 
Nigeria 53 
UAE 53 
(Hong Kong) 51 
Qatar 51 
Cambodia 51 
Haiti 47 
Papua New 
Guinea 
45 
Congo 44 
Serbia 40 
Suriname 40 
Tajikistan 40 
Tunisia 36 
Chile 33 
Madagascar 33 
Morocco 32 
Indonesia 31 
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Appendix B. 9 Comparison of OBS2010 Scores with Other Survey Scores 
 
Countries and territo-
ries 
OBS2010 GI08-10 OECD PEFA-26 PEFA-26mean 
US 100 95 87   
Norway 97  89 84 78 
Slovenia 97  73 50 56 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 93 51 56   
New Zealand  93  81   
Germany 87  87   
Sweden  87  68   
Brazil 83  69 50 67 
UK 80  89   
Chile 80 44 33   
Macedonia 80 61    
Poland 80 71 79   
Korea, Republic of  77 97 77   
France 77  64   
Russia 77 61 69   
Croatia 73  71   
Italy 73 75 77   
Botswana 73  79 17 45 
South Africa 73 65 88 84 78 
Costa Rica 70  77 84 89 
Colombia 67 55  67 67 
Czech Republic 67 91 53   
India 67 89  17 33 
Slovakia 67  81   
Ghana 63 59 81 17 33 
Ukraine  63 83 79   
Romania 63 53 67   
Philippines 60 38 81 84 84 
Indonesia 60 63 31   
China 57 55    
Mongolia 57 58 71   
Nepal 57 53  17 33 
Sri Lanka 57     
Zambia 57  67   
Kenya 57 64 71 50 56 
Peru 57 91 65 84 78 
Thailand 57  83   
Malaysia 53 24    
Rwanda 53 81 85 50 61 
El Salvador 53   50 67 
Georgia 53 49  17 56 
Guatemala 53 77  50 67 
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Countries and territo-
ries 
OBS2010 GI08-10 OECD PEFA-26 PEFA-26mean 
Mali 53  67 0 0 
Portugal 53  67   
Liberia 50 92 64 0 0 
Tanzania 50 86  67 67 
Albania  50 88 80   
Mexico 50 94 65   
Spain 50  77   
Namibia 50  73   
Argentina 47 62 71   
Kyrgyz Republic 47 28 71 17 22 
Venezuela 47 89 80   
Iraq 47 30    
Pakistan 43 55    
Trinidad and Tobago 43   67 67 
Kazakhstan 43 42    
Vietnam 43 50 64   
Ecuador 40 28    
Honduras 40   50 56 
Bolivia 37 84 77 17 56 
Turkey 37 57 83   
Sudan  33     
Bulgaria 33 68 75   
Cambodia 33 27 51   
Papua New Guinea 33  45   
Uganda 33 49 64 50 67 
Dominican Republic 33   17 44 
Bangladesh 30 54    
Egypt 30 17    
Sao Tome 30     
Serbia 30 14 40 67 67 
Afghanistan 27    33 33 
Jordan 27 65 64   
Yemen 27 20  84 89 
Mozambique 27  60 17 33 
Saudi Arabia 23   17 22 
Burkina Faso 23  59 17 33 
Malawi 23 84 67 17 22 
Nicaragua 23 23    
Niger 23   0 0 
Senegal 23   33 33 
Azerbaijan  20 47    
Congo (Dem. Rep.) 20   17 22 
Nigeria 17 35 53   
Algeria 13 28    
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Countries and territo-
ries 
OBS2010 GI08-10 OECD PEFA-26 PEFA-26mean 
Lebanon 13 65    
Morocco 13 52 32 17 33 
Angola 10 16     
Chad 7     
Fiji 7  93   
Cameroon 3 29    
Equatorial Guinea 0     
Timor-Leste 0   50 67 
 
Appendix B. 10 IDI SAI Rankings 
SAI Id INTOSAI 
Member 
INTOSAI 
Region 
SAI model SAIstrength 1.8 time limit 
new 
1.8 time limit 
new1 
SAI 01 Y ASOSAI Westminster 0,77 1 1 
SAI 02 Y EUROSAI Westminster 0,93 1 1 
SAI 03 Y ARABOSAI Court/Judicial Model  0,5 0,5 0 
SAI 04 N PASAI Westminster 0,47 1 1 
SAI 05 Y AFROSAI-E Court/Judicial Model  0,43 0 0 
SAI 06 N CAROSAI Part of Ministry of 
Finance 
0,33 0 0 
SAI 07 Y CAROSAI Westminster 0,3 0 0 
SAI 08 Y OLACEFS Board/Collegial Model 1 1 1 
SAI 09 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,87 1 1 
SAI 10 Y ASOSAI Westminster 0,77 1 1 
SAI 11 Y EUROSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 12 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,7 1 1 
SAI 13 Y CAROSAI Westminster 0,6 0 0 
SAI 14 Y ARABOSAI Other 1 1 1 
SAI 15 Y ASOSAI Westminster 0,5 0 0 
SAI 16 Y CAROSAI Westminster 0,83 0,5 0 
SAI 17 Y EUROSAI Court/Judicial Model  0,93 1 1 
SAI 18 Y CAROSAI Westminster 0,63 0,5 0 
SAI 19 Y CREFIAF Court/Judicial Model  0,6 0 0 
SAI 20 N CAROSAI Westminster 0,67 0 0 
SAI 21 Y ASOSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 22 Y EUROSAI Westminster 0,83 1 1 
SAI 23 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 0,83 1 1 
SAI 24 Y OLACEFS Court/Judicial Model  1 1 1 
SAI 25 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,87 1 1 
SAI 26 Y CREFIAF Court/Judicial Model  1 1 1 
SAI 27 Y CREFIAF Other 0,7 1 1 
SAI 28 Y ASOSAI Westminster 0,77 1 1 
SAI 29 Y CREFIAF Other 0,67 0,5 0 
SAI 30 Y 0 region Westminster 0,83 1 1 
SAI 31 Y CREFIAF Court/Judicial Model  0,47 0 0 
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SAI 32 N CAROSAI Westminster 0,67 0 0 
SAI 33 Y CREFIAF Westminster 0,37 0 0 
SAI 34 Y OLACEFS Westminster 0,6 0 0 
SAI 35 Y ASOSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 36 Y OLACEFS Westminster 0,93 1 1 
SAI 37 Y CREFIAF Court/Judicial Model  0,83 0,5 0 
SAI 38 Y CREFIAF Court/Judicial Model  0,67 0 0 
SAI 39 Y PASAI Westminster 0,77 0,5 0 
SAI 40 Y OLACEFS Other 0,83 1 1 
SAI 41 Y CREFIAF Court/Judicial Model  0,67 0 0 
SAI 42 Y EUROSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 43 Y OLACEFS Other 0,83 1 1 
SAI 44 Y EUROSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 45 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,87 1 1 
SAI 46 Y EUROSAI Westminster 0,77 1 1 
SAI 47 Y ARABOSAI Court/Judicial Model  1 1 1 
SAI 48 Y OLACEFS Board/Collegial Model 1 1 1 
SAI 49 Y OLACEFS Other 0,77 1 1 
SAI 50 Y ARABOSAI Other 1 1 1 
SAI 51 Y OLACEFS Court/Judicial Model  0,83 1 1 
SAI 52 Y CREFIAF Part of Ministry of 
Finance 
0,13 0 0 
SAI 53 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 0,67 0 0 
SAI 54 Y EUROSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 55 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 0,93 1 1 
SAI 56 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,6 1 1 
SAI 57 Y PASAI Part of Ministry of 
Finance 
0,77 1 1 
SAI 58 Y EUROSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 59 Y EUROSAI Court/Judicial Model  0,93 1 1 
SAI 60 Y CREFIAF Court/Judicial Model  0,8 1 1 
SAI 61 Y AFROSAI-E Other 0,47 0 0 
SAI 62 Y EUROSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 63 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 1 1 1 
SAI 64 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 65 Y EUROSAI Court/Judicial Model  0,73 1 1 
SAI 66 Y CAROSAI Westminster 0,93 1 1 
SAI 67 N PASAI Other 0,7 1 1 
SAI 68 Y OLACEFS Other 0,83 1 1 
SAI 69 Y CREFIAF Other 0,5 0 0 
SAI 70 Y CREFIAF Board/Collegial Model 0,5 0 0 
SAI 71 Y CAROSAI Westminster 0,83 0,5 0 
SAI 72 Y OLACEFS Board/Collegial Model 1 1 1 
SAI 73 Y EUROSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 74 Y EUROSAI Westminster 0,83 1 1 
SAI 75 Y ASOSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 76 Y ASOSAI Board/Collegial Model 1 1 1 
 Appendices 250 
 
SAI 77 Y ASOSAI Court/Judicial Model  0,8 1 1 
SAI 78 Y ARABOSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 79 Y EUROSAI Other 0,77 1 1 
SAI 80 Y ASOSAI Other 0,83 1 1 
SAI 81 Y EUROSAI Court/Judicial Model  0,93 1 1 
SAI 82 Y CAROSAI Westminster 0,93 1 1 
SAI 83 Y ASOSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,93 1 1 
SAI 84 Y ARABOSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 85 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,83 1 1 
SAI 86 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 87 Y PASAI Westminster 0,77 1 1 
SAI 88 Y ASOSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,93 1 1 
SAI 89 Y ARABOSAI Other 0,8 1 1 
SAI 90 Y ASOSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,53 0 0 
SAI 91 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 1 1 1 
SAI 92 Y ARABOSAI Court/Judicial Model  0,23 0 0 
SAI 93 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 0,67 0 0 
SAI 94 Y ARABOSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,77 1 1 
SAI 95 Y EUROSAI Westminster 0,43 0 0 
SAI 96 Y EUROSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 97 Y EUROSAI Court/Judicial Model  0,77 1 1 
SAI 98 Y EUROSAI Westminster 0,83 1 1 
SAI 99 Y CREFIAF Court/Judicial Model  0,67 0 0 
SAI 100 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 0,83 0,5 0 
SAI 101 Y ASOSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 102 Y ASOSAI Westminster 0,67 0 0 
SAI 103 Y CREFIAF Westminster 0,5 0,5 0 
SAI 104 Y EUROSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 105 Y PASAI Other 0,87 1 1 
SAI 106 Y ARABOSAI Court/Judicial Model  0,67 0 0 
SAI 107 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 0,7 1 1 
SAI 108 Y OLACEFS Westminster 0,87 1 1 
SAI 109 Y PASAI Other 1 1 1 
SAI 110 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 1 1 1 
SAI 111 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,93 1 1 
SAI 112 Y ASOSAI Westminster 0,77 1 1 
SAI 113 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 1 1 1 
SAI 114 N CAROSAI Westminster 0,43 0 0 
SAI 115 Y ARABOSAI Court/Judicial Model  0,93 1 1 
SAI 116 Y ASOSAI Westminster 0,87 1 1 
SAI 117 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 0,67 0 0 
SAI 118 Y PASAI Westminster 0,6 0 0 
SAI 119 Y ASOSAI Westminster 0,87 1 1 
SAI 120 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,83 1 1 
SAI 121 Y OLACEFS Board/Collegial Model 0,67 0 0 
SAI 122 Y PASAI Westminster 0,83 1 1 
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SAI 123 Y OLACEFS Board/Collegial Model 1 1 1 
SAI 124 Y CREFIAF Court/Judicial Model  0,67 0 0 
SAI 125 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 0,53 0,5 0 
SAI 126 N PASAI Other 0,93 1 1 
SAI 127 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 1 1 1 
SAI 128 Y PASAI Other 0,93 1 1 
SAI 129 N ARABOSAI Westminster 0,83 1 1 
SAI 130 Y OLACEFS Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 131 Y PASAI Westminster 0,77 0,5 0 
SAI 132 Y OLACEFS Other 1 1 1 
SAI 133 Y OLACEFS Other 1 1 1 
SAI 134 Y ASOSAI Other 1 1 1 
SAI 135 Y EUROSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 136 Y EUROSAI Court/Judicial Model  1 1 1 
SAI 137 Y OLACEFS Westminster 0,87 1 1 
SAI 138 Y ARABOSAI Westminster 0,93 1 1 
SAI 139 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,87 1 1 
SAI 140 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,5 0 0 
SAI 141 Y CREFIAF Other 0,87 1 1 
SAI 142 Y CAROSAI Westminster 0,6 0 0 
SAI 143 Y CAROSAI Westminster 0,43 0 0 
SAI 144 Y PASAI Westminster 0,87 1 1 
SAI 145 Y CREFIAF Court/Judicial Model  1 1 1 
SAI 146 Y ARABOSAI Westminster 0,83 1 1 
SAI 147 Y CREFIAF Court/Judicial Model  0,6 0,5 0 
SAI 148 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 1 1 1 
SAI 149 N AFROSAI-E Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 150 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 151 Y ASOSAI Westminster 0,93 1 1 
SAI 152 Y EUROSAI Westminster 0,93 1 1 
SAI 153 Y EUROSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 154 Y PASAI Westminster 0,47 0 0 
SAI 155 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 156 Y EUROSAI Court/Judicial Model  1 1 1 
SAI 157 Y ARABOSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 158 Y CAROSAI Court/Judicial Model  0,87 1 1 
SAI 159 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 0,93 1 1 
SAI 160 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,93 1 1 
SAI 161 Y EUROSAI Part of Ministry of 
Finance 
0,83 1 1 
SAI 162 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 163 Y CREFIAF Court/Judicial Model  0,6 0,5 0 
SAI 164 Y ASOSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,93 1 1 
SAI 165 N 0 region Other 0,23 0 0 
SAI 166 Y CREFIAF Other 0,5 0 0 
SAI 167 Y PASAI Westminster 0,5 0 0 
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SAI 168 Y CAROSAI Westminster 0,77 1 1 
SAI 169 Y ARABOSAI Court/Judicial Model  1 1 1 
SAI 170 Y EUROSAI Court/Judicial Model  0,77 1 1 
SAI 171 N CAROSAI Westminster 0,17 0,5 0 
SAI 172 Y PASAI Westminster 0,87 1 1 
SAI 173 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 174 Y EUROSAI Board/Collegial Model 0,93 1 1 
SAI 175 Y ARABOSAI Board/Collegial Model 1 1 1 
SAI 176 Y EUROSAI Westminster 0,5 0 0 
SAI 177 Y 0 region Westminster 0,77 1 1 
SAI 178 Y OLACEFS Board/Collegial Model 0,87 1 1 
SAI 179 Y OLACEFS Other 1 1 1 
SAI 180 Y ASOSAI Westminster 0,83 1 1 
SAI 181 Y ARABOSAI Westminster 1 1 1 
SAI 182 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 0,67 1 1 
SAI 183 Y AFROSAI-E Westminster 0,77 0,5 0 
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Appendix B. 11 Pair-wise Correlations of the SAI Indices 
 OBS2010 GI08.10 OECD  PEFA.26  PEFA.26 
mean 
a) Method = Pearson 
OBS2010  1.00     
GI08.10 
 
0.46*** 1.00    
OECD  
 
0.32** 0.37** 1.00   
PEFA.26 0.36** - 0.16 0.44** 1.00  
PEFA.26mean 0.35** - 0.19 0.33* 0.87*** 1.00 
b) Method= Spearman 
OBS2010  1.00     
GI08.10 
 
0.45*** 1.00    
OECD  
 
0.37*** 0.27* 1.00   
PEFA.26new 0.37** - 0.14 0.48** 1.00  
PEFA.26mean.new 0.43*** - 0.15 0.43** 0.87*** 1.00 
c) Method = Kendall 
OBS2010  1.00     
GI08.10 0.31*** 1.00    
OECD  0.28*** 0.21** 1.00   
PEFA.26new 0.28** - 0.10* 0.37** 1.00  
PEFA.26mean.new 0.30** - 0.10* 0.30** 0.77*** 1.00 
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1;   
 Appendices 254 
 
Appendix B. 12 List of Independent Variables (in alphabetical order of the variable label) 
Variable Label Variable 
Name 
Description Source 
 
A1000 Freedom and 
legality of 
elections 
(2006) 
Freedom and legality of elections : If no elec-
tions, mark 0 - if elections exists, from 1 = little 
freedom or legality to 4 = high level of freedom 
and legality 
Profils Institutionnels- Data-
base (IPD) 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsIn
stitutionnelsDatabase.htm  
A1001 Acceptance 
or contesta-
tion of most 
recent 
change at 
highest level 
of govern-
ment 
(2006) 
Acceptance or contestation of most recent 
change at highest level of government 
: from 1 = strong contestation to 4 = substantial 
acceptance 
Profils Institutionnels- Data-
base (IPD) 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsIn
stitutionnelsDatabase.htm 
A1002 Participation 
of armed 
forces in 
political life, 
de jure or de 
facto (2006) 
Participation of armed forces in political life, de 
jure or de facto: from 1 = strong participation to 
4 = very weak participation 
Profils Institutionnels- Data-
base (IPD) 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsIn
stitutionnelsDatabase.htm 
A3021 Level of 
"large-scale" 
corruption 
(between 
the admin-
istration and 
firms) (2006) 
Level of "large-scale" corruption (between the 
administration and firms): from 1 to 4 
Profils Institutionnels- Data-
base (IPD) 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsIn
stitutionnelsDatabase.htm 
A3070 Independ-
ence of the 
justice sys-
tem from 
Government 
(2006) 
Independence of the justice system from Gov-
ernment: from 1 to 4 
Profils Institutionnels- Data-
base (IPD) 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsIn
stitutionnelsDatabase.htm 
A6010 Effectiveness 
of legal 
measures to 
defend 
property 
rights be-
tween pri-
vate agents 
(2006) 
Effectiveness of legal measures to defend prop-
erty rights between private agents: from 1 = 
weak to 4 = highly effective 
Profils Institutionnels- Data-
base (IPD) 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsIn
stitutionnelsDatabase.htm 
A6032 Respect for 
contracts 
with private 
mediation 
(lawyers) 
(2006) 
Respect for contracts with private mediation 
(lawyers): from 1 to 4 
Profils Institutionnels- Data-
base (IPD) 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsIn
stitutionnelsDatabase.htm 
A605 Settlement 
of economic 
disputes: 
justice in 
commercial 
matters 
(2006) 
Settlement of economic disputes: justice in 
commercial matters: from 1=low degree of inde-
pendence, equality of treatment, application and 
rapidity to 4=high degree of independence. This 
variable is calculated from the mean of A6050 
(Independence of the justice system vis-à-vis the 
Government as regards commercial disputes), 
A6051 (Independence of the justice system vis-à-
vis litigants (local) as regards commercial dis-
putes), A6052 (Equality of treatment between 
nationals and foreigners as regards commercial 
disputes) and A6053 (Degree of application and 
rapidity of legal rulings on commercial matters). 
Profils Institutionnels- Data-
base (IPD) 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsIn
stitutionnelsDatabase.htm 
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A606 Law on 
bankruptcies 
(2006) 
Law on bankruptcies: 0 if there is no law on 
bankruptcies - if bankruptcy laws exist, grade 
from 1=deficient application to 4=swift and 
efficient application; This variable is calculated as 
the mean of A6060 (Law on bankruptcies), A6061 
(More precisely, independence of court’s ruling 
on bankruptcies) and A6061 (Existence of simpli-
fied legal procedures to restructure rather than 
put into liquidation?) 
Profils Institutionnels- Data-
base (IPD) 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsIn
stitutionnelsDatabase.htm 
Aid02.07pc Per capita 
Net official 
development 
assistance 
and official 
aid received 
(constant 
2009 US$) 
(mean for 
the years 
2002-2007) 
Net official development assistance is disburse-
ment flows (net of repayment of principal) that 
meet the DAC definition of ODA and are made to 
countries and territories on the DAC list of aid 
recipients. Net official aid refers to aid flows (net 
of repayments) from official donors to countries 
and territories in part II of the DAC list of recipi-
ents: more advanced countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, the countries of the former 
Soviet Union, and certain advanced developing 
countries and territories. Official aid is provided  
under terms and conditions similar to those for 
ODA. Part II of the DAC List was abolished in 
2005. The collection of data on official aid and 
other resource flows to Part II countries ended 
with 2004 data. Data are in constant 2008 U.S. 
dollars. (WB code: DT.ODA.ALLD.KD) Own calcu-
lation of the per capita value by dividing the Aid 
value by the mean of the population value 
(pop02_07 – see below) 
WBdataBank 
Ale.fract Degree of 
Fractionali-
zation based 
on the data 
by Alesina et 
al. (2001) 
Degree of Fractionalization : Own calculation, 
mean of the variables “Ethnic”, “Language” and 
“Religion” 
Auhtor’s calculation based 
on data by Alesina, 
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, 
Kurlat & Wacziarg 
http://www.stanford.edu/~
wacziarg/downloads/fractio
nalization.xls 
(Alesina et al 2003) 
B702 Competition 
between 
businesses: 
competition 
regulation 
arrange-
ments (2006) 
Competition between businesses: competition 
regulation arrangements: 0 if no arrangements - 
if arrangements, grade from 1 = not very effec-
tive to 4 = very effective. This variable is calculat-
ed from the mean of B7020 (Existence of ar-
rangements to combat restrictive collective 
agreements) and B7021 (Existence of arrange-
ments to combat abuses of dominant positions). 
Profils Institutionnels- Data-
base (IPD) 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsIn
stitutionnelsDatabase.htm 
B710 Information 
on the struc-
ture of 
sharehold-
ings in local 
firms (2006) 
Information on the structure of shareholdings in 
local firms: from 1 = very low level of information 
to 4 = high level of information.  
Profils Institutionnels- Data-
base (IPD) 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsIn
stitutionnelsDatabase.htm 
battledeaths_0
2.08 
The number 
of battle 
related 
deaths 
(mean of the 
years 2002 – 
2008) 
Battle-related deaths (number of people) (WB 
code: VC.BTL.DETH): 
Battle-related deaths are deaths in battle-related 
conflicts between warring parties, usually involv-
ing armed forces. This includes traditional battle-
field fighting, guerrilla activities, and all kinds of 
bombardments of military units, cities, and vil-
lages, etc. All deaths--military as well as civilian--
incurred in such situations, are counted as battle-
related deaths.I used the mean for the years 
2002 to 2008 here (instead of the usual 2002-
2007) as I believe conflict in the year 2008 still 
has a direct impact on the functioning of a SAI in 
World dataBank 
http://databank.worldbank.
org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&
id=4&CNO=2 (Last Accessed 
November 8, 2011) 
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2009.  
CAC2005 Ratification 
of the UN 
Convention 
Against 
Corruption 
(2005) 
Ratification of the UN Convention Against Cor-
ruption (CAC) before the end of the year 2005.  
Own research, see table B.37 
CAC2007 Ratification 
of the UN 
Convention 
Against 
Corruption 
(2007) 
Ratification of the UN Convention Against Cor-
ruption (CAC) before the end of the year 2007.  
Own research, see table B.37 
CAC2009 Ratification 
of the UN 
Convention 
Against 
Corruption 
(2009) 
Ratification of the UN Convention Against Cor-
ruption (CAC) before the end of the year 2009.  
Own research, see table B.37 
CBC_budget Total budget 
for capacity 
building 
(1996-2007), 
n=52 
Total budget for capacity building: total Budget 
for capacity building projects and programs per 
beneficiary SAI until and incl. of 2007 in EUR 
(1USD = 0,75 EUR,  1 GBP=1.19612 EUR) 
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
CBC_budget_t
hs_all 
Total budget 
(in thou-
sands) for 
capacity 
building 
(1996-2007), 
n=191 
Total budget for capacity building (in thousands): 
total Budget for capacity building projects and 
programs per beneficiary SAI until and incl. of 
2007 in EUR (1USD = 0,75 EUR,  1 GBP=1.19612 
EUR). Missing values were replaced with ‘0’. 
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
CBC_y Total num-
ber of years 
of capacity 
building 
(1996-2007), 
n=52 
Total number of years of capacity building per 
beneficiary SAI until (and incl. of) 2007 
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
CBC_y_all Total num-
ber of years 
of capacity 
building 
(1996-2007), 
n=191 
Total number of years of capacity building per 
beneficiary SAI until (and incl. of) 2007, missings 
were replaced with ‘0’. 
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
childmort_02.0
7 
Mortality 
rate, under-5 
(per 1,000); 
average for 
years 2002 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000); average for 
years 2002 to 2007 (WB code: SH.DYN.MORT): 
Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 
1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reach-
ing age five, if subject to current age-specific 
World dataBank 
http://databank.worldbank.
org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&
id=4&CNO=2 (Last Accessed 
November 8, 2011) 
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to 2007 mortality rates. 
chga_hinst Regime 
Institutions 
(2007) 
Six-fold classification of political regimes, coded: 
(0) Parliamentary democracy 
(1) Mixed (semi-presidential) democracy 
(2) Presidential democracy 
(3) Civilian dictatorship 
(4) Military dictatorship 
(5) Royal dictatorship 
Cheibub, Gandhi and Vree-
land (2009) in Teorell et al. 
(2010) 
ciri_empinx_ne
w 
Empower-
ment Rights 
Index (New) 
(2007) 
Empowerment Rights Index (New) 
This is an additive index constructed from the 
Foreign Movement, Domestic 
Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of 
Assembly & Association, Workers’ 
Rights, Electoral Self-Determination, and Free-
dom of Religion indicators. It ranges 
from 0 (no government respect for these seven 
rights) to 14 (full government respect 
for these seven rights). 
Cingranelli and Richards 
(2010) in Teorell et al. (2010) 
ciri_injud Independ-
ence of the 
Judiciary, 
year 2007 
This variable indicates the extent to which the 
judiciary is independent of control from other 
sources, such as another branch of the govern-
ment or the military. 
(0) Not independent 
(1) Partially independent 
(2) Generally independent 
Cingranelli & Richards – 
Human Rights Dataset 
(Cingranelli and Richards 
2010) 
http://www.humanrightsdat
a.org (Dataset version: 
2010.05.17),  
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
ciri_kill Extrajudicial 
Killing (2007) 
Extrajudicial Killing: Political or Extrajudicial 
Killings are: 
(0) Practiced frequently 
(1) Practiced occasionally 
(2) Have not occurred 
Cingranelli and Richards 
(2010) in Teorell et al. (2010) 
coal_02.07 Coal rents (% 
of GDP) 
(mean for 
the years 
2002-2007) 
Coal rents are the difference between the value 
of both hard and soft coal production at world 
prices and their total costs of production. (WB 
code: NY.GDP.COAL.RT.ZS) 
WBdataBank 
CPIArevenues_
05.07 
CPIA effi-
ciency of 
revenue 
mobilization 
rating 
(means of 
the years 
2005-2007) 
CPIA efficiency of revenue mobilization rating 
(1=low to 6=high) (Indicator code: 
IQ.CPA.REVN.XQ)  
WBdataBank 
defmin Defense 
Minister a 
Military 
Officer 
(2007) 
Dummy variable, 1if the defense minister is a 
military officer.  
 
DATABASE OF POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS (DPI) Data-
base of Political Institutions, 
http://go.worldbank.org/2EA
GGLRZ40 (Beck et al 2000; 
2001; Keefer 2009), last 
update March 2010 
 
directtax_02.0
7 
Direct taxa-
tion (mean 
of the years 
2002-2007) 
Direct taxation current Billion USD (mean of the 
years 2002-2007) 
African Economic Outlook 
(AEO, 2008) Database on 
African Fiscal Performance. 
http://www.africaneconomi
coutlook.org/en/database-
on-african-fiscal-
performance/table-1-direct-
taxes-usd/ 
dpi_checks Number of 
Veto Players 
as of January 
1, 2007 
Equals one if the Legislative Index of Political 
Competitiveness (dpi_lipc) or the Executive Index 
of Political Competitiveness (dpi_eipc) is less 
than 6. In countries where dpi_lipc and dpi_eipc 
Database of Political Institu-
tions 
http://go.worldbank.org/2E
AGGLRZ40 
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are greater than or equal to 6, dpi_checks is 
incremented by one if there is a chief executive, 
by a further one if the chief executive is competi-
tively elected (dpi_eipc greater than six), and by 
a further one if the opposition controls the legis-
lature. In presidential systems, dpi_checks is 
incremented by one for each chamber of the 
legislature (unless the president’s party has a 
majority in the lower house and a closed-list 
system is in effect), and by one for each party 
coded as allied with the president’s party and 
which has an ideological (left-right) orientation 
closer to that of the main opposition party than 
to that of the president’s party. In parliamentary 
systems dpi_checks is incremented by one for 
every party in the government coalition as long 
as the parties are needed to maintain a majority, 
and by one for every party in the government 
coalition that has a position on economic issues 
closer to the largest opposition party than to the 
party of the executive. (The prime minister’s 
party is not counted as a check if there is a closed 
rule in place.)  
(Beck et al 2000; 2001; 
Keefer 2009), 
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
dpi_fraud Fraud or 
Candidate 
Intimidation 
Affection 
(2007) 
Fraud or Candidate Intimidation Affection: 
Dummy variable, 1 when opposition is officially 
legal but reported vote fraud or 
candidate intimidation were serious enough to 
affect the outcome of elections. If not an 
election year, or if elected government has been 
deposed, records to the most recent 
election. 
Database of Political Institu-
tions 
http://go.worldbank.org/2E
AGGLRZ40 
(Beck et al 2000; 2001; 
Keefer 2009), 
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
dpi_plurality Plurality 
(2007) 
Plurality: Dummy variable, 1 if plurality is used as 
electoral rule to select any candidate in any 
house, or if there is competition for the seats in a 
one-party state (dpi_lipc=4). 
Database of Political Institu-
tions 
http://go.worldbank.org/2E
AGGLRZ40 
(Beck et al 2000; 2001; 
Keefer 2009), 
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
dpi_pr Proportional 
Representa-
tion (2007) 
Proportional Representation: Dummy variable, 1 
if Proportional Representation (PR) is used as 
electoral rule to 
select any candidate in any house. 
Database of Political Institu-
tions 
http://go.worldbank.org/2E
AGGLRZ40 
(Beck et al 2000; 2001; 
Keefer 2009), 
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
ecoleg Fragility of 
Economic 
Legitimacy 
(2007) 
Economic Legitimacy: Share of Export Trade 
in Manufactured Goods. 
Score from 0-3, wherby “0” is low fragility in 
economic legitimacy and “3” stands for high 
fragility of economic legitimacy 
 State Fragility Index and 
Matrix 2009  
Monty G. Marshall and 
Benjamin R. Cole  
Center for Systemic Peace 
Educa-
tion.exp_02.07 
Expected 
years of 
education 
(average for 
the yeas 
2002-2007) 
School life expectancy (years).  Primary to ter-
tiary.  Total :  
The expected number of years of schooling, or 
school life expectancy (SLE), is defined as the 
total number of years of schooling which a child 
can expect to receive, assuming that the proba-
bility of his or her being enrolled in school at any 
particular future age is equal to the current 
enrolment ratio at that age. It is a synthetic 
summary indicator of the overall pattern of 
enrolment ratios at one particular point in time, 
and has no predictive value except in so far as it 
is believed that enrolment patterns will remain 
unchanged into the future. Caution should be 
UNESCO Institute for Statis-
tics, table 8: School life 
expectancy (approximation 
method). Data on school life 
expectancy (years) from 
primary to tertiary by coun-
try and sex, available from 
UIS website, 
http://www.uis.unesco.org. 
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exercised when utilizing this indicator in interna-
tional comparisons. For example, a year or grade 
completed in one country is not necessarily the 
same in terms of educational content or quality 
as a year or grade completed in another country. 
Moreover, it should be noted that SLE does not 
necessarily coincide with the expected number 
of grades completed because of the possibility of 
repeating grades. Thus, school life expectancy 
represents the expected number of years of 
schooling that will be completed, including years 
spent repeating one or more grades. 
EFW2D 2007 2D Military interference in rule of law and politi-
cal process 
Economic Freedom of the 
World (EFW) dataset James 
D. Gwartney, Joshua C. Hall, 
and Robert Lawson (2010). 
Economic Freedom of the 
World: 2010 Annual Report. 
Vancouver, BC: The Fraser 
Institute. Data retrieved 
from 
http://www.freetheworld.co
m/datasets_efw.html 
EFW5Cvii Tax Compli-
ance (year 
2007) 
5Cvii Tax compliance: Economic Freedom of the 
World Dataset 2010: Area 5: Regulation of Cred-
it, Labor, and Business, Area C: Business Regula-
tions, vii: Cost of tax compliance (DB).  
This sub-component is based on the World 
Bank’s Doing Business data on the time required 
per year for a business to prepare, file, and pay 
taxes on corporate income, value added or sales 
taxes, and taxes on labor. The formula used to 
calculate the zero-to-10 ratings was: (Vmax − Vi) 
/ (Vmax − Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi represents 
the time cost (measured in hours) of tax compli-
ance. The values for Vmax and Vmin were set at 
892 hours (1.5 standard deviations above aver-
age) and 0 hours, respectively. Countries with 
values outside the range marked off by Vmax 
and Vmin received ratings of either zero or ten, 
accordingly. • Source World Bank, Doing Busi-
ness (various issues), 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/>. 10 is the 
highest possible rating and zero (0) is the lowest. 
A higher rating indicates less time cost, mostly 
due to clear regulations and procedures and 
indicates a greater degree of economic freedom. 
James D. Gwartney, Joshua 
C. Hall, and Robert Lawson 
2010 Economic Freedom 
Dataset, published in Eco-
nomic Freedom of the 
World: 2010 Annual Report. 
http://www.freetheworld.co
m/datasets_efw.html  
Ethnic Ethnic frac-
tionalization 
(1979-2001 
(varies by 
country)) 
Reflects probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country will not 
belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. The 
higher the number, the more 
fractionalized society. The definition of ethnicity 
involves a combination of racial and 
linguistic characteristics. The result is a higher 
degree of fractionalization than the 
commonly used ELF-index (see el_elf60) in for 
example Latin America, where people 
of many races speak the same language. 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, 
Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg 
http://www.stanford.edu/~
wacziarg/downloads/fractio
nalization.xls 
(Alesina et al 2003) 
Extenal.enviro
nment.capacit
y 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
SAI’s capaci-
ty to deal 
with external 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “Capacity to deal with external 
environment”, ‘0’ if it does not include such 
activities. Projects until and inclusive of 2007 
were considered.  
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
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environment 
(1996- 2007) 
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
ffp_fsi Failed States 
Index (2007) 
Failed States Index: The Failed States Index in-
cludes an examination of the pressures on states, 
their vulnerability to internal conflict and societal 
deterioration. For each indicator, the ratings are 
placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the 
lowest intensity (most stable) and 10 being the 
highest intensity (least stable). The total score is 
the sum of the 12 indicators and is on a scale of 
0-120 
Fund for Peace - Failed 
States Index 
http://www.fundforpeace.or
g/web/index.php?option=co
m_content&task=view&id=9
9 
&Itemid=140 
in Teorell et al (2010) 
fh_aor Associational 
and Organi-
zational 
Rights (2007) 
Associational and Organizational Rights: The 
variable evaluates the freedom of assembly, 
demonstrations and open public 
discussion; the freedom for nongovernmental 
organization; and the freedom for trade 
unions, peasant organizations and other profes-
sional and private organizations. 
Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 
(best). 
Freedom House, Freedom in 
the World, 
http://www.freedomhouse.
org in Teorell et al. (2010) 
fh_cl Civil Liberties 
(2007) 
Civil Liberties: Civil liberties allow for the free-
doms of expression and belief, associational and 
organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy without interference from the 
state. The more specific list of rights considered 
vary over the years. For the year 2006 
Freedom House has published the scores for the 
sub-categories (see below). Countries 
are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least 
free). 
Freedom House, Freedom in 
the World, 
http://www.freedomhouse.
org in Teorell et al. (2010) 
fh_ipolity2 Democracy, 
year 2007 
Democracy (Freedom House/Imputed Polity): 
Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least demo-
cratic and 10 most democratic. Average of Free-
dom House (fh_pr and fh_cl) is transformed to a 
scale 0-10 and Polity (p_polity2) 
is transformed to a scale 0-10. These variables 
are averaged into fh_polity2. The imputed ver-
sion has imputed values for countries where data 
on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on the 
average Freedom House measure. Hadenius & 
Teorell (2005) show that this average index 
performs better both in terms of validity and 
reliability than its constituent parts. 
Freedom House - Freedom 
in the World, 
http://www.freedomhouse.
org; and Polity IV, (Marshall 
and Jaggers 2002) 
http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/polity4.htm;  
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
fh_pr Political 
Rights (2007) 
Political Rights: Political rights enable people to 
participate freely in the political process, includ-
ing the right to vote freely for distinct alterna-
tives in legitimate elections, compete for public 
office, join political parties and organizations, 
and elect representatives who have a 
decisive impact on public policies and are ac-
countable to the electorate. The specific 
list of rights considered varies over the years. For 
the year 2006 Freedom House has 
published the scores for the sub-categories (see 
below). Countries are graded between 1 
(most free) and 7 (least free). 
Freedom House, Freedom in 
the World, 
http://www.freedomhouse.
org in Teorell et al. (2010) 
fh_press Freedom of 
the Press, 
year 2007 
The press freedom index is computed by adding 
three component ratings: Laws and regulations, 
Political pressures and controls and Economic 
Influences. The scale ranges from 0 (most free) 
to 100 (least free). 
Freedom House, Freedom in 
the World, 
http://www.freedomhouse.
org in Teorell et al. (2010) 
fh_status Freedom Status: (1) Free Freedom House, Freedom in 
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House Status 
(2007) 
(2) Partly Free 
(3) Not Free 
Until 2003, countries whose combined average 
ratings for Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designat-
ed “Free”; between 3.0 and 5.5 “Partly 
Free”, and between 5.5 and 7.0 “Not Free”. Since 
then, countries whose ratings average 
1.0 to 2.5 are considered “Free”, 3.0 to 5.0 “Part-
ly Free”, and 5.5 to 7.0 “Not Free”. 
the World, 
http://www.freedomhouse.
org in Teorell et al. (2010) 
Finan-
cial.audit.capa
city 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
SAI’s finan-
cial audit 
capacity 
(1996- 
2007), n=57 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “Financial Audit Capacity”, ‘0’ if 
it does not include such activities. Projects until 
and inclusive of 2007 were considered.  
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
Finan-
cial.audit.capa
city_all 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
SAI’s finan-
cial audit 
capacity 
(1996- 
2007), n=191 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “Financial Audit Capacity”, ‘0’ if 
it does not include such activities. Projects until 
and inclusive of 2007 were considered. Missings 
were replaced with “0” 
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
Foren-
sic.audit.capaci
ty 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
SAI’s finan-
cial audit 
capacity 
(1996- 
2007), n=57 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “Financial Audit Capacity”, ‘0’ if 
it does not include such activities. Projects until 
and inclusive of 2007 were considered.  
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
Foren-
sic.audit.capaci
ty_all 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
SAI’s Foren-
sic audit 
capacity 
(1996- 
2007), n=191 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “Forensic Audit Capacity”, ‘0’ if 
it does not include such activities. Projects until 
and inclusive of 2007 were considered. Missings 
were replaced with “0” 
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
FSIelite Factionalized 
Elites (2007) 
Rise of Factionalized Elites: Indicator is rated on a 
1 to 10 scale with 1 (low) being the most stable 
and 10 (high) being the most at-risk of collapse 
and violence (high factionalization). 
The Fund For Peace: Failed 
States Index (FSI) 
http://www.fundforpeace.or
g/global/?q=fsi-grid2007 
FSIext External 
Intervention 
(2007) 
Intervention of Other States 
or External Political Stakeholders: Indicator is 
rated on a 1 to 10 scale with 1 
(low) being the most stable and 10 (high) being 
the most at-risk of collapse and violence.  
The Fund For Peace: Failed 
States Index (FSI) 
http://www.fundforpeace.or
g/global/?q=fsi-grid2007 
FSIlegst Legitimacy of 
the State 
(2007) 
Legitimacy of the State: Indicator is rated on a 
1 to 10 scale with 1 
(low) being the most stable and 10 (high) 
being the most at-risk of collapse and vio-
lence (no legitimacy of the state)  
The Fund For Peace: Failed 
States Index (FSI) 
http://www.fundforpeace.or
g/global/?q=fsi-grid2007 
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FSIsecapp Security 
Apparatus 
Operates as 
a “State 
Within a 
State” (2007) 
Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a 
State”: Each Indicator is rated on a 1 to 10 
scale with 1 (low) being the most stable and 
10 (high) being the most at-risk of collapse 
and violence (security is a state within a 
state) 
The Fund For Peace: Failed 
States Index (FSI) 
http://www.fundforpeace.or
g/global/?q=fsi-grid2007 
gbs_totaid_02.
07 
General 
Budget 
Support as a 
percentage 
of total aid – 
disburse-
ments (aver-
age for 2002-
2007) 
General Budget Support as a percentage of total 
aid – disbursements (average for 2002-2007) 
De Renzio, Paolo, Matt 
Andrews and Zac Mills 
(2010) Evaluation of Donor 
Support to Public Financial 
Management (PFM) Reform 
in Developing Countries, 
Analytical study of quantita-
tive cross-country evidence, 
FINAL REPORT November 
2010, Overseas Develop-
ment Institute, London. The 
database was provided by 
the courtesy of the authors.  
GDPPC_02.07 Per Capita 
GDP, mean 
of the years 
2002 to 2007 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international 
$) (WB code: NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD): GDP per 
capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). 
PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to 
international dollars using purchasing power 
parity rates. An international dollar has the same 
purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has 
in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is 
the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes 
and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for depletion and degradation of natu-
ral resources. Data are in constant 2005 interna-
tional dollars. The variable has been linearliy 
transformed by taking its square root after 
graphical examination of its correlation with the 
OBS2010 variable.  
World dataBank 
http://databank.worldbank.
org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&
id=4&CNO=2 (Last Accessed 
November 8, 2011) 
HDI_00.07 Human 
Develop-
ment Index 
score (aver-
age for years 
2000, 2005, 
2006 and 
2007) 
Human Development Index score (average for 
years 2000, 2005, 2006 and 2007) 
United Nations Develop-
ment Programme, Human 
Development Reports; 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/repo
rts/  
HMResRel Fiscal Reli-
ance on 
Natural 
Resources 
Dummy Variable (0-1): The causal mechanism 
that links oil and minerals to regime types is 
assumed in the extant literature to be the rents 
captured by governments from oil, gas, and 
mineral production, thereby allowing them to 
finance themselves without taxing citizens. This 
dummy is based on a measure of Fiscal Reliance 
on Resource Revenues, the percentage of gov-
ernment revenues from oil, gas, or minerals. 
Fiscal Reliance includes taxes and royalties paid 
by either privately-owned or state owned oil and 
mining firms, as well as dividend payments or 
direct transfers paid to the government by state-
owned firms. If there was any reliance, thus the 
percentage was > 0, the dummy variable was 
coded as “1”. [I also tried to original continuous 
values as calculated by the author in separate 
regressions, reliance_02.07) 
Annex to Haber, Stephen 
and Victor Menaldo, 2011. 
“Do Natural Resources Fuel 
Authoritarianism? A Reap-
praisal of the Resource 
Curse” in American Political 
Science Review, February 
2011.  
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ht_colonial Colonial 
Origin (2007) 
Colonial Origin: This is a tenfold classification of 
the former colonial ruler of the country. Follow-
ing Bernard et al (2004), we have excluded the 
British settler colonies (the US, Canada, Australia, 
Israel and New Zeeland), and exclusively focused 
on "Western overseas" colonialism. This implies 
that only Western colonizers (e.g. excluding 
Japanese colonialism), and only countries located 
in the non-Western hemisphere "overseas" 
(e.g. excluding Ireland & Malta), have been cod-
ed. Each country that has been colonized since 
1700 is coded. In cases of several colonial pow-
ers, the last one is counted, if it lasted for 10 
years or longer. The categories are the following: 
(0) Never colonized by a Western overseas colo-
nial power (1) Dutch; (2) Spanish; (3) Italian; (4) 
US; (5) British; (6) French; (7) Portuguese; (8) 
Belgian; (9) British-French; (10) Australian 
Teorell and Hadenius (2005) 
in Teorell et al (2010) 
ht_region The region of 
the country 
This is a tenfold politico-geographic classification 
of world regions, based on a mixture of two 
considerations: geographical proximity (with the 
partial exception of category 5 below) and de-
marcation by area specialists having contributed 
to a regional understanding of democratization. 
The categories are as follow: 
(1) Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (includ-
ing Central Asia) 
(2) Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the 
Dominican Republic) 
(3) North Africa & the Middle East (including 
Israel, Turkey & Cyprus) 
(4) Sub-Saharan Africa 
(5) Western Europe and North America (includ-
ing Australia &New Zeeland) 
(6) East Asia (including Japan & Mongolia) 
(7) South-East Asia 
(8) South Asia 
(9) The Pacific (excluding Australia & New Zee-
land) 
(10) The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana & 
Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti & the Do-
minican Republic) 
Hadenius & Teorell – Region 
and Colonial Origin (Teorell 
and Hadenius 2005), in 
Teorell et al. (2010) 
IMF Dummy for 
IMF poverty 
reduction 
support  
Dummy for IMF poverty reduction support 
(PRGF, ECF, ESF, PSI, SBA, SCF) between 2004 
and 2007 
Categories: 
0: the country has not received IMF poverty 
reduction support during the years 2004-2007 
1: the country was a recipient of IMF poverty 
reduction support during the years 2004-2007 
Own research based on 
Gollwitzer and Quintyn 
(2010), source: IMF MONA; 
http://www.imf.org/external
/np/pdr/mona/index.aspx 
(Last Accessed December 
2011) 
INTOSAIregion The SAI’s 
main belong-
ing to an 
INTOSAI 
regional 
body (2010) 
Categorical variable assigning each SAI to one 
INTOSAI regional body:  
Levels are:  
AFROSAI-E  (African Organization of Supreme 
Audit Institutions-English speaking Africa) 
ARABOSAI (Arab Organization of SAIs) 
ASOSAI (Asian Organization of Supreme Audit 
Institutions) 
CAROSAI (Caribbean Organization of Supreme 
Audit Institutions) 
CREFIAF (Conseil Régional de Formation des 
Institutions Supérieures de Contrôle des Finances 
Publiques de l’Afrique Francophone 
Subsaharienne, Francophone Subsaharan African 
Own research see table B.36. 
based on the IDI list of main 
belongings (INTOSAI-Donor 
Cooperation (IDI), 2010. 
Capacity development of 
Supreme Audit Institutions – 
status, needs and good 
practices. INTOSAI-Donor 
Cooperation Stocktaking 
Report 2010. INTOSAI De-
velopment Initiative (IDI), 
Oslo, Norway. Annex A) ;  
 cross-checked with the list 
of SAI’s INTOSAI home 
 Appendices 264 
 
Organization of SAIs) 
EUROSAI (European Organization of Supreme 
Audit Institutions) 
NRM (no regional member) 
OLACEFS (Organization of Latin American and 
Caribbean Supreme Audit Institutions) 
PASAI (Pacific Association of Supreme Audit 
Institutions) 
groups as of 2010 
(http://www.intosai.org/upl
oads/intosaihomegroups201
0.pdf), and the membership 
lists of each INTOSAI region-
al group 
(http://www.intosai.org/regi
onal-working-groups.html) ; 
IT.audit.capacit
y 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
SAI’s IT audit 
capacity 
(1996- 
2007), n=57 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “IT Audit Capacity”, ‘0’ if it does 
not include such activities. Projects until and 
inclusive of 2007 were considered.  
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
IT.audit.capacit
y_all 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
SAI’s IT audit 
capacity 
(1996- 
2007), n=191 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “IT Audit Capacity”, ‘0’ if it does 
not include such activities. Projects until and 
inclusive of 2007 were considered. Missings were 
replaced with “0” 
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
Language Linguistic 
fractionaliza-
tion (2001) 
Reflects probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country will not 
belong to the same linguistic group. The higher 
the number, the more fractionalized society. 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, 
Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg 
http://www.stanford.edu/~
wacziarg/downloads/fractio
nalization.xls 
(Alesina et al 2003) 
lp_legor Legal origin 
(2007) 
Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or 
Commercial code of each country. 
There are five possible origins: 
(1) English Common Law 
(2) French Commercial Code 
(3) Socialist/Communist Laws 
(4) German Commercial Code 
(5) Scandinavian Commercial Code 
La Porta et al (1999) in 
Teorell et al. (2010) 
lp_muslim80 Religion: 
Muslim 
(1980) 
Muslims as percentage of population in 1980. La Porta et al (1999) in 
Teorell et al. (2010) 
M Manage-
ment Index 
(2006) 
Management Index: The Bertelsmann Transfor-
mation Index’s key innovation is its focus on the 
steering and management of development and 
transformation processes. The Index reviews and 
evaluates the reform activities of political deci-
sion makers, thus providing valuable information 
on the key factors of success and failure for 
states on their way to a market-based democra-
cy. Governments must be determined in pursu-
ing their goals, they must be prudent and effec-
tive in using their resources, and they must 
combine the capacity to govern with consensus-
building while cooperating reliably with neigh-
boring states and external support organizations. 
The BTI is the only ranking worldwide to focus so 
thoroughly on political leaders’ management 
performance with self-collected data. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, Trans-
formation Index 2006 - 
Political Management in 
International Comparison. 
http://www.bti-project.de/  
military Chief Execu-
tive a Mili-
Chief Executive a Military Officer: “1” if the 
source (Europa or Banks) includes a rank in their 
Beck et al 2000; 2001; 
Keefer 2009: DATABASE OF 
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tary Of-
ficer(2007) 
title, 0 otherwise. If chief executives were de-
scribed as officers with no indication of formal 
retirement when they assumed office, they are 
always listed as officers for the duration of their 
term. If chief executives were formally retired 
military officers upon taking office, then this 
variable gets a 0. I adopt the method as in Teorell 
et al (2010): in the original, “not applicable” is 
coded as -999. I replaced these observations with 
missing “NA”. 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
netusers_02.0
7 
Internet 
users (per 
100 people), 
average for 
2002-2007 
Internet users (per 100 people) (IT.NET.USER) World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
newbusreg_04.
07 
New busi-
nesses regis-
tered (num-
ber), average 
for 2004-
2007 
New businesses registered (number): New busi-
nesses registered are the number of new limited 
liability corporations registered in the calendar 
year. (IC.BUS.NREG) 
World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
newbusdens_0
4.07 
New busi-
ness density 
(new regis-
trations per 
1,000 people 
ages 15-64), 
average for 
2004-2007 
New business density (new registrations per 
1,000 people ages 15-64): New businesses regis-
tered are the number of new limited liability 
corporations registered in the calendar year. 
(IC.BUS.NDNS.ZS) 
World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
Oilmineral Dummy for 
Hydrocar-
bon-Rich and 
mineral-rich 
countries 
(2000-05) 
Dummy for Hydrocarbon-Rich and mineral-rich 
countries (2000-05). Includes all countries that 
are considered rich in hydrocarbons and/or 
mineral resources on the basis of the following 
criteria: (i) an average share of hydrocarbon 
and/or mineral fiscal revenues in total fiscal 
revenue of at least 25 percent during the period 
2000-2005 or (ii) an average share of hydrocar-
bon and/or mineral export proceeds in total 
export proceeds of at least 25 percent. (IMF, 
2007:62) Secondly, the dummy value of 1 has 
been assigned to countries that are considered 
rich in hydrocarbons and/or mineral resources 
on the basis of the following criteria: (i) an aver-
age share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral fiscal 
revenues in total fiscal revenue of at least 25 
percent during the period 2000-2005 or (ii) an 
average share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral 
export proceeds in total export proceeds of at 
least 25 percent during the period 2000-2005. 
Two countries (Indonesia and Jordan) do not 
meet the data criteria to be in the list but are 
included due to the relevant importance of min-
erals in their economies. Indonesia, Mauritania 
and Uzbekistan have substantial hydrocarbon 
resources. (IMF, 2007:63) 
IMF (2007) Guide on Re-
source Revenue Transparen-
cy, 
http://www.imf.org/external
/np/pp/2007/eng/051507g.
pdf  
Oil_02.07 Average of 
oil rents (% 
of GDP) 2002 
to 2007 
 
 
Oil rents (% of GDP) (World Bank Indicator name: 
NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS): 
Oil rents are the difference between the value of 
crude oil production at world prices and total 
costs of production. I calculated and used the 
mean for the years 2002 to 2007.  
World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
(Last Accessed November 8, 
2011) 
Organisation-
al.capacity 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “Organisational Capacity”, ‘0’ if 
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
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SAI’s Organi-
sational 
Capacity 
(1996- 
2007), n=57 
it does not include such activities. Projects until 
and inclusive of 2007 were considered.  
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
Organisation-
al.capacity_all 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
SAI’s Organi-
sational 
Capacity 
(1996- 
2007), n=191 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “Organisational Capacity”, ‘0’ if 
it does not include such activities. Projects until 
and inclusive of 2007 were considered. Missings 
were replaced with “0” 
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
Oth-
er.audit.capaci
ties 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
Other SAI 
Capacity 
(1996- 
2007), n=57 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “Other Capacities”, ‘0’ if it does 
not include such activities. Projects until and 
inclusive of 2007 were considered.  
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
Oth-
er.audit.capaci
ties_all 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
SAI’s Foren-
sic audit 
capacity 
(1996- 
2007), n=191 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “Other Capacities”, ‘0’ if it does 
not include such activities. Projects until and 
inclusive of 2007 were considered. Missings were 
replaced with “0” 
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
p_democ Institutional-
ized Democ-
racy (2007) 
Institutionalized Democracy: Range = 0-10 (0 = 
low; 10 = high) 
Polity IV 
http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/polity4.htm 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2002) 
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
p_durable Regime 
Durability 
(2007) 
Regime Durability: The number of years since the 
most recent regime change (defined by a three 
point change in the p_polity score over a period 
of three years or less) or the end of transition 
period defined by the lack of stable political 
institutions (denoted by a standardized authority 
score). In calculating the p_durable value, the 
first year during which a new (post-change) 
polity is established is coded as the baseline 
“year zero” (value = 0) and each subsequent year 
adds one to the value of the p_durable variable 
consecutively until a new regime change or 
transition period occurs. 
Polity IV 
http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/polity4.htm 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2002) 
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
p_fragment Polity Frag-
mentation 
(2007) 
Polity Fragmentation: This variable codes the 
operational existence of a separate polity, or 
polities, comprising substantial territory and 
population within the recognized borders of the 
state and over which the coded polity exercises 
no effective authority (effective authority may be 
participatory or coercive). Local autonomy ar-
rangements voluntarily established and accepted 
by both central and local authorities are not 
Polity IV 
http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/polity4.htm 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2002) 
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
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considered fragmentation. A polity that cannot 
exercise effective authority over at least 50 
percent of its established territory is necessarily 
considered to be in a condition of “state failure” 
(i.e., interruption or interregnum, see below, or 
civil war). Polity fragmentation may result from 
open warfare (active or latent) or foreign occu-
pation and may continue in the absence of open 
warfare if a situation of de facto separation 
remains unresolved and unchallenged by the 
state.  
(0) No overt fragmentation 
(1) Slight fragmentation: Less than ten percent of 
the country’s territory is effectively under local 
authority and actively separated from the central 
authority of the regime. 
(2) Moderate fragmentation: Ten to twenty-five 
percent of the country’s territory is effectively 
ruled by local authority and actively separated 
from the central authority of the regime. 
(3) Serious fragmentation: Over twenty-five 
percent (and up to fifty percent) of the country’s 
territory is effectively ruled by local authority 
and actively separated from the central authority 
of the regime. 
p_parreg Regulation of 
Participation 
(2007) 
Regulation of Participation: Participation is regu-
lated to the extent that there are binding rules 
on when, whether, and how political preferences 
are expressed. One-party states and Western 
democracies both regulate participation but they 
do so in different ways; the former by channeling 
participation through a single party structure, 
with sharp limits on diversity of opinion, and the 
latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring 
groups to compete nonviolently for political 
influence. The polar opposite is unregulated 
participation, in which there are no enduring 
national political organizations and no effective 
regime controls on political activity. In such 
situations political competition is fluid and often 
characterized by recurring coercion among shift-
ing coalitions of partisan groups. A five-category 
scale is used to code this dimension: (1) Unregu-
lated; (2) Multiple Identities; (3) Sectarian; (4) 
Restricted; (5) Regulated 
Polity IV 
http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/polity4.htm 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2002) 
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
p_polity2 Revised 
Combined 
Polity Score 
(2007) 
Revised Combined Polity Score Polity IV 
http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/polity4.htm 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2002) 
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
p_xconst Executive 
Constraints 
(Decision 
Rules) (2007) 
Polity Executive Constraints: According to Eck-
stein and Gurr, decision rules are defined in the 
following manner: "Superordinate structures in 
action make decisions concerning the direction 
of social units. Making such decisions requires 
that supers and subs be able to recognize when 
decision-processes have been concluded, espe-
cially "properly" concluded. An indispensable 
ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the 
existence of Decision Rules that provide basic 
criteria under which decisions are considered to 
have been taken." (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, 
p.121) Operationally, this variable refers to the 
extent of institutionalized constraints on the 
Polity IV 
http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/polity4.htm 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2002) 
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
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decision-making powers of chief executives, 
whether individuals or collectivities. Such limita-
tions may be imposed by any "accountability 
groups". In Western democracies these are 
usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability 
groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; 
councils of nobles or powerful advisors in mon-
archies; the military in coup-prone polities; and 
in many states a strong, independent judiciary. 
The concern is therefore with the checks and 
balances between the various parts of the deci-
sion-making process. A seven category scale is 
used.  
(1) Unlimited Authority; (2) Intermediate Catego-
ry; (3) Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive 
Authority; (4) Intermediate Category; (5) Sub-
stantial Limitations on Executive Authority; (6) 
Intermediate Category; (7) Executive Parity or 
Subordination. 
p_xrcomp Competi-
tiveness of 
Executive 
Recruitment 
(2007) 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment: Com-
petitiveness refers to “the extent that prevailing 
modes of advancement give subordinates equal 
opportunities to become superordinates (Gurr 
1974, p.1483).” For example, selection of chief 
executives through popular elections involving 
two or more viable parties or candidates is re-
garded as competitive. If power transfers are 
coded Unregulated (“1”) in the Regulation of 
Executive Recruitment (variable p_xrreg), or 
involve a transition to/from unregulated, Com-
petitiveness is coded “0” (Not Applicable). Four 
categories are used to measure this concept: (0) 
Not Applicable; (1) Selection; (2)  
Dual/Transitional; (3) Election 
Polity IV 
http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/polity4.htm 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2002) 
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
p_xrreg Regulation of 
Chief Execu-
tive Re-
cruitment 
(2007) 
Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment: In 
considering recruitment, we must first determine 
whether there are any established modes at all 
by which chief executives are selected. Regula-
tion refers to the extent to which a polity has 
institutionalized procedures for transferring 
executive power. Three categories are used to 
differentiate the extent of institutionalization: (1) 
Unregulated; (2) Designational/Transitional; (3) 
Regulated 
Polity IV 
http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/polity4.htm 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2002) 
in Teorell et al. (2010) 
partyage Average Age 
of Parties 
(2009) 
This is the average of the ages of the 1st gov-
ernment party (1GOVAGE), 2nd government 
party (2GOVAGE), and 1st opposition party 
(1OPPAGE), or the subset of these for which age 
of party is known. 
Database of Political Institu-
tions (2010) 
http://go.worldbank.org/2E
AGGLRZ40 
(Beck et al 2000; 2001; 
Keefer 2009) 
Perfor-
mance.audit.ca
pacity 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
SAI’s Per-
formance 
audit capaci-
ty (1996- 
2007), n=57 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “Performance Audit Capacity”, 
‘0’ if it does not include such activities. Projects 
until and inclusive of 2007 were considered.  
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
Perfor-
mance.audit.ca
pacity_all 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
SAI’s Per-
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “Performance Audit Capacity”, 
‘0’ if it does not include such activities. Projects 
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
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formance 
audit capaci-
ty (1996- 
2007), n=191 
until and inclusive of 2007 were considered. 
Missings were replaced with “0” 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
phoneusers_02
.07 
Telephone 
lines (per 
100 people), 
mean for 
2002-2007 
Telephone lines (per 100 people), 
(IT.MLT.MAIN.P2): Telephone lines are fixed 
telephone lines that connect a subscriber's ter-
minal equipment to the public switched tele-
phone network and that have a port on a tele-
phone exchange. Integrated services digital 
network channels and fixed wireless subscribers 
are included. 
World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
poleff Fragility of 
Re-
gime/Gov
ernance 
Stability 
Fragility of Regime/Governance Stabil-
ity: range from 0-3, whereby “0” 
stands for low fragility in regime stabil-
ity, and “3” for high fragility in “regime 
stability”  
State Fragility Index and 
Matrix 2009  
Monty G. Marshall and 
Benjamin R. Cole  
Center for Systemic Peace; 
http://www.systemicpeace.
org/inscr/inscr.htm 
pop_02.07 Population, 
total (mean 
for the years 
2002-2007) 
Population, total World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
popgrowth_02.
07 
Population 
growth 
(annual %), 
average 
2002-2007 
Population growth (annual %) (SP.POP.GROW) World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
PRSP Poverty 
Reduction 
Strategy 
Papers 
(PRSP) 
Dummy variable for completion of a World Bank 
led Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper before the 
end of 2007 (interim reports are coded as 0) 
0: the country has not completed a PRSP  by 
2007   
1: the country has completed a PRSP by 2007 
Own research based on 
Gollwitzer and Quintyn 
(2010), source: IMF; 
http://www.imf.org/external
/np/prsp/prsp.aspx (Last 
Accessed December 2011) 
Q1.1 Monopoly 
on the use of 
force (2006) 
Q1.1. Monopoly on the use of force 
To what extent does the state’s monopoly on the 
use of force cover the entire territory? Measured 
between 1-10 
Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI), 
http://bti2006.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/ 
Q1.2 State identi-
ty (2006) 
Q 1.2. State identity: To what extent do all rele-
vant groups in society agree about citizenship 
and accept the nation-state as legitimate? Meas-
ured between 1-10 
Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI), 
http://bti2006.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/ 
Q1.4 Basic Admin-
istration 
(2006) 
Q1.4 Basic administration: To what extent do 
basic administrative structures exist? Measured 
between 1-10 
Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI), 
http://bti2006.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/ 
Q3.3 Abuse of 
office prose-
cuted (2006) 
Q3.3. Abuse of office prosecuted: To what extent 
are there legal or political penalties for office-
holders who abuse their positions? Measured 
between 1-10 
Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI), 
http://bti2006.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/ 
Q7.4 Banking 
system 
(2006) 
Q7.4. Banking system: To what extent have a 
solid banking system and a capital market been 
established? Measured between 1-10 
Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI), 
http://bti2006.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/ 
Q10.2 Equal oppor-
tunity (2006) 
Q10.2. Equal opportunity: To what extent does 
equality of opportunity exist? Measured be-
tween 1-10 
Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI), 
http://bti2006.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/ 
Q13.1 Structural 
constraints 
(2006) 
 Q13.1 Structural constraints: To what extent do 
structural difficulties constrain the political lead-
ership’s governance capacity? Measured be-
tween 1-10 
Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI), 
http://bti2006.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/ 
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Q14.1 Prioritization 
(2006) 
Q14.1. Prioritization: To what extent does the 
political leadership set and maintain strategic 
priorities? Measured between 1-10 
Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI), 
http://bti2006.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/ 
Q16.3 Cleavages 
(2006) 
Q16.3 Cleavages: To what extent can the political 
leadership manage political cleavages so that 
they do not escalate into irreconcilable conflicts? 
Measured between 1-10 
Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI), 
http://bti2006.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/ 
Religion Religious 
fractionaliza-
tion (2001) 
Religious fractionalization: Reflects probability 
that two randomly selected people from a given 
country will not belong to the same religious 
group. The higher the number, the more frac-
tionalized society. 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, 
Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg. 
http://www.stanford.edu/~
wacziarg/downloads/fractio
nalization.xls  
Resourcespc_0
2.07 
Total Re-
sources 
Income per 
capita (aver-
age 2002-
2007) 
A measure of Total Resource Income Per Capita 
(Total Fuel Income Per Capita plus Total Metals 
Income Per Capita, in 2007 dollars) 
Annex to Haber, Stephen 
and Victor Menaldo, 2011. 
“Do Natural Resources Fuel 
Authoritarianism? A Reap-
praisal of the Resource 
Curse” in American Political 
Science Review, February 
2011.  
 
SAIjurisdiction Dummy 
Variable for 
the SAI 
having a 
judicial 
function 
Dummy Variable for the SAI having a judicial 
function 
1: SAI is coded as “court” in “SAImodel_09” 
0: SAI is coded as another category in 
“SAImodel_09” 
Own research based on the 
variable “SAImodel_09” 
SAIleader_total
1 
The leader-
ship com-
mitment of a 
SAI between 
2005 and 
2011  
In order to measure the effect of the leadership 
qualities and reform commitment of a SAI head, I 
created a new variable (SAIleadership_total1), 
measuring the engagement of a SAI in INTOSAI 
groups and the number of speeches held at 
UN/INTOSAI seminars between 2005 and 2011. 
This variable measures the commitment of a SAI 
leader to reform. As there is no data on the 
personal traits of SAI leaders or on national 
initiatives by SAI leaders, I decided to measure 
the engagement of SAI leaders within INTOSAI as 
a proxy for their leadership skills and commit-
ment. SAI leadership is thus measured by (1) the 
total number of engagements by a SAI in INTOSAI 
groups and (2) by the total number of speeches 
at UN/INTOSAI seminars. It is assumed that a 
committed SAI leader is eager to engage in 
INTOSAI groups and is more likely to participate 
in such groups. Furthermore it is assumed that 
peers know which SAIs have successfully imple-
mented reforms and invite these SAIs to present 
a speech at the UN/INTOSAI seminars and that 
SAI leaders who are successfully implementing 
reforms at home volunteer to conduct such 
speeches to present their success.  
I developed two versions of this variable, 
SAIleader_total assigned two points to all chairs 
and immediately past chairs of INTOSAI groups. 
However, this variable showed a bias towards 
countries with large area, population, GDP or 
other types of regional/global influence. Alt-
hough the heads of these SAIs are clearly com-
mitted leaders, it also seems that INTOSAI is 
committed to give large countries a stronger 
voice within the governing board particularly and 
also in other groups, in addition it seems that 
Own research, see table B.33 
All the information was 
collected online at the 
INTOSAI or related sites, as 
well as in INTOSAI journal 
articles. 
http://www.intosaijournal.o
rg/; 
http://www.intosai.org/en/p
ortal/regional_working_grou
ps/; 
http://www.intosai.org/en/p
ortal/about_us/organisation
/governing_board/; 
http://www.intosai.org/en/p
ortal/committees_working_
groups_task_forces/; 
http://www.intosaijournal.o
rg/congressesandconference
s/congressafrosai_oct2011.h
tml  
(all Last Accessed on De-
cember 5, 2011) 
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there is a commitment to leveling out regional 
bias by voting countries of all major world re-
gions into the INTOSAI governing board.  
I thus developed a second variable, which assigns 
only one point to all SAIs in INTOSAI groups, 
irrespective if they are chairs or simple members 
of the steering committee. This also increases 
the leverage of small and economically weak 
SAIs, which might not have the resources to 
engage as chairs but are still committed to ex-
change among peers. To summarize, the chairs 
and members of the INTOSAI governing board, 
all INTOSAI committees, working groups, task 
forces and regional working groups get one 
point. Immediately past chairs or upcoming 
chairs where they have already been elected also 
get one point.  
Finally I believe that strong SAI leaders volunteer 
to hold speeches at important INTOSAI events. 
The programs of the UN-INTOSAI seminars are 
publicly available. Every SAI which held a speech 
during the 2005, 2007, 2009 or 2011 seminar got 
one point. I calculate this variable for the years 
2005 – 2011 (and thus violating my rule that I 
always use data up to the year 2009) because I 
believe that SAI leaders which held a speech 
about a good practice in 2011 or are elected in 
2011 must have been implementing good prac-
tice over the last few years and secondly, SAI 
leaders are mostly appointed for a medium or 
long period, which makes it probable, that such 
SAI leaders must have been in their position 
already in the year 2009, thus some years before 
their appointment/engagement in INTOSAI. 
Table B.15 in Appendix B provides you with the 
details of the data collected. All the information 
was collected online at the INTOSAI or related 
sites, as well as in INTOSAI journal articles and 
was verified in principle by the INTOSAI secretar-
iat in Vienna. 
SAIleader_total
f1 
Categorical 
(factor) 
Variable 
based on 
“SAIleader_t
otal1” 
I coded the variable SAIleader_total1f as follows: 
" "0:1='low'; 1.01:7='med'; 7.01:26='high'". The 
original variable SAIleader_total1 had a range of 
minimum 0 and maximum 26, with a medium of 
4.00 and a mean of 4.77. Instead of dividing the 
variable into three roughly equal parts, which 
would result in only one observation having 
“high” leadership, I opted to divide the variable 
in three parts, whereas the first quartile (1.0) 
marks the end of ‘low’ leadership and the third 
quartile (7.0) marks the beginning of ‘high” lead-
ership values. However, the results are also 
confirmed, with equally high statistical power, 
when dividing the variable into three equal parts. 
The graphical examination is then reduced to 
only low and medium leadership strengths, as 
there is only one SAI (USA) with high leadership 
strength in this version. 
Own calculation based on 
SAIleader_total1 
SAImodel_09 The type of 
institutional 
model of the 
supreme 
audit institu-
tion in 2009 
This is a classification of SAI institutional models. 
The categories are as follows: 
(1) Board model: more than one person are 
heading the SAI and are responsible for decision-
making 
(2) part of ministry: there is no separate SAI, the 
Own research, see table B.35 
sources: (1) the SAIs’ web-
sites Last Accessed mainly 
via 
www.intosai.org/members 
and if not available via 
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audit function is conducted by a department in 
the ministry of finance 
(3) court (judicial model): the SAI has a judicial 
function 
(4) monocratic (Westminster model) : one per-
son (president, general auditor, general state 
inspector) is responsible for decision-making 
(reporting to parliament or any other institution 
responsible for follow-up); 
See also chapter 5.1. for a discussion of the 
various models and the development of my 
selection criteria for the classification of SAIs.  
Google search; and cross-
checked with (2) Santiso 
(2009); (3) 
http://www.intosaiitaudit.or
g/mandates/writeups/; (4) 
INTOSAI data from the ‘90s 
kindly provided to the au-
thor by Blume and Voigt 
(2011); (all  sites accessed in 
June 2011) 
sec Measure for 
the concen-
tration ex-
tent of the 
economy 
(2007) 
The concentration ratio measures how concen-
trated the particular economy is in any given 
sector by taking the sum of squares of percent 
contribution to GDP.  The lower the concentra-
tion ratio, the more diversified the economy. 
The calculation is based on the following varia-
bles: 
wdi_ase Agriculture’s share of economy (% of 
GDP) 
wdi_ise Industry’s share of economy (% of GDP) 
wdi_sse: Services’ share of economy (% of GDP) 
Own calculation based on 
Shediac, Richard, Rabih 
Abouchakra, Chadi N. 
Moujaes and Mazen Ramsay 
Najjar (2008) Economic 
Diversification The Road to 
Sustainable 
Development, booz&Co. p.3 
http://www.booz.com/medi
a/uploads/Economic-
Diversification.pdf  
and uses the World Devel-
opment Indicators, in Teorell 
et al. (2010) 
secleg Fragility in 
Security 
Legitimacy  
Fragility in Security Legitimacy: range between 0-
3: whereby “0” stands for low fragility of security 
legitimacy and “3” stands for high fragility in 
security legitimacy 
State Fragility Index and 
Matrix 2009  
Monty G. Marshall and 
Benjamin R. Cole  
Center for Systemic Peace 
http://www.systemicpeace.
org/inscr/inscr.htm  
sed Measure for 
the extent of 
diversifica-
tion of an 
economy 
(2007) 
Equal to the inverse of concentration ratio, the 
diversification quotient provides a numerical 
perspective with which countries can baseline 
and target future economic development.  The 
higher the diversification quotient, the more 
diversified the economy. 
The calculation is based on the following varia-
bles: 
wdi_ase Agriculture’s share of economy (% of 
GDP) 
wdi_ise Industry’s share of economy (% of GDP) 
wdi_sse: Services’ share of economy (% of GDP) 
Own calculation based on 
Shediac, Richard, Rabih 
Abouchakra, Chadi N. 
Moujaes and Mazen Ramsay 
Najjar (2008) Economic 
Diversification The Road to 
Sustainable 
Development, booz&Co. p.3 
http://www.booz.com/medi
a/uploads/Economic-
Diversification.pdf 
and uses the World Devel-
opment Indicators, in Teorell 
et al. (2010) 
servers_02.07 Secure In-
ternet serv-
ers (per 1 
million peo-
ple), average 
for 2002-
2007 
Secure Internet servers (per 1 million people) 
(IT.NET.SECR.P6) 
World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
SI Stateness 
Index (2006) 
Status Index – Market Economy: There are seven 
criteria based on a total of 14 questions used in 
assessing the state of economic transformation. 
The BTI concept of a market economy flanked by 
sociopolitical safeguards encompasses issues 
such as a framework of competition  and private 
property rights, as well as social responsibility, 
equal opportunity and sustainability. In BTI 
terms, comprehensive development should not 
only lead to economic growth; it should also fight 
Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI), 
http://bti2006.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/ 
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poverty effectively and expand the freedom of 
choice and action to as many citizens as possible. 
strategicplan Dummy 
variable for a 
SAI having 
published a 
strategic 
development 
plan (2009) 
Dummy variable for a SAI having published a 
strategic development plan dated before the end 
of 2009 
Own calculation, see table 
B.34 
Sup-
port.services 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
SAI’s Support 
Services 
(1996- 
2007), n=57 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “Support Services”, ‘0’ if it does 
not include such activities. Projects until and 
inclusive of 2007 were considered.  
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
Sup-
port.services_a
ll 
Capacity 
building to 
strengthen 
SAI’s Support 
Services 
(1996- 
2007), n=191 
Dummy variable: ‘1’ if focus of Capacity building 
project includes activities to strengthen the 
beneficiary SAI’s “Support Services”, ‘0’ if it does 
not include such activities. Projects until and 
inclusive of 2007 were considered. Missings were 
replaced with “0” 
Own calculation based on 
the Capacity Building Com-
mittee (CBC) Directory of 
Projects (version 2011), full 
database provided by the 
INTOSAI Development Initia-
tive (IDI); 
http://www.saidevelopment
.org/Lists/CBC%20Directory/
AllItems.aspx  
tax_02.07 Avge of 
central gov. 
total tax 
revenue (% 
of GDP) 
betw. 2002 
and 2007 
Average of central government total tax revenue 
(% of GDP) between 2002 and 2007. (If there is 
data only for some years between 2002 and 
2007, the average of those years is calculated, if 
there is no data for this period, data for 2008 is 
used, if there is also no data for 2008, data for 
2009 is used.) (variable code: 
GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS) 
World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
ti_cpi Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index (2007) 
Corruption Perceptions Index: The CPI focuses on 
corruption in the public sector and defines cor-
ruption as the abuse of public office for private 
gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend 
to ask questions in line with the misuse of public 
power for private benefit, with a focus, for ex-
ample, on bribe-taking by public officials in pub-
lic procurement. The sources do not distinguish 
between administrative and political corruption. 
The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the de-
gree of corruption as seen by business people, 
risk analysts and the general public and ranges 
between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
Transparency International 
http://www.transparency.or
g/  
in Teorell et al (2010)  
tot_pfmaid_02
.07pc 
Total PFM 
disburse-
ments (aver-
age for the 
years 2002-
2007)  
Total PFM disbursements: the per capita value 
was calculated by the author by dividing the 
value by the corresponding value from the varia-
ble “pop_02.07” (see above) 
De Renzio, Paolo, Matt 
Andrews and Zac Mills 
(2010) Evaluation of Donor 
Support to Public Financial 
Management (PFM) Reform 
in Developing Countries, 
Analytical study of quantita-
tive cross-country evidence, 
FINAL REPORT November 
2010, Overseas Develop-
ment Institute, London. The 
database was provided by 
the courtesy of the authors. 
un_combined Dummy Dummy variable for UN Presence in a country:  Own calculation based on 
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variable for 
UN Presence 
in a country 
(2000-2009) 
1: Presence of any number of UN peacekeepers 
as stated the variable “unpresence_n” or own 
research on presence of UN peacekeepers in the 
country since 2000, therefore equating state 
fragility with a conflict or post-conflict situation. 
(compare method with de Renzio et al. 2010:22) 
0: no UN peace keepers since 2000  
“unpresence_n” and UN 
Peacekeeping Operations 
1948-2011, pp.78-79 
http://www.un.org/en/peac
ekeeping/publications/yir/yi
r2011.pdf  
unpresence_n Presence of 
peace keep-
ers (number 
of troops, 
police, and 
military 
observers in 
mandate) 
(2009) 
Presence of peace keepers (number of troops, 
police, by and military observers in mandate) 
(VC.PKP.TOTL.UN) 
World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
Urban Urban popu-
lation (% of 
total) 
Urban population (% of total): (Indicator Name: 
SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS): Urban population refers to 
people living in urban areas as defined by na-
tional statistical offices. It is calculated using 
World Bank population estimates and urban 
ratios from the United Nations World Urbaniza-
tion Prospects. 
World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
Urbangrowth_
02.07 
Urban popu-
lation 
growth 
(annual %) 
Urban population growth (annual %) (Indicator 
name: SP.URB.GROW): Urban population refers 
to people living in urban areas as defined by 
national statistical offices. It is calculated using 
World Bank population estimates and urban 
ratios from the United Nations World Urbaniza-
tion Prospects. 
World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
wdi_area Surface area 
(sq. km)  
 
Surface area (sq. km) : Surface area is a country's 
total area, including areas under inland bodies of 
water and some coastal waterways.  
World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
wdi_sse Services’ 
share of 
economy (% 
of GDP) 
(2007) 
Services’ share of economy (% of GDP) World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40, in Teorell et al 
(2010) 
WDIclass World Bank 
Country 
Classification 
(2007) 
World Bank Country Classification (2007) accord-
ing to Income Groups: Low income; Lower mid-
dle income; Upper middle income; High income: 
nonOECD; High income: OECD. 
World Bank list of econo-
mies (July 2007) 
wbgi_pse Political 
Stability – 
Estimate 
(2007) 
Political Stability – Estimate: “Political Stability” 
combines several indicators which measure 
perceptions of the likelihood that the govern-
ment in power will be destabilized or overthrown 
by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent 
means, incl. domestic violence and terrorism.  
World Bank – Governance 
Indicators (a.k.a KKZ) 
http://www.govindicators.or
g 
(Kaufmann et al 2009) in 
Teorell et al 2010 
wbgi_vae Voice and 
Accountabil-
ity – Esti-
mate (2007) 
Voice and Accountability – Estimate: “Voice and 
Accountability” includes a number of indicators 
measuring various aspects of the political pro-
cess, civil liberties and political rights. These 
indicators measure the extent to which citizens 
of a country are able to participate in the selec-
tion of governments. This category also includes 
indicators measuring the independence of the 
media, which serves an important role in moni-
toring those in authority and holding them ac-
countable for their actions. 
World Bank – Governance 
Indicators (a.k.a KKZ) 
http://www.govindicators.or
g 
(Kaufmann et al 2009) in 
Teorell et al. (2010) 
young Population 
ages 0-14 (% 
of total) 
Population ages 0-14 (% of total) World Development Indica-
tors 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0
FSM7AQ40 
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Appendix B. 13 OLS Regression on OBS2010 SAI Power (Beta Coefficients Noted) 
Regressions:  (1) All (2) nonOECD  (1b)  (2b)  
H1a:  
SAImodel_09Board 
 1.97 
(2.51) 
* 2.24 
(4.13) 
*** 2.20 
(3.46) 
** 2.31 
(5.74) 
*** 
H1a:  
SAImodel_09court 
 1.75 
(2.25) 
* 2.13 
(3.89) 
*** 1.76 
(2.82) 
** 1.97 
(4.93) 
*** 
H1a: 
SAImodel_09monocratic 
 2.32 
(3.00) 
** 2.66 
(4.95) 
*** 2.47 
(3.97) 
*** 2.66 
(6.76) 
*** 
H1b: dpi_checks 
Political competitiveness 
 0.19 
(2.85) 
** 0.16 
(2.28) 
* 0.25 
(4.57) 
*** 0.24 
(4.43) 
*** 
H2a:  
Oil_02.07 
 -0.28 
(-3.83) 
*** -0.31 
(-3.93) 
*** -0.32 
(-5.30) 
*** -0.36 
(-6.05) 
*** 
H2b:  
IMF_1 
 -0.54 
(-2.96) 
** -0.56 
(-2.97) 
** -0.47 
(-3.09) 
** -0.46 
(-3.17) 
** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionAFROSAI-E 
 -0.50 
(-2.51) 
* -0.60 
(-2.73) 
** -0.54 
(-3.36) 
** -0.63 
(-3.88) 
*** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionARABOSAI 
 -0.93 
(-3.59) 
***
 
-1.08 
(-3.83) 
*** -0.93 
(-4.53) 
*** -1.08 
(-5.22) 
*** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionASOSAI 
 -0.33 
(-1.75) 
 . -0.54 
(-2.41) 
* -0.39 
(-2.55) 
* -0.59 
(-3.54) 
*** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionCAROSAI 
 -1.04 
(-2.03) 
* -1.04 
(-1.88) 
 . -1.23 
(-2.98) 
** -1.24 
(-3.04) 
*** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionCREFIAF 
 -0.51 
(-1.91) 
 . -0.69 
(-2.35) 
* -0.59 
(-2.74) 
** -0.79 
(-3.61) 
*** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionNRM 
 -0.26 
(-0.47) 
 NA  -0.16 
(-0.36) 
 NA  
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionOLACEFS 
 -0.45 
(-2.63) 
* -0.48 
(-2.56) 
* -0.57 
(-3.95) 
*** -0.587 
(-4.00) 
*** 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionPASAI 
 -1.90 
(-5.20) 
*** -1.90 
(-4.87) 
*** -1.97 
(-6.79) 
*** -1.96 
(-6.85) 
*** 
H3b: 
battledeaths_02.08 
 0.23 
(3.52) 
*** 0.25 
(3.61) 
*** 0.20 
(1.12) 
 0.17 
(1.00) 
 
H4b: log(fh_press) 
Press restriction 
 -0.11 
(-1.16) 
 0.02 
(0.14) 
 0.05 
(0.55) 
 0.27 
(2.12) 
* 
H6a: ciri_injud1.  
Partially indep. judiciary 
 0.37 
(2.79) 
** 0.41 
(2.73) 
** 0.48 
(4.33) 
*** 0.54 
(4.69) 
*** 
H6a: ciri_injud2. 
Generally indep. judiciary 
 0.47 
(2.20) 
* 0.62 
(2.50) 
* 0.88 
(4.27) 
*** 1.22 
(5.23) 
*** 
H7a:  
SAIleader_total1 
 0.24 
(3.40) 
** 0.20 
(2.54) 
* 0.19 
(2.94) 
** 0.14 
(2.11) 
* 
Constant (Ref. category:  
SAImodel_09. ministry; 
INTOSAIregionEUROSAI; 
IMF_0; ciri_injud0.Not indep.) 
-1.86 
(-2.39) 
* -2.19 
(-4.17) 
*** -2.06 
(-3.29) 
** -2.30 
(-6.01) 
*** 
N    85 73                ….    79  67 
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
 0.8212 
0.769 
 0.7806 
0.7074 
 0.8929 
0.8585 
         0.8902 
        0.8491 
F-statistic p.value  < 2.2e-16  5.777e-12  < 2.2e-16  <2.2e-16  
Significance levels reported as: ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1; t-values in brack-
ets. Model tests: Multi-collinearity tests GVIF^2(1/(2*Df)) <2 = True. Outlier tests and influential obser-
vations: Examination of qq-plots and leverage plots satisfying, no studentized residuals with Bonferonni p 
< 0.05, Largest |rstudent|: Bulgaria. Large Cook Distance reported for Bulgaria, Iraq, Brazil, Mexico, 
Malawi and Sri Lanka. However an exclusion of these influential cases did not substantially change the 
results but increase the significance of the overall model (see models 1b and 2b). Non-normality: graph-
ical examination of distribution of studentized residuals, QQ plots. Non-constant error variance: BP test 
no significance reported, plots of studentized residuals (and their squares) vs. fitted values show outliers 
but no heteroscedasticity. Nonlinearity: scatterplots and component and residual plots examined, inde-
pendent variables accordingly linearly transformed. Non-independence of errors: DW and BG tests not 
significant. Assessment of the linear model assumptions using the global test on 4df: all assumptions 
acceptable. The variables of hypothesis 5 were not included here because the number of observations is 
very small, the data is unreliable and not significant. 
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Appendix B. 14 OLS Regression on Alternative SAI Variables 
  (1) GI0810 (2) OECD (3) PEFA 
H1a: 
SAImodel_09court 
 -7.480 
(-0.931) 
 -3.933  
(-0.779) 
 23.686  
(1.932) 
. 
H1a. 
SAImodel_09ministry 
 -41.112  
(-2.434) 
* 2.534 
(0.191) 
 19.855  
(1.423) 
  
H1a: 
SAImodel_09monocratic 
 -2.838 
 (-0.483) 
 3.859 
(0.900) 
 27.124 
(2.268) 
* 
H1b: 
dpi_checks 
 0.627 
(0.344) 
 -2.249  
(-2.132) 
* -6.327 
(-1.874) 
* 
H2a: 
Oil_02.07 
 -0.696 
 (-3.377) 
** -0.228 
(-1.464) 
 0.523 
(0.370) 
 
H2b: 
IMF_1 
 24.550 
(2.986) 
** 2.160 
(0.439) 
 3.523 
(0.497) 
 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionARABOSAI 
 -3.351  
(-0.302) 
 -16.910 
(-2.473) 
* -34.251 
 (-1.639) 
 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionASOSAI 
 -19.418 
 (-2.565) 
*  -1.934 
(-0.384) 
 -6.678 
(-0.566) 
 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionCAROSAI 
 NA  NA  -0.468  
(-0.027) 
 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionCREFIAF 
 -8.935 
 (-0.677) 
 -10.790 
(-1.656) 
  -22.883 
(-2.291) 
* 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionEUROSAI 
 -2.013 
 (-0.289) 
 1.497 
(0.344) 
 23.022 
(1.823) 
. 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionNRM 
 5.105 
(0.343) 
 0.240 
(0.024) 
 25.972 
(1.160) 
 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionOLACEFS 
 -0.526  
(-0.070) 
-3.516  
(-0.636) 
 23.182 
(2.646) 
* 
H3a: 
INTOSAIregionPASAI 
 NA  1.855 
(0.282) 
 NA  
H3b: 
battledeaths_02.08 
 -0.002 
(-0.377) 
 3.491e-06 
(0.001) 
 -0.001 
(-0.154) 
 
H4b: 
log(fh_press) 
 -5.070  
(-0.629) 
-6.667 
(-1.764) 
 . 10.385 
(0.986) 
 
H6a: 
ciri_injud1. Partially independent 
 -6.877  
(-1.414) 
9.109 
(2.517) 
* 15.403 
(2.035) 
. 
H6b: 
ciri_injud2. Generally independent 
 -19.432 
(-2.151) 
* 5.559 
(1.234) 
 28.204 
(2.484) 
* 
H7: 
SAIleader_total1 
 1.087 
(2.071) 
* 0.448 
(1.430) 
  1.705  
(1.887) 
. 
Constant (Reference category measuring 
SAImodel_09Board; 
INTOSAIregionAFROSAI-E; IMF_0; 
ciri_injud0.Not independent) 
 88.37 
(2.528) 
 * 93.68 
(5.542) 
*** -19.685  
(-0.428) 
 
N    54  84  47 
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
 0.653 
0.4891 
 0.5006 
0.3644 
 0.7392 
0.5716 
 
F-statistic p.value  0.0002389  5.441e-05  0.0002341  
Notes: t-statistics in brackets; Significance levels reported as: ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1; Model (1) GI08.10: the following 
observations were excluded from the dataset because of high leverage and cook’s distance: Egypt, India, Iraq, Korea, Nicaragua, Uganda; 
Model (2) OECD: the following observations were excluded from the dataset bec. of high leverage and cook’s distance: Chile, Haiti, Suriname, 
Tajikistan; Model (3) PEFA: PEFA.26mean was used. India, Philippines and Tunisia were excluded. The regression models were tested as 
follows: influential observations: no studentized residuals with Bonferonni p < 0.05; Multi-collinearity tests GVIF^2(1/(2*Df)) <2 = True. Non-
normality: graphical examination of distribution of studentized residuals, QQ plots. Non-constant error variance: BP test no significance reported 
except for model 2 which contains still many outliers, plots of studentized residuals (and their squares) vs. fitted values. Nonlinearity: scatter-
plots and component and residual plots examined, independent variables accordingly linearly transformed. Non-independence of errors: DW 
and BG tests not significant. Assessment of the linear model assumptions using the global test on 4df: all assumptions acceptable.  
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Appendix B. 15 H2b_OLS Regression of Aid on OBS2010 
Regression (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
(1)log(Aid02.07pc) -4.753 *         
(2)log(tot_pfmaid_02.07pc)    -2.908 .       
(3) sqrt(gbs_totaid_02.07)    -26.910      
(4) IMF 
0 (constant)= no IMF  
1= IMF support 
      
50.780 
 -18.022 
 
***  
* 
  
(5) PRSP 
0(Constant)=no PRSP 
1= PRSP 
         
55.152 
 -17.920 
*** 
*** 
Constant 60.959 *** 36.844 *** 45.930 ***     
N 81  56  55  94  94  
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
0.07549 
0.06378 
 0.05364 
0.03611 
 0.03321 
0.01496 
 0.062 
0.0518 
 0.1286 
0.1192 
 
F-statistic p.value 0.01305  0.0859  0.183  0.01552  0.000385  
Significance codes:  ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1 
 
Appendix B. 15 continued 
Regression (6)  (7)  (8)    
(1)log(tot_pfmaid_02.07pc) *PRSP 
 
log(tot_pfmaid_02.07pc) 
PRSP =1 
Interaction term 
 
 
-3.304 
-4.662 
4.742 
      
(2)sqrt(gbs_totaid_02.07)*PRSP 
 
sqrt(gbs_totaid_02.07) 
PRSP=1 
Interaction term 
  
 
-40.511 
-23.823 
70.803 
** 
. 
    
(3)log(tot_pfmaid_02.07pc) *IMF 
 
log(tot_pfmaid_02.07pc) 
IMF =1 
Interaction term 
   
 
-3.752 
7.169 
13.077 
* 
* 
  
Constant  41.875 *** 52.732 *** 36.594 ***   
N 56  55  56    
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
0.1843 
0.1373 
 0.1748 
0.1262 
 0.1788 
0.1314 
   
F-statistic p.value 0.01350  0.01952  0.01589    
Significance codes:  ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1 
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Appendix B. 16 OLS Regression on OBS2010 SAI Power 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) log(directtax_02.07) 
fh_status2. Partly Free 
fh_status3. Not Free 
log(directtax_02.07):fh_status2.PartlyFree 
log(directtax_02.07):fh_status3. Not Free 
Intercept: log(directtax_02.07):fh_status1.Free 
5.020 
-25.428 
-37.629 
-7.223 
-4.447 
57.123 
. 
* 
** 
*** 
   
(2) 0(constant)=AFROSAI-E 
INTOSAIregionARABOSAI 
INTOSAIregionASOSAI 
INTOSAIregionCAROSAI 
INTOSAIregionCREFIAF 
INTOSAIregionEUROSAI 
INTOSAIregionNRM 
INTOSAIregionOLACEFS 
INTOSAIregionPASAI 
log(childmort_02.07) 
 127.309 
-37.089 
-13.284 
-24.864 
-16.578 
-21.652 
-21.031 
-19.033 
-29.836 
-17.455 
***  
***  
. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
*** 
  
(3) log(fh_press)   -27.657 ***  
(4) SAImodel_09Board    Ref.Cat. 
SAImodel_09court    -1.47 
SAImodel_09monocratic    5.89 
dpi_checks    2.44 . 
Oil_02.07    -0.36 * 
IMF_1    -11.70 * 
INTOSAIregionAFROSAI-E    Ref.Cat. 
INTOSAIregionARABOSAI    -19.17 * 
INTOSAIregionASOSAI    -2.05 
INTOSAIregionCAROSAI    NA 
INTOSAIregionCREFIAF    -11.33 
INTOSAIregionEUROSAI    -3.16 
INTOSAIregionNRM    -7.19 
INTOSAIregiionOLACEFS    -5.32 
INTOSAIregionPASAI    NA 
Battledeaths_02.08    0.004 . 
DCOverall    42.01 *** 
SAIleader_total1    1.40 *** 
Constant    152.711 *** -0.29  
N 27 94 94 61 
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
0.4663 
0.3392 
0.5603 
0.5132 
0.3285 
0.3212 
0.8283 
0.776 
F-statistic p.value 0.01528 7.141e-12 1.565e-09 4.057e-13 
Significance codes:  ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1;  
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Appendix B. 17 H3b_OLS Regression of External Intervention on OBS2010 SAI Power 
Regression   (1) (2) 
(1)battledeaths_02.08 +fh_status 
0(constant)=free 
Battledeaths_02.08 
1=partly free 
2= not free 
   
64.338171 
0.001497 
-23.91248 -
35.35918 
***  
***  
*** 
  
(2)FSIext *WDIclass 
Constant(WDIclass:HI.nonOECD) 
FSIext 
WDIclassHI.OECD  
WDIclassLI 
WDIclassLMI 
WDIclassUMI 
FSIext:WDIclassHI.OECD 
FSIext:WDIclassLI 
FSIext:WDIclassLMI 
FSIext:WDIclassUMI 
     
129.30 
-16.144 
-40.523 
-57.771  
-102.611 
-26.477 
11.795 
11.282 
18.788 
6.832 
 
***  
** 
. 
** 
 
. 
. 
** 
 
 
Constant   49.292295 ***  
N   93 94  
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
  0.3408 
0.3186 
0.4717 
0.4151 
 
F-statistic p.value  4.003e-08  8.986e-09 
Significance codes:  ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1 
 
Appendix B. 18 H5_ OLS Regression of Capacity Building on OBS2010 SAI Power 
Regression  (1) (2) (3: nonOECD) (4) (5) 
log(childmort_02.07)  -9.831 **    -9.2119 *** 
I(fh_ipolity2^2)  0.2276 *    0.3180 *** 
CBC_y  0.9724     
CBC_budget  -1.140e-08     
Organisational.capacity:1  -5.019     
Financial.audit.capacity:1  0.527     
Performance.audit.capacity:1  -14.86 .     
IT.audit.capacity:1  1.422     
Forensic.audit.capacity:1  1.908     
Other.audit.capacities:1  7.825     
External.environment.capacity:1  14.94 *   12.118 .  
Support.services:1  -3.165     
CBC_y_all    1.361  2.518 *   
CBC_budget_ths_all    -7.253e-06 -7.447e-06   
log(CBC_y_all_r)      9.7347 . 
log(CBC_budget_ths_all_r)      1.2895 
Organisational.capacity_all:1      -7.1507 
Financial.audit.capacity_all:1      -0.4337 
Performance.audit.capacity_all:1      -13.7061 . 
IT.audit.capacity_all:1      -2.8758 
Forensic.audit.capacity_all:1      2.7881 
Other.audit.capacities_all:1      7.3110 
External.environment.capacity_all:1      11.9633 . 
Support.services_all:1      -3.5272 
Constant                      80.83 ***  46.87 *** 40.53 ***   47.896 *** 60.8399 *** 
Model summary statistics:         
N  38  94  82  41  93 
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
 0.6597 
0.4963 
 0.02008 
-0.00146 
 0.07437 
0.05093 
0.08164 
0.05809 
0.6369 
0.5825 
F-statistic, p   0.001568 0.3974 0.04725 0.07015 3.455e-13 
Significance codes:  ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1; CBC_y_all_r is the same as CBC_y_all 
only that values of “0” have been recoded to “0.01” so that it becomes possible to calculate the log. The same is valid 
of CBC_budget_ths_all_r.
Appendix B. 19 OLS Regression of All Hypotheses on OBS2010 SAI Power 
Regressions (0)  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
H6: fh_ipolity2^2 0.35382 *** 0.27812 *** 0.22744 ** 0.355035 *** NA 0.2477 * NA 
H1: SAImodel_09Board 43.67766  . 37.85493 . NA 41.673621 . 44.298043 . NA 54.4988 * 
H1: SAImodel_09court 39.28967  . 34.37558  -4.88243  38.162383 . 43.422034 . -0.4891 48.8267 * 
H1: SAImodel_09monocratic 52.98523 * 48.84918 * 9.04835 * 50.423950 * 54.737994 * 13.3363 60.0576 ** 
H7: SAIleader_total1 1.14636 ** 1.21005 ** 1.21596 * 1.242597 ** 0.922569 * 1.2823 . 1.1867 ** 
H3: INTOSAIregionAFROSAI-E -11.47192 * -12.32743 * -11.42651 * -10.855911 * -12.365851 . Ref.Cat. -14.7045 ** 
H3: INTOSAIregionARABOSAI -18.70881 ** -18.03942 ** -28.54648 ** -20.088402 ** -26.865993 *** 5.1793 -27.6018 *** 
H3: INTOSAIregionASOSAI -1.96838  -0.98887  -5.45880 -2.383594 -1.912736 10.9275  .  -3.8476 
H3: INTOSAIregionCAROSAI -27.64276  . -26.44159 . -27.43796 . -26.748522 . -23.543360 NA -32.8265 ** 
H3: INTOSAIregionCREFIAF -18.22739 ** -16.60571 * -13.74980 * -18.046010 ** -17.771388 * 16.2694 -20.5566 ** 
H3: INTOSAIregionEUROSAI Ref.Cat.  Ref.Cat.  Ref.Cat. Ref.Cat. Ref.Cat. 20.1567 * Ref.Cat. 
H3: INTOSAIregionNRM -3.06032  -5.19597  -4.96615 -4.398963 -1.601760 NA -3.5200 
H3: INTOSAIregionOLACEFS -11.19948 * -12.26613 ** -8.13489 . -11.149295 * -4.525132 21.9271  -11.0470 * 
H3: INTOSAIregionPASAI -33.68946 ** -36.82965 *** -41.43455 *** -32.920082 ** -60.571826 *** -18.9461 -39.0543 *** 
H1: dpi_checks   3.08102 *      
H2: Oil_02.07    -0.28941     
H2: EFW5Cvii (tax compliance)     1.45582 *     
H2: IMF_1     -11.38391 *     
H3: battledeaths_02.08      0.001388 .    
H4: education.exp_02.07^3       0.003675   
H4: log(fh_press)       -13.863347 **   
H5: log(CBC_budget_r)        -1.4938  
H5: log(CBC_y_r)        4.8073  
H5: External.environment.capacity: 1        12.5275   
H5: Performance.audit.capacity: 1           -15.1930 .   
H6: ciri_injud1. Partially independent         5.9351 . 
H6: ciri_injud2. Generally independent         15.0240 ** 
H6: p_xconst         3.4525 ** 
H6: p_fragment1. slight fragmentation <10%         -4.2405 
H6: p_fragment2. moderate fragmentation 10-25%        -14.0430 . 
H6: p_fragment3. serious fragmentation >25%        16.4369 
Constant -15.11231  -15.25066  30.20074 *** -13.836051 47.096821 37.4742 . -26.5823 
N 94  88  82 93 85 38 90 
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
0.713 
0.6664 
 0.7535 
0.7062 
 0.7369 
0.6771 
0.7201 
0.6698 
0.7045 
0.6454 
0.6713 
0.4712 
0.7512 
0.6881 
F-statistic p.value < 2.2e-16  < 2.2e-16 8.534e-14 3.284e-16 4.427e-13 0.004962 6.244e-15 
Significance levels reported as follows:  ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1; The Constant measures the coefficient of the reference categories, which are: SAImodel_09ministry, INTOSAIregionEUROSAI, IMF_0, cirri_injud0.not independ-
ent, p_fragment0.no fragmentation. Only model (5) uses AFROSAI-E as reference category. CBC_budgetl_r is the same as CBC_budget  only that values of “0” have been recoded to “0.01” so that it becomes possible to calculate the log. The same is 
valid of CBC_y_r. The regression models have been tested as follows: Multi-collinearity tests GVIF^2(1/(2*Df)) <2 = True. Outlier tests and influential observations: Examination of qq-plots and leverage plots satisfying, no studentized residuals with 
Bonferonni p < 0.05, Largest |rstudent|: Bosnia-Herzegovina (BIH) and Brazil (BRA). Large Cook Distance with D values > 4/(n-k-1) reported for BIH, BRA and Russia (RUS). However an exclusion of these influential cases did not substantially change 
the results, thus they remained in the model (it however increase the R² and significance levels for SAImodel_09, for tax compliance and freedom of the press, dpi_checks looses significance). Non-normality: graphical examination of distribution of 
studentized residuals, QQ plots. Non-constant error variance: BP test no significance reported, plots of studentized residuals (and their squares) vs. fitted values show outliers but no heteroscedasticity. Nonlinearity: scatterplots and component and 
residual plots examined, independent variables accordingly linearly transformed (fh_press, education.exp, fh_ipolity2). Non-independence of errors: DW and BG tests not significant. Assessment of the linear model assumptions using the global test on 
4df: all assumptions acceptable  
Appendix B. 20 Description of Variables Measuring the Doorstep Conditions by Gollwitzer and Quintyn (2010) 
Name of 
Variable 
Source and year of data Description of variable 
DC_Overall Gollwitzer and Quintyn (forthcoming) improving the 
initial indicators of Gollwitzer and Quintyn (2010) 
Based mainly on data for the year 2009  
 
Gollwitzer and Quintyn developed a composite indicator, consisting of three sub-
indices, to measure a country’s performance under NWW’s doorstep conditions. 
D_Overall is the average of the three subindices D1, D2 and D3. For the development 
of their indicator they use variables from five different databases, mostly for the year 
2009, and publicly available information on political institutions, for a total of 77 
low, middle and upper middle income countries.  
D1  
Goll1.1. 
Goll1.2. 
Goll1.3. 
Gollwitzer and Quintyn (forthcoming) improving the 
initial indicators of Gollwitzer and Quintyn (2010) 
Based mainly on data for the year 2009  
 
D1 is the sub-index for NWW’s doorstep condition 1 – “rule of law for elites”. For 
the construction of their sub-index D1 they use 9-10 variables (depending on data 
availability) from three databases (Polity IV, IPD, EFW) and own research and ag-
gregate them with equal weights. They organize their variables around three catego-
ries (G1.1 Existence of the rules for the elite, G1.2. Independence and impartiality of 
the judicial system and G1.3. Elite’s respect for the courts’ decisions”) which togeth-
er compose doorstep 1.  
D2 
Goll2.1. 
Goll2.2. 
Gollwitzer and Quintyn (forthcoming) improving the 
initial indicators of Gollwitzer and Quintyn (2010) 
Based mainly on data for the year 2009  
 
D1 is the sub-index for NWW’s doorstep condition 2 – “perpetually lived organiza-
tions in the private and public sphere”.  D2 is based on the two categories G2.1. Sta-
bility and permanence of the political system and G2.2. Ease of creating organiza-
tions, measured through 9-12 variables (depending on data availability) of three da-
tasets (IPD, DPI, EFW) and own research. The variables are aggregated with equal 
weights. 
D3 
Goll3.1. 
Goll3.2. 
Goll3.3. 
Gollwitzer and Quintyn (forthcoming) improving the 
initial indicators of Gollwitzer and Quintyn (2010) 
Based mainly on data for the year 2009  
 
D3 is the sub-index for NWW’s doorstep condition 3 – “monopoly over the military”.  
D3 is composed of 8-9 variables (depending on data availability), which constitute 
the categories G3.1. Political control over the legal armed forces, G 3.2. Military 
interference in political life and G.3.3. Level of armed violence, which are based on 4 
databases (IPD, DPI, EFW, ACD) and own research and are aggregated with equal 
weights.  
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Appendix B. 21 H6a.1_OLS Regression of the Doorstep Conditions (Gollwitzer and Quintyn, 2010) on OBS2010 SAI Power 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)  (12)  
(1)Goll1.1. 64.391 ***              
(2)Goll1.2.  90.767 ***             
(3)Goll1.3.   73.312 ***            
(4)D1    101.66 ***           
(5)Goll2.1    110.37 ***          
(6)Goll2.2.      90.429 ****         
(7)D2       143.36 ***        
(8)Goll3.1.        27.021 *       
(9)Goll3.2.        44.495 ***      
(10)Goll3.3.         38.722 ***     
(11)D3           58.154 ***   
(12)DCOverall             75.298 *** 
Constant 8.131 8.437 4.019 -9.107  -28.15 * -7.209 -46.52 *** 32.164 *** 25.604 *** 26.787 *** 14.415 . -21.112 * 
N 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66  66  
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
0.3614 
0.3516 
0.4734 
0.4653 
0.4361 
0.4274  
0.5683 
0.5617 
0.3662 
0.3565 
0.3535 
0.3436 
0.5183 
0.5109 
0.08262 
0.0685 
0.2498 
0.2382 
0.1959 
0.1835 
0.2657 
0.2544 
 0.5288 
0.5215 
 
F-statistic p.value 7.484e-
08 
 1.203e-09 2.484e-09 1.800e-13 5.809e-
08 
 1.127e-
07 
 6.602e-12 0.01835 1.664e-05 0.00017
68 
 8.072e-
06 
 3.212e-12  
               
 Significance codes:  ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1 
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Appendix B. 22 Components of the Doorstep Conditions 
Doorstep condition 1 – “Rule of law for elites”: 
 Rules and disputes: Regularizing behavior through rules, both formal and informal, including  adjudicating disputes among elites (NWW, 2009:151)  
 Unbiased judiciary: Establishment of a judicial system whose decisions are binding and unbiased, at least with respect to elites. (NWW, 2009:151) An independent judiciary also enables 
the legislative branch to write legislation detailing impersonal rules of policy distribution and to enforce those rules through the courts. (NWW, 2009:267, 270)  
 Impersonal exchange of shares in joint-stock companies: Owning shares might begin as a unique privilege; however, if that privilege becomes widespread and shares are transferable, then 
an elite interest in supporting impersonal exchange of shares may grow which in turn may create an interest in impersonal formation of companies. (NWW, 2009:156) 
 Elections: Elites support political contestation through political parties. (NWW, 2009:156) 
 Property rights: The judicial system relatively free of corruption. Courts are able to establish and enforce clear enough property rights in land to support mortgage lending. (NWW, 
2009:154)  
Doorstep condition 2 – “Perpetually lived organizations in the public and private spheres”: 
 Perpetual life is a characteristic of both private and public organizations (NWW, 2009:152)  
 Prerequisite is a perpetually lived state (NWW, 2009:152)  
 The society eliminates the need for personal identification with networks of patronage and protection (NWW, 2009:152) 
 Perpetual life is linked to the belief that commitments will be honored (NWW, 2009:152, 158)  
 Implementing equality in a society requires that the society is able to create and sustain impersonal categories – such as citizens – and then to treat everyone in the same category alike. 
(NWW, 2009:162) 
Doorstep condition 3 – “Consolidated control of the military”: 
 Consolidated control of the military requires the existence of an organization with control over all the military resources of the country; that control over the various military assets is con-
solidated in that organization; and a set of credible conventions that determine how force is used against individuals and coalition members. (NWW, 2009:153) 
 Countries experiencing civil war by definition do not have consolidated control of the military. (NWW, 2009:153) 
 Societies where a single faction dominates the military are unlikely to sustain consolidated control for long. (NWW, 2009:153) 
 If active support of the military forces is necessary to hold or obtain control of civilian government institutions, then a society does not have political control of the military. (NWW, 
2009:169) 
 If military officers serve as officers in the civilian government, then a society does not have political control of the military. (NWW, 2009:169) 
 If the military as an organization enjoys ownership of significant economic assets that it can alienate or acquire without consent of the civilian authorities, then a society does not have po-
litical control of the military. (NWW, 2009:169) 
 The selection of the high military leadership must be under the control of the civilian authorities, armies who select their own leaders are not under political control. (NWW, 2009:169) 
 By definition, when military force is consolidated the military authority cannot be disciplined by the threat of military force from elsewhere in society. (NWW, 2009:169) 
 The decisions of when to fight and how much to spend on fighting are separated from the direction of military activity. …The institutions that determine the amount of resources allocated 
to the military are central to establishing political control of the military. (NWW, 2009:169) 
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Appendix B. 23 H6c_OLS Regression of Autocratic Strategies on OBS2010 SAI Power (only includes 
countries which were not rates as “free” in 2007 by Freedom House) 
Regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) ciri_kill  
ciri_kill2(constant)=have not 
occurred 
ciri_kill1= practiced occa-
sionally 
ciri_kill0=practiced frequent-
ly 
 
 
67.80  
 
-28.14  
 
-20.48 
*** 
***  
** 
  
 
 
    
(2)ciri_kill+ti_cpi 
ti_cpi (transparency) 
cirri_kill0(constant)=practiced frequently 
ciri_kill1. Practiced occasionally 
ciri_kill2. Have not occurred 
 
8.02 
23.64 
-14.10 
12.48 
* 
* 
* 
    
(3) ciri_kill+ti_cpi+sed+sqrtGDPPC02_07 
ciri_kill0(constant)=practiced frequently 
ciri_kill1. Practiced occasionally 
ciri_kill2. Have not occurred 
ti_cpi 
sed 
sqrtGDPpc 
 
-198.4856 
-10.3832 
22.3952 
6.0730 
12.7163 
0.2387 
. 
. 
* 
* 
   
(4) log(newbusdens_04.07)+ciri_kill 
ciri_kill0(constant)=practiced frequently 
ciri_kill1. Practiced occasionally 
ciri_kill2. Have not occurred 
log(newbusdens_04.07) 
   
56.07 
-13.06 
8.13  
6.40  
***  
. 
** 
 
 
  
 
(5) ecoleg 
0 (constant=high econ. diversification) 
1 
2 
3 = high econ. concentration 
    
47.895  
-10.445  
-5.128 
-19.945 
**
* 
** 
 
(6) ciri_kill+ti_cpi+ecoleg+sed (regressed on sqrtOBS2010) 
Intercept (ciri_kill2= have not occurred; ecoleg0=high econ. diversification) 
ciri_kill1=practiced occasionally 
ciri_kill2=practiced frequently 
ti_cpi (no corruption) 
sed (diversification) 
ecoleg1 
ecoleg2 
ecoleg3=high concentration 
   
-8.0436  
-2.5575  
-1.7315 
0.7895 
0.8514 
1.1333 
0.7136  
-0.7994 
**  
* 
* 
* 
Constant       
N 94 55 47 30 55 47 
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
0.2348 
0.218 
0.2555 
0.2108 
0.3882 
0.3136 
0.3712 
0.2986 
0.1996 
0.1525 
0.4886 
0.3968 
F-statistic p.value                 5.158e-06  0.001909 0.0008674 0.00648 0.00948 0.0002488 
 Significance codes:  ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1 
 
  
 Appendices 285 
 
Appendix B. 24 H6c_OLS Regressions of Transparency in Shares on OBS2010 SAI Power 
Regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) B710 (transparency in 
shares) 
10.04 ***    
(2) as.factor (B710) 
B710 = 2 
B710 = 3 
B710 = 4 
 
2.491 
26.118 
24.064 
** 
* 
  
(3)  
SAIleader_total1 
log(newbusdens_04.07) 
B710  
 
1.9443 
4.1538 
9.0412 
*** 
** 
*** 
 
(4)  
SAIleader_total1 
log(newbusdens_04.07) 
B710  
   
2.5811 
5.2131 
6.8978 
*** 
*** 
** 
Constant (B710=1) 29.58 *** 41.665 *** 23.0147 *** 22.5956 *** 
N 59 59 46 46 
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
0.1778 
0.1634 
0.2249 
0.1826 
0.5946 
0.5656 
0.7463 
0.7138 
F-statistic p.value 0.000881 0.002727 2.402e-08 1.137e-10 
Significance codes:  ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1;  
Model (4) weighted by country size (area) 
 
 
Appendix B. 25 H7a_OLS Regression of SAI Leadership and SAI Reform Commitment on OBS2010 
SAI Power 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1)SAIleader_total1 2.452 ***      
(2)SAIleader_total1f + fh_ipolity2: 
0(constant)=SAIleader_totalf.low 
1SAIleader_totalf.med 
SAIleader_totalf.high 
fh_ipolity2 
  
6.5682 
9.4095 
25.4237 
4.7775 
 
*** 
*  
*** 
  
 
   
(3) SAIleader_total1f + 
log(childmort_02.07): 
0(constant)=SAIleader_total1f.low 
1SAIleader_total1f.med 
SAIleader_total1f.high 
log(childmort_02.07) 
   
 
85.505 
1.719 
15.910 
-11.849 
***  
** 
*** 
   
(4)SAIleader_total1+ 
fh_ipolity2+ 
log(childmort_02.07) 
   1.2411 
3.4748 
-7.1260 
** 
***  
*** 
  
(5)strategicplan 
0 (constant)= no plan 
1=plan since 2009 
     
46.489 
8.907 
*** 
 
(6)strategicplan (without OECD countries) 
0(constant)=no plan 
1=plan since 2009 
     
41.373 
11.786 
***  
* 
Constant 36.768 ***   44.0399 ***   
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
0.2506 
0.2421 
0.5223 
0.5064 
0.4843 
0.4671 
0.5812 
0.5673 
0.0236 
0.01298 
0.05099 
0.03912 
F-statistic p.value 2.841e-07 2.027e-14 6.162e-13 < 2.2e-16 0.1394 0.04138 
Significance codes:  ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1 
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Appendix B. 26 Graph Depicting the OLS Regression of the Child Mortality Rate and the Strength of a 
SAI's Leader on OBS2010 SAI Power
316
 
 
Appendix B. 27 OLS Regression of Three Main Hypotheses 
 (1) 
OBS2010 
(2) 
OBS2010 
(3) 
GI08.10 
(4) 
OECD 
(5) 
PEFA.26mean 
H1a: inst.model 
SAImodel_09Board 
42.39 
(2.66) 
** 1.75 
(2.66) 
** 0.60 
(0.63) 
0.79 
(1.03) 
-0.17 
(-0.27) 
H1a:inst.model 
SAImodel_09court 
30.33 
(1.93) 
. 1.25 
(1.93) 
. 0.55 
(0.57) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.59 
(-1.11) 
H1a:inst.model 
SAImodel_09monocratic 
46.18 
(2.98) 
** 1.90 
(2.98) 
** 0.84 
(0.91) 
1.02 
(1.48) 
-0.22 
(-0.43) 
H6a:democracy 
fh_ipolity2^2 
0.44 
(8.51) 
*** 0.64 
(8.51) 
*** 0.39 
(3.02) 
** 0.18 
(1.41) 
0.23 
(1.54) 
H7a:leadership 
SAIleader_total1 
1.32 
(3.85) 
*** 0.25 
(3.85) 
*** 0.19 
(1.80) 
. 0.08 
(0.62) 
0.42 
(2.98) 
** 
Constant (measuring 
SAImodel_09ministry) 
-22.47 
(-1.45) 
-1.73 
(-2.74) 
** -0.72 
(-0.79) 
-0.80 
(-1.19) 
0.46 
(0.94) 
N 94 94 67 71 58 
Multiple R² 0.63 0.63 0.26 0.21 0.23 
Adj. R² 0.60 0.60 0.20 0.15 0.15 
F-statistic p.value < 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16 0.002 0.007 0.017 
Significance levels reported as: ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1;  
t-values in brackets. Table 6.2. is organized as follows: Models (1) and (2) are regressed on the OBS2010. 
Model (3) is regressed on the GI08-10, model (4) on the OECD and model (5) on the PEFA SAI depend-
ent variable. Models (2) – (5) was computed on standardized variables and thus includes the beta coeffi-
cients. 
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 See regression (3), table B.25 
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Appendix B. 28 OLS Regression on IDI SAIstrength (legal base, audit types, time limit) 
  (1) All (2) Recipients  (3) Recipients (4)Recipients  
INTOSAI.RegionAFROSAI-E  0.222964 
(2.208) 
* Ref.Cat.  Ref.Cat.  Ref.Cat.  
INTOSAI.RegionARABOSAI  0.282580 
(2.758) 
** 0.052622 
(0.934) 
 0.08425 
(1.430) 
 0.0575419 
(1.015) 
 
INTOSAI.RegionASOSAI  0.209651 
(2.066) 
* -0.042135 
(-0.721) 
 -0.01746 
(-0.288) 
 -0.0372155 
(-0.635) 
 
INTOSAI.RegionCAROSAI  0.160023 
(1.505) 
 -0.066578 
(-1.103) 
 -0.06471 
(-1.080) 
 -0.0632802 
(-1.059) 
 
INTOSAI.RegionCREFIAF  0.109638 
(1.051) 
 -0.142558 
(-2.302) 
* -0.15673 
(-2.377) 
* -0.1343569 
(-2.151) 
* 
INTOSAI.RegionEUROSAI  0.297336 
(3.037) 
** 0.116996 
(2.297) 
* 0.11831 
(2.274) 
* 0.1216704 
(2.350) 
* 
INTOSAI.RegionOLACEFS  0.251012 
(2.462) 
* 0.022098 
(0.372) 
 0.02893 
(0.464) 
 0.0227283 
(0.383) 
 
INTOSAI.RegionPASAI  0.232362 
(2.199) 
* 0.001581 
(0.025) 
 -0.01092 
(-0.167) 
 0.0008697 
(0.013) 
 
SAI.modelBoard/Collegial 
Model 
 0.001829 
(0.038) 
 -0.013674 
(-0.257) 
 -0.01786 
(-0.338) 
 -0.0207379 
(-0.384) 
 
SAI.modelCourt/Judicial Model  0.010160 
(0.213) 
 0.002029 
(0.039) 
 0.01716 
(0.326) 
 -0.0127596 
(-0.236) 
 
SAI.modelPart of Ministry of 
Finance 
-0.275838 
(-2.684) 
** -0.327521 
(-1.935) 
. -0.33570 
(-1.990) 
* -0.3165765 
(-1.874) 
 . 
SAI.modelWestminster  -0.006982 
(-0.167) 
 -0.030195 
(-0.675) 
 -0.02104 
(-0.467) 
 -0.0363989 
(-0.805) 
 
Log(1.9.staffing.total)    0.025980 
(2.598) 
* 0.024778 
(2.181) 
* 0.01821 
(1.581) 
 0.0244995  
(2.155) 
* 
2.1b.Dev.Action.PlanYes  0.065785 
(2.507) 
* 0.049713 
(1.732) 
. 0.04535 
(1.562) 
 0.0451859 (1.556)   
3.2.1a.Organizational.capacityYes    0.03715 
(1.115) 
   
3.2.1b.Financial.auditYes      -0.02667 
(-0.693) 
   
3.2.1c.Compliance.auditYes      -0.03059 
(-0.632) 
   
3.2.1d.Performance.auditYes    0.05404 
(1.132) 
   
3.2.1e.IT.auditYes      -0.12063 
(-2.336) 
*   
3.2.1g.Administrative.servicesYes    0.06263 
(1.195) 
   
3.2.1h.External.stakeholder.relationsYes    0.02489 
(0.392) 
   
3.4.CB.successfulNo        0.0279808 (0.429)  
3.4.CB.successfulYes        0.0329011 (1.109)  
Constant   0.417411 
(3.668) 
*** 0.675885 
(7.948) 
*** 0.69497  
(7.989) 
*** 0.6621828 (7.695) *** 
N 173     137   137 137 
Multiple R² 
Adj. R² 
0.3576 
0.3003 
 0.3696 0.303  0.4201  
0.3201 
  0.3804 
0.3042 
F-statistic p.value  8.336e-10  7.405e-08  4.127e-07  1.476e-07  
Significance levels reported as follows:  ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1; t-values in brackets. The constant is the reference category and 
measures the following categories: Model ( 1): INTOSAI.Region.0 region, SAI.model.Other, 2.1.Dev.Action.Plan.No; Model (2) INTOSAI.Region.AFROSAI-
E, SAI.model.Other, 2.1.Dev.Action.Plan.No; Model (3) as regression (2) 3.2.1a-h.No; Model (4): as regression (2), 3.4.CB.successful.Noreply. Model 
testing as follows: Multi-collinearity tests GVIF^2(1/(2*Df)) <2 = True; influential observations: studentized residuals with Bonferonni p < 0.05: SAI 92 was 
removed.SAIs 57 and 171 were removed because large cook’s distance and hat values. Non-normality: graphical examination Ok. Non-constant error 
variance: BP test no significance reported for model (1), but models (2), (3) and (4) seem to be heteroscedastic, also confirmed by plots of studentized r  
(and their squares) vs. fitted values. Nonlinearity: scatterplots and cr plots examined, variable “1.9.staffing.total” accordingly transformed. Non-
independence of errors: DW and BG tests not significant. Assessment of the linear model assumptions using the global test on 4df: all models not correct. 
For a description of the dependent variable see chapter 5.1. For a description of the independent variables see IDI (2010: Annex B – SAI Questionnaire.)  
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Appendix B. 29 Logistic Regression on IDI 1.8.time.limit.new1 (Binomial SAI Variable, P: Y=1) 
  (1) All (2) Recipients    
INTOSAI.RegionAFROSAI-E  0.213617 
(0.151) 
 Ref.cat.     
INTOSAI.RegionARABOSAI  1.157050 
(0.767) 
 1.33547 
(1.358) 
    
INTOSAI.RegionASOSAI  1.096751 
(0.735) 
 0.87368 
(0.912) 
    
INTOSAI.RegionCAROSAI  0.009631 
(0.006) 
 -0.42155 
(-0.446) 
    
INTOSAI.RegionCREFIAF  -0.898673 
(-0.609) 
 -1.30460 
(-1.150) 
    
INTOSAI.RegionEUROSAI  2.892273 
(1.914) 
 . 19.01315 
(0.016) 
    
INTOSAI.RegionOLACEFS  1.142566 
(0.711) 
 1.30436 
(1.029) 
    
INTOSAI.RegionPASAI  1.701116 
(1.137) 
 1.79948 
(1.745) 
 .    
SAI.modelBoard/Collegial 
Model 
 -1.254651 
(-1.245) 
 -1.49907 
(-1.166) 
    
SAI.modelCourt/Judicial Model  -1.045369 
(-1.244) 
 -1.12341 
(-1.063) 
    
SAI.modelPart of Ministry of 
Finance 
-0.906840 
(-0.539) 
 -1.11712 
(-0.411) 
    
SAI.modelWestminster  -1.416851 
(-1.813) 
 . -1.33140 
(-1.427) 
    
Log(1.9.staffing.total)    0.548183 
(3.002) 
** 0.58016 
(2.224) 
*    
2.1b.Dev.Action.PlanYes  0.471821 
(1.029) 
 0.40115 
(0.720) 
    
3.2.1a.Organizational.capacityYes  0.05668 
(0.088) 
    
3.2.1b.Financial.auditYes    -0.75505 
(-1.010) 
    
3.2.1c.Compliance.auditYes    -0.65514 
(-0.780) 
    
3.2.1d.Performance.auditYes  1.18734 
(1.363) 
    
3.2.1e.IT.auditYes    -0.62168 
(-0.622) 
    
3.2.1g.Administrative.servicesYes  2.62742 
(1.961) 
*    
3.2.1h.External.stakeholder.relationsYes  -1.54160 
(-0.931) 
    
Constant   -1.821994  
(-1.102) 
-1.97457 
(-1.196) 
   
N 177     141    
Null deviance: 
Residual deviance: 
AIC: 
No. of Fisher Sc. i.: 
215.36  on 175df 
143.51  on 161df 
173.51 
5 
 180.85  on 140df 
102.47  on 120df 
144.47 
17 
 
McFadden R²:   0.348467  0.5347655    
Significance levels reported as follows:  ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1; z-values in brackets. Models (1) and (2) are regressed 
on a binomial dependent variable. The constant is the reference category and measures the following categories: Model (1): INTOSAI.Region.0 
region, SAI.model.Other, 2.1.Dev.Action.Plan.No; Model (2) INTOSAI.Region.AFROSAI-E, SAI.model.Other, 2.1.Dev.Action.Plan.No; 3.2.1a-h.No; 
For a description of the dependent variable see chapter 3.1.. For a description of the independent variables see IDI (2010: Annex B – SAI Ques-
tionnaire. ) “Recipients” includes all SAIs which have identified themselves as recipients of capacity building measures in the past, at present or in 
the planned future. Thus they replied with a “yes” to the following questions: 3.1., 3.2., 3.2.1., 3.5.,4.9. (identified needs?), 4.10. (recipient?).  SAIs 
which were capacity building providers at any times were coded with “0”. This includes SAIs which replied with “yes” to the following questions: 
5.1., 5.2., 5.7. SAIs which have replied with “no” for both recipients and providers are coded with “0”. SAIs which replied with “yes” in both areas, 
were coded as “both” and have been included in the regressions (2) above. The coefficients measure the rate of change in the log of the odds [ln 
(Pi/(1-Pi))] for Y(IDI 1.8.time.limit.new1) to be 1, for a unit change in X, given all other X. The model parameters were estimated using maximum 
likelihood estimation.  
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Appendix B. 30 Model Effect Plots of the Logistic Regression (1) in Appendix B.29. it shows the effect 
of INTOSAI regional belonging, SAI institutional model and number of total SAI staff on the likelihood 
that an SAI submits its annual audit report within the stipulated legal time limit. 
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Appendix B. 31 Multinomial Logit Regression on IDI 1.8.time.limit.new (Multinomial SAI Variable 
Regressed on Recipients Only) 
   ANOVA table  
(type II tests) 
  P: Y=1 
within legal  time limit  
P: Y=0.5 
within 1yr after limit 
 
  LR Chisq (Df)      Pr(>Chisq)       
INTOSAI.Region  47.516 (16) 5.657e-05***       
SAI.model  6.630 (8) 0.576993       
INTOSAI.RegionAFROSAI-E     1.302561e-03 
(0.7204046) 
 4.173974e+10 
(1.3305733) 
 
INTOSAI.RegionARABOSAI      4.773661e-03 
(0.949672) 
 3.157781e+10 
(1.733030) 
 
INTOSAI.RegionASOSAI      1.544637e-03 
(8.854262e-01) 
 7.536331e-32 
(6.136826e-14) 
 
INTOSAI.RegionCAROSAI      1.393302e-03 
(0.8815035) 
 3.612725e+11 
(0.8838658) 
 
INTOSAI.RegionCREFIAF      4.140880e-04 
(0.8073217) 
 2.826817e+11 
(0.9124053) 
 
INTOSAI.RegionEUROSAI      3.793905e+20 
(8.166925e-06) 
 2.007790e+10 
(8.166925e-06) 
 
INTOSAI.RegionOLACEFS      2.018958e-03 
(1.229557) 
 1.800791e-49 
(NA) 
 
INTOSAI.RegionPASAI      1.251790e-02 
(0.8678396) 
 4.834225e+11 
(1.1053325) 
 
SAI.modelBoard/Collegial 
Model 
     2.159079e-01 
(1.370657) 
 8.413689e-22 
(NA) 
 
SAI.modelCourt/Judicial 
Model 
     0.3152729 
(1.150423) 
 1.127674 
(1.556288) 
 
SAI.modelPart of Ministry of 
Finance 
    2.297836e-01 
(2.905415e+00) 
 3.192755e-14 
(7.466670e-14) 
 
SAI.modelWestminster      0.3573921 
(1.039701) 
 3.7291891 
(1.605493) 
 
Log(1.9.staffing.total)    10.436 (2) 0.005417 **  2.210687 
(0.3030439) 
 2.727406 
(0.5007531) 
 
2.1b.Dev.Action.PlanYes  0.702 (2)   0.704140   1.2956502 
(0.6473073) 
 0.6633796 
(0.8553956) 
 
3.2.1a.Organizational.capacityYes    5.775 (2) 0.055727 . 2.463311 
(0.8308395) 
 10.270151 
(1.0205439) 
 
3.2.1b.Financial.auditYes  1.580 (2)  0.453880  0.3793249 
(0.8219831) 
 0.5501885 
(0.9878372) 
 
3.2.1c.Compliance.auditYes  1.646 (2)         0.453880  0.3343676 
(0.983401) 
 0.2805624 
(1.314978) 
 
3.2.1d.Performance.auditYes 1.646 (2) 0.439173  2.7270080 
(0.9727345) 
 0.6348916 
(1.4217012) 
 
3.2.1e.IT.auditYes  0.659 (2) 0.719275   0.4623718 
(1.088743) 
 1.2847917 
(1.700789) 
 
3.2.1g.Administrative.servicesYes 6.032(2) 0.049003*  9.357270e+00 
(1.4843432) 
 1.060883e-18 
(0.7555985) 
 
3.2.1h.External.stakeholder. 
relationsYes 
2.720 (2)  0.256627 1.561846e+10 
(0.7556016) 
 4.435951e+28 
(0.7556016) 
 
Constant      5.313237e+01 
(1.419506) 
 1.773098e-14 
(2.275980) 
 
N 141     141   141 141 
Residual Deviance: 136.8637 
AIC: 220.8637 
McFadden R²: 0.5170906 
Significance levels reported as follows:  ‘***’ p< 0.001; ‘**’ p< 0.01; ‘*’ p< 0.05 ; ‘.’ p < 0.1; The constant is the reference category and measures the 
following categories: INTOSAI.Region.0 region, SAI.model.Other, 2.1.Dev.Action.Plan.No; 3.2.1a-h.No; columns (2) and (3) odds ratios are reported 
with std. errors in brackets. For a description of the dependent variable see Annex B. For a description of the independent variables see IDI (2010: 
Annex B – SAI Questionnaire. )The regression coefficients represent effects on the log-odds of membership in category Y=1 and Y=0.5 respectively, 
versus the baseline category Y=0.  
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Appendix B. 32 Model Effect Plot of the Multinomial Logit Regression in Appendix B.31. It shows the 
effect of INTOSAI regional belonging on the likelihood that an SAI submits its annual audit report within 
the stipulated legal time limit. 
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Appendix B. 33 The Leadership Commitment of 
a SAI (SAIleader_total1) 
co
u
n
try 
resp
_to
tal_0
7
.1
1
_1 
sp
eech
-
es_to
tal_0
5
.1
1
 
SA
Ilead
er_to
t
al1
 
Afghanistan 0 0 0 
Albania 1 0 1 
Algeria 2 0 2 
Andorra 0 0 0 
Angola 0 0 0 
Antigua and Barbuda 2 0 2 
Argentina 3 1 4 
Armenia 1 0 1 
Australia 4 0 4 
Austria 11 1 12 
Azerbaijan 1 0 1 
Bahamas, The 4 0 4 
Bahrain 3 0 3 
Bangladesh 7 0 7 
Barbados 2 0 2 
Belarus 0 0 0 
Belgium 6 0 6 
Belize 1 0 1 
Benin 0 0 0 
Bhutan 2 0 2 
Bolivia 1 1 2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 0 
Botswana 0 0 0 
Brazil 9 1 10 
Brunei Darussalam 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 4 0 4 
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 
Burundi 0 0 0 
Cambodia 2 0 2 
Cameroon 6 0 6 
Canada 13 1 14 
Cape Verde 0 0 0 
Cayman Islands 1 0 1 
Central African Republic 0 0 0 
Chad 0 0 0 
Chile 7 0 7 
China 12 1 13 
Colombia 5 1 6 
Comoros 0 0 0 
Congo, Rep. 0 0 0 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0 0 0 
Cook Islands 3 0 3 
Costa Rica 5 0 5 
Cote d'Ivoire 2 0 2 
Croatia 1 0 1 
Cuba 4 0 4 
Curacao 0 0 0 
Cyprus 3 0 3 
Czech Republic 3 0 3 
Denmark 9 1 10 
Djibouti 0 0 0 
Dominica 0 0 0 
Dominican Republic 1 0 1 
Ecuador 6 0 6 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 6 1 7 
El Salvador 5 0 5 
Equatorial Guinea 0 0 0 
Eritrea 0 0 0 
Estonia 5 0 5 
Ethiopia 2 0 2 
Faeroe Islands 0 0 0 
Fiji 6 0 6 
Finland 6 0 6 
France 12 1 13 
French Polynesia 1 0 1 
Gabon 4 0 4 
Gambia, The 1 0 1 
Georgia 5 0 5 
Germany 8 0 8 
Ghana 1 0 1 
Gibraltar 0 0 0 
Greece 2 0 2 
Greenland 0 0 0 
Grenada 0 0 0 
Guam 0 0 0 
Guatemala 1 0 1 
Guinea 0 0 0 
Guinea-Bissau 0 0 0 
Guyana 3 0 3 
Haiti 0 0 0 
Honduras 0 0 0 
Hong Kong SAR, China 0 0 0 
Hungary 6 1 7 
Iceland 2 0 2 
India 9 1 10 
Indonesia 8 1 9 
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Iran, Islamic Rep. 3 0 3 
Iraq 4 0 4 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Isle of Man 0 0 0 
Israel 5 0 5 
Italy 6 0 6 
Jamaica 4 0 4 
Japan 6 0 6 
Jordan 4 0 4 
Kazakhstan 4 0 4 
Kenya 3 0 3 
Kiribati 4 0 4 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 0 0 0 
Korea, Rep. 13 1 14 
Kosovo 0 0 0 
Kuwait 4 1 5 
Kyrgyz Republic 0 0 0 
Lao PDR 0 0 0 
Latvia 3 0 3 
Lebanon 1 0 1 
Lesotho 2 0 2 
Liberia 0 0 0 
Libya 11 0 11 
Liechtenstein 2 0 2 
Lithuania 9 0 9 
Luxembourg 1 0 1 
Macao SAR, China 0 0 0 
Macedonia, FYR 2 0 2 
Madagascar 0 0 0 
Malawi 0 0 0 
Malaysia 5 0 5 
Maldives 0 0 0 
Mali 0 0 0 
Malta 3 0 3 
Marshall Islands 0 0 0 
Mauritania 1 0 1 
Mauritius 0 0 0 
Mayotte 0 0 0 
Mexico 14 0 14 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 1 0 1 
Moldova 2 0 2 
Monaco 0 0 0 
Mongolia 2 0 2 
Montenegro 0 0 0 
Morocco 13 1 14 
Mozambique 0 0 0 
Myanmar 0 0 0 
Namibia 6 0 6 
Nepal 0 0 0 
Netherlands 9 1 10 
New Caledonia 0 0 0 
New Zealand 10 0 10 
Nicaragua 1 0 1 
Niger 0 0 0 
Nigeria 0 0 0 
Northern Mariana Islands 1 0 1 
Norway 12 0 12 
Oman 5 1 6 
Pakistan 8 0 8 
Palau 1 0 1 
Panama 3 0 3 
Papua New Guinea 4 0 4 
Paraguay 3 1 4 
Peru 9 1 10 
Philippines 2 0 2 
Poland 10 1 11 
Portugal 4 0 4 
Puerto Rico 0 0 0 
Qatar 3 0 3 
Romania 4 0 4 
Russian Federation 11 3 14 
Rwanda 0 0 0 
Samoa 1 0 1 
San Marino 0 0 0 
Sao Tome and Principe 0 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 10 0 10 
Senegal 0 0 0 
Serbia 0 0 0 
Seychelles 0 0 0 
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 
Singapore 0 0 0 
Sint Maarten (Dutch part) 0 0 0 
Slovak Republic 7 0 7 
Slovenia 5 0 5 
Solomon Islands 1 0 1 
Somalia 0 0 0 
South Africa 13 4 17 
South Sudan 0 0 0 
Spain 6 0 6 
Sri Lanka 3 0 3 
St. Kitts and Nevis 1 0 1 
St. Lucia 2 0 2 
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St. Martin (French part) 0 0 0 
St. Vincent and the Grena-
dines 0 0 0 
Sudan 1 0 1 
Suriname 0 0 0 
Swaziland 0 0 0 
Sweden 11 0 11 
Switzerland 4 0 4 
Syrian Arab Republic 0 0 0 
Tajikistan 0 0 0 
Tanzania 5 0 5 
Thailand 2 0 2 
Timor-Leste 0 0 0 
Togo 0 0 0 
Tonga 3 0 3 
Trinidad and Tobago 3 0 3 
Tunisia 6 0 6 
Turkey 4 0 4 
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 
Turks and Caicos Islands 1 0 1 
Tuvalu 0 0 0 
Uganda 2 0 2 
Ukraine 10 1 11 
United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 
United Kingdom 11 1 12 
United States 24 1 25 
Uruguay 2 0 2 
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 
Vanuatu 0 0 0 
Venezuela, RB 4 1 5 
Vietnam 1 0 1 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 0 0 0 
West Bank and Gaza 1 0 1 
Yemen, Rep. 6 0 6 
Zambia 3 0 3 
Zimbabwe 4 0 4 
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Appendix B. 34 The Variable "strategicplan"
317
 
country ccodewb SAI strategic plan_link 
strategic 
plan_year strategicplan 
Afghanistan AFG 
 
0 0 
Albania ALB 
http://www.klsh.org.al/doc/2007050714
2001_sai_strategic_development_plan.p
df 2007 1 
Algeria DZA 
 
0 0 
Andorra ADO 
 
0 0 
Angola AGO 
 
0 0 
Antigua and 
Barbuda ATG 
 
0 0 
Argentina ARG 
 
0 0 
Armenia ARM 
 
0 0 
Australia AUS 
 
2010 0 
Austria AUT 
http://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/uploads/
media/Strategie_02.pdf 2002 1 
Azerbaijan AZE 
  
0 
Bahamas, The BHS 
  
0 
Bahrain BHR http://www.nac.gov.bh/strategy.asp 2006 1 
Bangladesh BGD 
http://www.cagbd.org/publication/strate
gic_plan_2007-2012.pdf 2007 1 
Barbados BRB 
  
0 
Belarus BLR 
  
0 
Belgium BEL 
  
0 
country ccodewb SAI strategic plan_link 
strategic 
plan_year strategicplan 
Belize BLZ 
http://www.audit.gov.bz/downloads/stra
tegic_plan_2008_2013.pdf 2008 1 
Benin BEN 
  
0 
Bhutan BTN 
http://www.bhutanaudit.gov.bt/contents
/papers/Strategic%20Plan.pdf 2008 1 
Bolivia BOL 
  
0 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina BIH 
  
0 
Botswana BWA 
  
0 
Brazil BRA tomorrow 
 
1 
                                                     
317
 All websites have been accessed on December 5, 2011. 
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Brunei Darus-
salam BRN 
  
0 
Bulgaria BGR 
http://www.bulnao.government.bg/inde
x.php?p=24 2007 1 
Burkina Faso BFA 
  
0 
Burundi BDI 
  
0 
Cambodia KHM 
  
0 
Cameroon CMR 
  
0 
Canada CAN 
  
0 
Cape Verde CPV 
  
0 
Cayman Islands 
  
0 
Central Afri-
can Republic CAF 
  
0 
Chad TCD 
  
0 
Chile CHL 
  
0 
China CHN 
  
0 
Colombia COL 
  
0 
Comoros COM 
  
0 
Congo, Rep. COG 
  
0 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. ZAR 
  
0 
Cook Islands 
  
0 
Costa Rica CRI 
http://cgrw01.cgr.go.cr/portal/page?_pa
geid=434,2625184&_dad=portal&_schem
a=PORTAL 2008 1 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV 
  
0 
Croatia HRV 
http://www.revizija.hr/hr/o-
nama/pravci-buduceg-razvoja/ 2003 1 
Cuba CUB 
  
0 
Curacao CUW 
  
0 
Cyprus CYP 
  
0 
country ccodewb SAI strategic plan_link 
strategic 
plan_year strategicplan 
Czech Repub-
lic CZE 
  
0 
Denmark DNK 
  
0 
Djibouti DJI 
  
0 
Dominica DMA 
  
0 
Dominican 
Republic DOM 
  
0 
Ecuador ECU 
http://www.contraloria.gob.ec/informati
vo.asp?id_SubSeccion=12 2009 1 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. EGY 
  
0 
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El Salvador SLV 
http://www.cortedecuentas.gob.sv/index
.php?option=com_content&view=catego
ry&id=52:paq&Itemid=7&layout=default 2009 1 
Equatorial 
Guinea GNQ 
  
0 
Eritrea ERI 
  
0 
Estonia EST 
http://www.riigikontroll.ee/Riigikontrollk
uiasutus/Strateegia/tabid/140/language/
en-US/Default.aspx 2006 1 
Ethiopia ETH 
  
0 
Faeroe Is-
lands FRO 
  
0 
Fiji FJI 
  
0 
Finland FIN 
  
0 
France FRA 
  
0 
French Poly-
nesia PYF 
  
0 
Gabon GAB 
  
0 
Gambia, The GMB 
  
0 
Georgia GEO 
  
0 
Germany DEU 
  
0 
Ghana GHA 
  
0 
Gibraltar GIB 
  
0 
Greece GRC 
  
0 
Greenland GRL 
  
0 
Grenada GRD 
  
0 
Guam GUM 
  
0 
Guatemala GTM 
  
0 
Guinea GIN 
  
0 
Guinea-Bissau GNB 
  
0 
country ccodewb SAI strategic plan_link 
strategic 
plan_year strategicplan 
Guyana GUY 
  
0 
Haiti HTI 
  
0 
Honduras HND 
  
0 
Hong Kong 
SAR, China HKG 
  
0 
Hungary HUN 
  
0 
Iceland ISL 
  
0 
India IND 
  
0 
Indonesia IDN 
  
0 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. IRN 
  
0 
Iraq IRQ 
  
0 
Ireland IRL 
  
0 
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Isle of Man IMY 
  
0 
Israel ISR 
  
0 
Italy ITA 
  
0 
Jamaica JAM 
  
0 
Japan JPN 
  
0 
Jordan JOR 
  
0 
Kazakhstan KAZ 
  
0 
Kenya KEN 
  
0 
Kiribati KIR 
  
0 
Korea, Dem. 
Rep. PRK 
  
0 
Korea, Rep. KOR 
  
0 
Kosovo KSV 
  
0 
Kuwait KWT 
  
0 
Kyrgyz Re-
public KGZ 
  
0 
Lao PDR LAO 
  
0 
Latvia LVA 
http://www.lrvk.gov.lv/index.php?id=211
6 2006 1 
Lebanon LBN 
  
0 
Lesotho LSO 
  
0 
Liberia LBR 
http://www.gacliberia.com/documents/s
trategy_plan.pdf 2008 1 
Libya LBY 
  
0 
Liechtenstein LIE 
  
0 
Lithuania LTU 
  
0 
Luxembourg LUX 
  
0 
Macao SAR, 
China MAC 
  
0 
country ccodewb SAI strategic plan_link 
strategic 
plan_year strategicplan 
Macedonia, 
FYR MKD 
http://www.dzr.gov.mk/en/DesktopDefa
ult.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=271 2006 1 
Madagascar MDG 
  
0 
Malawi MWI http://www.nao.mw/ 2009 1 
Malaysia MYS 
  
0 
Maldives MDV 
  
0 
Mali MLI 
  
0 
Malta MLT 
  
0 
Marshall 
Islands MHL 
  
0 
Mauritania MRT 
  
0 
Mauritius MUS 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/auditsite
/file/Strategic%20Plan.pdf 2007 1 
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Mayotte MYT 
  
0 
Mexico MEX 
  
0 
Micronesia, 
Fed. Sts. FSM 
  
0 
Moldova MDA 
http://www.ccrm.md/file/proiecte/curte
a_conturi_romana.pdf 2006 1 
Monaco MCO 
  
0 
Mongolia MNG 
  
0 
Montenegro MNE 
  
0 
Morocco MAR 
  
0 
Mozambique MOZ 
  
0 
Myanmar MMR 
  
0 
Namibia NAM 
  
0 
Nepal NPL 
  
0 
Netherlands NLD 
  
0 
New Caledo-
nia NCL 
  
0 
New Zealand NZL 
  
0 
Nicaragua NIC 
http://www.cgr.gob.ni/cgr/index.php?op
tion=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=
156&Itemid=101 2006 1 
Niger NER 
  
0 
Nigeria NGA 
  
0 
Northern 
Mariana Is-
lands MNP 
  
0 
Norway NOR 
  
0 
Oman OMN 
  
0 
Pakistan PAK 
  
0 
Palau PLW 
  
0 
Panama PAN 
  
0 
Papua New 
Guinea PNG http://www.ago.gov.pg/about_ago.html 2005 1 
Paraguay PRY 
http://www.contraloria.gov.py/index.php
?op-
tion=com_content&task=view&id=10&Ite
mid=28 2008 1 
Peru PER 
  
0 
Philippines PHL 
  
0 
Poland POL 
http://www.nik.gov.pl/plan-pracy-
nik/priorytety-kontroli/ 2009 1 
Portugal PRT 
http://www.tcontas.pt/pt/actos/outros.s
htm 2005 1 
Puerto Rico PRI 
  
0 
Qatar QAT 
  
0 
Romania ROM 
  
0 
Russian Fed-
eration RUS 
  
0 
Rwanda RWA 
  
0 
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Samoa WSM 
  
0 
San Marino SMR 
  
0 
Sao Tome and 
Principe STP 
  
0 
Saudi Arabia SAU 
  
0 
Senegal SEN 
  
0 
Serbia SRB 
  
0 
Seychelles SYC 
  
0 
Sierra Leone SLE 
  
0 
Singapore SGP 
  
0 
Sint Maarten 
(Dutch part) SXM 
  
0 
Slovak Repub-
lic SVK 
  
0 
Slovenia SVN 
http://www.rs-
rs.si/rsrs/rsrs.nsf/I/KC7BFA7711BBA2EDB
C125723C00500F6D 2007 1 
Solomon 
Islands SLB 
  
0 
Somalia SOM 
  
0 
South Africa ZAF 
http://www.agsa.co.za/AboutUs/Budgeta
ndstrategicplans.aspx 2002 1 
South Sudan SSD 
  
0 
Spain ESP 
  
0 
Sri Lanka LKA 
  
0 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis KNA 
  
0 
St. Lucia LCA 
  
0 
St. Martin 
(French part) MAF 
  
0 
St. Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines VCT 
  
0 
Sudan SDN 
  
0 
Suriname SUR 
  
0 
Swaziland SWZ 
  
0 
Sweden SWE 
  
0 
Switzerland CHE 
  
0 
Syrian Arab 
Republic SYR 
  
0 
Tajikistan TJK 
  
0 
Tanzania TZA 
  
0 
Thailand THA 
  
0 
Timor-Leste TMP 
  
0 
Togo TGO 
  
0 
Tonga TON 
  
0 
Trinidad and 
Tobago TTO 
  
0 
Tunisia TUN 
  
0 
Turkey TUR 
http://www.sayistay.gov.tr/tc/faaliyet/St
ratejikPlan.asp 2009 1 
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Turkmenistan TKM 
  
0 
Turks and 
Caicos Islands TCA 
  
0 
Tuvalu TUV 
  
0 
Uganda UGA 
http://www.oag.go.ug/docs/Corporate_P
lan_2006_2011.pdf 2005 1 
Ukraine UKR 
  
0 
United Arab 
Emirates ARE 
http://saiwb1.saiuae.gov.ae/Arabic/abou
sai/Pages/Strategicplan.aspx?menuid=1 2009 1 
United King-
dom GBR 
  
0 
United States USA 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-
1SP 2007 1 
Uruguay URY 
  
0 
Uzbekistan UZB 
  
0 
Vanuatu VUT 
  
0 
Venezuela, 
RB VEN 
http://www.cgr.gob.ve/contenido.php?C
od=061 2009 1 
Vietnam VNM 
  
0 
Virgin Islands 
(U.S.) VIR 
  
0 
West Bank 
and Gaza WBG 
  
0 
Yemen, Rep. YEM 
  
0 
Zambia ZMB 
  
0 
Zimbabwe ZWE 
  
0 
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Appendix B. 35 The Institutional Model of SAIs 
Country or  
territory 
Type of institutional model of 
the supreme audit institution 
in 2009 (SAImodel_09) 
AFGHANISTAN monocratic 
ALBANIA monocratic 
ALGERIA court 
ANGOLA court 
Anguilla ministry 
Antigua ministry 
ARGENTINA Board 
ARMENIA Board 
Aruba ministry 
AUSTRALIA monocratic 
AUSTRIA monocratic 
AZERBAIJAN Board 
BAHAMAS monocratic 
BAHRAIN court 
BANGLADESH monocratic 
BARBADOS monocratic 
BELARUS ministry 
BELGIUM court 
BELIZE monocratic 
BENIN court 
Bermuda ministry 
BHUTAN monocratic 
BOLIVIA monocratic 
BOSNIA-HERZ monocratic 
BOTSWANA monocratic 
BRAZIL court 
British Virgin Islands ministry 
BRUNEI ministry 
BULGARIA Board 
BURKNA FASO court 
BURUNDI monocratic 
C VERDE IS court 
CAMBODIA monocratic 
CAMEROON monocratic 
CANADA monocratic 
Cayman Islands ministry 
CEN AFR REP monocratic 
CHAD court 
CHILE monocratic 
CHINA PR monocratic 
COLOMBIA monocratic 
COMOROS ministry 
CONGO DR court 
CONGO REP court 
COSTA RICA monocratic 
COTE D'IVOR court 
CROATIA monocratic 
CUBA ministry 
CYPRUS monocratic 
CZECH REP Board 
DENMARK monocratic 
DJIBOUTI court 
DOMIN REP Board 
DOMINICA ministry 
ECUADOR monocratic 
EGYPT monocratic 
EL SALVADOR court 
EQUA GUINEA monocratic 
ERITREA monocratic 
ESTONIA monocratic 
ETH'PIA PDR monocratic 
FIJI monocratic 
FINLAND monocratic 
FRANCE court 
GABON court 
GAMBIA monocratic 
GEORGIA Board 
GERMANY monocratic 
GHANA monocratic 
GREECE court 
GRENADA ministry 
GUATEMALA monocratic 
GUINEA ministry 
GUINEA-B'AU ministry 
GUYANA monocratic 
HAITI court 
HONDURAS court 
HUNGARY monocratic 
ICELAND monocratic 
INDIA monocratic 
INDONESIA Board 
IRAN court 
IRAQ monocratic 
IRELAND monocratic 
ISRAEL monocratic 
ITALY court 
JAMAICA monocratic 
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JAPAN Board 
JORDAN monocratic 
KAZAKHSTAN Board 
KENYA monocratic 
KIRIBATI monocratic 
KOREA PR ministry 
KOREA REP Board 
KOSOVO monocratic 
KUWAIT monocratic 
KYRGYZSTAN Board 
LAOS ministry 
LATVIA monocratic 
LEBANON court 
LESOTHO monocratic 
LIBERIA monocratic 
LIBYA monocratic 
LITHUANIA monocratic 
LUXEMBOURG court 
MACEDONIA  monocratic 
MADAGASCAR court 
MALAWI monocratic 
MALAYSIA monocratic 
MALDIVE IS monocratic 
MALI monocratic 
MALTA monocratic 
MARSHALL IS monocratic 
MAURITANIA court 
MAURITIUS monocratic 
MEXICO monocratic 
MICRONESIA monocratic 
MOLDOVA court 
MONGOLIA monocratic 
MONTENEGRO monocratic 
MOROCCO court 
MOZAMBIQUE court 
MYANMAR monocratic 
NAMIBIA monocratic 
NEPAL monocratic 
NETHERLANDS Board 
NEW ZEALAND monocratic 
NICARAGUA Board 
NIGER court 
NIGERIA monocratic 
NORWAY monocratic 
OMAN monocratic 
PAKISTAN monocratic 
PANAMA monocratic 
PAPUA NEW G monocratic 
PARAGUAY monocratic 
PERU monocratic 
PHILIPPINES Board 
POLAND monocratic 
PORTUGAL court 
QATAR monocratic 
ROMANIA court 
RUSSIA Board 
RWANDA monocratic 
SAINT LUCIA monocratic 
SAMOA monocratic 
SAO TOME/PR court 
SA'U ARABIA monocratic 
SENEGAL court 
SERBIA monocratic 
SEYCHELLSS monocratic 
SIERRA LEO monocratic 
SINGAPORE monocratic 
SLOVAK REP monocratic 
SLOVENIA monocratic 
SO AFRICA monocratic 
SOLOMON IS monocratic 
SOMALIA monocratic 
SOUTH SUDAN monocratic 
SPAIN court 
SRI LANKA monocratic 
ST KITT/NEV monocratic 
ST VINCENT monocratic 
SUDAN monocratic 
SURINAME monocratic 
SWAZILAND monocratic 
SWEDEN Board 
SWITZERLAND monocratic 
SYRIA monocratic 
TAJIKISTAN ministry 
TANZANIA monocratic 
THAILAND monocratic 
TIMOR-LESTE ministry 
TOGO monocratic 
TRINIDAD monocratic 
TUNISIA court 
TURKEY court 
TURKMENSTAN ministry 
UA EMIRATES monocratic 
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UGANDA monocratic 
UK monocratic 
UKRAINE monocratic 
URUGUAY court 
USA monocratic 
UZBEKISTAN ministry 
VENEZUELA monocratic 
VIETNAM monocratic 
YEMEN REP monocratic 
ZAMBIA monocratic 
ZIMBABWE monocratic 
 
Appendix B. 36 INTOSAIregion - SAI's Main Belonging to an INTOSAI Region 
SAI INTOSAIregion 
Afghanistan ASOSAI 
Albania EUROSAI 
Algeria ARABOSAI 
Angola AFROSAI-E 
Anguilla CAROSAI 
Antigua and Barbuda CAROSAI 
Argentina OLACEFS 
Armenia EUROSAI 
Aruba CAROSAI 
Australia ASOSAI 
Austria EUROSAI 
Azerbaijan EUROSAI 
Bahamas, The CAROSAI 
Bahrain ARABOSAI 
Bangladesh ASOSAI 
Barbados CAROSAI 
Belarus EUROSAI 
Belgium EUROSAI 
Belize CAROSAI 
Benin CREFIAF 
Bermuda CAROSAI 
Bhutan ASOSAI 
Bolivia OLACEFS 
Bosnia and Herzegovina EUROSAI 
Botswana AFROSAI-E 
Brazil OLACEFS 
British Virgin Islands CAROSAI 
Brunei Darussalam ASOSAI 
Bulgaria EUROSAI 
Burkina Faso CREFIAF 
Burundi CREFIAF 
Cambodia ASOSAI 
Cameroon CREFIAF 
Canada NRM 
Cape Verde CREFIAF 
Cayman Islands CAROSAI 
Central African Republic CREFIAF 
Chad CREFIAF 
Chile OLACEFS 
China ASOSAI 
Colombia OLACEFS 
Comoros ARABOSAI 
Congo, Rep. CREFIAF 
Congo, Dem. Rep. CREFIAF 
Costa Rica OLACEFS 
Cote d'Ivoire CREFIAF 
Croatia EUROSAI 
Cuba OLACEFS 
Cyprus EUROSAI 
Czech Republic EUROSAI 
Denmark EUROSAI 
Djibouti AFROSAI-E 
Dominica CAROSAI 
Dominican Republic OLACEFS 
Ecuador OLACEFS 
Egypt, Arab Rep. ARABOSAI 
El Salvador OLACEFS 
Equatorial Guinea CREFIAF 
Eritrea AFROSAI-E 
Estonia EUROSAI 
Ethiopia AFROSAI-E 
Fiji PASAI 
Finland EUROSAI 
France EUROSAI 
Gabon CREFIAF 
Gambia, The AFROSAI-E 
Georgia EUROSAI 
Germany EUROSAI 
Ghana AFROSAI-E 
Greece EUROSAI 
Grenada CAROSAI 
Guatemala OLACEFS 
Guinea CREFIAF 
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Guinea-Bissau CREFIAF 
Guyana CAROSAI 
Haiti CAROSAI 
Honduras OLACEFS 
Hungary EUROSAI 
Iceland EUROSAI 
India ASOSAI 
Indonesia ASOSAI 
Iran, Islamic Rep. ASOSAI 
Iraq ARABOSAI 
Ireland EUROSAI 
Israel EUROSAI 
Italy EUROSAI 
Jamaica CAROSAI 
Japan ASOSAI 
Jordan ARABOSAI 
Kazakhstan ASOSAI 
Kenya AFROSAI-E 
Kiribati PASAI 
Korea, PR NRM 
Korea, Rep. ASOSAI 
Kosovo NRM 
Kuwait ARABOSAI 
Kyrgyz Republic ASOSAI 
Lao PDR ASOSAI 
Latvia EUROSAI 
Lebanon ARABOSAI 
Lesotho AFROSAI-E 
Liberia AFROSAI-E 
Libya ARABOSAI 
Lithuania EUROSAI 
Luxembourg EUROSAI 
Macedonia, FYR EUROSAI 
Madagascar CREFIAF 
Malawi AFROSAI-E 
Malaysia ASOSAI 
Maldives ASOSAI 
Mali CREFIAF 
Malta EUROSAI 
Marshall Islands PASAI 
Mauritania ARABOSAI 
Mauritius AFROSAI-E 
Mexico OLACEFS 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. PASAI 
Moldova EUROSAI 
Mongolia ASOSAI 
Montenegro EUROSAI 
Morocco ARABOSAI 
Mozambique AFROSAI-E 
Myanmar ASOSAI 
Namibia AFROSAI-E 
Nepal ASOSAI 
Netherlands EUROSAI 
New Zealand PASAI 
Nicaragua OLACEFS 
Niger CREFIAF 
Nigeria AFROSAI-E 
Norway EUROSAI 
Oman ARABOSAI 
Pakistan ASOSAI 
Panama OLACEFS 
Papua New Guinea PASAI 
Paraguay OLACEFS 
Peru OLACEFS 
Philippines ASOSAI 
Poland EUROSAI 
Portugal EUROSAI 
Qatar ARABOSAI 
Romania EUROSAI 
Russian Federation EUROSAI 
Rwanda CREFIAF 
Samoa PASAI 
Sao Tome and Principe CREFIAF 
Saudi Arabia ARABOSAI 
Senegal CREFIAF 
Serbia EUROSAI 
Seychelles AFROSAI-E 
Sierra Leone CREFIAF 
Singapore ASOSAI 
Slovak Republic EUROSAI 
Slovenia EUROSAI 
Solomon Islands PASAI 
Somalia ARABOSAI 
South Africa AFROSAI-E 
South Sudan AFROSAI-E 
Spain EUROSAI 
Sri Lanka ASOSAI 
St. Kitts and Nevis CAROSAI 
St. Lucia CAROSAI 
St. Vincent and the Grena-
dines CAROSAI 
Sudan ARABOSAI 
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Suriname CAROSAI 
Swaziland AFROSAI-E 
Sweden EUROSAI 
Switzerland EUROSAI 
Syrian Arab Republic ARABOSAI 
Tajikistan NRM 
Tanzania AFROSAI-E 
Thailand ASOSAI 
Timor-Leste NRM 
Togo CREFIAF 
Trinidad and Tobago CAROSAI 
Tunisia ARABOSAI 
Turkey EUROSAI 
Turkmenistan NRM 
Uganda AFROSAI-E 
Ukraine EUROSAI 
United Arab Emirates ARABOSAI 
United Kingdom EUROSAI 
United States NRM 
Uruguay OLACEFS 
Uzbekistan NRM 
Venezuela, RB OLACEFS 
Vietnam ASOSAI 
Yemen, Rep. ARABOSAI 
Zambia AFROSAI-E 
Zimbabwe AFROSAI-E 
 Appendices 307 
 
Appendix B. 37 CAC Ratification
318
 
ccodewb country signature 
Ratification, 
Acceptance (A), 
Approval (AA), 
Accession (a), 
Succession (d) CAC2005 CAC2007 CAC2009 
AFG Afghanistan 20.Feb.04 25.Aug.08 0 0 1 
ALB Albania 18 Dec 2003 25 May 2006 0 1 1 
DZA Algeria 9 Dec 2003 25.Aug.04 1 1 1 
AGO Angola 10 Dec 2003 29.Aug.06 0 1 1 
ATG 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
 
21 Jun 2006 a 0 0 0 
ARG Argentina 10 Dec 2003 28.Aug.06 0 1 1 
ARM Armenia 19 May 2005 8 Mar 2007 0 1 1 
AUS Australia 9 Dec 2003 7 Dec 2005 1 1 1 
AUT Austria 10 Dec 2003 11 Jan 2006 0 1 1 
AZE Azerbaijan 27.Feb.04 01.Nov.05 1 1 1 
BHS Bahamas 
 
10 Jan 2008 a 0 0 0 
BHR Bahrain 08.Feb.05 5 October 2010 0 0 0 
BGD Bangladesh 
 
27 Feb 2007 a 0 0 0 
BRB Barbados 10 Dec 2003 
 
0 0 0 
BLR Belarus 28.Apr.04 17.Feb.05 1 1 0 
BEL Belgium 10 Dec 2003 25.Sep.08 0 0 1 
BEN Benin 10 Dec 2003 14 Oct 2004 1 1 1 
BWA Botswana 
 
27 Jun 2011 a 0 0 0 
BTN Bhutan 15.Sep.05 
 
0 0 0 
BOL Bolivia 9 Dec 2003 5 Dec 2005 1 1 1 
BIH 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 16.Sep.05 26 Oct 2006 0 1 1 
BRA Brazil 9 Dec 2003 15.Jun.05 1 1 1 
BRN Brunei 11 Dec 2003 2 Dec 2008 0 0 1 
BGR Bulgaria 10 Dec 2003 20.Sep.06 0 1 1 
BFA 
Burkina 
Faso 10 Dec 2003 10 Oct 2006 0 1 1 
BDI Burundi 
 
10 Mar 2006 a 0 0 0 
KHM Cambodia 
 
5 Sep 2007 a 0 0 0 
CMR Cameroon 10 Dec 2003 06.Feb.06 0 1 1 
CAN Canada 21 May 2004 2 Oct 2007 0 1 1 
ccodewb country signature Ratification, CAC2005 CAC2007 CAC2009 
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Acceptance (A), 
Approval (AA), 
Accession (a), 
Succession (d) 
CPV Cape Verde 9 Dec 2003 23.Apr.08 0 0 1 
CAF 
Central 
African 
Republic 11.Feb.04 6 Oct 2006 0 1 1 
TCD Chad 
  
0 0 0 
CHL Chile 11 Dec 2003 13.Sep.06 0 1 1 
CHN China 10 Dec 2003 13 Jan 2006 0 1 1 
COL Colombia 10 Dec 2003 27 Oct 2006 0 1 1 
COM Comoros 10 Dec 2003 
 
0 0 0 
COG Congo 
 
13 Jul 2006 a 0 0 0 
CRI Costa Rica 10 Dec 2003 21 Mar 2007 0 1 1 
CIV 
Cote d'Iv-
oire 10 Dec 2003 
 
0 0 0 
HRV Croatia 10 Dec 2003 24.Apr.05 1 1 1 
CUB Cuba 9 Dec 2005 09.Feb.07 0 1 1 
CYP Cyprus 9 Dec 2003 23.Feb.09 0 0 1 
CZE 
Czech Re-
public 22.Apr.05 
 
0 0 0 
ZAR Congo, DR 
 
23 Sep 2010 a 0 0 0 
DNK Denmark 10 Dec 2003 26 Dec 2006 0 1 1 
DJI Djibouti 17.Jun.04 20.Apr.05 1 1 1 
DMA Dominica 
 
28 May 2010 a 0 0 0 
DOM 
Dominican 
Republic 10 Dec 2003 26 Oct 2006 0 1 1 
ECU Ecuador 10 Dec 2003 15.Sep.05 1 1 1 
EGY Egypt 9 Dec 2003 25.Feb.05 1 1 1 
SLV El Salvador 10 Dec 2003 01.Jul.04 1 1 1 
GNQ 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
  
0 0 0 
EST Estonia 
 
12 Apr 2010 a 0 0 0 
ETH 
Ethiopia 
(1993-) 10 Dec 2003 26.Nov.07 0 1 1 
EU EU 15.Sep.05 
12 Nov 2008 
AA 0 0 0 
FJI Fiji 
 
14 May 2008 a 0 0 0 
FIN Finland 9 Dec 2003 20 Jun 2006 A 0 1 0 
FRA France 9 Dec 2003 11.Jul.05 1 1 0 
GAB Gabon 10 Dec 2003 1 Oct 2007 0 1 1 
GEO Georgia 
 
4 Nov 2008 a 0 0 0 
DEU Germany 9 Dec 2003 
 
0 0 0 
GHA Ghana 9 Dec 2004 27.Jun.07 0 1 1 
GRC Greece 10 Dec 2003 17.Sep.08 0 0 1 
ccodewb country signature Ratification, CAC2005 CAC2007 CAC2009 
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Acceptance (A), 
Approval (AA), 
Accession (a), 
Succession (d) 
GTM Guatemala 9 Dec 2003 03.Nov.06 0 1 1 
GIN Guinea 15.Jul.05 
 
0 0 0 
GNB 
Guinea-
Bissau 
 
10 Sep 2007 a 0 1 0 
GUY Guyana 
 
16 Apr 2008 a 0 0 0 
HTI Haiti 10 Dec 2003 14.Sep.09 0 0 1 
HND Honduras 17 May 2004 23 May 2005 1 1 1 
HUN Hungary 10 Dec 2003 19.Apr.05 1 1 1 
ISL Iceland 
 
1 Mar 2011 a 0 0 0 
IND India 9 Dec 2005 1 May 2011 0 0 0 
IDN Indonesia 18 Dec 2003 19.Sep.06 0 1 1 
IRN Iran 9 Dec 2003 20.Apr.09 0 0 1 
IRQ Iraq 
 
17 Mar 2008 a 0 0 0 
IRL Ireland 9 Dec 2003 
 
0 0 0 
ISR Israel 29.Nov.05 04.Feb.09 0 0 1 
ITA Italy 9 Dec 2003 5 Oct 2009 0 0 1 
JAM Jamaica 16.Sep.05 5 Mar 2008 0 0 1 
JPN Japan 9 Dec 2003 
 
0 0 0 
JOR Jordan 9 Dec 2003 24.Feb.05 1 1 1 
KAZ Kazakhstan 
 
18 Jun 2008 a 0 0 0 
KEN Kenya 9 Dec 2003 9 Dec 2003 1 1 1 
KWT Kuwait 9 Dec 2003 16.Feb.07 0 1 1 
KGZ Kyrgyzstan 10 Dec 2003 16.Sep.05 1 1 1 
LAO Laos 10 Dec 2003 25.Sep.09 0 0 1 
LVA Latvia 19 May 2005 4 Jan 2006 0 1 1 
LBN Lebanon 
 
22 Apr 2009 a 0 0 0 
LSO Lesotho 16.Sep.05 16.Sep.05 1 1 1 
LBR Liberia 
 
16 Sep 2005 a 0 0 0 
LBY Libya 23 Dec 2003 07.Jun.05 1 1 1 
LIE 
Liechten-
stein 10 Dec 2003 08.Jul.10 0 0 0 
LTU Lithuania 10 Dec 2003 21 Dec 2006 0 1 1 
LUX Luxembourg 10 Dec 2003 06.Nov.07 0 1 1 
MDG Madagascar 10 Dec 2003 22.Sep.04 1 1 1 
MWI Malawi 21.Sep.04 4 Dec 2007 0 1 1 
MYS Malaysia 9 Dec 2003 24.Sep.08 0 0 1 
MDV Maldives 
 
22 Mar 2007 a 0 0 0 
MLI Mali 9 Dec 2003 18.Apr.08 0 0 1 
MLT Malta 12 May 2005 11.Apr.08 0 0 1 
MRT Mauritania 
 
25 Oct 2006 a 0 0 0 
MUS Mauritius 9 Dec 2003 15 Dec 2004 1 1 1 
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ccodewb country signature 
Ratification, 
Acceptance (A), 
Approval (AA), 
Accession (a), 
Succession (d) CAC2005 CAC2007 CAC2009 
MEX Mexico 9 Dec 2003 20.Jul.04 1 1 1 
MDA Moldova 28.Sep.04 1 Oct 2007 0 1 1 
MNG Mongolia 29.Apr.05 11 Jan 2006 0 1 1 
MNE Montenegro 
 
23 Oct 2006 d 0 0 0 
MAR Morocco 9 Dec 2003 9 May 2007 0 1 1 
MOZ 
Mozam-
bique 25 May 2004 09.Apr.08 0 0 1 
MMR Myanmar 2 Dec 2005 
 
0 0 0 
NAM Namibia 9 Dec 2003 03.Aug.04 1 1 1 
NRU Nauru 10 Dec 2003 31 Mar 2011 0 0 0 
NPL Nepal 10 Dec 2003 31 Mar 2011 0 0 0 
NLD Netherlands 10 Dec 2003 31 Oct 2006 A 0 0 0 
NZL 
New Zea-
land 10 Dec 2003 
 
0 0 0 
NIC Nicaragua 10 Dec 2003 15.Feb.06 0 1 1 
NER Niger 
 
11 Aug 2008 a 0 0 0 
NGA Nigeria 9 Dec 2003 14 Dec 2004 1 1 1 
NOR Norway 9 Dec 2003 29.Jun.06 0 1 1 
PAK 
Pakistan 
(1972-) 9 Dec 2003 31.Aug.07 0 1 1 
PCI Palau 
 
24 Mar 2009 a 0 0 0 
PAN Panama 10 Dec 2003 23.Sep.05 1 1 1 
PNG 
Papua New 
Guinea 22 Dec 2004 16.Jul.07 0 1 1 
PRY Paraguay 9 Dec 2003 01.Jun.05 1 1 1 
PER Peru 10 Dec 2003 16.Nov.04 1 1 1 
PHL Philippines 9 Dec 2003 08.Nov.06 0 1 1 
POL Poland 10 Dec 2003 15.Sep.06 0 1 1 
PRT Portugal 11 Dec 2003 28.Sep.07 0 1 1 
QAT Qatar 1 Dec 2005 30 Jan 2007 0 1 1 
KOR Korea, south 10 Dec 2003 27 Mar 2008 0 0 1 
ROM Romania 9 Dec 2003 02.Nov.04 1 1 1 
RUS Russia 9 Dec 2003 9 May 2006 0 1 1 
RWA Rwanda 30.Nov.04 4 Oct 2006 0 1 1 
STP 
Sao Tome 
and Principe 8 Dec 2005 12.Apr.06 0 1 1 
SAU Saudi Arabia 9 Jan 2004 
 
0 0 0 
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ccodewb country signature 
Ratification, 
Acceptance (A), 
Approval (AA), 
Accession (a), 
Succession (d) CAC2005 CAC2007 CAC2009 
SEN Senegal 9 Dec 2003 16.Nov.05 1 1 1 
SRB Serbia 11 Dec 2003 20 Dec 2005 1 1 1 
SYC Seychelles 27.Feb.04 16 Mar 2006 0 1 1 
SLE Sierra Leone 9 Dec 2003 30.Sep.04 1 1 1 
SGP Singapore 11.Nov.05 06.Nov.09 0 0 1 
SVK Slovakia 9 Dec 2003 01.Jun.06 0 1 1 
SVN Slovenia 
 
1 Apr 2008 a 0 0 0 
ZAF South Africa 9 Dec 2003 22.Nov.04 1 1 1 
ESP Spain 16.Sep.05 19.Jun.06 0 1 1 
LKA Sri Lanka 15 Mar 2004 31 Mar 2004 1 1 1 
SDN Sudan 14 Jan 2005 
 
0 0 0 
SWZ Swaziland 15.Sep.05 
 
0 0 0 
SWE Sweden 9 Dec 2003 25.Sep.07 0 1 1 
CHE Switzerland 10 Dec 2003 24.Sep.09 0 0 1 
SYR Syria 9 Dec 2003 
 
0 0 0 
TJK Tajikistan 
 
25 Sep 2006 a 0 0 0 
THA Thailand 9 Dec 2003 1 Mar 2011 0 0 0 
MKD Macedonia 18.Aug.05 13.Apr.07 0 1 1 
TMP Timor-Leste 10 Dec 2003 27 Mar 2009 0 0 1 
TGO Togo 10 Dec 2003 06.Jul.05 1 1 1 
TTO 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 11 Dec 2003 31 May 2006 0 1 1 
TUN Tunisia 30 Mar 2004 23.Sep.08 0 0 1 
TUR Turkey 10 Dec 2003 09.Nov.06 0 1 1 
TKM 
Turkmeni-
stan 
 
28 Mar 2005 a 0 0 0 
UGA Uganda 9 Dec 2003 09.Sep.04 1 1 1 
UKR Ukraine 11 Dec 2003 02 Dec 2009 0 0 1 
ARE 
United Arab 
Emirates 10.Aug.05 22.Feb.06 0 1 1 
GBR 
United 
Kingdom 9 Dec 2003 09.Feb.06 0 1 1 
TZA Tanzania 9 Dec 2003 25 May 2005 1 1 1 
USA 
United 
States 9 Dec 2003 30 Oct 2006 0 1 1 
URY Uruguay 9 Dec 2003 10 Jan 2007 0 1 1 
UZB Uzbekistan 
 
29 Jul 2008 a 0 0 0 
VUT Vanuatu 
 
12 Jul 2011 a 0 0 0 
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ccodewb country signature 
Ratification, 
Acceptance (A), 
Approval (AA), 
Accession (a), 
Succession (d) CAC2005 CAC2007 CAC2009 
VEN Venezuela 10 Dec 2003 02.Feb.09 0 0 1 
VNM Vietnam 10 Dec 2003 19.Aug.09 0 0 1 
YEM Yemen 11 Dec 2003 07.Nov.05 1 1 1 
ZMB Zambia 11 Dec 2003 7 Dec 2007 0 1 1 
ZWE Zimbabwe 20.Feb.04 8 Mar 2007 0 1 1 
 
 
Appendix B. 38 H6b_Strategies by Autocrats. This Graph shows the OLS Regression of status of the 
corruption perception index (ti_cpi) and political killings (cirri_kill) on OBS2010 SAI power (‘free’ 
countries have been excluded) 
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Appendix B. 39 Graph showing the OLS Regression of status of the corruption perception index (ti_cpi) 
and economic legitimacy through diversification (whereas ecoleg=3= high concentration) on OBS2010 
SAI power (‘free’ countries have been excluded) 
 
Appendix B. 40 OLS Regression of economic diversification index (sed) and political killings on 
OBS2010 SAI power (‘free’ countries have been excluded) 
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Graph (B.38) confirms graph 6.17. I find the weakest SAIs in countries which practice 
occasional political killings combined with high levels of corruption. Countries with 
high levels of political killings can still have strong SAIs, but never very powerful and 
completely independent SAIs. Graph B.39. also confirms my hypothesis. The weakest 
SAIs are found in countries with high levels of corruption and high concentration of the 
economic sectors (ecoleg=3).  
Figure B.40. again confirms the hypothesis H6b. The weakest SAIs are found in (semi-) 
authoritarian regimes which practice some extent of political killings. They slowly 
might allow SAIs as economic diversification increases, but will never accept complete-
ly independent and powerful SAIs. On the other hand, countries which practice frequent 
killings do have somehow mid-level SAIs (in order to control subordinates) but as eco-
nomic diversification increases, and thus the number of potential challengers increases, 
they ‘buy’ them off, grant their enemies rents and privileges and thus become tighter on 
existing accountability structures. 
To sum up, I have examined the three commonly known strategies of autocrats to stay 
in power (Haber, 2006). First, they might apply terror and ‘kill’ potential opponents. In 
such countries, there might be a SAI in order to control subordinates, but it will never 
be completely independent and strong (see graphs 6.17, B.38, B.40.). Secondly, the au-
tocrat might buy off opponents and thus corruption is widespread and the SAI is not 
functioning at all (see graphs B.39, B.40) Finally, the autocrat might opt for organiza-
tional diffusion or proliferation by creating business opportunities for his opponents 
mixed with occasional killing of very strong challengers. Here the SAI is improving as 
the economic diversification increases (see graph B.40) Autocracies with the lowest SAI 
power are those, which practice a mixture such as occasional political killings, high 
corruption and nepotism (measured as low ti_cpi) and low organizational proliferation.
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C) Appendices to Chapters Seven - Eight  
Appendix C. 1 List of Interviews 
Nr. Interviewees Date of Interview Time/Duration of 
interview 
data collection 
type 
1 (1) Vice President 
of the SAI; (2) Vice 
President of the 
SAI 
12 July 2011 19:30 - 21:30 notes taking, 
English 
2 (1) Head of the 
Cabinet of the 
Chairperson;  
(2) Head of De-
partment 
13 July 2011 13:00 - 14:20 audio recording, 
English 
3 (1) President of 
the SAI;  
(2) Principal audi-
tor 
13 July 2011 18:00 -19:00 audio recording, 
notes taking and 
written reply by 
SAI, English 
4 Board member 14 July 2011 14:00 - 14:45 audio recording, 
German 
5 Deputy Chairman 
of the Board 
14 July 2011 15:15 -16:00 notes taking, 
English 
6 Auditor General 14 July 2011 19:30 - 20:30 notes taking, 
English 
7 President of the 
SAI 
14 July 2011 22:00 - 0:00 notes taking, 
audio recording, 
English 
8 President of the 
SAI 
15 July 2011 13:00 - 14:00 notes taking, 
English 
9 President of the 
SAI 
15 July 2011  14:00 - 14:30 notes taking, 
French 
10 Manager 15 July 2011 14:45 - 15:30 notes taking, 
English 
11 Auditor General 15 July 2011 17:00 - 18:15 notes taking, 
English 
12 Chair of the SAI 15 July 2011 19:00 - 20:30 notes taking; 
audio recording; 
written reply by 
SAI, English 
13 Chairperson of 
the SAI 
15 July 2011 21:00 - 21:45 notes taking, 
English 
14 Auditor General  
of SAI  
15 July 2011 22:00 - 23:45 notes taking, 
English 
15 Head of the Cabi-
net of the Auditor 
General 
28 July 2011 17:00 - 18:00 notes taking, 
German 
16 Director Interna-
tional Coopera-
tion of the SAI 
18 August 2011  16:00 - 17:38 phone interview, 
audio recording, 
English 
17 General director  22 August 2011 16:50 - 18:00 phone interview, 
audio recording, 
English 
18 Project officer of 
an INTOSAI body 
  Phone discussion 
and email ex-
change, English 
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Appendix C. 2 Example of an Interview Questionnaire 
Meeting Agenda 
Katharina Noussi, Doctoral Student, Department of Political Science, University of Vi-
enna 
Mr.  [name], Vice President, and Mr. [name], Vice President of the [SAI name] 
Hotel NH Danube City, Wagramer Straße 21, 1220-Vienna, on July 12, 2011. 7.30 PM 
 
 
Questions: 
1. How do SAIs develop de jure and de facto independence and political lev-
erage?  
- Which factors support/condition the effective institutionalization of SAIs 
as independent accountability mechanisms? 
- Explain your SAI’s experience with reforms to strengthen its independ-
ence by law and in practice. Which reforms were implemented? How 
were priorities defined? 
 
2. Which incentives/constraints are crucial in gaining the support/consent of 
groups that are resisting the implementation of political reforms to 
strengthen the independence of a SAI? 
- Which factors impede the successful implementation of political re-
forms? 
- SAIs often fail to initiate, conduct or follow up on audits, for reasons of 
both capture and bias. Political reforms which strengthen the independ-
ence of SAIs, in general will leave some elite groups loosing privileges, 
so that they no longer can extract rents from public funds and their influ-
ence taking is hampered. A common reaction of the so called “losers” 
from reforms is reform blockade or if reforms are inevitable, bypassing 
legal processes and thus a continued elite capture of SAIs. Do you 
agree with this statement? Explain. 
 
3. Which roles can various stakeholders play in the political strengthening 
of SAIs? 
- Explain using practical examples from your SAI’s experience or your 
knowledge of other SAIs’ experience. Which roles can parliaments and 
political parties (particularly the parliamentary budget committee), the 
public (the media and civil society organizations), the business environ-
ment, the international community/donors as well as INTOSAI and its 
regional groups play? 
 
4. How do you interpret the ranking of SAIs in the Open Budget Survey 2010 
(see annex)? 
- Do you agree with the position of your SAI? Why? Why not? 
- Why do you think the SAIs of Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Po-
land, Macedonia, Chile, South Korea, Russia, Romania and Indonesia 
rank quite high? Why do you think the SAIs of Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Serbia, Bulgaria and Turkey rank quite low?  
5. If you compare the various capacity building projects your SAI has been 
involved with, which ones were successful/not successful and why? 
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- How do you value the impact of projects supporting various audit ca-
pacities (IT, Financial, Performance, other) vs. the development of the 
capacity to deal with the external environment?  
- Why do you think in the IDI Stocktaking Report SAIs identified organiza-
tional development as their first priority and strengthening external rela-
tions among the least important areas. Furthermore SAIs identified the 
required support to increase external relations as the cheapest category. 
Why do you think SAIs do not prioritize this aspect of reform? Should 
they? 
- In the IDI Stocktaking Report SAIs favor stand alone projects to PFM-
embedded projects. What are the reasons for this?  
- The IDI Stocktaking Report clearly identifies the need for a holistic ap-
proach to increase SAI capacity development. What does such a holistic 
approach encompass?   
   
6. Please comment on some of the findings regarding your SAI as presented 
in the Open Budget Survey and Global Integrity Reports. (see annex) 
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Annex:  
[the annex usually included quotes from the respective Open Budget Survey Re-
ports and Global Integrity Reports] 
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Appendix C. 3 Example of an Interview Transcript 
 
Interview number 1  
Date and location: 12 July 2011, Hotel NH Danube City, Vienna. 
Interview duration: approximately 2 hours  
Interview participants:  
K: interviewer 
I1: Vice President of a SAI 
I2: Vice President of the same SAI 
Interview method: semi-structured interview, anonymity promised, audio recording was not permitted, 
interviewer took detailed notes 
Own analysis in Atlas.ti., Version 6.2.27; Author assigned 31 Codes; 1 Memo and 25 Quotations to this 
document 
------------ 
K: What kind of institutional model is your SAI? 
I1: mix model between the General Auditor model and the Board model 
 
K: I have learned that a lot of interesting developments have taken place in [country name] lately. Most 
importantly the adoption of the new National Audit Organization Act in Dec 2010 and your election as vice 
presidents in Jan. of this year. Could you please start by painting me a picture of the process which led to 
the adoption of this new Act. 
I1: In the beginning of 2010 [country name] Parliament evaluated the national Audit Organization Act and 
decided to change the model. The SAI board used to have 11 members, the audit process was not clear 
because too many on board, in the previous law the SAI could only audit budget entities not state-owned 
enterprises, the board used to have 10 members, each was the head of an audit department, there were 
also different practices in different audit departments as well as in the 6 regional offices. We only devel-
oped a common audit manual for all departments and regional offices in 2009, thus 13 years after the 
establishment of the SAI there were still no common standards, no ISSAIs. 
 
K: May I ask you if you currently are or previously were members of political parties? 
I2: We are and never were members of political parties, neither the president of the [SAI name].  I was the 
Social Security Funds president. I was the deputy minister for labor and social policy between 2001 and 
2005, then I became a member of the SAI. 
I1: I became head of public financial control agency which is responsible for internal auditing then presi-
dent of the International Association of Internal Auditors [country name] chapter. 
 
K: Were there groups opposing the new audit act? 
I1: all parties supported the new NAOA except the socialist party [party name], which had one representa-
tive in the board of the SAI and the [political party], a political party representing the [ethnic group] minori-
ty in parliament, which had 3 members in the board and the [party name].  
Mrs. [personal name] and Mr. [personal name of I2] were the only board members supporting the new act. 
Mrs. [personal name]  is now working in the MoF Central harmonization unit. 
[political party], led by [name of the capital city] mayor [personal name], won parliamentary elections and 
prime minister office in July 2009 and did support this law because want to fight corruption. The scope of 
the new law is large, the SAI can audit political parties (only state budget support to pol. parties), state-
owned enterprises, state property, high ranking officials need to declare their income and properties, elec-
tion expenditures of parties (national, presidential, regional, communal elections). 
 
K: Has your SAI benefitted from capacity building and donor support? I saw in the CBC database that your 
SAI has benefitted from a lot of donor projects with extremely high costs, including a EU twinning project 
(> 10 mio. Euro). 
I1: Only during the pre-accession period. EU twinning is only possible for non EU members.  
[They show me a list of the five main capacity building projects] 
 
K: How did the new Act came about, when did the discussions start, how did they start? 
I1: In 2006 SIGMA conducted a peer-review of the [SAI name] and got a lot of negative findings, this is 
when the discussions started, the report pointed out that there needs to be adaptations to the legislative 
framework, there needs to be training of staff, improve structure, need PCs and audit software. 
K: did the report also analyze the independence and political economy of auditing? 
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I: They should have also focused on the decision making process and implement change from the very 
beginning, but it was impossible to even raise this question then bec. the [pol. Party], which was part of the 
ruling coalition had 3 persons on the board.  
Then there was a meeting with SIGMA experts in Paris, they recommended us a small board, to adopt the 
ISSAIs and the internal auditing standards. 
K: Are the reports public now? 
I: Yes, except ministry of defense some classified infos but parliament gets these reports. if there is a crimi-
nal case suspected send the report to the general prosecutor but the parliament is always informed. 
 
Then there was an exchange with the Slovenian and the Polish SAIs. The head of the Slovenian SAI and the 
Polish SAI (who is also President of EUROSAI) came to [country name] to meet with the Chair of Parliament 
and the [country name] Chair of Parliamentary Budget Committee. The objective of the visit was not to 
primarily convince but to explain the model and how to change. Their recommendations were mainly: the 
general auditor model is better than the board model, it is important to adopt internationally accepted 
standards, their need to be specific requirements for auditors, they need to pass an exam to demonstrate 
their proficiency of experience, the scope of auditing needs to be larger. 
K: thus the [SAI name] changed because of outside influence? 
I: Yes, because of outside influence. It would have been impossible to change by itself. But there was still 
local ownership of the process because [name of I2] and the President [of the SAI] supported it.  
We also had to close the regional offices under the new law to undermine the political pressure from local 
political leaders. The regional offices still exist but they report directly to the centre now, this improved 
their function! 
The SAI has 4 directorates: financial audits directorate, compliance audits of financial management direc-
torate, performance audits directorate and specific audits directorate.  
 
K: What role did the media play? 
I: the media was really interested and supported this reform because it opens the SAI to the public. 
 
I: The [SAI name] has a mixed model of structural/general -> there is a committee which decides with con-
sensus but the audit process is very clear, the president decides. 
 
I: In [country name] we also don't have a new budget law, it dates from 1996, the [SAI name] will try to 
convince Parliament to adopt a new budget law. our budget law is still based on expenditures not based 
on performance. the Minister of Finance is the most powerful person in government.  
 
I: there is a low level of election participation in [country name],, about 40-50%. but we have 30 MPs from 
the [pol. Party] and around 50 MPs from the [political party] who resist reforms.  
 
K: Why do you think the Russian SAI scores very well in the OBS2010? 
I: The head of the Russian SAI is a former KGB General, a very influential man and close ally of Putin, he was 
prime minister 12 years ago. The global institute of International Accounting also supported the Russian 
SAI . 
K: Why do you think it is so independent? 
I: Russia needs a strong SAI to control low levels of government. Putin is like a king, everything belongs to 
him and his allies anyway, so there is no need of corruption at the high level, but the country is very large, 
so he needs to control what goes on in the regions and there is high level of corruption and mismanage-
ment at low and medium levels.  
K: What is the situation in [country name]? 
I: In [country name] the privatization process was equally accompanied by a lot of corruption practices. 
Director of State Agencies... The customs and tax revenue agencies at the borders of [country name] expe-
rienced a lot of pressure from private sector, private companies put pressure on them, a lot of effort to 
protect these agencies. 
the newly founded Anti-Corruption Agency, is the [country name] FBI, was founded 2 years ago, Comm. 
exchange information with this agency.  
 
 
K: what kind of audits do you conduct? 
I: financial audits, regularity audits (public procurements, human resource management, properties), 3 Es 
performance audits started 10 years ago - not experiences, cooperation with Swedish SAI started in 2011 
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K: other factors which are crucial in gaining political strength: 
I: clear rules and procedures for hiring and dismissal of staff. 5 years ago, 40% of staff were 3 years before 
pension, were afraid working with PCs, now 20% before retirement. so the staff situation will change in the 
next years.  
I: we have 550 staff, 400 are auditors, this is enough at the moment, in the next two years we want to train 
all the staff, and adapt the audit manual according to the new law.   
 
K: tell me again, is the institutional model important in gaining independence? 
I: The General Auditor Model is not good for transition countries but a small board, other countries which 
have adopted this system are Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. The reason is that there is one 
person who decides and thus has no excuses or pressures from elsewhere but at the same time there is 
some control through the small board.  
 
K: What about the situation in other countries? 
I: Greece does not have effective external auditing. When I was the head of the internal auditing in [country 
name] I met my Greek colleagues. They told me, "You are crazy to develop internal auditing!" 
K: so in [country name] there is a certain culture, which accepts control and a professional bureaucracy. 
I: Yes. 
 
K: other issues 
I: There is a change of discourse from public accountability (managerial accountability) to responsibility. 
Responsibility implies that they will be punished if they don't achieve the objectives. The EC has introduced 
the concept of responsibility in negotiations/discussion.  
 
K: discussion of questions in the OBS 2010: 
qu 123: "Some reports are sent only to a designated committee of Parliament, and not all MPs have access 
to them. In 2008 an audit report on management of property in the Ministry of Defense was sent by the 
SAI to the National Security committee of the Parliament, but its chairman withheld the report from other 
MPs for some months. In addition, when the audit reports are sent to the Public Prosecutor's office, they 
are not released to anyone (and these are the reports of utmost interest because they are where the po-
tential abuse of funds would be),"  
I: this is not (or no longer) right. Often the PAC invites the President of the [SAI], 2 weeks ago to present 
the reports of EU fund auditing, The PAC can request the SAI to conduct 5 audits per year. 
K: Why only 5? 
I: because we are an independent institution.  
 
K: what do you think about your SAIs position in the OBS? 
I: Too low, I am sure with the new act we will be placed higher up soon. 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY: 
 There was resistance from two political parties to the introduction of the NAOA reform led by their 
representatives in the Board of the SAI and resistance by old employees who do not want to learn new 
auditing techniques and software. 
 Reform was led by professionals in the board and the EU as external driver as well as the political land-
scape which changed with a new party in power willing to fight corruption.  
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Appendix C. 4 List of All Codes 
The code labels are followed by two numbers. The first number lists the number of text references, it tells 
you how often a code has been applied (i.e. groundedness); the second number refers to connectivity, this 
is the number of links between it and other codes (i.e. theoretical density).  
 
CONSTRAINTS {0-4} 
CONSTRAINTS_inst. {0-4} 
CONSTRAINTS_inst._capacity {3-1} 
CONSTRAINTS_inst._design {3-1} 
CONSTRAINTS_inst._management {1-1} 
CONSTRAINTS_inst.design_too independent {0-0} 
CONSTRAINTS_int. env._ISSAIs not binding {0-1} 
CONSTRAINTS_int.env._prejudice against Africa {0-1} 
CONSTRAINTS_int.env._weak INTOSAI {0-1} 
CONSTRAINTS_international environment {0-4} 
CONSTRAINTS_nat. environment {0-8} 
CONSTRAINTS_nat. environment_corruption, threats, lack of protection {8-1} 
CONSTRAINTS_nat. environment_low awareness of SAI importance {4-1} 
CONSTRAINTS_nat. environment_low election participation {1-1} 
CONSTRAINTS_nat. environment_oil or donor dependency {1-1} 
CONSTRAINTS_nat. environment_pol.game {7-1} 
CONSTRAINTS_nat. environment_poverty/illiteracy {2-1} 
CONSTRAINTS_nat.environment_civil society biased {3-0} 
CONSTRAINTS_nat.environment_judiciary {2-1} 
CONSTRAINTS_nat.environment_presidential system {1-0} 
country_Arab spring {4-0} 
country_OECD {1-0} 
country_RDC {1-0} 
country_RUSSIA {1-0} 
DEF_ACCOUNTABILITY {1-0} 
FAILURE {1-6} 
FAILURE_change law {0-4} 
FAILURE_change law_to become independent {1-1} 
FAILURE_change law_to increase budget {0-1} 
FAILURE_change law_to increase mandate {0-1} 
FAILURE_to improve auditing/capacity {0-1} 
FAILURE_to increase follow-up {0-1} 
FAILURE_to increase transparency/public communiation {0-1} 
INITIATION {0-6} 
INITIATOR_external {0-3} 
INITIATOR_external_donors/EU {12-1} 
INITIATOR_external_INTOSAI body {6-1} 
INITIATOR_pol leadership {1-3} 
INITIATOR_pol leadership_executive/ruling party/coalition {3-1} 
INITIATOR_pol leadership_parliament {3-1} 
INITIATOR_pol leadership_president {2-0} 
INITIATOR_public {6-1} 
INITIATOR_SAI {17-1} 
NWW_monopoly on force {0-0} 
NWW_rule of law {1-0} 
PROBLEM {0-6} 
PROBLEM_capacity {2-6} 
PROBLEM_capacity_know-how {3-1} 
PROBLEM_capacity_lack of auditors {5-1} 
PROBLEM_capacity_lack of resources {4-1} 
PROBLEM_capacity_late report submission {1-1} 
PROBLEM_capacity_techn.infrastructure {0-1} 
PROBLEM_defense ministry {1-0} 
PROBLEM_legal {0-6} 
PROBLEM_legal_budget law/procedures {2-1} 
PROBLEM_legal_ISSAIS not binding {4-1} 
PROBLEM_legal_limited mandate {6-1} 
PROBLEM_legal_no independence by law/constitution {9-1} 
PROBLEM_legal_no standards/manual {1-1} 
PROBLEM_low follow-up {6-5} 
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PROBLEM_low follow-up_by executive {0-1} 
PROBLEM_low follow-up_by judiciary {1-1} 
PROBLEM_low follow-up_by parliament {4-1} 
PROBLEM_low follow-up_by public {4-1} 
PROBLEM_low follow-up_by SAI {2-0} 
PROBLEM_pol.influence/bias {4-4} 
PROBLEM_pol.influence/bias_corruption of auditors {8-1} 
PROBLEM_pol.influence/bias_lack of de facto independence {11-1} 
PROBLEM_pol.influence/bias_weak management/decision-making {3-1} 
RESULTS {0-3} 
STRATEGY {0-8} 
STRATEGY_align with INTOSAI regional body {1-0} 
STRATEGY_capacity building {0-4} 
STRATEGY_capacity_mutual exchange {8-1} 
STRATEGY_capacity_office infrastructure and ICT {12-1} 
STRATEGY_capacity_staff training {12-1} 
STRATEGY_circumvent law {1-0} 
STRATEGY_improve communication {4-4} 
STRATEGY_improve communication_bureaucracy {3-1} 
STRATEGY_improve communication_courts {1-0} 
STRATEGY_improve communication_parliament {3-2} 
STRATEGY_improve communication_parliament_form new committees {1-1} 
STRATEGY_improve communication_president {1-0} 
STRATEGY_improve communication_public {11-1} 
STRATEGY_legal {6-4} 
STRATEGY_legal_institution {19-1} 
STRATEGY_legal_ISSAIs, audit manual and other standards {13-1} 
STRATEGY_legal_staff recruitement rules {5-1} 
STRATEGY_management strategies {0-6} 
STRATEGY_management_assertiveness/leadership {5-1} 
STRATEGY_management_integrity/professionalism {11-1} 
STRATEGY_management_performance audit first {2-1} 
STRATEGY_management_staff motivation {6-1} 
STRATEGY_management_strategic plan {7-1} 
SUCCESS {2-5} 
SUCCESS_auditing improved {2-3} 
SUCCESS_auditing improved_capacity improved {4-1} 
SUCCESS_auditing improved_corruption detected {10-1} 
SUCCESS_citizen participation improved {1-0} 
SUCCESS_follow-up improved {0-3} 
SUCCESS_follow-up improved_by parliament {5-1} 
SUCCESS_follow-up improved_by public {4-1} 
SUCCESS_new law {7-6} 
SUCCESS_new law_ de jure independence improved {6-1} 
SUCCESS_new law_budget increased {0-1} 
SUCCESS_new law_decision-making clarified {3-1} 
SUCCESS_new law_head of SAI appointment {1-1} 
SUCCESS_new law_mandate improved {5-1} 
SUCCESS_transparency improved {7-1} 
SUPPORT {0-4} 
SUPPORT_inst.design {1-0} 
SUPPORT_int. env_GRECO {4-1} 
SUPPORT_int.env. {0-5} 
SUPPORT_int.env._external pressure/conditionalities {3-1} 
SUPPORT_int.env._INTOSAI/networking {6-1} 
SUPPORT_int.env._ISSAIs {4-1} 
SUPPORT_nat. environment {0-7} 
SUPPORT_nat. environment_culture/history {6-1} 
SUPPORT_nat. environment_political will {15-1} 
SUPPORT_nat.environment_economic growth {3-1} 
SUPPORT_nat.environment_gov composition changed {2-1} 
SUPPORT_nat.environment_PAC {2-1} 
SUPPORT_nat.environment_public/media {9-1} 
SUPPORT_personal strength {3-1} 
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Appendix C. 5 Example of a Network View - "The Initiation of SAI Reform" 
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Appendix C. 6 The Reform Cycle 
Appendix C. 7 Cross Tabulation of the Three QUAN Results with QUAL Results (based on Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007) 
1. QUAN result: International/regional influence (H3) 
Overall, the statistical tests confirmed hypothesis three.  
Holding other variables constant, the regional belonging of a SAI is strongly correlated with the power of a SAI. Particularly Eastern Europe 
and Sub-Saharan Africa perform better than their peers with similar levels of democratization or economic development. 
Corresponding 
QUAL results 
Int.1:  “I: In 2006 SIGMA conducted a peer-review of the [SAI name] and got a lot of negative findings. This is when the discussions started. The report pointed out 
that there need to be adaptations to the legislative framework, there need to be training of staff, we need to improve the institutional structure, and we need PCs 
and audit software. …Then there was a meeting with SIGMA experts in Paris, they recommended us a small board, to adopt the ISSAIs and the internal auditing 
standards. …Then there was an exchange with the Slovenian and the Polish SAIs. The head of the Slovenian SAI and the Polish SAI (who is also President of 
EUROSAI) came to [country name] to meet with the Chair of Parliament and the Chair of the Parliamentary Budget Committee. The objective of the visit was not 
primarily to convince but to explain the model and how to change. Their recommendations were mainly: the general auditor model is better than the board mod-
el, it is important to adopt internationally accepted standards, there need to be specific requirements for auditors, they need to pass an exam to demonstrate their 
proficiency of experience, the scope of auditing needs to be larger. K: ‚Thus the [SAI name] changed because of outside influence? I: Yes, because of outside influ-
ence. It would have been impossible to change by itself.” 
Int.2:  “You know since 2004 we have intensified relations with the European Union, you know and they have launched the different projects, programs.” 
Int.4: “K: Aber wenn es Widerstand gibt in der Politik, in der Regierung, was macht man da? I1: Am Besten ist, wenn man persönlich ein neues Beispiel sehen 
kann, fragen kann und man vergleichen kann, was es hier gibt in Deutschland, in Österreich...“319 
Int.5: „It is only about technical training. I don't need political support because de jure everything is fine, de facto is the problem.” 
Int.6: “K: What else helps to improve your work and gain political strength? I: The media, ICT, international law, ISSAIs help a lot.” 
Int.7: “We have received support by SIGMA, DFID, GAO, which is still continuing, in the beginning it was embarrassing until we proved that we are integer. The 
cooperation is a chance for change.” 
Int.8: “There was EU pressure for harmonization in accordance with the Acquis Communitaire. We have also received assistances, and there are conditionalities 
but we managed to fulfill these successfully. …The cooperation with the Norwegian SAI helped us a lot, membership in INTOSAI also helped us a lot; it strengthens 
your own profile. ...The Slovenian SAI is a huge success. Croatia and Macedonia only passed a new law this year to become independent. Serbia passed a new law 
this year to include auditing of political parties and realize an anti-corruption agency, this year they can also audit defense spending.” It is clear that EU member-
                                                     
319
 Author’s translation: Int.4: “K: But if there is resistance in politics, in government, what can you then do? I1: The best is, if you can see a good example, when you can ask and 
compare, with what exists in Germany, in Austria …” 
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ship is the main incentive for all these young countries to reform their institutions.   
Int.9: “K: Qu'est ce qu'il vous faut pour améliorer votre SAI? I: D'abord le personnel. 60 magistrats qu'on va former pour les intégrer dans la court. Il y a des projets 
avec l'UE et autres. L'UE nous a aussi donné des ordinnateurs et il vont construir un nouveau bâtiment.”
320
 
Int.11: “… the political support in many SAIs is not adequate.  (1) First because the awareness of the importance of SAIs is limited at the political level. Two reasons 
for this:  1. lack of leadership as head of SAIs. We are not assertive enough to demonstrate the value of SAIs to our governments. 2. At the same time we don't 
have a collective approach to promote the value of SAIs as INTOSAI or as regional groupings. So you find that in most instances each country stands alone at 
dealing with its government. That limits our ability to influence our governments especially the ones that are stubborn. … Learning from peers is always the best; 
we are working hard within INTOSAI to support the learning from peers.” 
Int.12: “Some auditees were resistant to this system but it is based on the Lima Declaration. … We are developing a data center which is a big national monitoring 
system, a little bit like in the USA where they have one social security number.” 
Int.13: “INTOSAI is very helpful to touch base and learn from each other.” 
Int.14: “The move that has started now between INTOSAI and the UN is very important, then it [ISSAIs] will be binding to our governments. …One factor among 
others is that AFROSAI-E started from a strong base, the South African SAI, thanks to it, it has immensely contributed to getting AFRSOAI-E to become the most 
active group of INTOSAI.” 
Int. 15: “Ziel ist die Selbstverpflichtung, die ISSAIs in den internationalen Rechtsbestand aufzunehmen. Das hat noch einmal eine andere Qualität,  darauf zu 
verweisen, in Wahrheit hast du selbst dem zugestimmt, als Druckmittel hat das eine ganz andere Qualität.“
321
 
Int. 16: “We draw a lot on the experience of other subregional groups in Africa, of which particularly the English- speaking African SAIs, who are more advanced 
than us in francophone Africa. We are drawing from their experience - a lot. …working with the external stakeholders is very important… it is easier for INTOSAI, 
the donors to work through [the INTOSAI regional body] to develop the SAIs.” 
Int.17: “I have been in this technical training for the last twenty years, you know they [the donors] are doing all the best, you know, they are doing their best abso-
lutely, … you know they also have limited funds, they cannot give you all the money that you want. … if we had sufficient money we could … do a lot of things.” 
Int.18: “The regional organization [AFROSAI] is often cited as being the “model” regional organization within INTOSAI with a high degree of professionalism and 
their work possesses high quality.” 
 
                                                     
320
 translate 
321
 translate 
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2. QUAN result: Favorable inter-elite relationships (H6) 
Overall, the statistical tests confirmed the hypothesis that holding other variables constant, the attainment of the doorstep conditions (and 
here particularly rule of law among elites measured among others by judicial independence or the level of transparency in shares of local 
firms) is strongly correlated with the power of a SAI.  
Overall, the statistical tests also confirmed the hypothesis that holding other variables constant, organizational proliferation (in the economic 
as well as political sector) is strongly correlated with the power of a SAI. 
This hypothesis also includes the statement, that reform is easier in post-conflict countries as the local elites have been weakened.  
The doorstep conditions are even more relevant in large countries, where elite groups have a stronger incentive to formalize their relation-
ships and where an authoritarian leadership has a stronger incentive to formalize accountability of low and mid level officials.  
Corresponding 
QUAL results 
Int.1: “I: Russia needs a strong SAI to control low levels of government. Putin is like a king, everything belongs to him and his allies anyway, so there is no need of 
corruption at the high level, but the country is very large, so he needs to control what goes on in the regions and there is high level of corruption and misman-
agement at low and medium levels. K: What is the situation in [country name]? I: In [country name] the privatization process was equally accompanied by a lot of 
corruption practices. … The customs and tax revenue agencies at the borders … experienced a lot of pressure from the private sector, private companies put pres-
sure on them, it took a lot of effort to protect these agencies.” 
Int.2: „I2: You know we have lost a lot of years of development in our country due to the high levels of corruption and such kind of not very material issues,  
K: So you think there is a high level of consensus, in the public? I2: Everybody! Each level, low, medium, you may find that we have very great success in the fight 
against corruption, we try to do our best, it is very important to our country. … The main objective of the government is to help the private to develop. The public 
is not the self interested. …I1: A survey conducted about doing business, and [country name] ranked 10, because very easy. I2: [country name] was among the top 
ten. You can establish your business in 15 minutes.” 
Int.3: starts his introduction proudly presenting me the long history of his SAI, explaining the new audit law and concluding with a general proud remark that 
his country was “in 2010 one of the fastest growing economies in the world.” When asked about the Russian SAI, I2 laughed, “Russia? The Russian are very good 
with law, but in practice they have no experience. We worked together with them in an environmental audit. They could not add value to the report.” 
Int. 4: “K: Kennen Sie die Situation in Nicaragua? I1: Ein bisschen, in Nicaragua haben wir ein sehr fragiles politisches Modell, es ist immer, jedes Jahr kommt eine 
neue Partei [meint mit Partei Regierung], … wenn wir keine feste und gute Partei haben, dann haben wir keine guten Institutionen meine ich. … die Hauptreform 
ist politische Reform.“ 
Int. 5: „Our country experiences a very high rate of growth, but also high level of corruption in the private and public field. The SAI effectiveness depends on the 
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democratization of a country. The law must be very specific, the law should be above everything, the law should be transmitted to everybody, and there should 
just be cases of corruption not mass everywhere.”  
I2 gives an example of how personal relationships matter, thus there is no rule of law among elites. I2 also gives another story explaining how everybody 
knows that there is high level of corruption and empty-shell institutions – “A camel hides his head behind a tree and thinks nobody sees him, but in fact eve-
rybody does. “ While this interview confirms that with low levels of rule of law among the elite there is also a weak SAI, the nature and the effect of the growth 
rate seems to disagree with our hypothesis, but not if we consider that the growth can be mainly attributed to oil exports.  
 Int.6: “auditors are threatened with violence … there is resistance by the executive to enact the new audit law, particularly by the president who is at the same 
time the government executive ... it is not easy if the political environment is not favorable.”  
Interviewee is from a very fragile country, which clearly affects his SAI. He recommended expanding on performance audit as it does not target individuals.  
Int.7: “Actually the work in [country name] is an extraordinary one, the situation and the circumstances are extraordinary, we work under a situation which is very 
much tiring, the country is very much tired of lots of things.”  
Like interviewee 6, interviewee 5 is also from a very fragile country and also starts explaining me how this affects his SAI. He also recommended expanding on 
performance audit because it gives the institution the chance to rehabilitate and does not accuse one person.  
Int.8: “I1: The Slovenian SAI is a huge success. Croatia and Macedonia only passed a new law this year to become independent. Serbia passed a new law this year 
to include auditing of political parties and realize an anti-corruption agency, this year they can also audit defense spending.” It is clear that EU membership is the 
main incentive for all these young countries to reform their institutions. However, elite structures might have also been weakened in the conflict, thus facilitating 
the realization of the “doorstep conditions”. 
Int. 9: “I: Le problème n'est pas l'accès où l'indépendence mais l'enforcement. L'impunité c'est le vrai problème. K: Est-ce que vous informez le parlament?I: Oui, 
mais les mandataires ne font rien. Ils ne s'intéressent pas.Les rapports sont aussi trôp en retard. …Le gouvernment a toujours des explications pour se justifier, 
surtout avec la guerre dans [region of the country], il y a toujours des excuses.”  
Clearly, the political situation in this country is not stable and affects the work of the SAI.  
Int.11: “It is critical we dont associate the urgency of ISSAI implementationwith developing countries only, if we look at the EU and US, countries that have taken 
their citizens down with them, why ? Because the way they disclose things is not always in a transparent way.”  
Interviewee 1 also had pointed out the weakness of the Greek internal auditing practices, Greece being a country which is also currently experiencing a huge 
debt crisis. Thus, the question of elite groups benefitting from a lack of transparency is clearly not an issue of developing countries only. However, the reasons 
behind the lack of transparency and related to that the advocacy options that are available differ for OECD and non-OECD member states according to our 
theory.  
Int.12: This is a very large country experiencing high rates of growth, which according to our theory facilitates the consolidation of the still weak democratic 
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institutions in the country; and indeed SAI reforms have been possible, albeit difficult. 
Int. 14: “K: How important is the political environment you work in? I1: In order for an auditor to be effective no matter how good you are, if the executive is 
not interested, the audit reports will end up in the shelves. As auditors we recommend. So if the other stakeholders are not interested, the audit reports can-
not have any effect. So it is very, very important. … I1: There are a lot of cases in court, some people have been jailed, it is a dangerous job. K: But the ad-
vantage is that you are not in a danger of civil or ethnic war, [country name] is a very inclusive society I believe? I1: Yes, the unifying force is [common lan-
guage].  …K: What helped this law come about? I1: political will of the president, he believes in the audit office, the president has come out of the people. …K: 
Is there no transparency in shares? I2: There might be but they often put a wrong name and later it is discovered that this company actually belongs to the 
minster.” According to this interviewee, the rule of law in his country is still very weak, still, there is no danger of civil war and the society is quite unified, there 
was also strong political commitment, which made SAI reform possible.  
  
Int.15: “Der [SAI name] hat seinen Leistungsbericht verändert, seit [year, name of SIA president], beschreibt er im Leistungsbericht das daily business, damit wird 
für den Normalbürger fassbar und intellektuell fassbar was der [SAI name] bewirkt. … In [OECD country name] gibt es ein [regional government], das den [SAI 
name] nicht will, einige [regional deputees] zeigen das sehr deutlich und die Prüfer bekommen das zu spüren. Aber sie führen ihre Arbeit trotzdem aus, sie haben 
ja das verfassungsmäßige Recht dazu.“  
So, even if there is resistance to auditors in this OECD country, as there is rule of law, the auditors cannot be prevented from doing their work. At the same 
time, the SAI is working to increase its power by focusing stronger on leveraging its recognition in society. The SAI has started to measure and publish its 
work and achievements a few years back so that it becomes comprehensive for the average citizen  
Int. 16: “Ah, we are not really afraid, you know we, our SAIs , I think we are respected, if not feared now, ah, there has never been any case of violence but there 
have been threats, but never violence as of now. … threats against auditors low level and high level and managers, everybody, there have been threats to individ-
uals … it is only the military that can challenge the president, so for that reason the president, or the governance structure cover their eyes on the wrongdoings of 
the military, and especially of the high military officials, so thats one reason why it  has become so difficult to audit the ministry of defense … … the court system 
is weak and thats one of the impediments or the weaknesses of our business environment , there , from my own experience I think the court system is weak and it 
cannot protect private property, so signing contract, people become so very, very, you know they take so much , they are so very much afraid to sign any contract , 
or at least sign a contract with people they know or with very strong political backing … there have been so many instances where because shareholders, foreign 
shareholders and [country name] shareholders and the courts cannot sign because they protect the [country name] which is very wrong…  I have seen a lot of 
workshops for the justice department, but you know most of that is just capacity building really, not institutional capacity building, it is technical capacity build-
ing, it is not capacity building we call for to remove for that subordination they have through which they have to the minister of justice, that is ... they are support-
ing it,  all the judges, they are supporting it, they are all subordinated to the minister of justice, if you leave that they can’t be independent… I: well, you see, the 
elites do resist, they dont want reforms because most of them K: but the resistance is not strong enough apparently, you succeeded to get the new procurement 
law passed. I: yes, we succeeded but you know they are effective to be resistant, they dont want reforms and ah, well most of them they want the money , the 
easily extract money from the public funds they abuse their powers and their positions to get themselves rich, from my own, from what I have seen, there are not 
for business, so even if they do business they are going to lose their money , … K: so what will the people do if they will lose out the money, they will just accept it? 
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I: In my country those that loose out, they are already very rich, so they go away, they do have enough money , they are very rich guys, you know, they might go 
to any island somewhere … K : [laughs] They will be offended and will go to some island to enjoy it? I: I will tell you that most of the guys, senior government 
officials, senior ministers, senior politicians that have been sent to jail as a result of our audits are very powerful and many other seniors, very powerful, I should 
tell you. K: so many of the very powerful people have been arrested? I: yes. … I: I think the strong part is the president, the president has some, you know, he is 
strong, he is so strong, if he decides that you were falling out of place because you are so corrupt then go away, go away.” 
After having described in detail and thus confirmed that the doorstep conditions are not met in this country, which has a very weak SAI according to the OBS 
criteria, my interviewee finishes with a still positive outlook and explains that the development of democratic institutions is a process, which will take some 
time but which they will go to achieve. As a positive example he cites the reform of the procurement law which was achieved even against strong resistance. 
Also the recent success in arresting many high level officials which were accused of corruption according to my interviewee is the result of the will of the pres-
ident of the republic. The question remains, what drives the president to fight high-level corruption? It would be an interesting case study to find out whether 
it was because he feared opposition by these officials and wanted to remove them from the political scene or whether it was because of the opposition, that 
he does not have to fear any organized coup d’état or opposition from this clientele and thus did not fear any revenge by authorizing their arrest. Further-
more I understand that the military is strong and supports the president and by arresting these senior officials he also gains in support from the general pub-
lic and the international community.  
Int. 17: “Yes, you see in the parliament we have opposition parties, ok, when they discuss [SAI name] issues they are actually in support, everybody is calling for 
more independence of [SAI name]. …you know, if we did not have a political problem we would have had an amendment of the constitution agreed … and that 
would enhance [SAI name] independence, but you know ... this year nothing has moved.” 
There is an open political crisis and there are frequent instances of violence in this country, thus it is clear that doorstep condition number 3 is not met, which 
correlates with the problems and weaknesses this SAI faces. Still, when comparing this SAI to peers in similarly unstable and poor countries, it fares quite well 
concerning its de jure independence and acceptance among the political parties as constitutional amendments strengthening its status were recently ap-
proved in parliament, while the political crises prevented the conduct of a public referendum, which is required for any constitutional amendment. It would be 
interesting to further investigate this case and find out where this acceptance stems from and whether this SAI can not only gain de jure but also de facto 
power. According to our theory, the executive might have accepted constitutional reform to strengthen the SAI because it knew that it will still be able to 
influence it, i.e. through limiting its resources and thus the scope of work. Another possible motivation by the presidential party to accept this reform might 
have been the truly large financial problems of the government and thus a general concern to improve financial management and fight corruption in this 
extremely poor country. While interviewee 16 is from a country which deposes of natural resources and other kinds of wealth, which facilitated the develop-
ment of high levels of corruption, this country disposes of hardly any natural resources and also has much lower levels of corruption according to Transparen-
cy International.  
  
 
 Appendices 333 
 
3. QUAN result: SAI leadership (H7) 
Overall, the statistical tests confirmed the hypothesis that holding other variables constant, the strength of a SAI’s leadership, measured by the 
number of a leader’s responsibilities in INTOSAI groups and the number of speeches at UN/INTOSAI seminars, is strongly correlated with the 
power of a SAI.  
Corresponding 
QUAL results 
Int.1: “I: Yes, because of outside influence. It would have been impossible to change by itself. But there was still local ownership  of the process because [name of a 
SAI Board member] and the President [of the SAI] supported it.” 
Int.2: “K: I think you said it changed because of the government putting it as a priority , the external pressure, also the public interest you said, so from all sides. I2: 
Exactly, and internally also, the chairman himself is committed to be successful.” 
Int.3: “K: Is the media interested in your work? I2: Not enough. [laughs] Unfortunately. So we have created a new group [SAI department], publications and com-
munication, and I am the head of it. [laughs]” 
Int.4: “I1: … aber es [der SAI] war sehr gut eingerichtet worden damals, …[Name eines Politikers], er war ein sehr intelligenter Mann, er hat so etwas als 
Konzeption eingerichtet. … Und nachher, nach [Name des Politikers] haben wir einen Finanzminsiter gehabt, der [Name], der hat unsere Institution gegründet, so 
wie es [Name 1] geplant hatte. .. zwei sehr wichtige Führungspersönlichkeiten … die beiden haben so was fest gemacht. …Dann war ich dieses Jahr für den Bericht 
2010 zuständig, dann haben wir begonnen mit der Transformation, … Haben wir viele Treffen gehabt … um einen engeren Kontakt zu haben mit dem Parlament 
und den technischen Kommissionen. …Das war zum ersten Mal, das man so etwas gemacht hat. Das habe ich selbst mit unseren Kollegen begonnen. K: Aber das 
ist ein langer Prozess. I1: Ein langer Prozess, aber kommt schon, ich sehe schon heute die Fortschritte “ 
Int.5: „I2 gives another story: A man asks God for a car. God says you need to buy a lottery ticket and he will help him win the car. [I2 wants to say that we cannot 
just wait for things to change but need to take some initiatives and with God's help we will succeed.]” 
Int.6: “I: Last year the SAI detected 250 criminal cases, when they then report them to the Attorney General Office, only 20-30 are penalized. Thus he prefers to 
not report to the Prosecutor any longer but to ask the responsible persons to correct, thus to pay the missing amounts. This will help to fill the state budget and 
thus help the population more than if the cases are transferred to the prosecutor, where the accused persons pay a bribe and are free again and the state receives 
nothing.... We have a huge problem in the country. Only 20% of international aid reached the intended destinations. …Our auditors are threatened with violence. 
…K: How did you become auditor general? I: I have been known by my integrity.” 
Int. 7: “We work in the absence of legislative and local laws, and also with the absence of political agreements among the parties in the government, and we work 
with the absence of the institutional administrative government….and the main source for our independence is that we have to convince our employees, our staff 
first, that the commitment to mutuality and professionalism is very much important to keep our institution independent and we should be very much aware and 
very much clear to and very much faithful with our staff, concerning this issue. … and at the same time this also depends on the administrative leadership, on the 
head of the institution, that others from outside of the institution feel that he is not an enemy for them.” 
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Int.8: “After our first report the government saw our strength and the support started.  Also the recruitment of quality staff was extremely difficult because of low 
salaries that we could provide while at the same time requesting high responsibility. In May 2010 we achieved amendments to increase the salary of our staff; all 
political parties were finally supporting this amendment. We had organized a press conference. We dared to press for changes against several political parties and 
ministries. Then the government composition changed.” 
Int.9: There are no comments on the power of leadership by this interviewee or of any of his SAI’s initiative to change the power of the SAI. However, the 
absence of a concept is also informative. This leader of a weak SAI resigns to the fact that the socio-political environment is unfavorable and keeps on repeat-
ing that the work is very difficult due to the unstable political situation. Thus, this is a weak SAI which is also headed by weak leadership. He is a typical exam-
ple for what Interviewee 11 calls “playing victim-mentality”.  
Int.10: Similar to Interview 9, interviewee 10 only spoke about problems, which are mainly caused by resource constraints imposed by the government as a 
deliberate strategy to undermine the SAI’s work. Interviewee 10 did not speak about any strategies which the SAI leadership undertook to change this situa-
tion.  
 Int.11: “I: The independence of SAIs is enshrined in the Lima and Mexico Declarations but the difficulties we have in many countries (these declarations) are not 
implemented by SAIs, the reason is because of the political support in many SAIs is not adequate. First because the awareness of the importance of SAIs is limited 
at the political level. Two reasons for this: First because there is a lack of leadership as head of SAIs. We are not assertive enough to demonstrate the value of SAIs 
to our governments. …Where you have strong head of SAIs they have been able to achieve independence.  We need to demonstrate the contribution that SAIs can 
provide to governments, (we need to be more) assertive! …The donors must have confidence in the SAI, donors will always have an understanding for the capacity 
of the SAI, donors will always come and support a SAI if they see the potential for reforms if the leader has the right integrity and assertiveness. …1. ISSAIs: 
INTOSAI has now a formal set ISSAIs and wants to build the capacity of every SAI to be able to apply these common standards. …but we heads of SAIs need to 
take our own initiative to add value. Ecosoc will just help to legitimize the ISSAIs. It was very impressive how during the 2010 INCOSAI in South Africa, all the SAIs 
embraced the ISSAIs. …2. Leadership and Management development: The tendency of many SAIs is to play victim mentality, that is not the way you operate as a 
leader, leadership is about influencing events, it is not about being submissive to the circumstances, (you need to put) a lot of effort in building a leader. 
…Strategic plan: We need to be experts in developing strategic plans. This is the reference point that helps you as a leader to focus, reasonable what is achieva-
ble/not achievable, this helps to mould our thinking. -> If you master these three aspects you can change the SAI.” 
Int.12: “I1: Even in the board they were resistant …. I never accept a No. If someone does not agree with me, I will come back to him again and again until he 
agrees with me. A “no” is not a possible answer for me. K: To conclude, what are the crucial factors for gaining political strength as a SAI?  I1: Leadership, legal 
base, IT.” 
Interviewee 13 takes her personal strength and the courage to accept the politically challenging job as auditor general from her religious belief that God will 
guide her. Her predecessor recently had to resign due to public pressure.   
Int. 14: “Leadership of SAI chair matters a lot. I have decided to transform the SAI from a traditional to a modern computerized system. …The leadership of the SAI 
coupled with committed political will has helped us to change things. We have submitted a report to parliament and called a full cabinet meeting with the Chair 
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there. This made substantive change. … The law greatly expanded on all areas, there are no more restrictions.” 
 Int. 15: “K: Welche Faktoren unterstützen die Unabhängigkeit des Präsidenten? I: Mindestdauer der Amtszeit ist wichtig, fachliche Eignung weniger notwendig, 
v.a. Managementskills sind notwendig, es ist wichtiger analysieren zu können, wo sind die Schwachstellen etc. … Gerade in Ländern wo es politisch und 
wirtschaftlich um Leben und Tod geht, und es persönliche Bedrohungen gibt, und in dieser Situation trotzdem weiterzumachen, da ist Herzblut, Integrität die 
wesentliche Geschichte.“ 
Int. 16: „We worked with the president [of the republic], because when we sent the law to the prime minister’s office to send it to the office of the president for 
them to review it and send it to parliament it was blocked somewhere. So [the head of the SAI] had to talk to the president for him to ask where this document 
was. Finally it was removed from the draw that it was kept.” 
Int. 17: “You know during the last two years, [SAI name] has been working and pushing to include special amendments about [SAI name] to guarantee more 
independence to [SAI name]. So it was through a number of channels. …First we proposed the amendments to the president of [name of the republic]… You see 
even for the final accounts for this year we are also doing the audit…. Yes, Mam, so we are working, even during those days of fighting in [name of capital city], 
even in those days we were working, we are working hard really, we dont want to stop. I have to admit that it has an impact on our work. …You see, sometimes 
because of the electricity cuts, because of the fuel, the oil, sometimes you know we have problems, although we are trying to overcome all those problems, so it’s, 
we are performing, we are conducting our work, trying to deliver.” 
 
 
 
  
References 
Abdukadirov, Sherzod. 2010. “The Problem of Political Calculation in Autocracies.” 
Constitutional Political Economy 21: 360–373. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Ori-
gins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." The American 
Economic Review 91 (5):1369-1401. 
Acemoglu, Daren, and Robinson, John A. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2012. Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New 
York: Crown Publishers. 
Ackerman, Peter, and Jack DuVall. 2001. A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent 
Conflict. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
African Development Bank Group and World Bank Group. 2010. Strengthening Coun-
try External Audit Systems in Africa. A Joint Strategy of the Africa Development 
Bank and the World Bank.          
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/24-              
EN-Audit_Systems_in_Africa_-_AfDB-WB.pdf (Last Accessed October 23, 
2012) 
Akram Khan, M. 2001. “Role of Supreme Audit Institutions in Shaping The Islamic 
Economy in The 21st Century.” IIUM Journal of Economics and Management 
9(1): 77–100. 
Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti. 1996. Budget Institutions and Budget Deficits. 
Cambridge, MA: NBER Working Paper 5556. 
Alesina, Alberto, Ricardo Hausmann, Rudolf Hommes, and Ernesto Stein. 1999 “Budg-
et Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America.” Journal of Develop-
ment Economics 59: 253–273. 
Alesina, Alberto, et al, 2003. "Fractionalization." Journal of Economic Growth 
8(2):155-94. http://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jecgro/v8y2003i2p155-94.html#biblio 
(Accessed November 4, 2011) 
Allen, Richard. 2008. “Reforming Fiscal Institutions: The Elusive Art of the Budget 
Advisor.” OECD Journal on Budgeting (3): 1–9. 
———. 2009. The Challenge of Reforming Budgetary Institutions in Developing Coun-
tries. Washington: International Monetary Fund. Working Paper, WP/09/96. 
Andrews, Matthew. 2009. Isomorphism and the Limits to African Public Financial 
Management Reform. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School. HKS Faculty 
 References 337 
 
Research Working Paper Series, RWP09-012. 
———. 2010. How Far Have Public Financial Management Reforms Come in Africa? 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School. HKS Faculty Research Working Pa-
per Series, RWP10-018.  
Andrews, Matthew, Jesse McConnell, and Alison Wescott. 2010. Development as 
Leadership-Led Change - A Report for the Global Leadership Initiative and the 
World Bank Institute (WBI). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School. HKS 
Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP10-009. 
Andrews, Matthew, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock. 2012. Escaping Capability 
Traps through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). Center for Interna-
tional Development at Harvard University. Working Paper No. 240. 
Armenakis, A.A., and S.G. Harris. 2002. Crafting a Change Message To Create Trans-
formational Readiness. Journal of Organizational Change Management 15:169-
183. 
Atwood, Brian. 2012. Creating a Global Partnership for Effective Development Coop-
eration. Paper prepared for the University of Minnesota’s Center for Integrative 
Leadership Conference on “Creating Public Value in a Multi-Sector, Shared-
Power World” September 20-22, 2012.  
http://www.oecd.org/dac/atwood%20global%20partnership%20article.pdf (Last 
Accessed on October 31, 2012) 
Aucoin, P., and R. Heintzmann. 2000. “The Dialectics of Accountability for Perfor-
mance in Public Management Reform.” International Review of Administrative 
Sciences 66:45-55. 
Baiocchi, G. 2001. “Participation, Activism and Politics: The Porto Alegré Experiment 
and Deliberative Democratic Theory.” Politics and Society 29 (1): 43-72. 
Bates, Robert H. 2001. Prosperity and Violence: the Political Economy of Development. 
New York: W.W. Norton. 
Beck, Martin. 2006. “Rational Choice.” In Einführung in die Comparative Politics, eds. 
Barrios, Harald, and Christoph Stefes. Munich, Germany: R.Oldenbourg Verlag, 
98-113. 
Behn, Robert. 2001. Rethinking Democratic Accountability. Washington: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
Bemelmans-Videc, M.-L., J. Lonsdale, and B. Perrin. 2007. Making accountability 
work. Dilemmas for evaluation and for audit. New Brunswick: Transaction.  
Biela, Jan, and Yannis Papadopoulos. 2010. Strategies for Assessing and Measuring 
Agency Accountability. Presented at the 32
nd
 European Group of Public Admin-
istration (EGPA) Annual Conference, Toulouse. 
 References 338 
 
Blume, Lorenz, and Stefan Voigt. 2011. "Does organizational design of Supreme Audit 
Institutions matter? A cross-country assessment.“ European Journal of Political 
Economy 27(2): 215–229. 
Bohman, J., and W. Rehg. (eds.) 1997 Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and 
Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Boix, Carles, and Susan Carol Stokes. 2003. "Endogenous Democratization." World 
Politics 55.4 (2003): 517 
Bolboaca, Sorana-Daniela, and Lorentz Jäntschi, 2006. “Pearson versus Spearman, 
Kendall's Tau Correlation Analysis on Structure-Activity Relationships of Bio-
logic Active Compounds.” Leonardo Journal of Sciences 9: 179-200. 
Booth, David. 2011. “Aid, Institutions and Governance: What Have We Learned?” De-
velopment Policy Review 29 (1): 5-26 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1973. “The Three Forms of Theoretical Knowledge.” Social Science 
Information 12: 53-80. 
———. 1984. Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. London: 
Routledge. 
———. 1988. Homo Academicus. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.  
———. 1996. The State Nobility. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.  
———. 2000. Pascalian Meditations. Cambridge, England: Polity Press. 
———. 2004. Science of Science and Reflexivity. Cambridge, England: Polity Press. 
(Original work published 2001) 
Bourdieu, Pierre et al. 1991. The Craft of Sociology – Epistemological Preliminaries. 
Berlin: Verlag Walter de Gruyter (Original work published 1968) 
Bourdieu, Pierre et al. 1999. The Weight of the World. Social Suffering in Contemporary 
Society. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.  
Bovens, Mark. 2005. “From Financial Accounting to Public Accountability.” In 
Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven des Haushalts- und Finanzmanagements, 
ed. H. Hill. Baden Baden: Nomos Verlag, 183-193. 
———. 2006. “Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability. A Conceptual Frame-
work.” European Governance Papers (EUROGOV), C-06-01. 
———. 2007a. “Public Accountability.” In The Oxford Handbook of Public Manage-
ment, eds. Ewan Ferlie, Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., and Christopher Pollitt. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 182-208. 
———. 2007b. “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework.” 
European Law Journal 13(4): 447-468. 
 References 339 
 
———. 2010. "Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a 
Mechanism." West European Politics 33 (5): 946-967. 
Bovens, Mark, Thomas Schillemans, and Paul ‘T Hart. 2008. “Does Public Accounta-
bility Work? An Assessment Tool.” Public Administration 86 (1): 225-242. 
Box, George E.P. 1979 Robustness in the Strategy of Scientific Model Building.” In 
Robustness in Statistics, eds. R.L. Launer, and G.N. Wilkinson. New York: Aca-
demic Press, 201-236. 
Bräutigam, Deborah. 2004. “The People's Budget? Politics, Participation and Pro-poor 
Policy.” Development Policy Review 22(6): 653–668. 
Brasileiro, Adriana. 2010. Lula on a spending spree - The president is placing jobs and 
politics ahead of honesty and transparency, critics say. Gulfnews.com, May 3, 
2010. http://gulfnews.com/business/features/lula-on-a-spending-spree-1.621372 
(Last Accessed on October 5, 2012) 
Breusch, Trevor S., and Adrian R. Pagan. 1979. "Simple test for heteroscedasticity and 
random coefficient variation". Econometrica (The Econometric Society) 47 (5): 
1287–1294. 
Brinkerhoff, Derick, and Arthur Goldsmith. 2003. “How Citizens Participate in Macro-
economic Policy: International Experience and Implications for Poverty Reduc-
tion.” World Development 31(4): 685-701. 
Broms, Rasmus. 2011. Taxation and Government Quality: The Size, the Shape, or just 
Europe 300 Years Ago? Gothenburg, Sweden: QoG the Quality of Government 
Institute, University of Gothenburg. Working Paper Series 2011:16.  
Burton, Michael G., Richard Gunther, John Higley. 1992. “Introduction: Elite Trans-
formations and Democratic Regimes.” In Elites and Democratic Consolidation 
in Latin American and Southern Europe, eds. John Higley and Richard Gunther. 
Cambridge: 1-38. 
Carothers, Thomas. 2002. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democra-
cy, 13(1), 5–22. 
Casper, Gerhard. 2000. “Constitutionalism.” In Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, 
2nd ed., (eds.) Leonard W. Levy and Kenneth L. Karst. New York: Macmillan 
Reference, 473-480. 
Chok, Nian Shong. 2008. Pearson’s Versus Spearman’s And Kendall’s Correlation 
Coefficients For Continuous Data. Master Thesis. University of Pittsburgh, 
Graduate School of Public Health.  
Clark, Colin, Michael de Martins, and Maria Krambia-Kapardis. 2007. "Audit quality 
attributes of European Union Supreme Audit Institutions." European Business 
Review 19(1): 40-71. 
 References 340 
 
Coelho, Paulo. 2004. Journeys. New York: Thorsons.  
Cohen, Joshua M. 1989. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” In The Good Poli-
ty: Normative Analysis of the State. eds. A. Hamlin and P. Pettit. New York: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Cohen, Joshua M., and J. Rogers. 1992. Associations and Democracy. London: Verso. 
Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI) and African Development 
Bank. 2008. Budget Practices and Procedures in Africa 2008. Pretoria, ZA: 
CABRI Secretariat.  
Collier, Paul. 2008. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and 
What Can Be Done About It. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
———. 2009. Wars, Guns and Votes. Democracy in Dangerous Places. London: Har-
per. 
Collier, D., and J. Mahoney. 1996. Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative 
Research. World Politics 49: 56-91 
Cornwall, Andrea, and Vera Schattan Coelho. 2007. Spaces for Change? The Politics of 
Participation in New Democratic Arenas. London: Zed Books.  
Creswell, John W., and Vicki L. Plano-Clark. 2007. Designing and Conducting Mixed 
Methods Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Croux, Christophe, and Catherine Dehon. 2010. "Influence Functions of the Spearman 
and Kendall Correlation Measures." Statistical Methods and Applications 19(4): 
497-515 
de Certeau, Michel. 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life. Translated by S. Rendall. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
de Renzio, Paolo.2006. “Aid, Budgets and Accountability: A Survey Article.” Devel-
opment Policy Review 24(6):627-645. 
———. 2009. Taking Stock: What do PEFA Assessments Tell us About PFM Systems 
Across Countries? London: Overseas Development Institute, WP 302.  
———. 2011. Buying Better Governance - The Political Economy of Budget Reforms in 
Aid-Dependent Countries. Oxford, UK: University College Oxford, Global Eco-
nomic Governance Programme. GEG Working Paper 2011/65. 
de Renzio, Paolo, Matt Andrews, and Zac Mills. 2010. Evaluation of Donor Support to 
Public Financial Management (PFM) Reform in Developing Countries Analyti-
cal study of quantitative cross-country evidence. Final Report November 2010. 
London: Overseas Development Institute.  
de Renzio, Paolo, and Bill Dorotinsky. 2007. Tracking Progress in the Quality of PFM 
Systems in HIPCs - An update on past assessments using PEFA data. Washing-
ton D.C.: PEFA Secretariat. 
 References 341 
 
          http://www.pefa.org/sites/pefa.org/files/attachments/Eng%20-%20HIPC-
PEFATrackingProgressPaperFINAL.pdf (Last Accessed October 23, 2012) 
de Renzio, Paolo, Pamela de Gomez, and James Sheppard. 2009. “Budget transparency 
and development in resource-dependent countries.” International Social Science 
Journal 57(1): 57-69. 
Department for International Development (DFID) 2005. Working With Supreme Audit 
Institutions. How To Note. London, UK: DFID. Policy Division Info Series. PD 
Info 079. 
Development Partners Group (DPG). 2006. Tanzania Joint Program Document. De-
cember 2006. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Development Partners Group. 
http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/uploads/media/JPD_Dec_8_FINAL.doc (Last Accessed 
October 01, 2007)  
Diamond, Larry. 2002. Thinking about hybrid regimes. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 
21–35. 
———. 2009. The Spirit of Democracy. The Struggle to Build Free Societies Through-
out the World. New York: Holt Paperbacks (originally published in hardcover in 
2008 by Times Books). 
———. 2010. “The State and Violence. A Discussion of Violence and Social Orders: A 
Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History.” In Perspec-
tives on Politics 8(1): 293-296. 
Diamond, Larry, Francis Fukuyama, and Michael McFaul. 2009.“Alternative 
Strategies.” In Democracy in U.S. Security Strategy: From Promotion to 
Support. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies: 29-96. 
Dryzek, John S. 2002. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contes-
tations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2004. “Pragmatism and Democracy: In Search of Deliberative Publics.” The 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy  18(1): 72-79.  
———. 2006. Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided 
World (Key Concepts). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.  
Dubnick, Melvin. 2002. Seeking Salvation for Accountability. Presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston. 
Dubnick, Melvin, and Jonathan B. Justice. 2004. Accounting for Accountability. Pre-
sented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Chicago. 
Dubnick, Melvin, and Kaifeng Yang. 2009. “The Pursuit of Accountability: Promise, 
Problems, and Prospects.” In The State of Public Administration, eds. Donald 
Menzel, and Harvey White. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe.  
 References 342 
 
Dür, Andreas. 2011. Rational Choice: Ein kritisches Plädoyer für Theorien der 
rationalen Entscheidung. Presentation at the Tag der Politikwissenschaft. Salz-
burg, Austria: Austrian Political Science Association (ÖGPW). 
http://www.oegpw.at/about_us/downloads/Tag-der-
PW_Redemanuskript_Andreas_Duer.pdf; 
http://www.oegpw.at/about_us/downloads/Tag-der-
PW_Redemanuskript_Andreas_Duer.pdf (Last Accessed on October 29, 2012). 
Easterly, William. 2006. The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to aid the 
Rest Have Done so Much Ill and so Little Good. London: Oxford University 
Press. 
———. 2002. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Misadventures in the Tropics. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Eckstein, Harry, and Ted Robert Gurr. 1975. Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis 
for Political Inquiry. New York: Wiley and Sons.  
Economic Commission for Africa. 2005. Assessing Public Financial Management and 
Accountability in the Context of Budget Transparency in Africa. New York: 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Development Policy Man-
agement Division. ECA/DPMD/AEGM/TP/05/2.  
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 2010. “The State and Violence. A Discussion of Violence and 
Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human His-
tory.” In Perspectives on Politics 8(1): 291-293. 
Elson, Diane. 2006. Budgeting for Women's Rights. Monitoring Government Budgets 
for Compliance with CEDAW. New York: UNIFEM. 
Elster, J. (ed.) 1998 Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press.  
EUROSAI. 2004. Guidelines on Audit Quality. Revised version for the consideration of 
Contact Committee of the Heads of the SAIs of the European Union. Luxem-
bourg, 6 – 7 December 2004, Version 29 October 2004. 
http://www.eurosai.org/docs/AQGuidelines.pdf (Last Accessed October 23, 
2012) 
Evans, P. 2004. “Development as Institutional Change: The Pitfalls of Monocropping 
and the Potentials of Deliberation.” Studies in Comparative International Devel-
opment 38 (4): 30-52. 
Feld, L., and S. Voigt. 2003. “Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-
Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators.” European Journal of Politi-
cal Economy 19(3):497-527. 
Filzmayer, Peter, Leonore Gewessler, Otmar Höll, and Gerhard Mangott. 2006. Interna-
 References 343 
 
tionale Politik. Wien: Facultas.  
Findley, Michael, Darren Hawkins, Rich Nielsen, Dan Nielson, and Sven Wilson. 2010. 
To Empower or Impoverish? The Sector-by-Sector Effectiveness of Foreign Aid. 
Oxford, UK: AidData Oxford Conference, March 22-25, 2010. 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/aiddata/Findely_aiddata.pdf (Last Accessed on Octo-
ber 29, 2012) 
Fishkin, James. 1991. Democracy and Deliberation. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Fisman, Raymond. 2001 “Estimating the Value of Political Connections”, American 
Economic Association 91(4): 1095–1102. 
Fisman, Edward, and Ray Miguel. 2008. Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence 
and the Poverty of Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press  
Fölscher, Alta (ed.) 2009. Strengthening Budget Practices in Africa. 5th Annual CABRI 
Seminar, April 07 to April 09, 2009, Dakar, Senegal. Pretoria, ZA: Collaborative 
Africa Budget Reform Initiative. http://www.iag-
agi.org/bdf/docs/cabri_strengthening_budget_practices_in_africa.pdf (Last Ac-
cessed October 23, 2012) 
Fox, John. 2008. Applied Regression Analysis and Generalized Linear Models. Second 
Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.  
Freedom House. 2011. Freedom in the World 2011. The Authoritarian Challenge to 
Democracy. Washington DC: Freedom House. 
          http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/freedom-world-2011-authoritarian-
challenge-democracy (Last Accessed October 23, 2012) 
Fukuyama, Francis. 2004a. “The Imperative of State-Building”, Journal of Democracy 
15(2): 17–31. 
———. 2004b. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Itha-
ca: Cornell University Press.  
———. (ed.) 2008. Falling behind. Explaining the development gap between Latin 
America and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fukuyama, Francis, and Michael McFaul. (2007) “Should Democracy Be Promoted or 
Demoted?” The Washington Quarterly 31(1): 23–45. 
Fung, A. 2003. “Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and 
Their Consequences.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 11(3): 338-367. 
Fung, Archon, Eric O. Wright (eds.) 2003. Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innova-
tions in Empowered Participatory Governance. London: Verso. 
GAO. 2007. Testimony Before the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives: 
Long-Term Fiscal Challenge. Additional Transparency and Controls Are 
Needed. Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United 
 References 344 
 
States. Washington D.C.: Government Accountability Office Report No. GAO-
07-1144T. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071144t.pdf (Last Accessed on 
October 29, 2012).  
Gauri, V. 2004. Social Rights and Economics: Claims to Health Care and Education in 
Developing Countries. World Development 32: 465–477. 
Gaventa, John. 2006. Triumph, Deficit or Contestation: Deepening the “Deepening 
Democracy” Debate. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. IDS 
Working Paper 264. 
George, A.L., and A. Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the So-
cial Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Gladwell, Malcolm. 2000. The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Dif-
ference. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 
Glaeser, E., R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2004. „Do Institutions 
Cause Growth?“ Journal of Economic Growth 9: 271-303. 
Gläser, Jochen, and Grit Laudel. 2004. Experteninterviews und qualitative 
Inhaltsanalyse als Instumente rekonstruierender Untersuchungen. Wiesbaden: 
VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Gollwitzer, Sophia, and Marc Quintyn. 2010. The Effectiveness of Macroeconomic 
Commitment in Weak(er) Institutional Environments. Washington: International 
Monetary Fund, WP/10/193 
Goloba-Mutebi, Frederick. 2005. “When Popular Participation Won't Improve Service 
Provision: Primary Health Care in Uganda.” Development Policy Review 23(2): 
165–182. 
Goetz, Anne-Marie, and Rob Jenkins. 2005. Reinventing Accountability: Making De-
mocracy Work for Human Development. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Goldberger, A.S. 1991. A Course in Econometrics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universi-
ty Press.  
Gong, T. 2009. “'Institutional Learning and Adaptation: Developing State Audit Capac-
ity in China.” Public Administration and Development 29: 33–41. 
Granovetter, Mark. 1978. "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior." American Jour-
nal of Sociology 83 (6): 1420-1443. 
Greif, Avner. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Grodzins, Morton. 1958. The Metropolitan Area as a Racial Problem. Pittsburgh: Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Press. 
Groves, Leslie, and Rachel Hinton (eds.) 2004. Inclusive Aid: Changing Power and 
 References 345 
 
Relationships in International Development. London: Earthscan. 
Grzymala-Busse, Anna, and Pauline Jones Luong. 2006. “Democratization: Post-
Communist Implications.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, eds. 
Barry R. Weingast, and Donald A. Wittman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
656-669. 
Gujarati, Damodar N., and Dawn C. Porter. 2009. Basic Econometrics. 5
th
 int.ed. New 
York: McGraw-Hill.  
Haber, Stephen. 2006. “Authoritarian Government.” In The Oxford Handbook of Politi-
cal Economy, eds. Barry R. Weingast, and Donald A. Wittman. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 693-707. 
Haber, Stephen, and Victor Menaldo. 2011. “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarian-
ism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse.” American Political Science Review, 
105(1):1-26 . 
Haber, Stephen H., Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer. 2003. The Politics of Property 
Rigths: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in 
Mexico, 1976-1929. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Habermas, Jürgen. 1962. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press. 
———. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.  
Haggard, Stephan, and Lydia Tiede. 2011. “The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: 
Where are We?” World Development 39(5):673-685. 
Handler, Scott P. 2010. Towards a Theory of Self-Enforcing Stability: With an Applica-
tion to Security Development Following the “Anbar Awakening”. Presented at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington.  
Harrits, Gitte Sommer. 2011. “More Than Method? A Discussion of Paradigm Differ-
ences Within Mixed Methods Research.” Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 
5(2): 150-155. 
Hartzell, Caroline. 2010. “The State and Violence. A Discussion of Violence and Social 
Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History.” In 
Perspectives on Politics 8(1): 289-291. 
Haggard, Stephan, and Lydia Tiede. 2011. “The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: 
Where are We?” World Development, 39(5): 673-685.  
Hakikazi Catalyst, REPOA, and TGNP. 2007. Follow the Money, A Resource Book for 
Trainers on Public Expenditure Tracking in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: 
Hakikazi.  http://www.hakikazi.org/papers/PETS_Manual.pdf (Last Accessed 
October 01,2007) 
Healey, J., and W. Tordoff. (eds.) 1995. Votes and Budgets: Comparative Studies in 
 References 346 
 
Accountable Governance in the South. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hendry, D.F., and J.F. Richard. 1983. “The Econometric Analysis of Economic Time 
Series.” International Statistical Review 51: 3-33 
Henry, Peter Blair and Conrad Miller. 2009. “Institutions vs. Policies: A Tale of Two 
Islands.” American Economic Review 99(2): 261-267. 
Hielscher, Stefan. 2008. Die Sachs-Easterly-Kontroverse: „Dissent on Development“ 
Revisited. Halle-Wittenberg: Lehrstuhls für Wirtschaftsethik an der Martin-
Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg. Diskussionspapier Nr. 2008-6. 
Horowitz, Donald L. 2003. “Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers.” Journal of 
Democracy 14: 115-127. 
Huntington, Samuel P. [1968] 2006. Political Order in Changing Societies. With a new 
Foreword by Francis Fukuyama. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
———. 1991a.”Democracy’s Third Wave.” Journal of Democracy 2 (Spring). 
———. 1991b. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Nor-
man: University of Oklahoma Press: 101. 
Huth, Paul K. 1996. Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International 
Conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
Inclusive Tanzania Consortium (ITC). 2007. Workshop Report on the Establishment of 
a Public Expenditure Review (PER) Working Group for Vulnerability. 25
th
 Sep-
tember, 2007 at Travertine Hotel, Dar es Salaam, Facilitated by Henry Wimile, 
2007. Dar es Salaam: Information Center on Disability. 
Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2008. Modernization, cultural change, and 
democracy. The human development sequence. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press 
International Budget Partnership (IBP). 2010. Open Budgets. Transform Lives. The 
Open Budget Survey 2010. Washington: International Budget Partnership. 
International Monetary Fund. 2002. Tanzania. Report on the Observance of Standards 
and Codes (ROSC) Fiscal Transparency Module. Washington D.C.: Internation-
al Monetary fund, IMF Country Report No. 02/59. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2002/cr0259.pdf (Last Accessed on Oc-
tober 29, 2012) 
INTOSAI. [1977] 1998. The Lima Declaration. Vienna: INTOSAI General Secretariat. 
http://www.issai.org/media(622,1033)/ISSAI_1_E.pdf (Last Accessed October 
5, 2012) 
———. 2001. Independence of SAIs Project: Final Task Force Report. March 31, 
2001. 
———. 2007. Mexico Declaration on SAI Independence. Vienna: INTOSAI General 
 References 347 
 
Secretariat. http://www.issai.org/media(626,1033)/ISSAI_10_E.pdf (Last Ac-
cessed October 5, 2012) 
———. 2010a. Strategic Plan 2011-2016. Vienna: INTOSAI. 
http://www.intosai.org/uploads/intosaispenglishv9web.pdf (03 August 2012) 
———. 2010b. The Johannesburg Accords. XX. INCOSAI. Johannesburg, South Afri-
ca: INTOSAI. http://www.intosai.org/uploads/jhbaccordsen.pdf (Last Accessed 
on October 29, 2012) 
INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI). 2010. Capacity Development of Supreme Audit 
Institutions – Status, Needs and Good Practices. INTOSAI-Donor Cooperation: 
Stocktaking Report 2010. Oslo: INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI). 
INTOSAI-Donor Cooperation. 2012. Working Together to Strengthen SAIs in Develop-
ing Countries – 4th Quarterly Update, April-June 2012. Oslo: INTOSAI-Donor 
Secretariat. http://www.idi.no/artikkel.aspx?MId1=96&AId=607 (Last Accessed 
October 5, 2012). 
INTOSAI Professional Standards Committee (PSC). 2011.  The Purpose and Authority 
of INTOSAI’s Professional Standards. Copenhagen: INTOSAI Professional 
Standards Committee. 
http://www.issai.org/media(1075,1033)/Purpose_and_authority_of_the_INTOS
AI's_professional_standards.pdf (Last Accessed August 03, 2012). 
Isabella, L. 1990. Evolving Interpretations as a Change Unfolds: How Managers Con-
strue Key Organizational Events. Academy of Management Jounal 33:7-41. 
Isaksson, Ann-Sofie, and Arne Bigsten. 2012. “Institution Building with Limited Re-
sources: Establishing a Supreme Audit Institution in Rwanda.” World Develop-
ment. 40(9): 870–1881. 
Iversen, Torben. 2006 “Capitalism and Democracy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Politi-
cal Economy, eds. Barry R. Weingast, and Donald A. Wittman. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 601-623 
Jensen, Erik G. 2009. „Justice and the Rule of Law.” In The Challenges of State Building 
and Peace Building. (edt) Charles Call. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 119-
142. 
Jensen, Erik, and Thomas Heller (eds.) 2003. Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical 
Approaches to the Rule of Law. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
Kallonga, Emmanuel, Philipp Connelly, Kees de Graaf. 2007. Public Expenditure 
Tracking in Tanzania – Supporting communities to speak out. Capacity.org Prac-
tice Reports.  
           http://www.capacity.org/capacity/opencms/en/topics/accountability/supporting-
communities-to-speak-out.html (Last Accessed October 23, 2012) 
Khan, Musthaq. 2005. “Markets, states, and democracy: Patron-client networks and the 
case for democracy in developing countries.“ Democratization, 12(5), 704-724. 
 References 348 
 
———. 2006. Governance and Development. Presented at the Workshop on Govern-
ance and Development organized by the World Bank and DFID, Dhaka.   
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: 
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Knoke, Irene. 2003. “Politische Partizipation als Allheilmittel? Theorie und 
Wirklichkeit der neuen Armutsbekämpfungsstrategie.“ Journal für 
Entwicklungspolitik (JEP) Austrian Journal of Development Studies 19(2): 77-
89 
Krafchik, Warren, and Joachim Wehner. 1998. ‘‘The Role of Parliament in the Budget 
Process.’’ South African Journal of Economics 66 (4): 512–541. 
Krasner, Stephen D. 2009. State Development, State Building and Foreign Aid. Present-
ed at the CDDRL Research Seminar, Stanford University. Audio transcript 
available at: http://cddrl.stanford.edu/events/state_development_state_building_ 
and_foreign_aid (Last Accessed on October 4, 2012). 
———. 2011a. International Support for State-building - Flawed Consensus. PRISM 
2(3): 65-74. 
———. 2011b. “Foreign Aid: Competing Paradigms.” Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding 5(2):123-149. 
———. 2011c. “State, Power, Anarchism - A Discussion of The Art of Not Being Gov-
erned: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia.” Perspectives on Politics 
9(1): 79-83. 
Kurtz, M. and A. Schrank. 2007. „Growth and Governance: A Defense.“ Journal of 
Politics 69: 563-569. 
Laws, Edward. 2012. Political Settlements, Elite Pacts, and Governments of National 
Unity. A Conceptual Study. The Leadership Program: Developmental Leaders, 
Elites and Coalitions. http://www.dlprog.org/ (Last Accessed October 23, 2012) 
Lawson, Andrew, and Alta Folscher. 2011. Evaluation of PEFA Programme 2004-2010 
&. Development of Recommendations beyond 2011. Fiscus Public Finance Con-
sultants Ltd. and Mokoro Ltd. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PEFA/Resources/PEFAEvaluationRevisedFin
alReportJuly2011.pdf  (Last Accessed on October 4, 2012). 
Lave, Jean, and Etienne Wenger. 1991. Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Par-
ticipation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Lavielle, B., M. Pérez, and H. Hofbauer. 2003. Latin America Index of Budget Trans-
parency. Mexico and Washington DC: IBP.  
Leftwich, A., and K. Sen. 2010. Beyond Institutions: Institutions and Organizations in 
 References 349 
 
the Politics and Economics of Growth and Poverty Reduction - a Thematic Syn-
thesis of Research Evidence. Manchester, UK: IDPM, School of Environment 
and Development, University of Manchester (First published by DFID). 
http://www.ippg.org.uk/8933_Beyond%20Institutions.final%20(1).pdf (Last Ac-
cessed February 05, 2011). 
Levitsky, S., and L.A. Way 2002. The rise of competitive authoritarianism. Journal of 
Democracy, 13(2), 51–66. 
Lieberman, Evan S. 2005. “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Compara-
tive Research.” American Political Science Review 99(3): 435-452 
Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
———. 2004. “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies.” Journal of Democracy 
15(2): 96 
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred C. Stepan, 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Con-
solidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Devel-
opment and Political Legitimacy." The American Political Science Review 53 
(1): 69-105.  
———. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. New York: Doubleday & 
Company.  
Lister, M., and M. Carbone (eds..) 2006. New Pathways in International Development: 
Gender and Civil Society in EU Policy. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
Lizzeri, A. and N. Persico. 2001. “The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative 
Electoral Incentives.” American Economic Review 91:225-39. 
Luhmann, N. 1966. Theorie der Verwaltungswissenschaft: Bestandsaufnahme und 
Entwurf. Köln-Berlin: Grote.  
Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian 
Rule. Comparative Political Studies, 41(4/5): 715–741. 
Mainwaring, Scott, and Christopher Welna. 2003. Democratic Accountability in Latin 
America. Oxford Studies in Democratization. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
Manning, Nick, and Rick Stapenhurst. 2002. Strengthening Oversight by Legislatures. 
PREM Note 74, Washington, DC: the World Bank. 
Mayring, Philipp. [1983] 2000. Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken, 
7
th
 ed. Weinheim: Deutscher Studien Verlag. 
McFaul, Michael. 2004.“The Fourth Wave.” In After the Collapse of Communism: 
 References 350 
 
Comparative Lessons of Transition. (eds.) Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-
Weiss. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 58-95. 
Meisel, Nicolas, and Jacques Ould Aoudia, J. 2008. Is "Good Governance" a Good De-
velopment Strategy? Paris: Agence Francaise de Développement, WP58. 
Melo, Marcus, Carlos Pereira, and Carlos M. Figueiredo. 2009. “Political and Institu-
tional Checks on Corruption.” Comparative Political Studies 42(9): 1217–1244. 
Merkel, Wolfgang. 2010. Systemtransformation. Eine Einführung in die Theorie und 
Empirie der Transformationsforschung. 2., überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.  
Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. 
“World Society and the Nation-State.” American Journal of Sociology 103 (1): 
144-81 
Migaud, Didier. 2012. Partout où de l’argent public est engagé, la Cour a vocation à 
contrôler. Le successeur de Philippe Seguin livre sa propre vision de la Cour. 
Le Nouvel Economiste. March 28, 2012. 
http://www.lenouveleconomiste.fr/partout-ou-de-largent-public-est-engage-la-
cour-a-vocation-a-controler-14253/ (Last Accessed on November 01, 2012) 
Miguel, Edward. 2009. Africa’s Turn? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Milagros García Crespo (ed). 2005. Public Expenditure Control In Europe. Coordinat-
ing Audit Functions in the European Union. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.  
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., R. Perotti, and M. Rostagno. 2002. “Electoral Systems and Public 
Spending.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:649-57. 
Miller, Daniel. 2010. “Sachs, Easterly and the Banality of the Aid Effectiveness Debate: 
Time to Move On.” Mapping Politics 3: 72-86. 
Morrison, Kevin M., and M.M. Singer. 2007. “Inequality and Deliberative Develop-
ment: Revisiting Bolivia’s Experience with the PRSP,” Development Policy Re-
view 25/(6): 721-740. 
Moussa, Yaya. 2004. Public Expenditure Management in Francophone Africa: A 
Cross-Country Analysis. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
WP/04/42. 
Moyo, Dambissa. 2009. Dead Aid. Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another 
Way for Africa. London: Allen Lane. 
National Audit Office. 2005. State Audit in the European Union. London: National Au-
dit Office (NAO).  
            http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0506/state_audit_in_the_eu.aspx (Last Ac-
cessed on November 01, 2012)  
———. 2011. Good Practices in Supporting Supreme Audit Institutions. 4th High Level 
 References 351 
 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness. 29 Nov – 1 Dec. 2011, Busan, Korea: NAO. 
http://www.oecd.org/development/aideffectiveness/49066186.pdf (Last Ac-
cessed on November 05, 2012) 
Newell, Peter, and Joanna Wheeler. 2006. Rights, Resources and the Politics of Ac-
countability. London: ZED Books. 
Nohlen, Dieter, and Rainer-Olaf Schultze, eds. 2005. Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft – 
Theorien, Methoden, Begriffe. 3
rd
 ed. Munich: C.H.Beck. 
Nombembe, Terence. 2012. “The World Is Desperate for an Independent Voice of Rea-
son.” International Journal of Government Auditing 39(1): 4-7. 
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Perfor-
mance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
North, Douglass C., John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009a. “Violence and the 
Rise of Open-access Orders.” Journal of Democracy 20 (1): 55-68. 
———. 2009b. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting 
Recorded Human History. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Norton, A., and D. Elson. 2002. What’s Behind the Budget? Politics, Rights, and Ac-
countability in the Budget Process. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Noussi, Katharina. 2009. Changing Patterns of State Budget Accountability: Limits and 
Possibilities for Inclusive Development and “Deepening” Democracy”. Present-
ed at 1
st
 Vienna Africa Conference for Early Stage Researchers, University of 
Vienna. 
———. 2010a. White-Collar Crime and Corruption – How to Build Institutions of Ac-
countability in Developing Countries. Presented at the 23
rd
 Annual Meeting of 
the Academic Council of the United Nations System (ACUNS), Vienna Interna-
tional Center. 
———. 2010b. Bedeutung von und Voraussetzungen für effektive Oberste 
Rechnungskontrollbehörden. Presented at the Forum Budget Aid, Austrian De-
velopment Agency, Vienna. 
———. 2010c. How Effective Institutions for Public Accountability Develop: the Case 
of Supreme Audit Institutions. Poster presented at the 5
th
 European Consortium 
on Political Research (ECPR) Summer School on Methods and Techniques, 
Ljubljana. 
———. 2010d. How to Build Institutional Capacity in Developing Countries: the Case 
of Supreme Audit Institutions. Presented at the 3
rd
 European Consortium of Polit-
ical Research (ECPR) Graduate Conference, Dublin. 
———. 2012a. “Stronger Oversight of the Financial Sector: Lessons from Institutional 
Reforms in Developing Countries.” In Financial Crimes – A Threat to Global 
 References 352 
 
Security, eds. Maximilian Edelbacher, Peter Kratcoski, and Michael Theil. Lon-
don, CRC Press - Taylor & Francis Group, 331-354. 
———. 2012b. Institutionalizing Public Accountability –Why Citizen-Oriented, Inde-
pendent External Public Auditing Thrives in Some Countries and Fails in Oth-
ers. Presented at the 26
th
 Annual International Conference of the International 
Consortium on Governmental Financial Management (ICGFM), Miami.  
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1993 “On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual 
Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Coun-
tries.” World Development 21(8): 1355-1369. 
———. 1998. “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies.” Journal of Democra-
cy 9(3): 112-126. 
———. 2004. “Why the rule of law matters.” Journal of Democracy 15 (4): 34-46. 
OECD. 2001. Budget: Towards a New Role for the Legislature. Paris: OECD. 
———. 2002a. “OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency.” OECD Journal on 
Budgeting 3: 7–14. 
———. 2002b. Models of Public Budgeting and Accounting Reform. OECD Journal 
on Budgeting 2/Supplement 1. 
———. 2005. (2008) The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agen-
da for Action. Paris: OECD. 
          http://www.oecd.org/development/aideffectiveness/34428351.pdf (Last Accessed 
23 October 2012)  
———. 2011. Good Practices in Supporting Supreme Audit Institutions. Paris: OECD. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/aideffectiveness/Final%20SAI%20Good%20Practice%
20Note.pdf (Last Accessed on November 05, 2012) 
OHCHR. 2006. Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach to 
Development Cooperation. Geneva: Office of United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 
Ostrom, Elinor. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
Ottaway, M. 2003. Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism. Wash-
ington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
Panel on Human Dignity. 2011. 2011 Report – Protecting Dignity: An Agenda for Hu-
man Rights. Geneva: Swiss Confederation and the Geneva Academy for Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. http://www.udhr60.ch/docs/Panel-
humanDignity_rapport2011.pdf (Last Accessed, January 23, 2012)  
Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. 1997. “Separation of Powers and 
Political Accountability.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4):1163-202. 
 References 353 
 
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Econom-
ic Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
———. 2004. “Constitutions and Economic Policy.” Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives. 18:75-98. 
Petrei, Humberto. 1998. Budget and Control: Reforming the Public Sector in Latin 
America. Washington, DC: IADB 
Poernomo, Hadi. 2011. Supreme Audit Institution and Citizen: Indonesian Experience. 
Presented at the 21st UN/INTOSAI Symposium. Vienna: INTOSAI. 
http://www.intosai.org/fileadmin/downloads/downloads/5_events/symposia/201
1/_E__21_UN_INT_SympReport_Attachments.pdf (Last Accessed October 5, 
2012) 
Policy Forum. 2007. What Will the 2007/2008 Budget Say? Tanzania Budget 
2007/2008: Pre-Budget Brief 1.07. Dar es Salaam: Policy Forum. 
http://www.policyforum.or.tz/longsummarybrief.pdf  
Pollitt, Christopher, Xavier Girre, Jeremy Lonsdale, Robert Mul, Hilkka Summa, Marit 
Waerness. 2002. Performance or compliance? Performance audit and public 
management in five countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Pollitt, Christopher, and Hilkka Summa. 1997. “Reflexive Watchdogs? How Supreme 
Audit Institutions Account for Themselves.” Public Administration 75(2):313-
336. 
Portela, Fábio. 2010. Unearthing Fraud. Veja Magazine, Edition 2145 from 6-jan-2010. 
http://portal2.tcu.gov.br/portal/page/portal/TCU/english/news_events/Unearthin
g%20fraud.pdf (Last Accessed October 5, 2012) 
Power, Michael. 1994. The Audit Explosion. London: Demos. 
———. 1997. The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Pretorius, Carole, and Nico Pretorius. 2008. A Review of Public Financial Management 
Reform Literature. London: DFID, Evaluation Report EV698. 
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
———. 2006. “Self-Enforcing Democracy.“ In The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Economy, eds. Barry R. Weingast, and Donald A. Wittman. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 312-328. 
Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds. 1999. Democracy, Ac-
countability, and Representation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Przeworski, Adam, et al. 2000. Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and 
Well-Being in the World, 1950 - 1990. Cambridge, UK: Press Syndicate of the 
 References 354 
 
University of Cambridge. 
Public Expenditure Framework Assessment Secretariat. 2011. The Public Expenditure 
and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Framework. Revised second version. 
Washington D.C.: PEFA. http://www.pefa.org/en/content/pefa-framework-
material-1 (Last Accessed October 23, 2012).    
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Puttick, George, Sandy van Esch, and Suresh Kana. 2007. The Principles and Practice 
of Auditing: Ninth Edition. Cape Town: Juta & Co. Ltd.   
Queyranne, Maximilien, and Delphine Moretti.2012. Public Prominence and “Muscle” 
— the Role of the French Court of Accounts. IMF Public Financial Management 
Blog. September 28, 2012. http://blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2012/09/public-
prominence-and-muscle-the-role-of-the-french-court-of-accounts.html (Last 
Accessed on November 01, 2012) 
Ragin, C.C. 1987. The Comparative Method. Berkely: University of California Press.  
Rajan, Raghuram, and Arvind Subramanian. 2007. “Does Aid Affect Governance?” 
American Economic Review 97(2): 322-327. 
Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. 2002. Democracies at War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.  
Rhodes, R.A.W., Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman (eds.) 2006. The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rios-Figueroa, J. and J. Staton. 2008. Unpacking the Rule of Law: A Review of Judicial 
Independence Measures. Committee on Concepts and Measures Working Paper 
Series, International Political Science Association. 
Robinson, Mark, ed. 2008. Budgeting for the Poor. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmil-
lan. 
Rouse, Joseph. 1996. Engaging Science. How to understand its Practices Philosophi-
cally. New York: Cornell University Press. 
Sachs, Jeffrey, 2005. The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for our Time. N.Y.: 
Penguin Press.  
Sachs, Jeffrey, 2008. Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet. London: Al-
len Lane. 
Santiso, Carlos. 2006. “Banking on Accountability? Strengthening Budget Oversight 
and Public Sector Auditing in Emerging Economies” Public Budgeting and Fi-
nance 26(2): 66-100. 
———. 2009. The Political Economy of Government Auditing. Financial Governance 
 References 355 
 
and the Rule of Law in Latin America and Beyond. London: Routlegde. 
Schedler, Andreas (ed.) 2006. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree 
Competition. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.  
Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Platter. 1999. The Self-Restraining 
State. Power and Accountability in New Democracies. London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers.  
Schein, E.H. 1996. “Kurt Lewin’s Change Theory in the Field and in the Classroom: 
Notes toward a Model of Managed Learning.” Systems Practice 9:27-47. 
Schelling, Thomas C. 1971. "Dynamic Models of Segregation." Journal of Mathemati-
cal Sociology 1(2): 143-186. 
Schelker, Mark, and Reiner Eichenberger. 2003. "Starke 
Rechnungsprüfungskommissionen: Wichtiger als direkte Demokratie und 
Föderalismus? Ein erster Blick auf die Daten.“ Schweizerische Zeitschrift für 
Volkswirtschaft und Statistik 139(3): 351–373. 
———.  2007. "Independent and Competing Agencies: An Effective Way to Control 
Government.“ Public Choice 130: 79-98.  
Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore. 2007. “Strengthening Public Expenditure Management in 
Africa: Criteria, Priorities, and Sequencing” In Budgeting and Budgetary Institu-
tions, ed. Anwar Shah. Washington DC: The World Bank. 387-434. 
———. 2009. “Potemkin Villages: “The” Medium-Term Expenditure Framework in 
Developing Countries.” Public Budgeting and Finance 29(2): 1–26. 
Schick, Allen. 1998. A Contemporary Approach to Public Expenditure Management. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
———. 2002. ‘‘Can National Legislatures Regain an Effective Voice in Budget Poli-
cy?’’ OECD Journal on Budgeting 1 (3): 15–42. 
———. 2009. Evolutions in budgetary practice. Allen Schick and the OECD Senior 
Budget Officials. Paris: OECD. 
Schumpeter, Alois. 1946. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper 
1946. 
Seabright, Paul. 1996. “Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incom-
plete Contracts Model.” European Economic Review 40(1):61-89. 
Seymour, D., and J. Pincus. 2008. Human Rights and Economics: the Conceptual Basis 
for their Complementarities. Development Policy Review 26: 387–405. 
Shah, Anwar. 2007a Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption. Washing-
ton: World Bank. 
 References 356 
 
———. 2007b Budgeting and Budgetary Institutions. Washington: World Bank. 
Siebold, Thomas. 2005. Participation in PRS Processes – A Review of the International 
Debate. University of Duisburg-Essen: Institute for Development and Peace 
(INEF). 
Simson, Rebecca, Natasha Sharma, and Imran Aziz. 2011. A Guide To Public Financial 
Management Literature – For Practitioners in Developing Countries. London: 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7542.pdf (Last Accessed October 23, 
2012) 
Sklar, Richard. 1987. “Developmental Democracy.“ Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 29(4): 686-714 
Snider, Jack. 2010. “The State and Violence.” In Perspectives on Politics 8(1): 287-289. 
Sok, Saravuth. 2012. PFM Reform in Cambodia: Towards Performance Measurement. 
Presented at 26
th
 Annual International Consortium of Governmental Financial 
Management (ICGFM) Conference, Miami. 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/91545449/PFM-Reform-in-Cambodia-Towards-
Performance-Management (Last Accessed on October 5, 2012) 
Songco, D. 2001. Accountability for the Poor: Experiences in Civic Engagement in 
Public Expenditure management. Washington, DC: The World Bank 
Spiller, Pablo T., and Mariano Tommasi. 2007. The Institutional Foundations of Public 
Policy in Argentina. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Stapenhurst, Rick, et al., eds. 2008. Legislative Oversight and Budgeting. A World Per-
spective. Washington: World Bank. 
Stapenhurst, Rick, and Jack Titsworth, 2006. “Parliament and Supreme Audit Institu-
tions.” In The Role of Parliament in Curbing Corruption. (eds.) Rick 
Stapenhurst, Niall Johnston, and Riccardo Pelizzo. Washington D.C.: World 
Bank, WBI Development Studies, 101-110. 
http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-
acquia/wbi/The%20Role%20of%20Parliment%20in%20Curbing%20Corruption
.pdf (Last Accessed on November 05, 2012) 
Stacy, Helen. 2009. Human Rights for the 21st Century. Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press. 
Steger, Gerhard. 2012. Making Public Finance Management Systems gender responsive: 
The GRB Experience in Austria. Paper prepared for the Interactive Expert Panel: 
Review theme: Evaluation of progress in the implementation of the agreed 
conclusions of CSW 52 on "Financing for gender equality and the empowerment of 
women“. Panel 3: National experiences in implementing the agreed conclusions of 
CSW 52. United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. Fifty-sixth session. 
27 February – 9 March 2012, New York.  
 References 357 
 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw56/panels/panel3-Gerhard-Steger.pdf 
(Last Accessed on October 31, 2012) 
Stein, Ernesto, Ernesto Talvi, and Alejandro Grisanti. 1998. Institutional Arrangements 
and Fiscal Performance: The Latin American Experience. Washington, DC: 
IDB OCE Working Paper 367. 
Swidler, Ann. 1986. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. American Sociological 
Review 51 (2):273-286.  
Teddlie, Charles, and Abbas Tashakkori. 2009. Foundations of Mixed Methods Re-
search: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
Teorell, Jan, Marcus Samanni, Nicholas Charron, Sören Holmberg, and Bo Rothstein. 
2010. The Quality of Government Dataset, version 27May10. University of 
Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute. http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
(Last Accessed September, 2011)  
Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992. Cambridge 
MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
Toinet, Marie-France. 1989. "La Continuité Institutionnelle Où Le Reaganism 
Centralisateur." Révue Francaise de Science Politique 39(4): 456-476  
Tollison, Robert D. 1982. "Rent seeking: A Survey". Kyklos 35 (4): 575–602. 
Tomasevski, Katarina. 2005. Strengthening Pro-poor Law: Legal Enforcement of Eco-
nomic and Social Rights. Human Rights and Poverty Reduction Background Pa-
per. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI).   
Tsebelis, George. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in 
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism." British 
Journal of Political Science 25(3): 289-325. 
Ulfelder, Jay, and Michael Lustik. 2007. Modeling Transitions To and From Democra-
cy. Democratization 14(3): 351-387. 
United Nations. 2005. United Nations Convention against Corruption. Vienna: United 
Nations Office against Drugs and Crime. 
United Nations and INTOSAI. 2011. Report on the 21st UN/INTOSAI Symposium on 
Government Audit: Effective Practices of Cooperation Between SAIs and Citi-
zens to Enhance Public Accountability. Vienna, 13-15 July 2011. 
http://www.intosai.org/fileadmin/downloads/downloads/5_events/symposia/201
1/_E__21_UN_INT_SympReport.pdf (Last Accessed August 22, 2012) 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). 2007. Audit-
ing for Social Change: A Strategy for Citizen Engagement in Public Sector Ac-
countability. New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
 References 358 
 
Affairs (DESA). Report No. ST/ESA/PAD/SSER.E/75. 
http://www.unpan.org/Portals/0/60yrhistory/documents/Publications/Auditing%
20for%20Social%20Change.2007.pdf (Last Accessed on October 29, 2012) 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). 2009. People 
Matter. Civic Engagement in Public Governance. New York: United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). World Public Sector Re-
port 2008. Report No: ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/108  
United Nations Development Programme. 2004. Democracy in Latin America. New 
York: UNDP.  
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). 2011. A/RES/66/209. Promoting the Effi-
ciency, Accountability, Effectiveness and Transparency of Public Administration 
by Strengthening Supreme Audit Institutions. New York: United Nations General 
Assembly, Sixty-sixth Session, Agenda Item 21, 91
st
 Plenary Meeting, Decem-
ber 22, 2011. http://daccessddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/471/36/ 
PDF/N1147136.pdf?OpenElement (Last Accessed August 03, 2012)  
United Nations Habitat. 2004. 72 Frequently Asked Questions about Participatory 
Budgeting. Urban Governance Toolkit Series. Nairobi: UN-HABITAT. 
Unsworth, Sue. 2009. “What’s politics got to do with it? Why donors find it so hard to 
come to terms with politics, and why this matters.” Journal of International De-
velopment 21: 883–894. 
van den Berg, J. 1999. Verantwoorden of Vertrekken: Een Essay over Politieke 
Verantwoordelijkheid. The Hague: VNG uitgerevij. 
van Zyl, Albert, Vivek Ramkumar, and Paolo de Renzio. 2009. Responding to Chal-
lenges of Supreme Audit Institutions: Can Legislatures and Civil Society Help? 
Bergen, Norway: Christian Michelsen Institute, U4 Issue 2009:1. 
von Hagen, Jürgen. 2006. “Political Economy of Fiscal Institutions.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Economy, eds. Barry R. Weingast, and Donald A. 
Wittman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 464-478. 
———. 2007. “Budgeting Institutions for Better Fiscal Performance.” In Budgeting and 
Budgetary Institutions, ed. Anwar Shah. Washington DC: The World Bank. 27-
52. 
von Hagen, Jürgen, and Ian J. Harden. 1995. “Budget Processes and Commitment to 
Fiscal Discipline.” European Economic Review 39(3): 771-79. 
Waglé, Swarnim, and Parmesh Shah. 2001. An Issue Paper on Participation in Public 
Expenditure Systems. Washington, DC: the World Bank. 
Wang, Vibeke, and Lise Rakner. 2005. The Accountability Function of Supreme Audit 
Institutions in Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania. Bergen, Norway: Christian 
 References 359 
 
Michelsen Institute, R2005:4.  
Weber, Max. 1954. “The Economic System and the Normative Orders.” Law in Econo-
my and Society, ed. Max Rheinstein. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
11-40. 
Wehner, Joachim. 2010. Legislatures and the Budget Process: The Myth of Fiscal Con-
trol. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
———. 2006 “'Assessing the Power of the Purse: An Index of Legislative Budget Insti-
tutions.” Political Studies 54(4): 767–785. 
Wehner, Joachim, and Paolo de Renzio. 2012. “Citizens, Legislators, and Executive 
Disclosure: The Political Determinants of Fiscal Transparency.” World Devel-
opment (forthcoming). 
Weingast, B. (1997). “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” 
American Political Science Review 91: 245–263. 
———. 2002. “Rational Choice Institutionalism.” In Political Science. State of the 
Discipline. (Eds)  Katznelson/Milner. New York: Norton, 660-693. 
Wenger, Etienne. 1998. Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning and Identity. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Wenger, Etienne, and William M. Snyder. 2000. Communities of practice: the organiza-
tional frontier. Harvard Business Review 78 (1):139-145. 
Weingast, Barry R. 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of 
Law." The American Political Science Review 91 (2):245-263.  
———. 2005. Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to Democratic Stabil-
ity In America's First Century. Stanford: Stanford University.  
Wildavsky, Aaron. 1964. The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Toronto: Little, Brown 
and Co. 
Wildavsky, Aaron B., and Naomi Caiden. 2004. The New Politics of the Budgetary 
Process. New York: Pearson/Longman. 
Woodruff, C. 2006. “Measuring Institutions.” In International Handbook on the Eco-
nomics of Corruption. Ed. S.R. Ackermann. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
World Bank. 1997. World Development Report: The State in a Changing World. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2001. Features and Functions of Supreme Audit Institutions. Washington, DC: 
The World Bank. PREM Notes Public Sector, October 2001, Number 59. 
———. 2005. Tanzania. Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) 
Accounting and Auditing. Washington D.C.: World Bank. Report No. 35188.  
 References 360 
 
———. 2010. Public Financial Management Reform in the Middle East and North Af-
rica: An Overview of Regional Experience. Washington, World Bank, Report 
No. 55061-MNA. 
Wynne, Andy. 2011. "The General State Inspectorate – Independent or Under the Exec-
utive – How Does It Compare With The Court Of Accounts in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica?“ International Journal of Governmental Financial Management 11(1):93-
130. 
Young, Iris Marion. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Curriculum Vitae 361 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
I was born as Katharina Scheba in October 1977 in Linz/Austria. In 1996 I finished the 
Matura at the BRG/Europagymnasium Linz-Auhof with Merits and went for a year 
abroad to do voluntary social work in New Zealand and Australia before starting Uni-
versity studies. I then earned the following academic degrees:  
1997-2000: Bachelor of Arts (Second Class Honors-Division One) in Development 
Studies from the School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich 
(UK). Between July 1999 and February 2000 I studied at the Université de Dschang, 
Cameroon and conducted field research for my thesis on “The role of the Performing 
Arts in Development: a case study from Cameroon”, for which I received Highest Mer-
its (UK marking system 77%). 
2000-2002: Master of Advanced Studies (with Highest Merits) in Cultural Management 
from the Institute of Cultural Management and Cultural Science (IKM), University of 
Music and Performing Arts, Vienna (AT). I also received Highest Merits for my thesis 
on “Arts and Socio-Cultural Activities by the African Diaspora in Vienna.” 
Since March 2007 I have been studying part-time for the Doctorate of Philosophy at the 
Department of Political Science, University of Vienna. For my doctoral research I was 
awarded the University of Vienna Research Grant (2009), the Stanford University 
Graduate Student Exchange Grant (Nov. 2009) as well as several travel grants for short 
term study visits abroad such as to conduct preliminary research in England (June 
2009), to participate in the ECPR Summer School on Methods and Techniques, 
Ljubljana (August 2010) and to present my research at the ECPR Graduate Student 
Conference, Dublin (Sept. 2010) and at the Annual ICGFM Conference, Miami (May 
2012). I was also awarded the Marietta Blau Scholarship of the Austrian Ministry of 
Science and Research (2010), which I finally had to reject for private reasons. During 
the summer term of 2012 I held the reading seminar (BA) "Theory and Empiricism of 
International Politics". The focus of this course was to provide an introduction to inter-
national politics with a focus on international security and development politics. I am a 
member of the Austrian Political Science Association and the Academic Council of the 
United Nations System.  
The common issue linking my various academic and professional experiences is my 
passion for EMPOWERMENT. Between 1999 and 2003 I conducted research on and 
worked with African artists and migrant groups in their strife for empowerment and 
socio-political change. Between 2001 and 2011 (since 2008 only on a freelancer basis) I 
worked for LIGHT FOR THE WORLD, a European Consortium of Non-Governmental 
Development Organizations specialized in promoting the inclusion of persons with dis-
abilities in development cooperation. My interest in public finance accountability was 
sparked during the experiences I gained as project coordinator of a large pilot advocacy 
project which took place between 2005 and 2011 in Tanzania. I have earned the profes-
sional title of Project Management Professional (PMP®) in July 2012, when I was for-
mally evaluated for demonstrated project management experience, knowledge and per-
formance by the Project Management Institute (PMI®), Philadelphia, USA.    
I am also a proud mother of three boys (born in 2003, 2004 and 2008) and speak and 
write the following languages: German (mother tongue), English (proficient), French 
(very good), Italian (mediate), Russian (basic), Spanish (rudimentary).   
 Abstract (English) 362 
 
Abstract (English) 
This dissertation investigates the topical question how public accountability is effective-
ly institutionalized. In order to solve this overall research puzzle I examine as a case 
study Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) world-wide. How do they strengthen their in-
dependence and protect themselves against outside influence? 
The research design of this project applies a mixed-methods approach to research con-
sisting of four main parts: First, I justify the case study through preliminary expert inter-
views, a literature review and a content analysis of the International Standards of Supreme 
Audit Institutions. A cross-national assessment of SAIs based on data from four surveys 
then leads to the specific research question: Why does citizen-focused, independent, exter-
nal public auditing thrive in some countries and fail in others?  
In the second part of this doctoral thesis I develop the argument and test it through 
econometric analyses. In the third section I study the practice of reform through 17 semi-
structured expert interviews with heads of SAIs. Finally I triangulate the various research 
findings into a common discussion and draw my final inferences. 
I show that while the institutional arrangements for government auditing, the nature of the 
source of national income, the external influence on reform, the local demand for public 
accountability and the technical and organizational capacities of SAIs matter; the political 
economy of inter-elite relations and the existence of leadership commitment by the head of 
the SAI ultimately explain the success or failure of reform initiatives. I close by suggesting 
five practical strategies for strengthening powerful accountability arrangements that endure. 
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Abstract (Deutsch) 
Diese Dissertation behandelt die höchst aktuelle Frage wie öffentliche Rechenschaft 
wirksam institutionalisiert wird. Um dieses übergeordnete Forschungspuzzle zu lösen, 
untersuche ich als Fallstudie Oberste Rechnungskontrollbehörden (ORKB), wie staat-
liche Audit Behörden und Rechnungshöfe, weltweit. Wie stärken diese ihre Unabhängigkeit 
und wie schützen sie sich vor externer Einflussnahme? 
Dieses Projekt wendet einen gemischten Methodenansatz an und umfasst vier Teile. 
Zuerst rechtfertige ich die Eignung von ORKB als Fallstudie anhand einführender Ex-
perteninterviews, einer Literaturstudie und einer Inhaltsanalyse der Internationalen 
Standards Oberster Rechnungskontrollbehörden. Eine ländervergleichende Untersu-
chung von ORKB basierend auf Daten von vier Umfragen führt dann zu meiner spezifi-
schen Forschungsfrage: Warum gedeiht bürgerorientiertes, unabhängiges, externes öf-
fentliches Auditing in manchen Ländern und scheitert in anderen? 
Im zweiten Teil dieser Doktorarbeit entwickle ich die Argumentation und teste diese 
durch ökonometrische Analysen. Im dritten Abschnitt untersuche ich die Reformpraxis 
mittels 17 semi-strukturierter Experteninterviews mit Leitern von ORKB. Schließlich brin-
ge ich die einzelnen Forschungsergebnisse in einer Gesamtdiskussion zusammen und 
ziehe ich Schlussfolgerungen. 
Ich zeige, dass obwohl die institutionellen Gegebenheiten, die Ursprungsart der öffent-
lichen Einnahmen, der externe Einfluss auf Reformen, die lokale Nachfrage nach öf-
fentlicher Rechenschaft und die technischen und organisatorischen Kapazitäten von 
ORKB von Bedeutung sind; die politische Öknomie der Beziehungen zwischen den 
Elitengruppen und das Vorhandensein von Leadership durch die ORKB Leitung letzt-
lich den Erfolg oder das Scheitern von Reforminitiativen erklären. Zum Schluss schlage 
ich fünf Strategien zur Stärkung von mächtigen Rechenschaftsarrangements, welche 
sich nachhaltig behaupten können, vor. 
 
